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Preface 
THIS STUDY BEGAN and begins as an account of land settlement by 
Europeans and of the vicissitudes of expatriate plantation agriculture in 
British New Guinea and Papua between 1 884 and 1 942 . It became and 
becomes at the same time a narrative of the settler experience and a 
prolonged meditation upon the moral difficulties that surrounded and 
surround the Western intrusion. Nearly a fifth of the work - Part I - is 
taken up with early attempts and failure before 1 907 to attract the white 
agricultural 'pioneers' believed vital if the country was to 'develop' and pay 
its way. Part II examines the formation of an Australian federal policy for a 
'new' territory thought to be of great economic value. The international 
plantation boom of the decade before 1 9 1 4  did bring a considerable 
investment and a few hundred settlers with high expectations. Part III deals 
with conflict between the administration of Judge J .H.P. (later Sir Hubert) 
Murray and the planters over the course of development and the place of 
the Papuan people in the colonial economy. In Part N a series of crises and 
disappointments force settlers to reassess their position and reach a kind 
of accord with the Papuan Government in the period 1 92 1 -26 . Part V deals 
with the remaining history of the plantation industries. Part VI is an 
account of the culture and life of the settler community and an assessment 
of relations on the plantations between European management and Papuan 
workers . Part VII contains conclusions of various kinds. 
I was aware as I wrote that the preparatory chapters collectively seemed 
to be acquiring a dimension out of proportion to the whole. I wish that it 
was possible to get to the heart of the matter sooner but the chapters that 
make up Parts I and II are nonetheless important groundwork for what 
follows. As with several other works that treat aspects of the history of 
British New Guinea and Papua chronologically, the reader will fmd a 
quickening of activity and consequently, I suppose, increasing interest in 
the subject begtnning with developments that occur in 1 905 , and a 
slackening of activity and of interest for the observer after 1 930. This is 
how it was for the participants in that history themselves and it is reflected 
in the records they have left. There is a long prelude in which progress is 
negligible, a period of frenetic activity, a succession · of struggles, 
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denouement and a gradual reassessment. The residue of all the effort 
expended before 1 942 survived to grow, flourish and wilt again in another 
age itself now closed or closing. 
The account that follows could not have been written without the 
willingness of some old settlers to recollect their lives in Papua and to 
respond to questions that were sometimes painful to answer. I gratefully 
acknowledge a very large debt to these people, some now dead, and to 
others included here who advised or assisted me in a period of more than a 
decade: in Sydney, Mrs Winifred Loudon and Mrs Judy Davidson, Kris 
Klugman, B. E. Fairfax-Ross, Colin Sefton, Mrs Haidee Champion, 
Commander J. F. Horn, Mr and Mrs Guy Cadden; in Port Moresby, Evan 
Cleland, Neal Nicklason, Ausa Songoro, Sir Ebia Olewale, and Kevin Green 
and Moeka Helai then of the National Archives of Papua New Guinea; at 
Sogeri, Mr and Mrs A. Lisle Johnston; at Popondetta, Mr and Mrs Clendyn 
Searle of Awala; at Samarai and Alotau, Fred Craig, Ernie Evenett and 
Keith Gribben; at Galley Reach, George Sariman and Charlie and Joe Arua; 
at Kanosia, Jan Brouwers; at Kemp Welch River, Owen and Mary Wardrop 
of Poligolo; at Kikori, Harry Lawson; in Brisbane, Ivan Champion, Mrs Ellen 
Bruce - 1 00 years old in 1976 - and her daughters Mrs Loma Jenkins and 
Mrs Joan Ru-Desille, and J. W. Lukin of Palm Beach; in Melbourne, Sir 
John Bloomfield, Major General R. R. McNicoll and Mrs Ellen Hall; in 
Canberra, Mrs Penelope Hope, Captain Edmund Clay, Lorraine McKnight of 
the Commonwealth Archives Office then still at Parkes, Mrs 'Peter' Kinsman 
of the ANU Archives of Business and Labour, the members of the 
Department of Pacific and South East Asian History in the Research School 
of Pacific Studies of the Australian National University - Robyn Savory who 
typed the first chapters, Gavan Daws, Niel Gunson, Bob Langdon, and for a 
time, Peter Carris. Michael Stenson, a visitor in 1 976 , gave me advice at a 
critical moment. In Papua New Guinea in 1 988 I was assisted with the 
developments outlined in the Postscript by Yogi Srikhanta, Financial 
Controller in Port Moresby for S. A. Sipef N. V. of Antwerp, new owners of 
the old British New Guinea Development Company. The study as presented 
here is a revised version of a thesis in Pacific History submitted in the 
Australian National University. My supervisors in tum were Francis West, 
Stewart Firth and Hank Nelson. I thank each of them. While much of the 
work was written with Professor Nelson's eye in mind he cannot be held 
accountable for its defects. In the revision I was grateful for criticism of the 
original thesis from Bill Gammage, Colin Newbury, and Colin Barlow, and 
for corrections of detail from Eileen and Ted Johnston, and Wallace and 
Robyn Kienzle. If I have persisted in error, the blame is mine. I have 
acknowledged in a dedication my continuing debt to three mentors now 
dead whose contending ethics stimulated me as a young man and caused 
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me to hesitate in judgement countless times since. It remains to thank the 
Australian National University for the research scholarship that allowed me 
to undertake this study, the members of the Editorial Board of The Journal 
of Pacifl.c History for accepting the work for publication, the JPH's Executive 
Editor, Jenny Terrell, for her advice and her skills in preparing the work for 
the printer, and Gillian Boulton-Lewis and our children for their 
forbearance. 
As a Cadet Education Officer fresh from the Australian School of Pacific 
Administration in Januruy 1 960 I first saw tropical verdure and tropical 
plantations when I was by good fortune posted to Karkar Island in the 
Madang District of what had been in 1 942 the Mandated Territory of New 
Guinea. This large volcanic island was the richest concentration of lowland 
plantation agriculture in the country outside the Gazelle Peninsula of New 
Britain, with thirteen 'expatriate' and mission owned estates, and 
innumerable villager smallholdings of coconuts and cocoa. Portions of 
several Karkar estates had been planted by German settlers between 1 9 1 1 
and their expropriation in 1 92 1 .  The routines of plantation life were 
observable daily. Large numbers of contract labourers from the Highlands 
districts supplemented by settled communities of mostly Mumeng and 
Sepik workers lived in the labour lines. There was an occasional 
disturbance of the peace. The plantation managers and assistants led 
enviable lives and there were several pronounced eccentrics among them. 
The plantation system seemed timeless and immutable like the Australian 
administration itself. The plantations were, in fact, just then at the very 
zenith of their trajectory, enjoying an unprecedented prosperity that was 
soon to decline as the national independence of Papua New Guinea 
approached. The history that follows deals with plantations in quite 
another region of Papua New Guinea and in another age but it rests on the 
remembered familiarities and indelible impressions left by that encounter 
with plantation life near Madang thirty-five years ago. 
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Note on Weights, Measures and Currency 
Imperial weights and measures are used throughout. A conversion table ls provided 
below. Since lnflatlon of currencies has obviously taken place since the beginning of the 
century even as general wealth and income have risen it is difficult to establish standards 
of comparison by which we now can have some idea of what the value and purchasing 
power of money was then. A salary of £250 a year provided a sparse but adequate living 
for a plantation manager in 1 9 1 4  but a very meagre one by 192 1 .  As a rough measure to 
obtain the equivalent in 1995 Australian Dollars we might multiply such a figure by a 
factor of twenty. By this calculation the salary of the Lieutenant Governor of Papua, 
£1 ,800 in 1922, would now be about $36,000, hardly a very large income, but the £11h 
million invested in commercial agriculture in Papua during the boom years would be 
equivalent to $30 million, the investment of £200,000 by Sir Rupert Clarke and R. S. 
Whiting alone worth $4 million today, the minimum £6 a year paid to indentured Papuan 
labourers at the end of their contract would have the purchasing power of about $ 1 20, 
the minimum annual cost of a labourer to an employer in wages, food, and fees, $424. 
Imperial 
1 pound (weight) 
Metric 
.4536 kilogram 
50.8 kilograms 
1.0 1 6  tonnes 
1 hundredweight ( 1 12 pounds) 
1 ton (2240 pounds weight) 
1 mile 
1 acre 
1 .  609 kilometres 
. 405 hectare 
There were twenty shillings (20s. ) in a Pound (£1 )  whether Sterling (Stg) or Australian 
(Aust). £ l (Stg) was exchanged for twenty-five shillings - or £ 1 .  5s. (Aust) over much of the 
period under review. There were twelve pence ( 12d. ) in a shilling ( ls. ) and 240 pence in 
£ 1 .  In 1966 each £1 (Aust) became valued at $2 (Aust). 
Glossary 
boss-boy foreman (New Guinea Pidgin) 
dlmdlm white man (Suau & Eastern Papua) 
dohorl presently, ·wait a while' (Motu, Central DiVtsion) 
dubu ceremonial platform, church (Motu) 
gavamanl the government, an officer (Motu, from English) 
kampong village (Malay) 
kangany foreman (Tamil) 
lagatol large double hulled canoe (Motu) 
maganl wallaby I wallabta agllts I (Motu) 
mml calico wrap, loin cloth (Mo tu) 
ro.uf ceremonial house, temple (Namau, Gulf Division) 
slnabada mistress, white woman (Motu: lit. big mother) 
taubada master, white man (Motu: lit. big man) 
vanagl outrigger canoe (Mo tu) 
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I ntroduction 
. . .  the pioneering spirit of  man, a spirit which may have destroyed 
much as well as created, have caused misery as well as happiness, 
but to which human civilisation is largely indebted and which we 
cannot condemn unless we condemn civilisation itself. 
E. M. W. Tillyard, MUton, Chatto and Windus, 1930. 
The retrospect on modem imperialism presents special problems to 
western critics living within or on the periphery of an intellectual 
environment where the old colonial lore has the power to elicit 
nostalgia for the horizons empire once spanned and lost, the 
passing of the privileged life of service and romance is still regretted 
and new legends legitimising past exploits and contemporary neo­
imperialist interventions are being newly devised. 
Benita Parry, Conrod and Imperialism, Macmillan, 1983. 

I ntroduction 
THERE CAN BE little posthumous meeting of  minds between the white planter 
of the first quarter of this century and the Melanesian nationalist of the last. 
To those for whom the European intrusion was essentially a violation, that a 
settler should have extracted something like a 'Western' standard of living 
from the labour of Papua New Guineans in Papua New Guinea may appear the 
taking of an immoral advantage of a defenceless people. In the larger world, 
plantations stand generally accused of being mere enclaves of the economies 
of the occupying powers set up to utilise the resources and effort of others, 
while contributing little to any improvement in their comfort, and at the 
additional cost of their liberty. Through the unimpeded expatriation of profits, 
it is said, the operation of these enclaves prevented capital accumulation in 
the colonies, stranding them in a condition of permanent dependency or 
'underdevelopment' with the result that the 'independence' that was fmally 
achieved by former colonised states is a sham, a mask for 'neo-colonialism', 
a clever system in which economic manipulation continues through duped 
and compromised national elites. And not only does the plantation system 
stand accused of being the most extreme form of predatory exploitation 
undertaken by the Western imperialists but it is widely assumed that during 
the colonial period it must also have been highly profitable, whatever they say, 
for the planters in particular, and that in the scale of exploiters these settlers 
represent an especially pernicious class. 
I am not equipped to respond to this analysis, although I can feel its power, 
except by weighing it against the settler experience in Papua. While, taking the 
long view, much of the above critique may be sustainable as one perspective, 
a closer examination of the content and context of their experience certainly 
permits an alternative representation of the settlers, their character and 
conduct. Of the character of the settlers I shall have much to say throughout 
the work, but of their part in a 'general crime', if crime there was, it can be 
said of the Europeans who made their home in Papua as planters in the 
period under review that they at least profited little from their opportunity, 
being themselves dupes of excessive expectations and delusions they shared 
with those who had encouraged them to settle there. They are among the 
peripheral casualties of the political, economic and cultural transformations 
of this century. 
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Indeed, as they failed to prosper it did not take long for planters to come 
to believe that they had been used and betrayed by the real 'colonisers', the 
metropolitan politicians, manufacturers and merchants who had promoted 
settlement in the first place. And it is clear that at least in the period 1 905-
1 9 1 4  Australian federal ministries, having resolved on a policy for the 
development of the 'first grandchild of the Empire'1 based on the rapid 
establishment of plantation industries, were determined to attract such 
settlers. For, despite the offer of very generous conditions, scarcely any 
planting 'pioneers' at all had been persuaded to come to the country in the 
previous twenty years of European dominion on the coast of southeast New 
Guinea. Without 'development' from which a revenue could be raised British 
New Guinea had 'stood still'. The 'new' Papua, it seemed, had to be developed. 
If in the end the rush that followed the passage of the Papua Act of 1 905 was 
partly the by-product of an international boom in tropical agriculture that 
quite fortuitously occurred at the time, it was also a response to urgent 
government promotional propaganda. 
No one in 1 905 or 1 9 14 could have envisaged the world of 1 9 1 9  or 1 929,  
much less that of 1 975 or 1 995 . The European intervention in Papua had 
seemed then - to those wishing the Papuans well as much as to those who 
cared only for profit - finally unavoidable, the settlers indispensable, the kind 
of economy they brought the only one they could have brought. And 
transactions between such settlers and the Papuans at the time could never 
have been equal. I cannot therefore assert that planters and plantations did 
not attempt to exploit Papua and Papuans in the sense described above. I can 
demonstrate that at the time quite rational men, and not always out of self­
interest, saw the situation differently. I am not sure that planters and 
plantations were then wrong to be there. That was just how the world was 
going to be for a time. 
Undoubtedly the Papuan planters of the first decade of this century, like 
white settlers everywhere, were opportunists on one front of the progress of 
triumphant Western industrial civilisation - a civilisation underpinned by 
unparalleled advances in the exact sciences that had institutionalised the 
seizure and exploitation of economic and technical advantage. Undoubtedly 
the development of colonial plantations allowed the rapid expansion of 
production of desired commodities for European or North American 
consumption at greatly decreased cost. Undoubtedly, also, the power that the 
industrial states could bring to bear, moderated only by their own imperfectly 
The phrase was Beatrice Grimshaw's in her Papua the Maroellous: The cowztry of 
chances (Melbourne 1 909), 5.  See below p. 70. It was used in the title of a small book, 
Papua: � Grandchild of the Empire' by Gordon Inglis published in 1 9 1 2 .  This was a 
collection of articles on Papua written for The Field. 
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applied moral and legal systems, to impose and maintain the conditions in the 
plantation colonies that were optimum for production was unprecedented. But 
consumption in the West, if profligate, was not insatiable. So intense did the 
international competition and efficient the production of tropical commodities 
become by the 1 920s that the profits of the planting industries were bound to 
decline just as prices to consumers declined. The expectations of an unlimited 
market held at the outset by settlers and investors in tropical plantations were 
to prove largely false even as the metropolitan societies at large benefited in 
cheap commodity imports. If excessive planting and overproduction in the 
rival mercantile empires were inevitable, no one could have predicted the 
consequent reduction in profitability exacerbated by the immense blow to 
wealth, trade and economic growth dealt the Europeans by their self­
destructive war of 1 9 1 4- 1 8. There would be no bargaining . power left for 
coloured labour and little for white capital in the plantation colonies locked 
into the straitened international economic order of the 1 920s and 1 930s. 
The conditions whereby white men, whether as individual settlers or as 
employees , could come to tropical territories to work land and secure the 
service of indentured labourers, who were not white, at a cost in wages, 
issues, provisions and charges that amounted per head, as in the case of 
Papua in 1 926, to perhaps one twentieth of the cost of a white overseer, a 
twenty-fifth the cost of an employed manager, or a tenth the cost of an 
unskilled labourer in metropolitan countries, were thus determined not by the 
settler but by the reach of European power before 1 9 1 4  and by the terms of 
trade that developed between low wage colonies and high wage industrial 
states.2 After a time these conditions ensured that prices of plantation 
products everywhere were held close to the costs of production in those 
colonial territories where costs were lowest. Whether by 'good fortune' in being 
first in attracting capital, or whether by reasons of climate, soil and an 
abundance of available land and labour, however secured, some colonies 
became pace-setters in the production of vegetable oils and fibres, rubber, 
spices, sugar, tea, coffee and cocoa. Ceylon and Malaya, the Philippines,  Java 
and Sumatra, the Gold and Ivory Coasts were among these jewels of empire 
in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Benefiting from 
economies of scale and infrastructure and the higher prices that obtained in 
the early days of greatest advantage these more successful producers 
dominated the markets driving prices down until the industries of their 
competitive rivals elsewhere in the colonial world could not survive without 
the intercession of anxious governments whose revenues all depended upon 
the export of tropical commodities. Colonial economies on the margins - and 
See Chapter 1 1. pp. 1 45-6. 
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Papua was to find itself among them - were the last to benefit from rises in 
prices and the first to falter as prices fell below costs. 
Planters and Papuans 
This history in recording the attempt to develop Papua through the 
establishment of plantation industries is also an account of the white 
colonists3 or settlers that came to southeast New Guinea between 1 884 and 
1 942, of the expectations they brought and of the difficulties they experienced 
as individuals and as a group. The foreigners, men and women, who settled 
in British New Guinea and Papua number only a few hundred and most are 
known and identifiable by name. With these Australians, Englishmen, 
Scotsmen, Irishmen and others - planters, settlers, men and women - I found 
it difficult, as I proceeded, not to have a deepening sympathy. The intense 
relationship with his or her subject matter and a close association with a 
group of people from whom he or she may feel initially quite alien in 
temperament and outlook has probably led before to an enhancement of 
understanding in a researcher that makes it difficult for him, or her, to 
condemn easily. The researcher might well come to feel as Margery Perham 
felt in Kenya in 1 930 that 
I think I now understand the 'immigrant community'. To own a bit of this lovely 
country, to make a house . . . to have a share in this thrilling sunlight; to have 
cheap, apparently reverential, impersonal labour; to feel the sense of singularity, of 
enhanced personality that comes from having a white skin among dark millions . 
. . You feel there is a future to be made and that your head and hands will count 
in the laying of its foundations. 4 
With hindsight, we know what the outcomes were for these people and how 
their world and work have been eclipsed by changes in political and economic 
reality and in social and racial attitudes. Of that other eclipse, the profound 
interruption to a cultural continuum, the unwelcome challenge to a secure 
sense of identity and the new imperative to redefine themselves that for 
Melanesian societies attended white settlement, and of the experience of 
individual Papuans, others will write. The 'colonised' emerge in the work that 
follows almost wholly in relation to the intruders - as enumerated servants or 
labourers, prisoners or witnesses, as friends only in a very restricted sense, 
or as enemies - all but a few, it might seem, mutely compliant in the 
The terms 'colony' and 'colonists' were seldom used in Papua to describe the country 
or its European settlers. By 1 90 1 ,  seeing themselves as a new nation of improved 'British 
stock', Australians had come to resent the term 'colonial' when used to describe themselves. 
If Australia in New Guinea could not fail to be influenced by British administrative practice, 
Papua was nonetheless described as a Territory of the Commonwealth, the implied parallels 
being the 'Territories' of the United States, potential states of the Union, rather than the 
British Crown Colonies. Those who settled in 'territories' were 'pioneers' and 'settlers'. 
4 Margery Perham, Eastf1{rlcan Journey (London 1976), 1 90.  
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plantation encounter. Defiance we shall fmd in fact was hardly infrequent. For 
while the interaction between planter and plantation worker could not be 
equal, the workers were not entirely powerless nor employers invariably 
insensitive or indeed always 'in control' . The villager contracted to work far 
from his home found the experience at once exciting and threatening, both 
intimidating and liberating. It was clearly not without either its rewards or a 
large measure of physical security. Yet it must surely also have been deeply 
humiliating, the disparities in power, material culture and organisation 
between Papuans and the newcomers bound for a time to create or confirm 
notions of inferiority on the one side and superiority on the other. Among the 
Europeans, certainly, few if any before 1 9 1 4  or indeed before 1 945 , however 
humanitarian, could admit a confident belief in the complete equality ofnon­
Europeans with themselves. 
What follows is also a study of conflict - between the desire of the 
metropolitan power to profit from its dependency and the desire to be seen by 
others and history to have dealt justly with its original inhabitants; between 
the interests, as they saw them, of the white 'Papuan' settlers, and the 
interests of the 'native' Papuans and of good government as seen by the 
Papuan administration. In the twenty years from 1905 until 1925 contests to 
settle these matters were dramatically played out. Though perhaps only 
'storms in the Papuan teacup'5 in a wider context, especially between 1 9 14 
and 1 922 what seemed at the time to the antagonists a titanic struggle took 
place in the Papuan microcosm to decide an essential issue - to whom the 
future of Papua would belong, the 'pioneering' settlers or the indigenous 
inhabitants. In 1975 it would seem obvious that demographic reality, abstract 
morality and economic expediency could have determined only one outcome 
to such a confrontation - and so it could seem at a distance even in 1 9 1 0  -
but settlers whose outlook had been formed in the late Victorian years 
brought to Papua assumptions about their place in the world and the place 
of non-Europeans that were not easily shaken, assumptions in conflict with 
those underpinning the 'excessive and enfeebling' humanitarianism of 
Christian missions and 'unrealistic' paternalism and legalism of 'hypocritical' 
governments. The particular bitterness of this struggle between the regtme of 
'Judge' J. H. P. (later Sir Hubert) Murray and the local and Australian 
capitalists he represented as being 'indifferent to native suffering' and wanting 
to debauch the country, had as its underlying cause the frustration of settler 
This assessment is C. D. Rowley's in his The Australians ln German New Guinea 
(Melbourne 1958), 332. He was describing the press agitation and the public meetings of 
1 920 when opposition to J. H. P. Murray's administration reached its peak. It was 'this 
storm in the Papuan teacup' - for all its clamour no more than a side-show at a time when 
the destiny of the former German New Guinea was being decided. 
· 
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hopes and the failure of the prosperity expected in 1 9 1 4  to be realised in the 
following years. These settlers and the investors in plantations all the while 
saw their difficulties as the consequence of the hostility or indifference of 
governments pursuing an extravagant native policy paid for out of their capital 
and effort. A collapse of trade in 192 1-22 at the very time when tree crops 
were coming into full production was profoundly cathartic, chastening planter 
expectations and yielding Murray the field. Thereafter as the administration 
in Port Moresby increasingly took their part in the real struggle to maintain 
both the solvency of commerce and the revenue, these settlers became 
reconciled to the political and economic constraints that operated in Papua 
just as they had come to accept that the protective legislation designed to 
secure the persons and working conditions of Papuan workers would remain 
immutable and effectively administered. 
The Setting 
Papua here comprises the southeastern quarter of the great island called by 
the white men New Guinea, and the surrounding archipelagoes. These lands 
became for a while the Protectorate and then Possession of British New 
Guinea ( 1 884- 1 906), from 1 902 placed under Australian jurisdiction and in 
1 906 renamed the Territory of Papua. Situated in north western Melanesia this 
was among the very last areas penetrated by the Europeans in the period of 
their decisive political, economic and cultural expansion that brought the 
modern world order into being. The boundaries of the new Protectorate in 
1 884, as the intruders measured them, extended from 1 4 1  to 155 degrees 
east, a distance of 930 miles, and from five to twelve degrees south, a distance 
at its maximum of 320 miles, with a total land area of over 86 ,000 square 
miles. British New Guinea was bounded on the west by the Netherlands East 
Indies dependency of West New Guinea and on the north by German New 
Guinea until 1 9 1 9  and then by the Territory of New Guinea mandated by the 
League of Nations to Australia.6 The surrounding islands included within the 
boundaries of the British claim were the D'Entrecasteaux and Trobriand 
Islands, the Louisiade Archipelago, Woodlark (Murua), and numerous smaller 
groups and isolated islands. The mainland consists broadly of four regions -
the very thinly populated and low lying region of the Trans-Fly and Fly river 
estuary in the west; a region in the centre of very heavy rainfall at the head 
of the Gulf of Papua into which flowed the Bamu, Turama, Kikori, Purari and 
Vailala rivers; a region with the ranges running parallel to the prevailing 
After 1945 the Mandated Territory of New Guinea became a Trust Territory of the 
United Nations administered by Australia and linked in an 'administrative union' with the 
Territory of Papua from 1 949. The territories were formally combined as Papua New Guinea 
with limited self-government in 1 972 becoming the Independent State of Papua New Guinea 
in September 1 975 . 
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winds and therefore in partial rain shadow along the south coast; and, to the 
north over the great unbroken chain of mountains that extend to the eastern 
tip of New Guinea, a region of extensive coastal lowlands with two areas of 
volcanic activity facing the Solomon Sea. 
The Melanesian population of the coastal communities was counted as it 
came under government control but the total for the whole country would not 
be known until after 1945. It was variously estimated at between 250,000 and 
350,000. The high valleys of the central ranges did support comparatively 
large populations but these were not visited until the 1930s and much of the 
malarial intermediate zone between these highlands and the smaller coastal 
concentrations of people had never been settled by men. During the period 
examined in this study British New Guinea and Papua in practical terms 
consisted of the southeastern littoral of New Guinea and neighbouring islands 
with an enumerated 'native' or 'Papuan' population of less than 200,000 and 
with the numbers of Europeans that settled or sojourned in the country at 
any one time never exceeding 1,500 until the second world war approached. 
These then are the setting and the scale of things for what follows: a large 
territory, much of it still to be systematically explored, inhabited by several 
hundred thousand Melanesians separated by geography, language, mutual 
unfamiliarity or hostility, and a few hundred newcomers widely dispersed and 
divided by status, occupation and motive, but well known to each other and 
in communication with the larger world. 
Foundations 
In 1956 J. D. Legge provided a reliable general account of the administration, 
economic development, and land and labour policy in Papua based on the 
indispensable Papuan Annual Reports and Australian Parliamentary Papers 
over the whole period.7 Like Dr Francis West's biography of Sir Hubert 
Murray8, Professor Legge's book could not have been expected, within the 
limits of its objectives, to have considered the settler experience in any detail. 
A large body of archival material needed examination if a more confidently 
based account of the events and controversies over economic development in 
Papua was to be made. A reading of both Legge and West suggests that 
Murray's administration from 1908 until 1940 probably achieved the best that 
could be done in a period of stagnant capitalism, Australian indifference and 
racial prejudice. In general this remains, of course, a reasonable conclusion. 
These were the texts that I began with together with Margriet Roe's early 
thesis on Southeast Papua to 19309 and Liese Baker's sub-thesis 'The 
8 
J.D. Legge, Australian Colonial Polley (Sydney 1 956). · 
Francis West, Hubert Murray: The Australian Proconsul (Melbourne 1 968). 
Margriet Roe, 'A History of South-east Papua to 1930' , PhD thesis, ANU, 1962.  
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beginning of the indentured labour system in Papua 1888- 1908' .1 0  My 
preliminary study of the conflict that developed between the then Judge 
Murray's administration and the British New Guinea Development Company 
in the period 1910-22, now reconsidered, forms the basis of Parts III and 
N.1 1  
Of  other material dealing wholly or  in part with Papua before 1942, the 
works of E. P. Wolfers1 2 and Amirah Inglis1 3 on race relations are a little too 
'unambivalent' in my view. While I believe, as I am sure they do, that the 
defence of the paramount principle of self-determination is now - if we are to 
live together in a greatly shrunken world - a moral imperative that may urge 
us to judge settler societies harshly, and I accept many of their individual 
judgements, I find myself still defending the accused. Interpreting their world 
rather than judging it is the harder task. Prevailing opinion may have changed 
but the white settlers in Papua were not evil or stupid above the norm. They 
were caught up in their milieu, time and place, as we are in ours. They saw 
themselves as pioneers and they were certainly racially prejudiced. They were 
confident that they had the right, and not merely the power, to be where they 
were and to do what they were doing. Why was this so? These people had not 
created the intellectual world in which for Europeans everywhere an 
assumption of racial superiority had then the burden of self-evident truth, or 
a world economic order that permitted and encouraged white settlement in the 
tropics. Excepting their particular offences they are not culpable. Hank 
Nelson's history of encounters between expatriate miners and Papuans comes 
nearer to adding to our understanding of the human dilemma posed by the 
collision of cultures - an exposure that illuminates without general censure 
and with an overriding humanity .14 Perhaps the present work will add a 
further perspective. 
General works of use were those by Lucy Mair1 5 and Harold Brookfield. 16 
Mair brought an experienced comparative eye and a steady ethical position to 
bear on development policies under Australian rule in both Papua and New 
Guinea, a perspective usefully maintained by Brookfield. Specialists in other 
disciplines, their work as historians has been more broad than detailed. 
George Beckford's Persistent Poverty: Underdevelopment in the Plantation 
Jo Liese Baker, 'The beginning of the indentured labour system in Papua, 1 888- 1 908', 
BA Honours thesis, ANU, 1970. 
JI D. C. Lewis, 'Labour and development in Papua: The case of the British New Guinea 
Development Company', MA Qualifying thesis, ANU, 1 973 . 
J2 E. P. Wolfers, Race relations and colonial rule in Papua New Guinea (Sydney 1975). 
J3 Amtrah Inglis, Not a white woman safe (Canberra 1 974). 
J4 Hank Nelson, Black. white and gold (Canberra 1 976). 
Js Lucy Mair, Australia in New Guinea (Melbourne 1948 and 1 970). 
J6 Harold Brookfield, Colonialism. development and independence (Cambridge 1 972). 
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Economies of the Third World17 was provocative but not, on the whole, I 
believe, relevant to Papua or to my particular enterprise. I accept that the vast 
plantation systems imposed upon the tropical world by European power in the 
last three centuries may now comprise an economic trap from which many 
societies created in the process are hard-pressed to escape. But Papua never 
became a 'pure' plantation economy and the settler plantation episode there 
and in the other Pacific territories was too brief for the burden of blame for 
'underdevelopment' to be placed upon it. Certainly some settlers had in their 
minds an ideal of what a plantation based society might be like and tested the 
constraints on its realisation. Certainly Hubert Murray, Lieutenant Governor 
1908- 1940, was soon determined that such a society would not be permitted 
to develop in Papua. 
Azeem Amarshi, Kenneth Good and Rex Mortimer in their Development and 
Dependency: The political economy of Papua New Guinea18 reach many 
conclusions that I find incontestable though it will be obvious that I also differ 
with them about much. I cannot accept their attempt to impose a scheme 
derived from Beckford and others, and in their case heavily burdened with 
ideological rhetoric , upon the Papua and New Guinea data. They imply that 
there might have been another way by which the world could have passed 
through recent centuries, one free of a phase of intervention and temporary 
domination by Europeans then and one free of inequity now. I do not believe ,  
as they seem to believe, that the government of an independent Papua New 
Guinea is essentially 'neo-colonialist' , even while I concede it cannot readily 
escape the constraints of the present international order. This is just how the 
world is for a time. 
In retrospect there does seem an inevitability in the Papuan case. Given the 
world as it had become by 1884 the European intrusion could hardly have 
been further delayed and certainly not prevented. Thereafter of fundamental 
concern to Australia only as a strategic barrier, and without any decisive 
economic advantage, southeast New Guinea never acquired more than quite 
marginal significance as a producer of tropical commodities. Nonetheless the 
great issues of colonialism and colonisation were exposed and contested there 
and in consideration of these in context might lie an interest in 'storms in the 
Papuan teacup'. 
Following the pioneering work by Legge on colonial policy in Papua, the 
biographical studies of the principal administrators by Joyce19 and West, 
1 7  George Beckford, Persistent Poverty: Underdevelopment ln Plantation Economtes of the 
Third World (New York 1 972). 
18 AzeemAmarshl, Kenneth Good and Rex Mortlmer, bevelopmentand dependency: The 
polltical economy of Papua New Guinea (Melbourne 1 979 ). 
1 9  Roger Joyce, Sir WUllam MacGregor (Melbourne 1 97 1 ). 
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Hank Nelson's work on the miners, and the studies by David Wetherell and 
Diane Langmore of the missionaries in Papua,20 the present research is 
intended to fill another large gap in our knowledge of the Papuan region of 
Papua New Guinea in the colonial period. Work remains for others in a 
complementary study of the planters of German New Guinea and the 
Mandated Territory to 1942, in a history of plantations in the combined 
territories after 1945, and for parallel studies of the experience of Papuans 
and New Guineans under indenture.21 
20 David Wetherell, Reluctant Mission: The Anglican Church ln Papua New Guinea 1 891-
1 942 (Queensland 1977); Diane Langmore, Tamate, a king (Melbourne 1 974 ),andMlssf.onary 
Lives: Papua 1 875-1914 (Hawaii 1 989). 
21  See Appendix A: The Indentured Labour System in Papua: Some Recent Studies, pp. 
3 1 6-8, below. 
PART 1 
Remote estuary - British New Guinea 1884-
1 905 
The natives of New Guinea will need the same protection which the 
law gives to the young and weak in factory towns, and to the poor 
and defenceless everywhere ... [They] are an agricultural people, 
but they are superstitious followers of their fathers and it will be 
very difficult to get them out of the rut of many generations ... All 
growth requires time, but I see no reason why British rule should 
not succeed in New Guinea, and prove a benefit and blessing to the 
native as to the alien race. 
Rev. W.G. Lawes, Sydney Morning Herald, 11 March 1886. 
The position of Europeans in the colony can, speaking generally, 
only be to supervise field labour performed by coloured men, and 
to work under shade or cover of some kind. 
Dr Wil11am MacGregor, British New Guinea Annual Report, 1890-91. 

CHAPTER 1 
A strateg ic purpose obtained 
A PROTECTORATE was fmally established over southeastern New Guinea and 
adjacent islands in 1 884 to satisfy the need of the still unfederated Australian 
colonies for emotional and strategic security. Aware of the difficulties being 
caused elsewhere in the western Pacific by the random settlement of traders, 
the depredations of labour recruiters, and the unregulated purchase of land 
by planters in areas not as yet annexed by one of the great powers, the 
Colonial Office had included New Guinea among the island groups where, 
under the Western Pacific Order in Council, 1 877, the conduct of British 
subjects fell within the jurisdiction of British law. Further than this the 
imperial government in London did not wish to go. Indeed, the malarial coasts 
and the reputation of the inhabitants for ferocity had hitherto protected New 
Guinea from the South Sea labour trade, and, apart from the small mixed 
community of copra traders and Methodist missionaries centred in the Duke 
of York islands in the northeast and a few traders in beche-de-mer and pearl 
and a handful of missionaries of the London Missionary Society in the south­
east and the Torres Strait, most of the eastern littoral and all of the interior 
of the great island had remained quite undisturbed by Europeans when four 
ships of the Pacific Naval Squadron appeared off the south coast in September. 
Politicians and speculators in the Australian colonies had for more than a 
decade been pressing the British authorities with an extraordinary blend of 
imperialist rhetoric and penny-pinching nationalism to annexe the eastern 
half of New Guinea together with the Solomon Islands and the New Hebrides 
for an 'Australian empire' in the South Seas, and several attempts were made 
to float enterprises to trade, plant or prospect in New Guinea - some 
expeditions actually reaching the country - but these appeals, threats, and 
adventures had failed to move London. Moreover, it was made quite clear to 
British subjects contemplating settlement in New Guinea that there could be 
'no sanction, even tacitly, to the acquisition of land' and that no such 
'acquisition . . .  made previous to a decision [on the future status of the 
country] can be recognised to the prejudice of the Crown' .1 Though reconciled 
George Seymour Fort, Report on British New Gulnea, 1 886. Compiled from the notes 
of the Late Sir Peter Scratchley, H.M.  Special Commissioner in British New Guinea, by his 
private secretary, Appendix 13 :  Letter to Mr E. Schubert, 1 3  Oct. 1 875 . 
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by 1883 to the inevitability of having to proceed further, Lord Derby, Colonial 
Secretary in Gladstone's second ministry, disowned a pre-emptive annexation 
by the Queensland government in April of that year. By November, when a 
Colonial Convention meeting in Sydney pressed for annexation in the face of 
a now palpable German interest in New Britain and the whole northeast coast 
of the New Guinea mainland, and for the first time offered to meet part of the 
costs of an administration, action could no longer be delayed. 
To bolster the arguments for possession for reasons of security, the 
Convention reiterated those of Australian economic self-interest. The delegates 
concurred that 'a rapid extension of British trade and enterprise in the Torres 
Straits' was likely and that New Guinea would 'shortly be the resort of many 
adventurous subjects of Great Britain' .2 Yet the proclamation of a 
Protectorate over British New Guinea in November 1884 was clearly not in 
answer to an 'economic' impulse, or in order to assume responsibility where 
British traders and adventurers had already developed a significant British 
interest, but because the protection of a much larger interest in the 
Australasian colonies seemed to demand it. In an empire sated with territorial 
responsibilities and held captive by their needs, it was a desire much more 
strongly felt in the existing colonies than at 'home' to balance the initiative of 
a rival imperialism that eventually prompted action. 
As for agricultural investment by any of the 'adventurous sons of Great 
Britain' that were expected to flock there - this the very terms of the 
Protectorate appeared at first to preclude. The proclamation of 1884 assured 
the Papuan 'chiefs' gathered at points around the coast for a succession of 
ceremonies that 'your lands will be secured to you' and declared that 'no 
settlement or acquisition of land is to be permitted'.3 Too literal a 
construction placed upon these assurances would have made provision of a 
settled government impossible and the instructions issued by the Colonial 
Office to Sir Peter Scratchley, the Special Commissioner appointed to 
administer the country, allowed for some land acquisition both for public and 
private purposes. 
But it was enjoined upon him that should it 'be decided to allow Her 
Majesty's subjects to purchase land, such transactions must in every case be 
conducted through you; that [the wishes of the native people] in these matters 
will be respected, and that the purchase money will be paid through you'.4 
Scratchley disallowed an original purchase claim of 1878 but gave permissive 
occupancy both to Andrew Goldie, the storekeeper at Port Moresby who had 
In D. C. Gordon, The Australian Frontier in New Guinea 1 870-1885 (New York 1 95 1 ), 
1 92. See also Roger C. Thompson, Australian Imperialism Ln the Paciflc (Melbourne 1 980). 
In J. H . P. Murray, Papua or British New Guinea (London 1 9 1 2 ), 74. 
Seymour Fort, Report, 1 
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made the application, and to Ah Gim, a Chinese trader at Suau Island. Blocks 
were purchased for a government bungalow at each of these two places and 
an additional large area obtained at Port Moresby for the principal settlement. 
While the administration needed to acquire land for its headquarters and 
for a port, no real expectation was held of a sudden influx of settlers. 
Scratchley received only a scatter of applications for land - from a firm 
representing a German company, from a 'New Guinea Land and Emigration 
Company' of London, and from a third trader. The first was referred to the 
imperial government, the second Scratchley described as 'unworkable and 
premature' and the correspondence concerning the third was never completed. 
Seymour Fort, Scratchley's secretary, noted that New Guinea had been 
'primarily annexed for a strategic purpose' and that 'that purpose had been 
obtained'. Nothing, he believed, could be done 'towards systematically 
developing the country and developing its resources until it is made an 
integral part of the Anglo-Australian political system', but that it was 'doubtful 
whether the country [could] ever be self-supporting, partly on account of the 
climate and partly owing to the attitude and condition of the natives' .5 
Scratchley's successor, John Douglas, invited a horticulturist from 
Queensland, Carl Hartmann, to establish a government fruit garden in which 
a wide range of exotic fruits was planted. But while he purchased tracts from 
the villagers on the Veimauri River and considerably extended the boundaries 
available for the settlement at Port Moresby, Douglas felt unable to proceed 
further in alienating land. To applicants he 'invariably replied that [he] had no 
power to make grants or to confer immunities of this kind'. He received 
applications from a London syndicate which he described as possessed of 'very 
imperfect geographic data'; from John Strachan of Sydney, master mariner 
and explorer in the Torres Strait; from H. C. Everill, leader of the Australasian 
Geographic Society's Fly River Expedition of 1885; and from Theodore Bevan, 
an explorer in the Papuan Gulf. Bevan had made three voyages to southeast 
New Guinea, the third backed by the islands trading and shipping firm of 
Burns Philp. His application was for 200,000 acres. None of these bids could 
be considered. Alone among the applicants, H. 0. Forbes, a naturalist, was 
given some kind of permission to buy a small area of land on the Astrolabe 
Range behind Port Moresby.6 
The explorers' proposals for huge unconditional freehold grants were 
obviously speculations on the likelihood that the demands of future settlement 
would make the land valuable and Douglas commented, 
Ibid . ,  24, 27. 
BNGAR 1 888, 7. 
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Experience in other countries has amply shown that the granting of land apart from 
conditions of settlement and a real equivalent obtained in some form of value is the 
most fatal impediment to future development. It would be the same in British New 
Guinea and though I do not think there are any valid reasons against the moderate 
alienation of land where there is so much which is of no utility whatever to the 
natives, care should be taken to secure some real equivalent in settlement and 
civilisation. 7 
Though some moderate alienation might be allowed in the future, of the likely 
availability of large areas of good land for extensive white settlement, he 
advised, 
Now as far as has been learned there are no large areas of fine land that are not 
required by the natives . . . They . . .  being a race of cultivators plant their food 
crops in the best lands sometimes at long distances from the village. The 
Government could not, without violating the law, dispossess these settled 
communities and it certainly does not possess the physical force that would be 
required to do so.8 
The uncertainty of the Special Commissioners as to their powers and the 
transparently speculative nature of most of the proposals for grants of land 
made to them did not deter criticism from those who through vision or self­
interest had hoped for more in the way of development. Andrew Goldie, Port 
Moresby's only resident trader and 'not a man to mince matters' , thought the 
Protectorate 'a blow to the country' and a device inspired by the missionaries 
who wished to prevent settlement. Theodore Bevan had been confronted in 
Port Moresby by the Deputy Commissioner, Hugh Hastings Romilly , with the 
opinion that the widespread belief in Australia that settlement would be 
permitted in British New Guinea was 'very delusive'. Bevan called the 
Protectorate 'an effete and meretricious system' and 'a failure in every sense 
of the word', under which, as the small population of gold prospectors 
fluctuated downwards, the tenuous European foothold in the country 
appeared to be slipping away. 9 
In the very last month under this 'system', in August 1888, with the 
discovery of gold on Sudest, largest of the Louisiades, hundreds of miners 
entered the country from Queensland and Bevan admitted that 'should 
permanent [sic] deposits of the precious metal be found on a payable basis 
then of course will the future of New Guinea be assured'. 10 But raised, as he 
said, in 'bleak, rainy, foggy London' he did not identify himself with the 
antipodean paradigm of the laconic miner or with the mateship of the diggers' 
camp. It was the country itself that held him in thrall. His first glimpse of the 
8 
Ibid. , 9.  
Ibid., xxill. 
Theodore Bevan, ToU, Travel and Discovery ln British New Guinea (London 1 890), 1 1 .  
10 Ibid. , 272. 
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coast from the deck of a Chinese junk out of Cooktown ravished him as it was 
to ravish many another susceptible eye, for, 
While sailing along the fine bold coast (characterised by lofty headlands, 
interspersed with lovely little coves and deep delicious bays) I, for the first time, 
beheld rich groves of the feathery coco-nut palm, overshadowing native villages 
which nestled at the foot of grassy round topped swelling hills, and could feast my 
eyes on a wealth of tropical form and colouring never before imagined, not even in 
my most vivid dreams of the isles of the Southern Seas. A truly beautiful picture, 
with the sun shining on it there; a right fair home for an ever -vexed race. 1 1  
Gold in sufficient quantities might assure the future of New Guinea for a 
period, he agreed, but 'otherwise in any case' it would be plantation enterprise 
that ' must in course of time become the mainspring of the prosperity of this 
new British possession'. Bevan was but the first of those who recorded the 
deceptive attractions of the country and the nostalgia its memory could evoke. 
Tropical verdure, it seems, played upon the imagination, encouraging 
fantasies of self-sufficiency, avarice, ease or power in varying degrees among 
all, or almost all, who saw the islands. To the casualties of European societies, 
disillusioned by failure at home, the tropics represented escape. To those 
whose ambitions had been merely frustrated, island life might mean 
opportunities that were closed even in the colonies of white settlement. Infinite 
possibilities opened before the mind. There appeared in the case of New 
Guinea abundant land, a moist 'forcing house' where anything planted grew 
almost visibly in the perpetual summer, land possessed of, rather than by, a 
race of indolent children to be corrected and improved and brought to the 
service of a manifestly superior civilisation. 
Theodore Bevan believed as did most of his contemporaries that white men 
should not be expected to carry out manual work at sea level in these 
latitudes, but he speculated that the mountainous interior would surely 
shelter stretches of land in a climate that could allow Europeans to settle and 
labour 'with accustomed ease'. The country must prove, he believed, 'one of 
the richest dependencies of the British Crown' with its 'noble rivers' and the 
'towering Papuan heights keeping watch and ward to the northward of the 
vast Australian plain . . .  like some mitre-shaped coronet over the brow of the 
young Australian dominion' . 1 2 Variations of such expectant prose, usually 
accompanying criticism, as did Bevan's, of each successive or preceding 
administration, were to be expressed again and again by others, captivated 
visitors and hopeful settlers, to the end of the period examined in this study 
and beyond. 
1 1  Ibid . ,  8-9. 
1 2  Ibid . ,  285. 
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The Possession 
British New Guinea ceased to have the status of a Protectorate in September 
1 888 when with the arrival of Dr William MacGregor as Administrator British 
sovereignty was formally proclaimed and the country became an annexed 
Possession. It was, however, to be a British Possession administered at second 
hand. While his appointment was made by the Colonial Office, under an 
agreement between the imperial government and the governments of the three 
eastern Australian colonies made in 1 88 7, MacGregor was to be responsible 
in the first place to the Governor of Queensland and not directly to the 
Colonial Secretary in London. Copies of all significant correspondence were to 
be forwarded to the 'Home' government where reserve powers were retained 
over all ordinances that had a bearing upon the native people. An undefined 
power of intervention was also allowed Queensland, New South Wales and 
Victoria which between them contributed £15 ,000 annually towards the 
revenue. 
MacGregor had served under Sir Arthur Gordon in Fiji as Chief Medical 
Officer, Colonial Secretary and once as Administrator of the Colony. Though 
prepared when in New Guinea to put down endemic raiding and to establish 
fear of the government with violence if necessary, he shared with Gordon a 
respect for 'wild' mankind and a concern to protect native peoples from the 
destructive effects of white settlement - a necessary intrusion that would 
inevitably come neither he nor Gordon could doubt. It was fortunate that 
British New Guinea represented as near as possible a tabula ra.sa in 
colonisation - an opportunity to establish a 'new' territory free of some of the 
problems created in the development of other colonies and without the 
incubus of an entrenched white community in unregulated occupation of 
native lands. 
Within months of his arrival MacGregor enacted in three ordinances 
fundamental measures to protect the indigenous inhabitants of the new 
colony from avoidable evils that had done much harm elsewhere. The first 
forbade dealings with the people in firearms, opium and alcohol; the second 
acknowledged the prlma f acie claim of the Papuans to ownership of all lands 
in the Possession - affirming that the Crown alone had the power to deal in 
land with the original owners; and the third closed the country to recruitment 
for labour abroad. Not immediately concerned with the encouragement of 
white settlement, MacGregor set about the urgent and congenial work of 
establishing the authority of the government among the population and of 
exploring a rugged domain greater in its extent than the United Kingdom. His 
success in pacification and exploration was judged ten years later by the 
visiting Queensland premier, Sir Hugh Nelson, as 'an achievement 
unprecedented in the world's history, one worthy of nineteenth century 
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civilisation, and one which reflects the highest honour upon those by whom 
it has been accomplished'. 13 
MacGregor was to describe the Land Regulation Ordinance of 1 888 in 
retrospect as the 'palladium of Papua' for the unprecedented protection it gave 
to the interests of a diverse, 'primitive' and fragmented population without a 
common body of law or the attributes of a state.14 Under the ordinance such 
lands as the Papuans were willing to sell could be purchased or leased by the 
Crown only when in each case the Administrator had satisfied himself after 
sufficient inquiry that the owners could be deprived permanently of the land 
in question and of its resources without predictable hardship. The process of 
purchase could be lengthy and complicated. Traditional tenure was not 
uniform and rights to the use of land might be based on inheritance through 
either the male or female line, on recent use by relatives, or on conquest. 
There could be rival claims. Even after land had been bought the Crown 
acquired no indefeasible title under the ordinance. lndefeasibility was to be 
asserted in 1899 but in other respects the protective provisions of the original 
land statute were to remain unchanged throughout the colonial period. A 
second land ordinance in 1889 allowed the Crown to grant to settlers, upon 
payment of survey fees, the freehold of lands it had acquired. But it was the 
Crown Lands Ordinance of 1890 that was to provide a comprehensive 
framework for the extensive acquisition and alienation of crown grants that 
would permit white settlement to proceed at last on some scale.15 Or so, it 
was hoped, would be the result. 
Part I of this ordinance allowed for consideration of the few purchase 
claims that antedated 4 September 1888, 2 , 645 acres of which were 
eventually recognised. Part II empowered the Administrator to declare areas 
of land unoccupied and unclaimed by the Papuans to be 'waste and vacant' 
and at the disposal of the Crown. Added to lands that were to be acquired by 
purchase these areas were to form a pool from which settlement blocks might 
be offered to enquirers. Part III contained provisions to prevent irregular 
settlement and illegal occupation of land. 
Part IV set out the payments and conditions for crown grants. Agricultural 
land was offered in fee simple at 1 Os. an acre, or at 2s. 6d. an acre if 
improvement covenants were undertaken. Land on sandy foreshores or on 
coral limestone designated expressly for the planting of coconuts could be 
bought for 5s. an acre, pasturage for 2s. an acre, and small blocks for trading 
1 3  Queensland Legislative Assembly, Votes and Proceedlngs. 1 898. Notes of trip to 
British New Guinea. Compiled for Lord Lamtngton and Sir Hugh Nelson. p .  29 (p.  1 085). 
14  Sir William MacGregor, Introduction to J.  H. P. Mutray's Papua or Brltlsh New Guinea 
(London 1 9 12 ). 
111 Supplement to BNG Government Gazette, 23 Nov. 1 889 . 
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or fishing stations for £5 an acre. A fifth part set out the conditions for crown 
leases. Agricultural leases could be obtained at a shilling an acre without 
conditions or at 6d. an acre after three years with improvement conditions, 
with a maximum term of twenty-five years. Coconut land could be leased for 
up to sixty years without rent within the first five years in which a quarter of 
the land had to be planted up. Pasture could be leased for fifteen years at 2d. 
an acre. 
While land could be alienated out of areas the Crown might acquire and 
hold in anticipation of demand, a prospective settler could also apply for 
Papuan held land. Since so much land appeared to be of little use to the 
population and the interest shown in land by bonafide settlers was to remain 
slight, a willingness on the part of the owners to sell seemed the only matter 
to decide and an officer, under MacGregor usually the Government Surveyor, 
would investigate and buy the land in question with its immediate alienation 
in mind. Indeed permissive occupancy was often allowed to traders and 
sometimes to settlers in expectation of a favourable conclusion to an 
application, and though no 'dealing' could take place under the law it was to 
his advantage if before he lodged his application the settler enquired among 
the villagers after land in which he was interested. All applications remained 
subject to the scrutiny of the Executive Council consisting of the 
Administrator (from 1895, the Lieutenant Governor), the Chief Judicial Officer, 
the Government Secretary, and the Treasurer, with from time to time the 
Government Surveyor as a provisional member. 
In 1908 the Government Secretary would be uneasy about the 
consequences of officers purchasing land in haste and without sufficient care 
in marking the boundaries with the Papuans who were selling it, but there is 
no evidence that Papuan refusal to sell was ever overridden in the Executive 
Council and there was even then still no provision for any compulsory 
purchase of native lands.16 Collusion under this system between a private 
settler and a government officer purchasing land to defraud or intimidate 
Papuan owners, whilst not inconceivable, was hardly possible. The chain of 
official accountability was formidable and precise, and discovery of 
wrongdoing would mean disgrace and punishment. The small white 
community, like the communities from which it sprang, was deeply divided 
into occupational and class divisions each with its own loyalties and code and 
each prepared to allege corruption in another. Within easy corresponding 
distance a free and sensation-mongering Australasian press stood ever ready 
to exploit charges of malpractice. It was indeed ironical, if not perhaps 
surprising, that Australian parliaments and newspapers, the public voices of 
a settler society that had singularly failed, and was failing still, to protect the 
1 6  See below p. 1 09.  
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Aboriginal people it had dispossessed in Australia, would be sensitive to any 
charge of failure to protect Papuans. For so they would prove. 
In what became German New Guinea in 1884, Richard Parkinson had begun 
clearing land for the first coconut plantation at Ralum on the Gazelle Peninsula in 
1882. But no planting on the generous scale of Ralum was to begin in British New 
Guinea while it retained the name. MacGregor sent prisoners to Daugo 
(Fisherman's Island) outside Fairfax Harbour in 1890 to plant coconuts. The work 
was supervised by a sandalwood getter, Robert Hunter. The object was to stimulate 
the nearby Port Moresby villagers to extend their groves by example. In 1894 the 
Administrator introduced a regulation for the compulsory planting of coconuts 
throughout the Possession - wherever enforcement was possible - in an effort to 
induce the Papuans to produce on their own account, for 'if they cannot greatly 
increase present exports and create new ones, they cannot exist long as a race' .17 
But rapid increase in the productivity of the 'native race' could hardly have been 
expected and unless a revenue base could be found that would lead the colony to 
the stage where it was self-supporting the government could scarcely be said to 
have fulfilled the expectations generally held about colonies - that they both be self­
sustaining and, it was to be hoped, profitable to their possessors. Only the 
'intervention of Europeans' could promise these ends in the short term and at the 
same time give the Papuans the models and experience of civilised industry and 
commerce they must imitate to survive, for - MacGregor was also to conclude in 
1898 - 'natives are not likely alone ever to add much to the exports of the 
colony' .18 Yet the settling of Europeans, possibly with families, and isolated from 
one another on their holdings, required an extension of law and order and a 
convincing guarantee of protection that could not immediately be given in 1890. 
MacGregor had previously demonstrated his sympathy with what he regarded 
. as the legitimate aspirations of white planters in Fiji where he had himself taken 
up land and planted for his private interest and profit. But Fiji was comparatively 
a finite sphere. There, pacification had meant subordinating the known hereditary 
and hierarchical authorities among the Fijians to the government and placing a 
control on a volatile settler community whose presence long antedated the cession 
to Britain. In New Guinea, where the Protectorate had not even raised a police force 
and where the native communities were smaller but more numerous, more distinct 
from each other in language and custom than the Fijians, constantly at war, and 
with 'chiefs' - if that was what they were to be called - that could scarcely be 
distinguished from their fellows, MacGregor had to begin upon a more uncertain 
fonndation. The process of exploration alone in Papua would not end for another 
fifty years. 
1 7  In R. B. Joyce, Str WUllam MacGregor (Melbourne 1 97 1 ), 1 98. MacGregor to Governor 
of Queensland, 15 Nov. 1 893 (Colonial Office file C0422 /9/7848). 
1 8  BNGAR 1 897-98, xlill. 
CHAPTE R 2 
Neither working settlers nor land-grabbers 
BY 1892 MacGREGOR had begun to be anxious about the absence of 
development affirming in a letter introducing a first Handbook for Intending 
Settlers in British New Guinea that 'the circumstances of the Possession are 
such as now make it the duty of the Government to attract the working 
settler possessed of some capital'. 1 Exploration had revealed tracts of 
country that he thought were suitable for sugar, tea, coffee, and rice, and 
pacification had opened up areas where settlers could live in reasonable 
safety and where the men of the district, themselves newly free from threat, 
would be available as labour. Not only were coconuts and native foods 
cultivated on the government stations - in the Mekeo and at Rigo, Samarai 
and at Nivani Island - but consignments of economic plants imported from 
the botanic gardens at Rockhampton in Queensland had been sent to 
Resident Magistrates and Government Agents for trial elsewhere. By 1894 
more than forty exotic fruits, spices, vegetables and trees were thriving on 
the Rigo station including cotton in sixteen varieties. Small quantities of 
seed, cuttings and root stock could be made available. 
The difficulty appeared in finding enterprising settlers in a world wide 
open to the white man and offering many a more comfortable life and less 
risky prospect. For, though it might ravish the eye and imagination of those 
who saw the country, practical consideration of New Guinea untinted from 
afar could only suggest caution to prudent men of modest means for whom 
Australia itself provided much greater attraction. Very few settlers of the 
yeoman kind that MacGregor had in mind were to come to the country 
until long after he had gone. Instead, in the mid-nineties, interest abroad 
seemed restricted as before to a few speculators who were prepared to 
gamble on some eventual boom in land when large holdings minimally 
improved might be disposed of at great profit. To 'the speculator in land the 
country offers no field' MacGregor made quite clear in 1892 I and until 1897 
Handbook of Informatlonfor Intendlng Settlers ln British New Gulnea, 1 892.  Preface 
(NLA, MS 1 709, Staniforth Smith Papers, item 1 459). 
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he scorned all large proposals.2 On leave in England in 1894 he grasped 
every opportunity offered by invitations to address learned societies to 
publicise the scientific and commercial attractions of British New Guinea. 
His speeches were published in journals and reported in newspapers, 
magnifying MacGregor's reputation - he was created a knight in 1895 and 
his position elevated from that of an Administrator to that of Lieutenant 
Governor - but without other result. 
The first tentative commercial plantings of export crops were not for the 
most part made by settlers who had come for that purpose but by already 
resident traders , government officials and missionaries who with little or no 
capital turned to experiments with coconuts, coffee, rubber and other 
cultures from a variety of motives, chiefly as means of spreading the base 
of their incomes. Traders, such as Reginald Guise at Hula and Richard Ede 
in the Laughlins, planted groves of coconuts on their small blocks dotted 
around the coast both to encourage imitation among the Papuans and to 
ensure a steadier future supply of nuts for copra. Several of the 'planters' 
whose ambitions stretched to the establishment of plantations of a size that 
could wholly or substantially provide a living were to come from among 
these traders. Indeed, the distinction in southeast New Guinea as 
elsewhere in the Pacific between traders who aspired to become planters 
and many smaller planters who subsisted through the years of 
development on trade was blurred. After 1907 in Papua with. the coming of 
plantation companies, the salaried manager, assistant or overseer became 
the more characteristic representative of the planter class than either of 
these categories of 'small' men. 
The earliest plantation of an ambitious size in British New Guinea was 
the project of first manager of the Port Moresby branch of Bums, Philp and 
Company Limited, Walter Henry Gors . The property was at Dedele on 
Cloudy Bay where in partnership with a Norwegian trader, Thomas 
Andersen, Gors had acquired a crown grant of 440 acres in February 1894. 
Andersen lived at Dedele overseeing the work of coconut planting while 
operating a store Gors supplied from Port Moresby.3 
Walter Gors had arrived in the country in 189 1, the first of four brothers 
and a sister to come and eventually take up land. He gained a reputation 
for indefatigable work on behalf of Bums Philp and the company was for a 
Ibid. One smaller 'speculation' MacGregor did entertain was the grant in 1 894 of 
1 ,280 acres at Vaigana near Port Moresby to Dr Lamberto Loria, 'doctor of Mathematics' 
and ethnographer. The land remained undeveloped and was sold to R. A. Gordon in 1 9 1 4  
following Loria's death in Rome. 'Gordon's Estate' and 'Waigani' (the former Vaigana) 
became suburbs of Port Moresby in later years. 
3 Andersen committed suicide in November 1 899 after the discovery that he had 
'robbed' his own (and Gors's) store (BNGAR 1899-1900, 4). 
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period locally identified with him.  He bought and sold anything that might 
reap a profit, from 'shark fms to pearls , massoi bark to wild rubber, 
paradise bird feathers to human skulls' ,  but principally copra.4 Having 
bought out Andrew Goldie, Burns Philp were the suppliers of traders and 
the bankers and creditors to the whole white community from Mullins 
Harbour to Darn, and the company issued its own One Pound and Five 
Pound notes negotiable as far south as Sydney. Its monopoly of both 
wholesale and retail trade was soon challenged in Port Moresby by Captain 
C. R. Baldwin, a former employee, and at Samarai, where there was a 
separate branch, it was rivalled from the beginning by the firm of Whitten 
Brothers. Nonetheless, until Dutch vessels were attracted to Papua in the 
new century and provided some competition in overseas shipping, Burns 
Philp completely dominated the purchase of copra and the modest export 
trade of both ports. 
In 1897, Port Moresby employees of Burns Philp also began clearing 
land for arabica coffee on the first portion of 250 acres of a freehold block 
that Gors had acquired as a staff 'sanatorium' at Warirata, over 2,000 feet 
above the Laloki gorge thirty miles inland from the port. It was to be 
developed and maintained by staff in rotation as they took local leave. As 
well as the coffee which flourished, tea, passion fruit, pineapples and 
cinnamon were grown, and for a period until Gors left British New Guinea 
in 1902, irregular supplies of Warirata produce reached the town. 
Meanwhile, in the Eastern Division, there had appeared at last - almost 
as if from nowhere - a private settler prepared to take up planting with 
vigour. Indeed, when the Royal Commissioners of 1906 arrived in Papua, 
as British New Guinea had just been renamed, his was still the 'most 
systematic attempt at cocoanut planting' in the country and the only 
plantation in production that had been laid down by an experienced 
planter. The plantation was on Panasesa, an island in the Conflict Group 
seventy miles east of Samarai.5 The Conflicts comprising a circle of very 
small islets under 1 ,800 acres in extent were uninhabited and had been 
leased with an option to convert to freehold by Henry Alexander Wickham 
in 1896. 
Widely travelled and subsequently to be given late recognition and a 
knighthood for his exploit in 1876 in securing the original Para (Hevea 
Brasiliensls) rubber seeds from which the entire rubber industry of 
Southeast Asia was developed, Wickham was fifty years old when he came 
to New Guinea. After a daunting experience as a planter in South America 
Papuan Courier, 22 May 1935, Obituary: Walter H. Gors. 
CPP 1 907, p. 137-459,  British New Guinea, Report of the Royal Commtsston of 
Inqutry tnto present condtttons . . . , xvi (p. 1 52). 
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he had held positions as a district commissioner in British Honduras and 
as Commissioner for the Introduction of the Para India-rubber Tree and 
Inspector of Forests for the Government of India. Settling for a time in 
Australia he had attempted to grow coffee in North Queensland, and on 
coming to New Guinea he interested himself at first in the latex bearing 
trees and vines that its forests offered. What could have prompted this 
restless man, comparatively late in life ,  to commit himself to a lease of a 
remote atoll on which to grow coconuts? Perhaps, since he arrived in 1895, 
his had been a solitary response to MacGregor's advertisement of the 
country in 1894. Perhaps he needed to provide for retirement; or perhaps 
his interest had been impulsively engaged, like Theodore Bevan's, by the 
tropical verdure - for Wickham was a talented amateur artist illustrating a 
book he wrote on rubber production in 1 908 with his own work. He was 
remembered as 'every inch a pioneer, broad-shouldered and heavily built 
with an extraordinary long and wavy moustache, his physical strength . . .  
as great as his resolution'.6 
His isolation in the Conflicts only apparent, Henry Wickham was 
singularly able to draw on the wider planting world for information and 
assistance and upon a long personal experience of practical experiment 
with new materials and processes. Seeking to exploit the full commercial 
possibilities of his lease he employed Papuans to dive not only for the usual 
shell, pearls and beche-de-mer, but also for marine sponges which he was 
the first to treat and export. In 1899 he brought a marine biologist to the 
lagoon to test whether pearls could be artificially cultured there. In the 
boom of 1 9 10, regarded as an authority on both plantations and the 
country, Wickham was to commend Papua to potential rubber investors.7 
He had continued to travel, spending less and less time at Panasesa until 
1 9 1 1 when he assigned control of his Conflict Islands Planting Association 
to a new company in wh�ch he retained an interest. 
Despite the beginnings recently made by Walter Gors and Henry 
Wickham, as yet too small to notice, MacGregor regretted in the Annual 
Report of 1895-96 that 'no European planting on a scale of any importance 
has been started'. 8 No new grants at all had been issued in the year, but 
now an effort was mounted to rapidly increase the areas of obviously good 
land that the Crown could offer. The Government Surveyor, John Cameron, 
The Times (London), 28 Sept. 1928. Obituary: Sir Henry Wickham. An 
obituary in the Papuan Courter ( 1 4  Dec. 1 928)  mentions Wickham's pioneering in 'New 
Guinea' without detail. He had been knighted in 1920. 
7 ANUABL Deposit 95 , M37, British New Guinea Development Co. Ltd, London 
Office Records, BNGD Prospectus ( 19 1 0), p. 9 .  
8 BNGAR 1895-96, xxxill. 
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purchased 31, OOO acres of the best lands he could find around the head of 
Milne Bay in the Eastern Division and at Cloudy Bay, Domara, Marshall 
Lagoon and on the Kemp Welch river in the Central Division. The blocks 
selected by Cameron in 1895-96, attractive to the eye, were among the first 
to be offered to investors and taken up a decade later. 
In 1894 Cameron himself had been granted the freehold of an area of 
over 2,000 acres in the Kabadi district on the western side of Galley Reach, 
the estuary of the Laloki, Vanapa and Brown rivers midway between Port 
Moresby and Yule Island. He was the first of several government officers to 
whom MacGregor saw no reason to deny the privilege of taking up land. In 
retrospect, Sir Francis Winter, Chief Judicial Officer under both MacGregor 
and his successor, thought that if it might be conceded that in permitting 
his officers these interests MacGregor had departed from strict observance 
of the 'rules of the civil service', he had clearly done so only 'for the benefit 
of the country' . Cameron did not live to develop his grant but in 1897 the 
Lieutenant Governor encouraged David Ballantine, Treasurer, Collector of 
Customs and Resident Magistrate (RM), to begin the planting of coffee on 
100 acres granted to him in the Sogeri district, a rolling plateau behind the 
Astrolabe Range of which Warirata was a spur. Ballantine had only recently 
'pacified the tribes' between Sogeri and the Owen Stanley Range and his 
plantation might have been a device to establish a European presence near 
the periphery of control. 
By 1897 too, Albert Charles English, the Government Agent responsible 
for the plant nurseries at Rigo, forty miles southeast of Port Moresby, had 
planted out a private estate of fifty acres of native rubber. Small quantities 
of this rubber had been exported since 1895 and the value of the trade 
exceeded £ 1,000 in 1902-03. The latex was extracted from various trees, 
principally the Ficus Rigo , or Makimaki , and was gathered usually by 
Papuans employed by sandalwood getters . A regulation was passed in 1895 
to protect the trees in what MacGregor hoped would become a 'new native 
industry'. A. C. English sent samples to London at the time where they 
were regarded as the equal in quality of the best rubber then coming out of 
the Amazon. Assured by such comparisons he proceeded to plant Ficus 
Rigo on grants he had obtained in 1894 neighbouring the government 
station. By 1901 he had 12,000 of these trees together with about fifty 
Ficus Elastica. A Londoner who had come to the country to trade in bird of 
paradise plumes, English had been appointed Government Agent at Rigo 
under the Protectorate. He accompanied MacGregor on several journeys of 
exploration and was commended with his constabulary for 'pluck and 
gallantry' in an engagement with 'hill tribes' near Dedele in 1 894. Becoming 
an Assistant Resident Magistrate (ARM) after MacGregor's departure, he 
was accused by Captain Baldwin before the Royal Commission in 1906 of 
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neglecting his official duties to engage in trade and his other pursuits 
which by then included, in addition to the rubber plantation, Barodobo, a 
potentially profitable 'experiment' with sisal (agave sisalana) .9 
Denying neglect of his responsibilities, English defended himself on the 
grounds that as the civil service made no provision for the retirement of its 
officers he had been but prudent and industrious in his spare time. 
Undoubtedly impressed by the ARM's undertakings and prepared to use 
them to illustrate what private enterprise could accomplish, the 
Commissioners could only agree that English's interests and duties were in 
conflict. He resigned from the service in March 1907 remaining a planter at 
Rigo until 1942. 
After the miners, the missionaries of the London Missionaiy Society 
(LMS), the New Guinea Anglican Mission, the Methodist Overseas Mission, 
and the Congregation of the Sacred Heart were the largest group of white 
residents. They were clearly the more widely distributed and settled part of 
the community and more than 140 grants - mostly of under five acres -
had been made to the missions by 1898. As the mission stations, like those 
of the government, were expected to become largely self-sufficient in foods, 
exotic trees and vegetables were inevitably planted. MacGregor 
recommended that the missions also establish small plantations of 
economic trees from which the Papuans could obtain 'seed and example'. 
He thought he could 'confidently expect valuable assistance from Dr 
Ginocchi [at the head of the Catholic Mission in the Mekeo district] in this 
matter' .10 By 1895 arabica coffee was bearing 'splendidly' on mission land 
on Hall Sound. In the years to come a large copra plantation was indeed 
developed by the Sacred Heart Fathers on Yule Island. But while there was 
to be some expansion of mission plantations,  most remained more 
horticultural and educational than commercial and were never in British 
New Guinea or Papua to compare in size or significance with the mission 
estates,  both Catholic and Lutheran, in German New Guinea.1 1  
Keeping out the Land Grabber 
In his last Annual Report in 1897-98, MacGregor surveyed the whole 
decade of his administration. There was much to find satisfaction with in 
the extension of law and order and in the work of exploration, but 
economic development had been negligible. Scarcely more than 5,000 acres 
had been granted for agricultural purposes in ten years and the situation 
of the colony qua colony had become desperate. He wrote 
CPP 1 907, 297-8, Royal Cornmfsskm . . .  , 2-5, 3 1 -2 .  
10 BNGAR 1893-94, 44. 
1 1  B y  1 900 mission grants had increased t o  340. See below p .  37 and n. 
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The time has come when agricultural development should be pushed in the 
Possession with as much perseverance as has been employed in forcing peace on 
the different hostile tribes to prepare for it . . .  industrial development through 
agriculture is now a pressing necessity if British New Guinea is to be made a 
British colony in anything more than name. The conditions under which land 
has been offered for some years for settlement have been very easy but they have 
failed to attract settlers. There will be no help for this condition of matters except 
to grant facilities and inducements as may attract settlers of the kind now 
required. There is already undoubtedly as much land known and available for 
occupation as, if utilized, would suffice to make the colony self-supporting. 12 
Failure to attract independent settlers and the urgent need to extend the 
revenue base now made MacGregor treat with interest and approval the 
proposal of a British New Guinea Syndicate formed in London early in 1897 
to take up lands in New Guinea for large scale plantation development. The 
promoter� of the scheme, John Lowles MP, Sir Somers Vine and Sir 
Charles Kennedy, sought and obtained the support of the then Premier of 
Queensland, Sir Hugh Nelson. Early in 1898, after MacGregor had drafted 
an agreement acceptable to Vine and Lowles , an ordinance was passed by 
the Legislative Council in Port Moresby that allowed grants totalling up to 
250,000 acres to be made progressively to the Syndicate over eight years 
after which their options would lapse. The Colonial Office had rejected an 
early proposal of the syndicators that they be given a charter. For the first 
time the colonial governments that contributed to the revenue chose to 
exercise their right of intervention to oppose allowance of the ordinance. 
Opposition was roused by a series of articles in the Melbourne Age in 
May 1898 written with the assistance and inspiration of Theodore Bevan. 
From time to time since 1888 Bevan had sought to use his contribution to 
exploration as a lever to obtain large grants of land for projects varying 
from plantations to gold dredging. Vague and blatantly speculative, these 
applications had not commanded sufficient capital to make them credible 
and had been refused. Now MacGregor was accused of partiality in giving 
preference to the 'British' scheme over those of an 'Australian' and at the 
same time denounced for betraying the principles he had earlier espoused 
by being lately prepared to allow a 'monopoly' in pursuit of huge 
concessions into the country.13 
Though MacGregor's instructions obliged him to consult only with the 
government of Queensland which had hitherto borne the full responsibility 
of representing the contributing colonies, the Age asserted that in a matter 
1 2  BNGAR 1 897-98, 59. 
1 3 Queensland Legislative Assembly, Votes and Proceedings, 1 898, contains copies of 
a large correspondence over the BNG Syndicate. The Age (Melbourne) articles appeared on 
10,  1 1 , 1 6 ,  1 7  and 25 May 1 898. 
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of the importance of the current proposal the Victorian and New South 
Wales governments should have been expressly consulted. Whether this 
view was justified or not, its assertion made it politically perilous for these 
governments to condone the scheme, and when a new Queensland ministry 
itself withdrew its support, all three colonies declared their opposition. 
MacGregor's defence of his actions was ignored in the furore of populist 
indignation against 'speculators' ,  'land grabbers' and the 'astute boomers' 
who would tie up the best lands in the Possession against Australian 
enterprise. The Colonial Office, itself reserved about the good faith of the 
promoters, was yet reluctant to disallow the ordinance after matters had 
proceeded so far and did so only after insisting that compensation be paid 
to the Syndicate. A disappointed visionary and an opportunist and 
sensational press had combined to manipulate governments and public 
opinion by appealing to an anglophobia that jostled with imperial 
sentiment in the minds of most Australians. Yet there was no substance in 
the assumption that Australian capital was eager to enter New Guinea or 
that any serious Australian enterprise had been hindered. New Guinea, it 
seemed, was to be an Australian preserve and to be exploited by 
Australians when they were ready to do so. That was all. 
In defending his actions over the Syndicate, the Lieutenant Governor 
referred to failure in attempts he had made in the years since 1 890 to 
interest large Australian firms in agricultural investment in New Guinea. 14 
But a year after the collapse of the 'British' scheme and after Sir William 
Macgregor had left the Possession to become Governor of Lagos, a 
conference was held in Sydney between George Ruthven LeHunte, his 
successor in New Guinea, and the 'Prime Ministers' of Queensland and New 
South Wales to consider LeHunte's proposals for a new land ordinance and 
the financing of the administration as Australian federation approached. 
Between sessions of the conference, James Burns, chairman and managing 
director of Burns, Philp and Company, asked LeHunte to consider the draft 
prospectus of a company to be floated to purchase and develop 1 00,000 
acres for agriculture and I 00,000 for pasture in British New Guinea with 
capital of £1 00,000. 15 In reaction to what had been decided to be the 
speculative and excessive nature of the British New Guinea Syndicate's 
proposals, the conference had only the previous day agreed that under the 
new ordinance no grants of more than ten square miles (6,400 acres) could 
1 4 Queensland Legislative Assembly, Votes and Proceedings, 1 898. MacGregor to 
Governor of Queensland, 31 Dec. 1 897. See also R. B. Joyce's 'The British New Guinea 
Syndicate Affair' in the Journal of the Queensland HLslDrical Society, Vol. V, 1 953 . 
1 5  Ibid. , 1899, p.  20. 'Notes of a meeting held at Sydney on the 1 5th and 1 6th August 
1 899 to discuss land and financial matters of British New Guinea'. 
32 THE PLANTATION DREAM 
be made without the consent of the contributing colonies and that no 
grants exceeding 50,000 acres were to be made at all. LeHunte suggested 
to Burns that his company, if floated, might accept 50,000 acres in fee 
simple and 50,000 acres in leasehold. Burns found this unacceptable on 
the grounds that no investor could be expected to put his money into the 
leases, which as the law stood were only for a twenty-five year term. 
Obviously startled by the sudden emergence of an Australian interest, the 
conference, with great inconsistency, inserted a provision in the ordinance 
that allowed that the granting of areas larger than 50,000 acres freehold 
could be permitted after the new law had been in operation for six months. 
In September 1900 the Hall Sound Company was registered. The 
provisional board of directors included James Burns, Sir Malcolm 
McEacharn - a Melbourne shipowner, J .  T. Walker and Sir George Dibbs of 
Sydney, and Walter Gors, the promoter of the company and 'local' director 
in Port Moresby. The capital of the company was now to be £50,000 in £1 
shares of which 30,000 were to be issued at l s. on application with calls of 
1 s. to be made at not less than monthly intervals. Gors as promoter was to 
receive 3,000 fully paid up shares 'under certain conditions' - presumably 
that he undertook to manage the affairs of the company in British New 
Guinea for a specified period. 16  
As its name indicated, the company sought to acquire land around Hall 
Sound, the sheltered anchorage between Yule Island and the mouth of the 
St Joseph or Angabunga River seventy miles northwest of Port Moresby. 
Within its powers under the new ordinance the government proceeded 
immediately to make an initial grant to the company of 5 ,OOO acres near 
Inawaia, a village some miles up the Angabunga, and of a portion of Yule 
Island for sheds ,  a store and a wharf. 
The Hall Sound Company had the enthusiastic support of LeHunte and 
of the Queensland government now led by Robert Philp, one of the founders 
of Burns Philp, and 'this first large bona ftde attempt by an Australian 
company to develop the untouched resources of British New Guinea' was 
commended to the Victorian and New South Wales governments for 
approval. 17  But, while they had been prepared to combine with 
Queensland to oppose the intrusion of a large alien 'British' enterprise into 
an Australian preserve, the premiers in Sydney and Melbourne were by no 
16 Ibid. ,  1 900, p .  853. ·Application of Hall Sound Company to take up land in British 
New Guinea' . This contains further correspondence and includes the Hall Sound 
Company Prospectus. McEarcharn and Walker were also directors of Burns Philp. 
1 7 Ibid. ,  855 (p. 3) .  The Chief Secretary of Queensland to the Prime Minister of 
Victoria, 28 Sept. 1900. 
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means prepared now to allow even an Australian company into the field 
without scrutiny, and both asked the Queenslanders for more information. 
Burns let it be known through LeHunte that if difficulties were put in 
the way of an agreement then the company was unlikely to proceed. This 
may have been perceived as a ploy to induce compliance with the scheme, 
but almost certainly it represented a disinclination to pursue very far a 
course of action essentially inspired by Walter Gors that to Bums involved 
at best some considerable risk. The prospectus had drawn attention to the 
success of the plantings at Warirata and it acknowledged Gors's unrivalled 
qualifications for overseeing the work, but no agricultural development had 
been undertaken in British New Guinea that could as yet gtve some guide 
as to commercial possibilities. Indeed, the prospectus betrayed this 
uncertainty where it spoke of one of the principal objects of the company 
being 'to test the adaptability of the land for tropical agriculture' . 1 8  The 
capital was scarcely adequate for the development of the lands Gors and 
Burns hoped to obtain and unless further capital was raised, and this 
probably outside Australia, then the company might certainly be 
considered a speculative venture. And so the premiers in Sydney and 
Melbourne concluded. 
If British New Guinea had little attraction for the small settler and 'if 
this scheme is also set aside from want of encouragement' , the Queensland 
government responded, the question arose as to 
What offers which have for their object the development, on an advantageous 
scale, of the resources of British New Guinea, are to be accepted at all, or are 
any beginnings to be made to such development except those which have no 
other recommendations than that of being so small as to contribute only in an 
inappreciable degree to the prospect of the Possession becoming a self-sustaining 
province?19 
At his first and perhaps only 'glance' , the New South Wales premier, Sir 
William Lyne, felt that the proposal was open to the same. objections as 
those raised against the British New Guinea Syndicate. That the Hall 
Sound Company was Australian, that it asked now for no concessions 
outside the recently amended land law, and that the governments of the 
contributing colonies were being consulted about its proposals, failed to 
sway him. He announced without debate in the New South Wales 
Legislative Assembly in November 1900 that he firmly opposed the scheme 
on the grounds that he did 'not think that a lease of so large an area 
should be granted'.20 It was the last exercise of power with respect to New 
18 Ibid. ,  853 (p. 2). Prospectus. 
19  Ibid. , 856 (p. 4). 
20 New South Wales, Parl.lamentary Record, Nov. 1900. 
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Guinea by one of the Australian colonial governments before responsibility 
for dealings with the Possession passed to the newly federated Common­
wealth of Australia in January 1 90 1 .  
LeHunte was greatly disappointed and raised the question of the Hall 
Sound Company for reconsideration by the Federal Government. Lengthy 
debates on New Guinea in both houses of Parliament in their first session 
included reference to the scheme but rhetoric laden opposition to 'land 
grabbers' in general so clouded the air that members could scarcely 
distinguish between the reviled 'Somers Vine' syndicate and the Australian 
company despite the presence in the House of Representatives of Sir 
Malcolm McEacham and in the Senate of J .  T. Walker.21 
The populist Western Australian senator, Staniforth Smith, visited the 
Hall Sound Company land on his first visit to British New Guinea in 1 903 . 
Before leaving Australia he had heard that the company 'was composed of 
men who were genuine investors desirous of putting their money in the 
development of valuable industries' . He had gone 'at considerable trouble . .  
. inland to inspect their property and found ten acres planted with chillies 
which practically grow wild. The whole staff consisted of a Samoan and two 
Papuans' .22 He was told that the promoters were still hoping to obtain a 
much larger freehold grant before floating a company in . London with 
enough capital to develop the lands acquired. In a report Smith denounced 
the venture as another speculative fraud. He was not seriously challenged. 
The larger grant was never obtained, James Bums was never to be 
induced to invest further in Papuan lands and the Hall Sound Company 
died. Despite the promising beginnings made by Walter Gors, Bums Philp 
cautiously avoided direct interest in plantations in southeast New Guinea 
until the thirties when a few largely planted-up estates could be bought at 
or for less than the cost of their development. On many occasions in the 
intervening years planters reflected resentfully that the failure of the 
company to undertake the risks of planting - while living off those who 
did - demonstrated a farsightedness on the part of the 'octopus of the 
Pacific' they wished they had themselves possessed. 
2 1  Commonwealth of  Australia. Parliamentary Debates. (Representatives), p .  745 1 ,  1 9  
Nov. 190 1 ;  (Senate), pp. 7467, 7479-8 1 ,  7486, 20 Nov. 190 1 .  
22 NLA, Deposit 1 709, Staniforth Smith Papers, item 1 46 1 ,  'British New Guinea with 
a preface on Australia's policy in the Pacific', by Senator Staniforth Smith, 2 1  July 1 903. 
Portions taken from articles in the Dally Telegraph (Sydney), Morning Herald (Perth), and 
the Kalgoorlle Miner. 
C HAPTER 3 
The interregnum 
MAcGREGOR HAD FRAMED the terms and fees payable for land under the 
1 890 ordinance when he could not have predicted the difficulties in 
obtaining settlers and when it was hoped that land sales would come for a 
period to make a considerable contribution to the revenue. If the original 
cost to the government of the lands it had acquired had averaged, as he 
estimated, at about ls.  an acre, then the extent to which the revenue might 
have benefited if demand for land had been greater can be appreciated. But 
in 1 899 LeHunte thought that the charges were excessive and had been a 
positive discouragement to settlement. Francis Winter, the Chief Judicial 
Officer, in a memorandum accompanying a proposal for changes LeHunte 
wished to make in the law, pointed out that both the annual rents of 
pastoral leases, equivalent to £5 3s. a square mile, and their .term of fifteen 
years would seem to compare very unfavourably with what selectors or 
graziers could obtain in Australia. 1 In addition to the new conditions it 
contained requiring the Lieutenant Governor to gain the approval of the 
governments of the contributing colonies before making any large grant, 
the Lands Ordinance of 1899 considerably lowered the charges for crown 
lands. The government could now sell freehold agricultural blocks for a 
shilling an acre, virtually at cost. Annual rents on pastoral leases were 
reduced to a penny an acre and the term extended to twenty-five years. 
Letters Patent transfering the government of British New Guinea to the 
new Commonwealth of Australia were finally issued on 18  March 1902 and 
Sir George LeHunte left the country in the March of the following year. Due 
chiefly to the efforts in the Federal Parliament of a strong temperance lobby 
which sought, in the interests of the native people, to impose complete 
prohibition on the import of alcohol into New Guinea, including any for 
white consumption, and to the filibustering pressure of a few members 
influenced by the principles of Social Credit who wanted to end the freehold 
grant system, there occurred a delay of over four years before a new 
constitution for the country to be called the Territory of Papua was brought 
into operation in September 1906. This long period of uncertainty about 
the policies that would be followed under direct Australian rule was 
Queensland Legislative Assembly, Votes and Proceedtngs, Vol. 4, 1899, p. 944. 
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prolonged still further by the need to await the outcome of a Royal 
Commission brought on by dissension in the government service and a 
delay in the appointment of the first Australian Lieutenant Governor until 
1 908. 
Between 1 898 and the end of the interregnum in 1906 serious interest 
in taking up land holdings limited to a size that could be approved in Port 
Moresby without referring the applications to Australia remained, as it had 
been since 1 890, almost wholly confined to a few residents who had come 
to the country for some purpose other than to plant. In 1 899 ten square 
miles of unoccupied land on the Musa River in the Northern Division were 
selected by the Government Medical Officer (GMO) at Samarai, Dr Cecil 
Vaughan, for a rubber plantation. Granted permissive occupancy, Vaughan 
floated a small company in Australia to develop the block. Though it had 
been agreed that the land should not be more than twenty miles from the 
coast it was soon found that the area chosen was subject to seasonal 
flooding and a second selection had to be made a further twenty miles 
inland. LeHunte used the example of Vaughan's original selection to show 
that even when land could be inspected by a prospective settler in person 
its nature could be unknown. 2 Since he doubted that very large tracts of 
good land were available in any one place, a thorough inspection by a 
buyer was imperative both in his own interest and that of the reputation of 
the country. In the same year a large block was taken up on the Oriomo 
River opposite Daru in the Western Division. Again country for which the 
Papuans had little use, its fertility an illusion, this land could also be 
inundated by both flood and tide. In fact, very large stretches of low-lying 
coastline from the Dutch border almost to Hall Sound in the south and 
from the German border to Cape Vogel in the north, accessible and 
seemingly fertile, if their vegetation was any guide, were vulnerable to 
flooding. Vaughan commenced clearing the Musa block but neither of these 
properties was developed. 
More successful were plantations begun on a less ambitious scale. In 
the Eastern Division the first plantings since Henry Wickham's were on 
three small blocks developed after 1 898 around the shores of Milne Bay. 
Bubuleta, the oldest, was the first experiment in planting of the Samarai 
merchant, William Whitten. A Londoner who had arrived in British New 
Guinea during the Protectorate, Whitten was joined in 1 892 by his brother 
Robert and the firm of Whitten Brothers grew into a prosperous agency and 
trading business with several modest plantations ,  a Port Moresby branch 
and stores on the goldfields. Advancing credit with some generosity to the 
Ibid. ,  938. 
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miners and smaller traders of the Eastern, South Eastern, and Northern 
Divisions, their position in the east paralleled that of Walter Gors and 
Bums Philp and Company in the western divisions. William Whitten 
bought the original Dedele Plantation from Walter Gors after Gors left for 
Australia in 1 902. 
Killerton, the second development on Milne Bay, covered a small island 
and was the first of a string of properties on the coasts near Samarai 
developed for income and example by Charles Abel, a prominent LMS 
missionary and a pioneer in the technical education of the Papuans. In 
1 9 1 0  Abel set up Enesi Plantations Limited to manage these properties. His 
interest in developing the 'industrial' side of Christian mission work was to 
lead him out of the LMS and to the formation of the Kwato Extension 
Association in 1 9 1 7.3 The third plantation, Ramaga, on the south side of 
the bay, was not begun until 1902. It was developed slowly by John Clunn, 
a Cooktown miner who had become proprietor of a Samarai hotel. Another 
miner, William Shedden, in partnership with John Gusth Nelsson, a Swede 
and trader to the miners on the Muma (Woodlark) goldfield, and Charles 
Arbouin, Bums Philps' first agent at Samarai, began development of a 
plantation on Doini or Blanchard Island to .the south and in sight of 
Samarai in 1 903. 
Also in the Eastern Division a naturalist and major collector for Lord 
Rothschild's Tring Museum, Albert Meek, had been granted 300 acres on 
Goodenough in the D'Entrecasteaux in 1 896 in partnership with a 
Woodlark miner, James Thompson.4 The land was reported the following 
year to be largely planted up but seems to have been soon abandoned.5 In 
1 899 Meek was clearing land for a coconut plantation and 'farm' on Sariba 
Island on the China Strait near Samarai. 6 He imported a herd of cattle 
from 'south' to keep the ground clear under the palms and· to supply the 
nearby township with milk. But by 1 906, his experiment with planter life 
evidently exhausted, he had resumed collecting in the Solomons. 
Cows were also used in later years to maintain clear ground under 
coconuts at Loani, a plantation on the mainland opposite Samarai. This 
property of 500 acres had been partly cleared and planted by a brother of 
the LMS missionary Fred Walker and taken up in the brothers' joint names 
in 1897. It was to pass in 1909 to Elias Solomon, a settler possibly from 
3 See David Wetherell's Reluctant Mlsslon: The Angllcan Church tn Papua New 
Gutnea 1891-1942 (Queensland 1977), 2 15-24, for a discussion of the industrial 
mlsslons. See also pp. 8 1 -2 below. 
4 Mlrlam Rothschild, Dear Lord Roth.schUd. {Baltimore 1983 ). OVer 500 of Meek's 
letters are held ln the Rothschild Archive. 
5 BNGAR 1 896-97, 49. 
11 A. S. Meek, A Natwullst In Cannibal Land (London 19 13), 100. 
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Mauritius, who had overseen a government nursery at Wagawaga on Milne 
Bay in 1 907. Solomon planted rubber, a few cacao trees and vanilla. 
In the Central Division a third plantation was begun in the Sogeri 
District. In 1902 the Chief Clerk and Registrar of the Central Court, 
Charles Grant Garrioch, went into partnership with Henry Lesueur Greene 
to plant coffee on a block not far from David Ballantlne's. Both of these 
men, it appears, had also come to New Guinea from Mauritius. Both were 
acquainted with plantations rather than experienced in them. Greene, who 
managed the property for the partnership, was a former bank clerk, aged 
twenty.,four. He had, he said, come to the country for his health and had 
found Sogeri favourable; more probably Garrioch had invited him to come 
and try his luck in obtaining a government 'billet' for which Greene was to 
make several approaches. In addition to co.ffea arabica, Garrioch and 
Greene planted the first Para or hevea rubber in the country at Sagoro 
Tana, about eight acres in December 1 903. 
In October 1903 a small grant of land was made to Edward Robert 
Anderson at Hisiu beach, a long sweep of coast on Redscar Bay to the west 
of Galley Reach. Here he planted the first commercial palms in a district 
that was to attract others. In 1 905 he was joined as neighbour by Alearce 
Savery Anthony, yet another settler from Mauritius,  who had managed for 
David Ballantine at Sogeri. Described as a 'coloured' man, . Anthony may 
have come to New Guinea as a personal servant of the Government 
Secretary, Anthony Musgrave, but became a collector of specimens both 
natural and cultural for European museums. At Hisiu he obtained a lease 
of 640 acres. 7 
At the two extremities of the country interest remained slight. In the 
South Eastern Division the first grant for a coconut plantation was not 
made until 1903 when 200 acres at the eastern end of Rossel (Yela) Island 
were acquired by the island's only resident white trader, Frank Osborne. In 
the Western Division apart from the Oriomo River lands and a small 
experiment recorded as having been made with peanuts on Gebaro Island 
in 1 899 by Charles 'Peanut Charlie' Gillingham, there was no further 
development before 1 905 , when Mibu Island, at the mouth of the Fly River, 
was leased to the Western British New Guinea Trading Company, an 
ambitiously named venture of a Darn trader and recruiter Captain William 
At the time of his death Anthony claimed Malta as his birthplace. (Papuan Courter, 
2 4  Sept. 1 920. ) He was also believed to have been 'MacGregor's taxidermist'. He 
bequeathed his property to Lord Roberts' Incorporated Soldiers and Sailors Help Society. 
The Port Moresby publican, T.D. Ryan, bought the plantation in 1921  and in 1 928 sold it 
to Dr C.C. Simson. (For Simson, see below p. 1 02 . )  
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Luff. 8 The lease was forfeited undeveloped in 1 908. Mibu was found to 
comprise mostly tidal flats and the only area on the island suitable for 
coconuts was eventually planted in 1 9 1 4  by John Cowling, a Thursday 
Island trader and pearl buyer who had kept a store at the Pahoturi River 
since 1 899. 
While these modest developments were all that stood out in commercial 
plantation agriculture in the interregnum, the interstices of opportunity 
had continued to fill with even smaller undertakings. In 1 894 an 'energetic 
settler', Richard Edward Weaver, had begun cultivation of a market garden 
on the Laloki River near Sapphire Creek, demonstrating after all, Francis 
Winter observed, 'that a European can do manual labour' on the coastal 
lowlands.9 Weaver was representative of a class of perhaps fifty settlers 
who could make little claim to being either traders or planters in the 
conventional sense. They included a handful of 'Manilla' men, several 
Chinese and Lascars, a variety of South Sea Islanders - castaways and 
absconding crew, two Malay servants left behind by the Italian naturalist 
Luigi D'Albertis in 1876 , runaway convict$ from the French penal 
settlement at Noumea, and English and Australian 'knockabouts'.  They 
gathered sandalwood, pearls, trochus and trepang, or drifteq in and out of 
prospecting. They subsisted as best they could on small holdings and what 
the country could offer, intermarrying with Papuans and heavily dependent 
on their goodwill. Some like Robert Hunter, sandalwood and wild rubber 
collector, were relatively prosperous. Most never were. Hunter planted 
cotton at Obu on Hisiu Beach in 1898 and, with his brother George, was 
employed for a time by the government. 
The European population was still very small, rising to 5 73 in 1 904. 
With concentrations only on the goldfields and at Samarai and Port 
Moresby, this community was widely distributed in ones and twos along 
the coasts. Possessed as they were of artefacts of great novelty, and 
pursuing their mysterious ends often with a display of swagger, bluff and 
exaggerated idiosyncrasy that would hardly have been tolerated at 'home', 
their very scarcity enhanced the notoriety of · these strangers among the 
Papuans. Among these Europeans and their Papuan employees a mental 
map of British New Guinea was already being formed upon which the 
isolated stations and settlements connected by ketch, launch and lugger or 
the government yacht, the Merrie England, appeared a formidable and 
reassuring network, the distances between points seemed less than they 
were, and two or three whites together might be felt almost to comprise a 
town. 
8 
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In the interregnum land acquired by the Crown far exceeded the land 
actually alienated for settlement or development. In 1899 over 326,000 
acres of the Laloki, Brown and Goldie river lands between Port Moresby 
and the Astrolabe Range were declared waste and vacant. This area, the 
largest so declared, had been the hunting grounds of the coastal Motu and 
Koitapu peoples and a buffer territory between them and the Koiaris of the 
range. In the same year 1 2,500 acres were purchased from the Koiaris 
between Warirata and Sogeri. After LeHunte had asked the Queensland 
government for help, the staff of surveyors was increased temporarily to six 
with a draughtsman and two assistants in November 1900 .  In the following 
year there were seventy applications for land. Sixteen were made by 
Christian missions, fifteen of which were granted. Of the remainder, nine 
were withdrawn, six refused, and twenty three remained under 
consideration at the end of the year. The total area granted amounted to 
only l ,  1 15 acres nearly half of which went to the missions. The total area 
applied for had been 202 ,529 acres, including a resubmitted application of 
the Hall Sound Company and another for a block of over 100,000 acres at 
Mullens Harbour that LeHunte favoured but was unable to consider -
presumably because the applicant who made it could not command 
sufficient capital. This applicant was the Hon. Richard de Moleyns,  son of 
an Irish peer and probably living on a remittance. He had entered the 
government service briefly in 1 900 and later worked as an assistant on 
various plantations. The anthropologist Bronislaw Malinowski was to know 
'Dirty Dick' in Samarai during the war years as 'a thoroughbred noble 
figure. Drunk as a sponge, so long as there is whiskey about . . .  After 
sobering up . . . with strikingly good manners . . . [but] little intellectual 
culture' . 1 0  De Moleyns committed suicide in Samarai hospital in 1 9 1 6  and 
his family repudiated his debts. If he was exceptional in his origins and 
manners, there were others who shared his style of life on the fringes of the 
white community. 
By 1 904 lands purchased from the Papuans amounted to 353,6 1 4  acres 
and areas declared 'waste and vacant' totalled 338,988 acres, while the 
area actually alienated to settlers was 22,099 acres or 19 ,576 acres if 
mission grants were excepted. Christopher Robinson, Winter's successor as 
CJ O and Acting Administrator in 1 903 ,  submitte d  further 
recommendations for changes in the land law. He advocated that the 
Crown should at last assume the radical title to all lands whether presently 
occupied or claimed under customary tenure or not, but that future 
alienation should only be allowed under lease. A questionnaire circulated 
1 0  Bronislaw Malinowski, A Dtary in the Strict Sense of the Term (London 1 967), 39 . 
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among the white residents had brought answers overwhelmingly favouring 
the continuance of the freehold grant system but even so, as Robinson 
noted, the demand for land had been 'very slight'. 1 1  A system of land 
alienation based on leasing, he pointed out, protected planters from 
creditors, for the lessee was saved a large initial outlay that could instead 
be turned to development. Rents could be scaled according to the 
increasing capacity of an enterprise to pay and would provide the 
government with a continuing and direct source of income to augment and 
perhaps exceed import duties as the principal source of local revenue. If 
· despite the prejudice in its favour, the offer of land in freehold had failed to 
attract settlement, then long leases with their advantages well advertised 
might yet do so. 
By 1 906 , gold exports amounted to over £58,000 in value, or three 
quarters of the exports. The value of copra, still coming mostly from village 
groves, had increased to more than £9,000. It remained the principal item 
of trade with the Papuans but its value did not exceed that of the combined 
export of pearls, beche-de-mer, trochus and sandalwood, declining as these 
small industries were. Coffee exports of about fifteen tons were valued at 
£9 1 5 .  But of the 700,000 acres of crown lands and the grants and leases 
made from them for agrtcultural purposes, barely 1 ,500 acres had been 
actually developed after more than twenty years of European presence on 
the coast.12  Devoid generally of both capital and experience, the few 
planters, even when beginning to see some success, remained mostly 
amateurs working on a small scale and depending upon some other 
livelihood or a partnership to supplement their income or provide 
development funds. 
The Land Ordinance of 1906 was to end the granting of freehold rights 
in Papua. It did not assert the Crown's claim to radical title and preserved 
MacGregor's presumption of the Papuans' customary ownership of all land 
unless otherwise determined. The ordinance nonetheless provided very 
generous leasing conditions that until 1909 waived survey charges, levied 
no rents for the first ten years, and exacted only 3d. an acre per annum 
thereafter. Improvement conditions alone applied a check on excessive 
ambition. But these too seemed light. A fifth of any agricultural lease taken 
up was to be planted with an 'approved' crop within five years, or, in the 
case of pastoral leases, the lessee was gtven five years in which to stock 
each square mile With ten head of cattle. Within twenty years . three 
quarters of a plantation lease had to be planted up. 
1 1  NAPNG Serles 064, Despatch No 35, 1 2  Aug. 1903, to Governor of Queensland. 
12 PAR 1 906-07, 132; PAR 1912-13, 23. 
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In a flurry of activity outstanding freehold grants were issued to the 
remaining provisional grantees and published in the last British New 
Guinea Government Gazette in September 1 906 . Since 1 890 465 grants 
had been made, the last to be finalised being Henry Wickham's. Because 
the Conflict Islands , still unsurveyed, did not contain more than a third of 
the area stated in the deed of grant, Wickham had disputed the purchase 
charges and the freehold title was not issued until 1920. 13 
Commenting in 1 9 12 ,  Sir William MacGregor saw the argument over the 
form of tenure given alienated land to have been irrelevant to the 
development of the country since a boom in tropical commodities in the 
interim had succeeded in attracting capital to leasehold land in Papua 
when offers of cheap freehold in British New Guinea had failed to excite 
interest. What was meritorious about the land legislation of British New 
Guinea and Papua, he thought, was its guarantee of Papuan rights. 14 A 
more recent writer has concluded that it was 'to the credit of Papua's rulers 
that they were never dominated by the determination to make lands 
available at all costs'. 15 To the extent that large speculative land bids were 
discouraged before 1906 this is obviously true. But short of being offered 
absolutely free and without conditions, land had been made amply 
available. The government had already acquired far more crown land than 
it was ever able to dispose of, and had heavy demands developed, far 
greater areas could have been obtained without alteration in the law. In 
British New Guinea the reach of imperialism had, at least temporarily, 
exceeded its grasp and the goodwill of the new gavamani towards the 
Papuans was never really brought to the test. Among the remoter estuaries 
of empire, the country had remained barely touched by the high tide of the 
Western sea, possessed of a well intentioned land law designed to protect 
the native inhabitants in a flow of alien settlers that could not be induced 
to come. With the end of the interregnum coinciding with an international 
plantation boom it appeared that at last the flow might begin. 
1 3 CRS Al 22/9540.  A Bill was introduced in 1 906 in the Federal Parliament to 
permit the grant but was withdrawn. The Papua Act was amended in 1920 to overcome 
the impasse. 
14 Sir William MacGregor in the Foreword to J.H.P. Murray's Papua or British New 
Guinea (London 1 9 1 2  ). 
1 5  L.P.  Mair, Australia in New Guinea (Melbourne 1970), 135.  
CHAPTER 4 
The greatest freedom of contract 
THE QUESTION OF exploitation of the labour of the 'natives' of New Guinea 
had arisen even before the establishment of the Protectorate. A report of a 
Committee of Inquiry into the workings of the Western Pacific Orders in 
Council was presented to the Colonial Secretary in Whitehall in October 
1 883. With the unrecognised attempt by the Queensland government in the 
previous April to annex the whole of eastern New Guinea still a recent 
memory and with the Convention of the Australasian Colonies in session 
and pressing again for an assertion of British sovereignty, the Committee 
opposed the creation of a protectorate on any terms other than those which 
reserved to the imperial authorities the appointment of officials in any 
government to be established. Sir Arthur Gordon, the first High 
Commissioner and principal author of the report, was anxious to avoid any 
step that might lead to direct rule in New Guinea by Australians 
accountable to representative white colonial legislatures on grounds similar 
to those which had earlier led him in 18  78 to support annexation - the 
need to protect the islanders from the violence and anarchy that he 
believed would attend white settlement. But whereas in 1878 he had been 
disturbed at the thought of the treatment native peoples were likely to 
receive from miners entering the country, in 1883 he was apprehensive 
about the capacity of Australian governments, in particular Queensland's, 
to withstand pressure from sugar interests to allow large scale use of cheap 
labour drawn from this new, large and populous source by the Queensland 
sugar industry. It was 'to place the destinies of many millions of men 
entirely in the hands of those whose interests are always alien, and too 
often antagonistic to their own' .1 
The Colonial Office took a different view from that of the Committee and 
could see little reason to bear the burden of undertaking new 
responsibilities in New Guinea except in response to Australian pressures 
and upon the understanding that the burden must eventually pass to the 
Australians. But in consideration of the scruples of many who shared 
Gordon's apprehensions the Letters Patent establishing a Protectorate over 
the southeast coast in September 1884 explicitly forbade the removal of 
Quoted ln Deryck Scarr, Fragments of Empire (Canberra 1967), 13 1 .  
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labour from the country. As if to confirm Gordon's worst predictions, the 
first recruiting vessels to visit the coasts had begun calling at the 
Louisiades in April 1 883 - the captain and Queensland government agent 
on the very first ship, the Stanley, being subsequently convicted of offences 
under the Queensland Kidnapping Act. In the succeeding year repeated 
violations of the Queensland law regarding recruitment and the desertions 
of 'New Guinea natives' from sugar plantations led to the appointment of a 
Royal Commission in December 1 884, the Report of which gave so much 
evidence of misunderstanding, deception and violence in a traffic barely 
eighteen months old that the government in Brisbane ordered the 
repatriation of all New Guinea labourers. Of a total of 648 'recruited' in the 
Louisiades, 404 were returned in 1885 , fifty saw out their contracts in 
Queensland for another year or two, and the balance of 150 remain 
unaccounted for and might have died of disease or starvation in service or 
after absconding from it. To those Australians now sensitive to their 
countrymen's treatment of 'coloured people' it seemed that a calamity had 
barely been avoided. 
The Protectorate was recognise,d by the European powers as an 
assertion of a claim to a future consolidation of British interests in the 
region but otherwise by definition it meant the provision of no more than a 
protective shield under which still sovereign native political structures and 
community life could continue to work without outside interference. After 
the unfavourable findings of the Royal Commission of 1 884, and as with 
the issue of land alienation, the question of whether or how the labour of 
the native people of New Guinea might be exploited was left unresolved for 
as long as the Protectorate lasted. 
The final assumption of British sovereignty in September 1 888 was 
preceded a month earlier by a gold rush on Sudest. In his third enactment 
as Administrator Dr William MacGregor proclaimed an interim Labour 
Ordinance aimed at the miners. This placed an immediate restraint on the 
use of 'aboriginal natives' of British New Guinea as labourers outside 
defined districts or otherwise beyond ten miles from their homes unless for 
government service or engagement under agreement sanctioned by a 
Resident Magistrate to work on coastal boats. No agreement could be for 
more than six months and the consent of the 'tribe' or family needed to be 
secured. In other respects the conditions of service, briefly set out in this 
ordinance, were to remain those upon which all future contract or 
indentured labour law was to be based.2 These conditions were that the 
determination of the willingness of New Guinea men to engage and of their 
Natlves Removal Prohlbltlon Ordlnance, 1888. Supplement to BNG Government 
Gazette, 1 7 Sept. 1888. 
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understanding of what they were committing themselves to, and of the 
employer's preparedness to offer an agreed wage, rations, fair treatment 
and a passage home after a fixed term of service, should from the 
beginning be the responsibility of the magisterial staff. Employers were 
required either to deposit wages in advance or to supply a guarantee to 
cover default. The Resident Magistrates (RMs) while remaining accountable 
to the Government Secretary could cancel agreements at any time without 
being obliged to give reasons. 
That the labourers recruited in the Louisiades for service in Queensland 
in the brief labour trade of 1 883-85 were apparently less tractable or 
vigorous than workers drawn from elsewhere in western Melanesia led no 
one to suppose that the largest of all Pacific islands could not yield more 
than sufficient labour for its own economic development if a properly 
regulated internal system of contract labour was instituted. It was 
unthinkable in the 1 890s that it might ever be thought desirable to import 
labour into New Guinea to work mines and plantations - for if most white 
Australians were uneasy about the use of kanakas by Queensland sugar 
planters and would soon proceed to end the trade in island labour into 
Australia, they were not likely to consent to the importation of coolies into a 
territory so close to their northern coasts and which they already 
considered their own. 
A comprehensive Native Labour Ordinance in 1 892 permitted casual 
employment of the 'natives of British New Guinea' within twenty-five miles 
of their villages for periods up to a month, and contracts of service entered 
into before an RM now allowed labour to be removed from one Division to 
another for periods up to a year. Employers in the Torres Strait pearl 
fisheries who maintained assets in the Possession and provided security 
could take Papuans outside the boundaries of the country as far south as 
Cooktown - a privilege extended also to the missions, effectively the Sacred 
Heart Mission which wanted to send pupils from the Mekeo to Thursday 
Island. Either party to a contract could now apply to have agreements 
altered or cancelled though in any case the employer was obliged to bear 
the cost of returning labourers home. Only the death of a labourer or his 
positive refusal to return to his village could relieve the employer of this 
obligation.3 
The law as yet contained no sanctions - except loss of pay - that could 
be applied to labourers who 'without reasonable cause' deserted their 
employers or who refused to work, and since wages were normally paid in 
full at the termination of the contract in the presence of an RM, the 
Natlve Labour Ordinance, 1892. Supplement to BNG Government Gazette, 4 June 
1 892. 
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employer was compelled to register desertions or other complaints promptly 
or remain liable for the whole amount of the wages agreed to at the outset 
and other costs stipulated by law. 
As elsewhere in the tropical world where labour was secured by 
contract, the wage in cash paid in full at the end of the term of indenture 
was not the whole wage nor the total cost of labour. Employers were 
required to maintain their workers, to accommodate, feed and minimally 
clothe them, the cost of these provisions together with the expenses of 
recruitment and repatriation amounting to three or more times the average 
cash wage that accrued at the rate of between 5s. and £ 1 a month. And 
clearly this deferred cash wage was not intended to provide support for 
distant dependants during the period of indenture. MacGregor included a 
clause in the new ordinance to the effect that an RM sanctioning an 
agreement had to be satisfied that the dependants of a labourer would be 
adequately maintained in their village in his absence but it was not 
expected that they would be maintained by either the labourer or his 
employer.4 In British New Guinea and subsequently in Papua, unless they 
were permitted to accompany the indentured labourer wholly at the 
employer's risk and expense, a worker's dependants were expected to fmd 
their subsistence at home. 
To MacGregor the ordinance had been 'framed to permit the greatest 
freedom of contract between the employer and the native that is compatible 
with reasonable protection of the latter in his present condition' .5 To the 
few settlers , as matters stood in 1 892,  it might reasonably have seemed 
that the men of British New Guinea had very little to lose in breaking their 
contracts whereas employers took a considerable risk in employing them at 
all. While the chief inducement to engage for service with the white man 
must always have been the goods purchased with the wages labourers 
expected to receive at the end of their indenture, and while coastal 
communities were quickly made dependent on the metal goods, cloth and 
tobacco which indentured service allowed them to buy, in an essential 
sense the capacity of the people to subsist without work for money was not 
greatly diminished by the European intrusion. 
Villagers could not fmally be compelled to work for Europeans, and 
indentured labourers possessed, unlike their employers, no movable wealth 
that could be claimed in redress of a breach of contract - it being agreed 
that their lands could not so be used. There seemed no means by which 
Papuan workers could be forced to honour an agreement with an employer 
other than by withholding their wages - unless penalties properly belonging 
4 NLO 1892, XIV (3 ). 
BNGAR 1891-91 , 12 .  
The greatest freedom of contract 47 
to the criminal law were applied in cases of default by native employees in 
civil contracts of service. This was legally anomalous but deemed 
practically necessary and in 1893, in an amending ordinance, MacGregor 
imposed such a penalty in the form of a month's imprisonment for 
unjustified desertion or refusal to begin contracted service. A further 
amendment in 1897, waiving imprisonment, allowed for the arrest and 
return to their employers of deserters, but another in 1900 imposed a 
fortnight's gaol for failure to cany out reasonable orders. Thus the 
inequalities of the situation were resolved in the employer's favour with the 
power of the magistrates and the threat of gaol standing behind a 
taubada's order. The extent to which employers could exploit this 
advantage would be tested in the coming years. 
A further ordinance consolidating the labour law and amendments was 
proclaimed by MacGregor's successor, G.  R. LeHunte, in January 1 900.6 
This required recruiters of Papuan labour to be licensed ·  and to lodge 
guarantees covered by a bond of £50 with a licensing officer. The recruiter's 
responsibilities towards men he had recruited, like those subsequently of 
the employer, became a charge against his estate in the case of his death 
and the RMs were to be allowed the same unobstructed access to 
recruiters' boats that they had to labour lines on mines and plantations.  By 
making it an offence to use false pretences to induce a villager to leave his 
home to travel to a government station to be engaged as a labourer, the law 
placed upon the recruiter the first responsibility of making sure that 
recruits understood enough of the purpose, duration, destination and 
conditions of the employment they were being offered well before they 
appeared before an RM who could witness their contract. 7 In effect 
recruiters needed to know from employers requiring labour what the 
conditions and type of work would be so that labourers could be recruited 
to specific order. There were to be no labour exchanges or pools. 
Labourers could now have their contracts endorsed to permit re­
engagement for a second year and contraets could be signed before any RM 
along large parts of the coast soon to be declared Settled Labour Districts. 
The penal sanctions for refusal to work, desertion or neglect of duty could 
Natlve Labour Ordinance, 1900. Supplement to BNG Govemment·Gazette, 10 Feb. 
1 900. 
See note 7, p. 94 below for mention of a prosecution in 1903 of Edward Auerback 
for using false pretences while recruiting. The missionary Charles Abel noted in a letter to 
the Foreign Secretary of the LMS in London that 'Auerback, Lindsay Bell, Nichollls l  and 
(F. 1 Evenett had all been detected transgressing the law that year. (Abel to W. I. 
Thompson, 20 Oct. 1903, cited in Liese Baker: 'The beginning of the indentured labour 
system in Papua, 1888- 1 908', BA Honours thesis, ANU, 1 970, p. 24. The Papuan letters 
of the LMS, 1872-1906, are held in NLA, Microfilm M9 1 - 1 0 1 . )  
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include both imprisonment and loss of wages though the costs of carrying 
out a warrant for the arrest of deserters were still to be borne by the 
employer. The relaxation for a time of the requirement that labourers be 
signed on at the government station nearest their homes came under 
criticism and in 1 9 1 2  the more stringent rule was restored. Thus, unless 
the employer was a licensed recruiter himself, the burden of seeing that the 
conditions at the outset of engagement were fulfilled was to rest with 
recruiters and government officers in the divisions where labour was 
obtained. Though RMs were frequently moved the offices on stations soon 
acquired systematic records of labour movements that allowed recruitment 
and repatriation to be policed with an apparently complete effectiveness . 
The structure of the system of indentured labour in British New Guinea 
and inherited by the Territory of Papua under the Commonwealth was thus 
substantially assembled and in place well before 1906 . The actual numbers 
of the 'Papuan natives of British New Guinea' who were affected by the 
consolidated Labour Ordinance of 1 900 were relatively small with most 
employed in gold mining in the South Eastern and Northern Divisions or 
the Torres Strait pearl fisheries . In 1 902-03, the Eastern Division was 
providing most labourers with 2 ,  1 14 engaging there in the year, 1 ,  1 22 for 
work in other divisions.8 
Both employers and distant governments could readily argue that 
employment did no more than soak up the idle labour become available 
with the suppression of tribal warfare, that service for the white man was a 
healthy substitute for feuding and that the absence of young men placed 
little added burden upon communities where the labour of subsistence had 
always fallen unequally upon the women. Indeed engagement was to be 
largely confined to those apparently most easily 'spared' - the young 
unmarried men - whose labour may always have been marginal to the 
strictly subsistence requirements of village life.  But responsible officers 
nearer at hand soon saw that there were cultural and social stresses 
brought about by the absence of cohorts of such young men year after year 
that could not be calculated, and in ensuring that workers spent 
substantial periods at home between contracts, the successive 
administrations sought at least to temper the worst effects of the indenture 
system upon the fabric of Papuan societies. And clearly, in dependencies 
like British New Guinea and its successor entity, the Territory of Papua, 
where labour was exclusively drawn from within the country, the healthy 
continuance of the parallel subsistence economy in the communities that 
supplied the new workers remained vital to the plantation or mining 
8 BNGAR 1 902-03 , 27. 
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economy that Europeans sought to establish. We may now think that it 
was the distant consumers of tropical commodities and not the white 
settlers in the tropics who chiefly benefited from the near perfect 
competition that existed between the plantation colonies in the production 
of these commodities. We may also think those consumers beneficiaries of 
an effective subsidy to production provided by the enduring capacity of 
subjected peoples to forego both the society of many of the younger men 
and the added labour they might have contributed at home - or to any 
alternative smallholder cash-crop development, and to otherwise furnish 
subsistence to workers' dependents independently of the cash system. 
It may be a virtue of the administrations of British New Guinea and 
Papua that in tacit recognition of the intractability of the international 
terms of trade that determined 'native' wages, the Papuans would never be 
permitted to become a landless and permanently wage dependent 
proletariat. The corollary of this, it seems, was that they were ever to 
remain 'boys' and their wages in the nature of pocket money for the 
purchase of imported luxuries. The sensitivity to the moral issues 
surrounding the acquisition of new colonial responsibilities that 
characterised the best in late nineteenth century British imperialism could 
secure a situation no better than this. 
A new Native Labour Ordinance drafted in 1 906 while Captain F. R. 
Barton was Administrator by J. H. P. Murray CJO was given assent in April 
1 907.9 It permitted terms of indenture of up to three years, or consecutive 
shorter terms of indenture amounting to three years, after which labourers 
were to be returned to live in their villages for a minimum of twelve months 
before they could be re-engaged. The ordinance consolidated the previous 
legislation placing the full responsibility for the care, safety and safe 
repatriation of indentured labourers clearly in the hands of the Europeans 
recruiting or employing them. In the case of an employer his obligations 
commenced from the day on which a contract was signed until the 
labourer's return home. As before, Contracts of Service were to be signed 
before an RM or ARM in the labourer's home division, the kind of labour to 
be undertaken and the place of work to be limited to those 'agreed to' in the 
contract. Wages were to be lodged at monthly intervals with the RM in the 
division in which the worker was employed and paid out in full in the 
presence of an officer at the end of the term of indenture. The wages of 
deceased labourers were sent on to their relatives. A further ordinance in 
1 9 1 1 which continued in force with amendments until 1941 , permitted 
signing on for a fourth year provided at least a year separated the 
Natlve Labour Ordinance, 1 907. Supplement to Territory of Papua Government 
Gazette, 23 Apr. 1907. 
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completion of the prolonged period of indenture and the commencement of 
another . 10 Employers were required to place an amount equivalent to 
three months' wages in advance with an RM or nominate a guarantor who 
had agreed to provide surety for the employer's liabilities. In later years 
larger employers might have this requirement waived. 
The administration was reluctant to allow the payment of 'advances' -
payments to labourers during the term of indenture - on account of the 
advantage such payments would give the planter (or very commonly his 
wife) as storekeeper. But from 1 9 1 9  amounts totalling no more than a sixth 
of the wages due at the end of the contract could be advanced out of the 
deposits held by the RM , and spent locally, usually at the plantation store. 
Native Affairs officers routinely checked prices in such stores as plantations 
were inspected. 1 1  
The techniques of cultivation and preparation for export of tropical tree 
crops did not greatly change throughout the period under review. Much of 
the work on plantations was essentially horticultural, if on a large scale, 
and continued to require a very large input of manual labour by 
comparison with the increasingly mechanised agriculture of the temperate 
lands.12 The standards for the export of tropical products were set and the 
technology developed usually in the main producing countries. These 
requirements were quickly passed on through trade and agricultural 
bulletins and the signals given by the market to the growers in places like 
Papua who could not afford to fall far behind. 13 Little or none of the value 
of increased efficiency or productivity achieved over the years was retained 
by the producers in these territories - this was quickly absorbed by the 
metropolitan manufacturers and consumers who as a consequence did no 
more than buy more cheaply and well. 
1 0  Exemptions from the requirements of the NLO to allow repeated re-engagements 
were very frequently permitted Papuans from the villages near Port Moresby. 
1 1  B y  the thirties advances of u p  to a third of accumulated wages were permitted 
(PAR 1 935-35, 7). 
1 2  Temperate tree crops required pickers and packers in large numbers only at 
harvest time and markets in their produce remained accustomed to accepting prices 
determined by competition among European producers employing white labour, the 
latter, if not necessarily unionised, forming a class hardly to be ignored - as 'native' and 
indentured labour in the colonies could be - in political calculations in the metropole. 
1 3  Staniforth Smith, Director of Agriculture 1907-30, kept himself and planters well 
abreast of new ideas in the boom years and beyond. From 19 1 1  too, the Papuan Times 
and its successor, the Papuan Courter, regularly published news of the markets in copra 
and rubber and frequently other information useful to planters. The BNGD Co. from 1 9 1 0  
was able to draw o n  the knowledge of members of its board who were also directors of the 
Kuala Selangor Rubber Co. , subscribers to the Rubber Growers' Association of Malaya 
bulletins. As mentioned in Chapter 1 6  below at least two inventions developed by a 
Papuan settler were of some interest to others - a new type of copra dryer and a coconut 
desiccator both designed by the Samarai engineer and planter, Norman Izod. 
PART I I  
First grandchi ld of the Empire - 1901-1914 
Your Commissioners, feeling convinced that the outside world 
generally possesses only the vaguest knowledge with regard to 
Papua, and this often of the most misleading character, consider 
that in the interests of the Territory every means should be 
adopted for placing its great natural possibilities before the 
public, so that the inaccuracies as to climate and the nature of 
the native population be swept aside, and the fact brought out 
that neither the one nor yet the other is half as bad as it has 
been painted, while further, that its beauties and potentialities in 
the way of immediate and profitable white settlement should be 
put forward in an attractive and authentic form. 
Report of the Royal Commission of Inquiry Into Present Conditions &c, 1907. 
There is chance in everything mortal, it is true, but the element 
of chance in the Papuan planter's gains is , after all, the personal 
factor only. The soil will produce. The products will sell. Neither 
drought nor hurricane will sweep away the results of a man's 
labour of years in a day or a month, for both are unknown in 
Papua. Nothing can prevent a small capitalist doing well, and 
making money rapidly, save his own fault . . .  if he has common­
sense, common industry and patience, his fortune will surely 
follow. 
Beatrtce Grimshaw, Papua the Marvellous: The country of Chances. c. 1909. 

CHAPTE R 5 
A natural dependency of Austral ia 
WITH THE APPROACH of federation in Australia, the Secretary of State for 
the Colonies, Joseph Chamberlain, sought to establish that the full 
responsibility for the future government and expense of British New Guinea 
should be with the new Commonwealth. In June 1 898 he reminded the 
colonial governments that participated in supporting the administration 
that the Possession was a 'natural dependency' of Australia, that it was 
likely to be developed almost entirely by Australian enterprise, and that it 
had been annexed solely in response to an overwhelming colonial demand. 
From the end of 1 900 the British government declined to make further 
contributions to the revenue of British New Guinea, the expenditure in 
1 901  being mostly met out of a small reserve built up by MacGregor. With 
the establishment of the Commonwealth , the former contributing colonies 
also withdrew their financial support pending federal initiative in a matter 
that had ceased to be a States responsibility under the Australian 
Constitution. By late 1 90 1  LeHunte was forced to approach the 
Queensland Government for guarantees to cover his deficit. 1 
Pressed thus to consider the acceptance of British New Guinea as a 
territory of the Commonwealth before, in the opinion of some members, the 
new nation was ready to undertake such a responsibility, both houses of 
the federal parliament debated the issues in November 1901 . The debates 
are instructive for in them were raised the fundamental contradictions that 
existed between preservation of a 'White Australia' and an expansionist 
policy by the Commonwealth in the South Pacific. In view of the threat 
implicit in the stand of the imperial authorities - that the Possession might 
otherwise be abandoned - the government of Sir Edmund Barton moved 
that British New Guinea be accepted as a 'Territory' of the Commonwealth 
and that £20,000 a year be voted for five years as an interim measure to 
meet the costs of administration.2 In the end a majority of the 
parliamentarians were readily persuaded that an increased responsibility in 
CRS A2 03 / 2538, Letter LeHunte to Sir Samuel Griffith, 1 Oct. 1 90 1 .  
Commonwealth Parltamentary Debates, Vol. VI ,  1 90 1 ,  p.  7092. (Representatives) 
1 2  Nov. 190 1 .  The debate was resumed on 1 9  Nov., p. 7396 .  The record of the debate of 
20 Nov. in the Senate includes the text of Chamberlain's despatch of 8 June 1 898, p. 
7470. 
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New Guinea was justly commensurate with Australia's new status and 
imperative if hostile powers were to continue to be denied use of numerous 
harbours from which an attack upon Australia might in future be 
launched. But a minority felt that the acquisition of common borders 
between unambiguously Australian territory and territories of the German 
and Dutch empires might lead directly to those very entanglements and 
confrontations that British possession was supposed to prevent and which 
continuation of the former arrangement might avoid. The symmetry of an 
island continent inhabited by one race and nation, so recently established, 
was to be immediately lost and the policy of white racial exclusivism 
compromised from the start. 
The member for New England and a wealthy grazier, William Bowie 
Stuart Sawers failed to see any advantage for Australia in accepting the full 
burden of a limitless expenditure in New Guinea where the experience of 
the 'home' government with many another unprofitable colonial possession 
was likely to be repeated. Or, he asked, were industries such as sugar 
production to be encouraged there and given assistance that would be 'to 
the detriment of our own workers within our own proper Australian 
territory'? He hoped that if the Commonwealth could find part of the costs 
of government, the Colonial Office would continue to administer British 
New Guinea and that some rearrangement of the spheres of influence of 
European powers in the Pacific might be made to remove the danger of 
conflict further from Australian shores, for 'the policy of mopping up the 
islands is a sort of Jingoism which I hope Australia will refrain from'. 3 
The Attorney General, Alfred Deakin, eloquently advanced those 
arguments for the government that were calculated to disarm opposition 
through an appeal to humanitarianism. If the attitude of the 'home 
authorities' was firm and unalterable in refusing further to take 
responsibility, and since British New Guinea had indeed been 'virtually 
annexed' at the behest of the Australian colonies 'for many years past', the 
Commonwealth had very little choice in the matter. Nor could it be 
admitted that 'separated by half the earth's circuit, a Government in 
Downing Street would be likely to administer [New Guinea's] affairs more 
efficiently in the interests of the Empire as a whole than would the 
Government of the Commonwealth with its much greater proximity' .4 As 
for the threat to Australia's security posed by the common borders 
acquired, it was unlikely, Deakin thought, that the settlers of the respective 
Australian, German and Dutch territories would find themselves face to 
face for many years. 
Ibid . ,  7406 , 7407. 
Ibid. , 74 10. 
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Ultimately, he argued, i t  was essential that the Commonwealth assume 
full control over the Possession in the interests of the native people, for the 
protection of their lands and labour from 'irresponsible men who are a law 
unto themselves' and who would inevitably be drawn there, as 
The only guarantee, or the most efficient we can have, that the settlement of New 
Guinea shall form an exception in the history of the development of a tropical 
country inhabited by native races - that the settlement shall take place on the 
lines of peace, order, and good government, so that great land monopolies and 
injustice to the native may be prevented - is that when we pay this £20,000 a 
year, the Commonwealth Parliament shall be able to impose its own conditions, 
and see to the administration itself. 5 
There was, it seemed, no alternative to an acceptance of this responsibility 
just as 'there can be no pause in New Guinea till its resources are 
sufficiently developed to yield a revenue to provide for its efficient 
administration'. 6 
Among the speakers in the debate in the upper house on the following 
day was a senator from Western Australia, Miles Staniforth Cater Smith. 
Senator Smith regretted that 'we have to accept the government of any 
territory outside of Australia for the next fifty or hundred years' when 
Australians had such a vast land of their own to develop. 7 He was 
immediately intrigued, nonetheless, by the alternatives open to Australia in 
the development of the Possession and by the difficulties presented by the 
incorporation in some manner of '350 ,000 aliens . . .  equal in number to 
the population of two states of the Commonwealth'. In particular and in 
direct reference to both the Hall Sound Company and the 'Somers Vine 
Syndicate' he condemned 'endeavours . . . to monopolise huge tracts of 
country' in New Guinea and hoped that if Australia was to be obliged to 
undertake the government that a stipulation should be that no alienation 
of land in fee simple be permitted.8 It was declamation of a kind that was 
repeated and which made it difficult for Senator Walker, the Hall Sound 
director, to do more than seem to apologise for his company with 
suggestions that it would accept long leases instead of freehold land. 
Australian populism whether expressed on the left or the right of 
representative legislatures could fmd easy game and electoral profit in 
inveighing against any step by capitalists that it suited politicians (or other 
capitalists) to represent as excessive. 
8 
Ibid . ,  74 12 .  
Ibid . ,  74 1 1 .  
Ibid. ,  (Senate) 7477. 
Ibid . ,  7476 . 
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Staniforth Smith's interest in British New Guinea was to increase. He 
was born in Victoria in 1 869. Having gone as a telegraph linesman to the 
Western Australian goldfields he had become Reuters' correspondent and a 
highly successful and popular mayor of Kalgoorlie at thirty. He established 
the town markets undercutting middlemen by profitably railing fresh fruit 
and vegetables from the coast at municipal expense. He gave Kalgoorlie 
children holidays by the sea. In the elections for the first Senate he received 
the most votes of any Western Australian candidate. After March 1 902 he 
'adopted' British New Guinea as a cause, becoming an undisputed 
parliamentary authority on the Possession, and in 1903, on an 
investigatory tour that also included German New Guinea and the British 
Solomon Islands, he visited the country. 
Senator Smith returned greatly impressed by the luxuriance of tropical 
vegetation and the fertility this might suggest to anyone who had spent 
years on the arid Western Australian diggings. Of Australia's 'new' 
dependency he concluded, 
British New Guinea is like a large and valuable estate which, up to the present 
lying idle, only requires money judiciously spent in cultivation to make it capable 
of yielding a large revenue. The present revenue is sufficient to maintain the 
status quo and unless the Commonwealth is prepared to initiate a more liberal 
policy New Guinea will remain undeveloped, and always be a financial burden. 9 
But, he repeated, the country must not be given over to speculators, 
syndicators or promoters like the Hall Sound Company 'who desire to 
obtain the freehold of huge areas, not to cultivate, but to hold until white 
settlers arrive, when they will be in a position to demand a share of the 
wealth they produce'. 1° For Staniforth Smith it was to the same 
enterprising white smallholder-planter for whom MacGregor had waited in 
vain that the Commonwealth should look if the country was to be 'opened 
up'. In the full flush of federation, Australia now seemed possessed of 
immensely increased capacity to carry out the work of development and, 
indeed, must fmd the means or forfeit the right to hold such a valuable 
territory. Point was again given to the threat posed by other powers in the 
region in October 1 904 when the Melbourne Age reported that a writer in 
the St Petersburg paper Novoe Vremya had urged the establishment of a 
Russian naval refuelling station in the vicinity pf New Guinea for the Baltic 
NLA Deposit 1 709 , Staniforth Smith Papers, item 1 46 1 ,  'British New Guinea with 
a preface on Australia's policy in the Pacific' by Senator Staniforth Smith, 2 1  July 1 903, 
p. 1 7. This contains portions of articles by Smith that had appeared in the Dally 
Telegraph (Sydney), the Morning Herald (Perth), and the Kalgoorlle Miner. 
1 0  Ibid. 
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Fleet then embarking for the Far East. 1 1  The Prime Minister consulted 
Senator Smith, recently returned from New Guinea, about conditions in the 
Dutch territory. The senator understood these to be chaotic and urged 
opposition to any Russian move. No member of parliament, it seemed, now 
knew more of the region than Staniforth Smith and in the debates late in 
1 905 over the form of a new constitution for British New Guinea to be 
embodied in the Papua Act, his advantage, unfailingly demonstrated,  might 
well have irritated some of his colleagues. 
At the end of the year in a letter to Deakin, now Prime Minister, Smith 
suggested that he be enabled to visit Java, the Straits Settlements and the 
Federated Malay States in order to see alternatives from which to choose in 
the development of the 'new' Territory of Papua and to make 
recommendations. The permanent head of the Department of External 
Affairs, Atlee Hunt, responded that 
Mr Deakin wishes to say that he much appreciates the public spirit you display, 
and will be pleased indeed to received a report on the lines indicated by you. 
Your knowledge of the Territory of Papua will place you in a position enjoyed by 
very few others of making your report of such a nature that it will have practical 
value in assisting the development of the Possession. 12 
The Report was tabled as a Parliamentary Paper in June 1 906 . It was 
clearly the work of an energetic mind, voracious for administrative and 
agricultural minutiae, unfettered by doubt. Smith concluded 'confidently . .  
. that any economic plant growing successfully in Java could be grown 
equally successfully in Papua' which was , after all, at 'the same latitude 
and in the same isotherm' as 'the Garden of the East'. 1 3 Only the lack of 
skill and experience among the Papuans could prevent the commercial 
development of many of the agricultural products that might be grown and 
in time this condition could be amended. Meanwhile he could recommend 
the development of rubber and copra industries certain that they would 
succeed. 
Nonetheless, 'exceptionally easy terms' must be offered if settlers were to 
be attracted to New Guinea when huge areas of tropic lands appeared to be 
available elsewhere. While leasehold title was preferable to alienation of 
land in freehold, Smith continued to believe, lessees who fulfilled the 
conditions of their leases should be allowed the virtual equivalent of 
freehold - the leases should be perpetual and the rental kept to a 
'peppercorn' rate for the first ten or fifteen years. Much impressed by the 
1 1  Staniforth Smith Papers, Items 930-936 .  
1 2  Ibid.,  item 938, Atlee Hunt t o  Staniforth Smith, 3 Jan. 1906. 
1 3  CPP 1906, Vol. 2, Report on the Federated Malay States and Java, by Senator 
Staniforth Smith, p. 53. 
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support given to the planters of Java by the Netherlands East Indies 
Government through the research establishments at Buitenzorg, he 
recommended that the Papuan Government quickly develop coastal and hill 
experimental stations with nurseries from which planters could obtain seed 
at cost. The government should also establish its own commercial 
plantations of rubber and coconuts in conjunction with these stations and 
smaller experimental plots should be maintained by the RMs with prison 
labour at all divisional headquarters. Finally, there was a need for an 
agriculture department administered by a 'thoroughly practical expert in 
tropical plantation work' . It must operate as an 'Intelligence Department' 
constantly in touch with developments abroad, for, being 'the last of the 
nations to take upon our shoulders the burden of a tropical dependency' , 
Australia could begin its work in Papua 'lightened by the fact that almost 
every important problem of subordinate government in the tropics, and 
almost every difficulty regarding economic development, has either been 
solved or has been the subject of prolonged investigation' . 14 
Of the Papuans , their 'true welfare' , Staniforth Smith thought, would 
more probably be served by Australian imitation of the methods used by 
the Dutch in compelling the native Javanese to become an efficient and 
prosperous workforce - rather than by following the British practice of 
importing more 'virile' races under an indenture system. The transfer of 
labour from India and China to Malaya had injured the Malays, 
accentuating their 'listlessness' and 'destroying their distinctive race 
characteristics' . 15 If doubts were held about the industriousness of the 
Papuans it was to be remembered that they were an agricultural people, 
that thousands of them were already under voluntary indenture within the 
Territory and that similar people from the South Sea Islands had worked 
well in Queensland. Taxation, he thought, should not therefore be used, for 
the present at least, to force the people into wage labour and they were to 
have their possession of the lands they occupied once more confirmed. 
Hesitant as he may have been in 1 90 1  about Australia's capacity to 
undertake responsibility for British New Guinea when so much remained to 
be done at home, by 1906 Staniforth Smith had come to see the country as 
an inviting national and personal opportunity. For by 1906 also, 
developments in Papua had set in train steps that would lead to a Royal 
Commission into the administration, and the senator could see that in 
considering his own future he might reasonably aspire to a greater and 
more direct influence on the government of the Territory if and when the 
Administrator, Captain Francis Rickman Barton, retired. It was an 
14 Ibid. , 64. 
15 Ibid . ,  67. 
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attractive option but not the only one open to him. In June 1 906 he sought 
nomination from non-Labor groups in Western Australia for the House of 
Representatives seat of Fremantle, believing that the Senate was too 
elevated a base for an active and continuing political career in Australia. It 
seems likely that Smith would have received that nomination for he 
remained a popular figure, the very image of a plain-speaking and practical 
politician whose views seemed to reflect public opinion. But on 4 
September Deakin offered Staniforth Smith the post of Director of 
Agriculture, Mines and Public Works together with the office of 
Commissioner of Lands and Surveys in the Government of Papua with an 
invitation to carry out those policies he had advocated for the development 
of the Territory. 16 So broad and encompassing did this mandate seem that 
Smith can only have thought that he was being prepared for the highest 
office in the administration when it became vacant. Accepting the 
appointment the following day he set out his hopes in an effort to bind 
Deakin to their fulfilment adding that 
I shall trust entirely to you when the official offer is made to so amplify my 
position that I shall not be cramped in carrying out a strenuous development 
policy, and at the same time enable me to succeed Captain Barton whenever his 
term may expire, as the first Australian Lieutenant Governor. 17 
Yet the Prime Minister had been trying to arrange the return of Sir 
William MacGregor to serve a further term in New Guinea and to smooth 
the passage of new policies that the Commonwealth might undertake there. 
Such an appointment would not necessarily have barred the way for 
Staniforth Smith for long and Deakin went so far as to say in reply that 'I 
have no knowledge of any Australian with qualifications for the post of 
Lieutenant Governor equal to your own. After you have had local 
experience I do not suppose that you could be passed over but I cannot 
officially guarantee it' . 18 But as an unofficial guarantee this was enough. 
Senator Smith telegrammed his political brokers his intention to retire from 
politics to take up 'farming' . 19  
To secure an opinion upon which Commonwealth policy might be based 
the permanent secretary of the federal department responsible for the 
Territory had earlier been sent to Port Moresby in July 1 905 .  This was 
Arthur Atlee Hunt. Born in 1 864, Atlee Hunt had been private secretary to 
the first Prime Minister, Edmund Barton, and as head of External Affairs 
( 1 90 1 - 1 9 1 7) ,  and subsequently of Home and Territories ( 1 9 1 7- 1 92 1 ) , he 
16 Staniforth Smith Papers, item 969, Deakin to Staniforth Smith, 4 Sept. 1 906 . 
1 7 Ibid. , Staniforth Smith to Deakin, 5 Sept. 1 906. 
18 Ibid. , item 968, Deakin to Staniforth Smith, 5 Sept. 1 906 . 
19 Ibid. ,  item 955 .  
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was to remain the Commonwealth officer responsible for relations with the 
administration in Papua through many changes of federal ministry and 
years of hope , conflict and disappointment. The permanent secretary's 
Report was barely tabled before the Papua Act was passed in November 
1 905. 
His Report couched in terms more circumspect than Smith's ,  Hunt had 
not seen in New Guinea a country where white men could be encouraged to 
settle in large numbers both on account of the climate and because such 
settlers 'are the very kind . . . of whom Australia stands in need herself. 20 
But since a policy of mere possession and pacification could only lead to 
the degeneration of the Papuans through sloth, and might hardly be said to 
be making 'the fullest use of the goodly heritage' it had become Australia's 
'privilege to possess', the country must be developed. And while 
'extravagant optimism' was not warranted and the time and investment 
required in the progress of development should not be underestimated, a 
combination of imported capital, white direction and native labour would 
lead eventually, he suggested, to 'a solid and substantial prosperity'.21 
Cautious , prudent, yet suggesting the possibility of real gain, this was 
well calculated not to escape the eye of 'judicious' investors and Hunt went 
on to hold out the hope that in time the country, rightly administered, 
might indeed be another Java and repay its possessors 'most handsomely' , 
for 'the management of a colony is . . .  merely the conduct of a commercial 
undertaking' and Australia's principal consideration must be 'where . . .  the 
capital [ is ]  to be found which is to run this mercantile enterprise that we 
have taken on our hands' .22 Using the example of the public loans that 
had financed the development programs of the Australian colonies he went 
so far as to propose that the Commonwealth invest a fixed amount, a 
minimum of £300 ,000, in the government of British New Guinea in annual 
payments of £ 1 5 ,000 upon which an interest of 3% or 3.5% might be 
levied. 
Hunt was prepared to concede that the 'savage practices' of the 
inhabitants were 'inhuman' perhaps only to European minds and he was 
surprised and impressed by the variety and settled quality of Papuan 
community life. Yet he accepted as axiomatic that iron tools and peace 
would debilitate the people and rob them of the opportunity for struggle 
without which, as every reasonable man would grant, health and vigour 
could not be maintained whether by races or individuals. He proposed that 
taxation should be used to compel the villagers into work either for 
2° CPP 1905, Vol. 2 ,  Brltlsh New Guinea Report, by Atlee Hunt, p. 6 .  
2 1  Ibid. , 19 ,  28. 
2 2  Ibid. , 28. 
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themselves or for others. If, as he thought likely, the lot of raising economic 
crops and therefore the tax in the villages should fall mainly upon the 
women who traditionally bore a disproportionate burden of the garden 
labour, then a levy 'of young men for plantation service to be performed as 
a national duty' could be imposed upon each community from the wages of 
whom the tax could be deducted. 23 
It was a confident age for Europeans, their collective hubris as yet to 
face its most terrible challenges. Staniforth Smith's and Atlee Hunt's 
Reports were written in the last decade of what had been an extraordinruy 
century of expansion in white settlement overseas. And everywhere white 
men had settled extensively 'native' peoples seemed to be in retreat, their 
numbers diminishing inexorably towards extinction, the Australian 
Aborigines the most conspicuous among them. Java was an exception. 
There it appeared the Dutch had solved the problem of population decline 
with a policy that compelled the Javanese to work for Europeans.  The 
concern expressed by Hunt and Smith to 'save' the Papuans by getting 
them likewise to labour for foreigners might now seem to some more an 
exercise in casuistry, a convenient rationalisation for the exploitation of the 
weak by the strong. But these men like many of their contemporaries 
elsewhere - including many who were unaware that they might derive any 
personal advantage from the labour of Javanese or Papuans - were 
responding to facts that seemed indisputable. The invigorating function of 
work, struggle and effort in human societies was obvious.  Getting the 
Papuans to work was an urgent necessity if they were to survive as a 
people.24 
23 Ibid. , 24. 
24 There was a similar presumption that the adoption of European clothing by 
'native' peoples was also a contributor to their 'annihilation'. The Native Regulations 
issued under the Native Regulations Ordinance 1 908-1930 forbade (subject only to 
express exemptions) the wearing of clothing on the upper body by Papuans, men and 
women. 
CHAPTER 6 
The late Crown Colony trad itions 
ATLEE HUNT HAD stayed in Port Moresby a s  a guest o f  Captain Barton , the 
Administrator, and his Report gave a favourable impression of both the 
administration and its officers; the 'standstill' in development he attributed 
wholly to the uncertainty that prevailed as to what Australian policy would be. 
But a case arose while Hunt was in Papua that was to place doubts in 
Deakin's mind that Runt's high opinion of Barton's administration was 
justified. The Administrator had suspended the Chief Government Surveyor, 
John Richmond, when Richmond refused to withdraw a charge that Barton 
had altered official papers connected with the forfeiture and transfer of an 
urban lease and had destroyed an official minute paper. The case further 
divided two factions that had formed among the fifty officers that comprised 
the government service - those who were loyal to the Administrator and those 
sympathising with Richmond and aggrieved in other ways , who were grouped 
around the doyen of the service and Government Secretary, Anthony 
Musgrave. 
The case was examined by a board of enquiry in Australia and Barton 
exonerated. But now aware of the division among the officials in Port Moresby 
and unwilling to act publicly in view of the support Runt's report together 
with the outcome of the enquiry gave to the Administrator, Deakin wrote 
privately in March 1 906 to the Chief Judicial Officer (CJO) in Papua, John 
Hubert Plunkett Murray, requesting a confidential 'criticism of the 
circumstances in New Guinea' and the 'fullest and frankest judgement you 
can favour me with upon our officers, methods and aims' . 1 The moves that 
led to the eventual appointment of Hubert Murray as Lieutenant Governor 
have been recounted by his and Deakin's biographers but since the choice of 
Murray was due in part to a view of development for Papua which he held at 
this time and that he was to express before a Royal Commission in November 
1 906 they must be discussed here. 
Murray, always standing at a distance from events in which he was 
engaged and as self-sufficient and reserved as Staniforth Smith was 
gregarious and garrulous, possessed an intimidating and enigmatic 
personality. Physically imposing, a graduate with Firsts at Oxford, Lieutenant 
J. A. LaNauze, Alfred Deakln (Melbourne 1 965 ), Vol. 2, p. 459. 
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Colonel of the New South Wales Mounted Infantry in the South African War 
and in every way an apparent anglophile in manner, he identified himself as 
an Australian nationalist, a Roman Catholic and a sympathiser with both 
Boer and Fenian. After an undistinguished career as a circuit court judge in 
New South Wales, he was forty-three in 1 904 when appointed CJO in British 
New Guinea following the suicide of his predecessor. A profound boredom can 
account at least in part for his going there. 
In 1 900 Murray had seen quarrels between English and Australian officers 
in South Africa as 'inevitable'. He had then stood in no doubt that his loyalties 
were with the fitter, and he thought better led,  colonials. In his long letter of 
26 March 1 906 in reply to Deakin he revealed with what cold and legal eye 
but partisan heart he had silently contemplated the cavalier vestige that 
remained of LeHunte's 'English' administration. In short there was in Papua, 
he wrote, a 'Colonial Office' party led by the Administrator that had no interest 
in the development of the country and 'imbued with horror, doubtless sincere, 
of Australian democracy, would inwardly rejoice if all white settlers -
especially miners - could be removed from the country, and who consider, 
apparently, that the destiny of B .N.G. would be fulfilled if it never came to 
anything more than a sort of curiosity-shop and an extensive and very 
expensive ethnological museum'. Opposed was an 'Australian' party 'anxious 
for the development of the country, and sincere in their dislike of a policy 
which, in their opinion, had retarded the progress of the Possession' .2 If the 
sincerity of each party with regard to the development of the country could not 
be doubted there was much in the behaviour of the Administrator and his 
friends that could be represented as scandalous. Murray affirmed that it was 
his private view that Richmond's claims had been correct and that Captain 
Barton was indeed a 'man of weak character and indolent disposition', 
thoroughly dominated by the 'unscrupulous' Treasurer and drunkard, David 
Ballantine.3 There was much else besides. It needed hardly to be added, as 
Murray said, where his sympathies lay. 
These were revelations that the Prime Minister having solicited them could 
hardly ignore. Yet neither, on account of the way in which they were obtained, 
could he discuss them with his officer responsible for Papua, Atlee Hunt, with 
whom Barton carried on a friendly correspondence. Having been informed by 
an irritated Hunt that Deakin had received 'adverse criticism' about affairs in 
Francis West, Selected Letters of Hubert Murray (Melbourne 1971  ), 37, letter No. 32, 
Murray to Deakin, 26 March 1906. 
3 Ibid. ,  40. 
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Papua, Barton , 'astonished' , called for a full enquiry.4 In the circumstances 
Deakin found it very convenient to grant the request. 
Three members of a Royal Commission were appointed in August 1 906 and 
were taking evidence in Port Moresby in September. The terms of reference 
went well beyond an enquiry into 'present conditions' to allow the 
Commissioners to make general recommendations about the government and 
development of the Territory. 
Murray's evidence before the Commission in November - essentially an 
expanded version of what he had written in confidence to Deakin in March 
and relying as it did both upon a critique of Barton's 'policy' of opposition to 
white settlement and upon criticism of the personal conduct of the 
Administrator and his adherents - was bound to provoke deep bitterness 
among the condemned. While he could plausibly claim that there was 
considerable and culpable carelessness in the recent work of the 
administration in the processing of land applications and in the accounting 
of money and stores, Murray's central contention that the 'scantiness of white 
settlement' could be attributed to 'interminable delay' and obstruction by 
Captain Barton's and previous administrations in the making ofland available 
rested ultimately on subjective impressions - the few applications with which 
the government had dithered were not, as he implied, the tip of some 
submerged iceberg of demand for land, but all that there were. 
Yet if it was conceded that there was a prlma facie case that the 
administration had been dilatory over land applications - and Captain Barton 
was to challenge that there was a single case of unnecessary delay - then the 
cause could be found, Murray claimed, in the Administrator's own attitude of 
deep hostility to white settlement. In private and unguarded conversation 
Barton had expressed his distaste for the miners as a class and his wish that 
gold had never been discovered in British New Guinea. In another instance 
the Administrator had denied protection sought by a settler who believed 
himself exposed to attack by Papuan raiders. This latter case made a profound 
impression upon the Commissioners and concerned a request for a police 
patrol made by Henry Greene at Sagoro Tano after a rumour had spread 
among the Koiari that the 'Hagari' were about to descend upon his plantation 
and murder the two Europeans there.5 A force of the Armed Constabulary 
was, in fact, already in the Sogeri area but Greene was never told. Instead the 
file of correspondence in the matter had annotations made by Barton or his 
NLA Deposit 52, Atlee Hunt Papers, item 4 1 ,  Captain F. R. Barton to Hunt, 
5 July 1906. 
5 CPP 1907, pp. 137-459, British New Guinea, Report of the Royal Commission of 
Inquiry into present conditions . . .  , pp. xciv-xcvii (pp. 2 1 4-233) contain the Commissioners' 
comments on the case; pp. 25-3 1 (pp. 29 1 -97)  contain a record of the hearings in the matter. 
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officers that referred to Greene's 'funk' and a copy of a letter to Greene from 
the Administrator's private secretary that suggested that he leave the country 
if he felt so easily threatened, for the sake of 'the prestige of the white man'. 6 
This prestige had not been so great as recently as April 1 906, Murray had 
elsewhere reminded the Commissioners, as to discourage the murderers of old 
Weaver, the market gardener on the Laloki, whose property was within ten 
miles of Port Moresby. 
For Barton's hostility to settlement Murray could also find a cause in an 
excessive sympathy for the Papuans - the placing of the natives 'on a pedestal 
for too long'.7 It is true that Barton had a gentlemanly but serious interest in 
ethnography, contributing to C. G. Seligman's great work The Melanesians of 
British New Guinea. 8 And in evidence the Administrator defended his refusal 
to press Papuans who were unwilling to sell land for settlement, and his 
adherence to the guarantees proclaimed by Commodore Erskine in 1 884. Yet 
beyond this his 'sympathy' might have been slight. He was quick to make late 
proposals to tax the Papuans through forced labour on village plantations 
when, in November 1 906 , he saw how events were turning. Meant to vindicate 
his decisiveness this gesture might well have suggested that it had been 
inertia rather than preoccupation with Papuan welfare that had been more 
characteristic of his 'policy'. Certainly the unnecessary violence employed by 
several RMs , Barton's friends, and brought as evidence against them by 
Murray, seems hardly congruent with the view that a sensitive appreciation 
of Papuan interests was the uppermost concern with the Administrator's 
clique . 
There is no doubt that Judge Murray believed in the substantial truth of 
his own testimony for it was consistent with views expressed in letters to his 
family since 1 904. Nor need we doubt that he was quite sincere in 
recommending to Deakin in March that it would be best if a complete stranger 
were chosen to succeed Barton - the argument at the time and afterwards that 
his 'disloyalty' to the Administrator had been prompted by ambition has no 
sure basis. Indeed Murray had little choice but to reiterate before the 
Commission the opinions he had privately expressed to the Prime Minister 
and to do so as forcefully as possible. The divisions within the service were 
real enough and the Administrator's inadequacies now appeared obvious. Yet 
the factionalism had derived far more from personal antipathies than from the 
fundamental differences over policy that Murray thought he could descry, and 
Barton, though an Englishman, had been appointed as interim Administrator 
not by the Colonial Office but by Deakin himself. 
8 
Ibid. ,  xcvl. Copy of letter from Arthur Jewell to Greene, 22 Jan. 1 906 . 
Ibid . ,  p. 85 , Murray's evidence, 8 Nov. 1 906 . 
C. G. Seligman, The Melaneslans of British New Guinea (Cambridge 1 9 10). 
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Whether correct in point of detail or not - and the Commissioners could 
find error in several of his charges - the CJO's evidence represented a 
formidable synthesis of argument the general credibility of which could 
withstand refutation in its parts . The overriding impression Murray gave that 
the administration of British New Guinea had fallen into the hands of 
amateurs was entirely compatible with what the Commissioners wanted to 
find. A scapegoat for stagnation had been identified not in the physical and 
economic circumstances of the country nor in the lack of an Australian policy, 
indeed any policy, in the years until 1 906 , but in a deliberate and reactionary 
'policy of retard' allegedly pursued by an effete and misguided coterie of 
officials that felt no responsibility towards Australia or Australian interests . 
If the 'late Crown Colony traditions' could be set aside, the Commissioners 
were convinced, the country might be turned 'into an agricultural and pastoral 
asset of great value to the Commonwealth'. The land they had observed to be 
'rich, virgin, and easily worked while its infinite variety makes the successful 
cultivation of almost all tropical products possible'. The Papuan, on the other 
hand, had been plunged by government protection 'into a condition of peaceful 
sloth' , a 'lotus-eaters' dream' from which it was 'an imperative and immediate 
necessity' to awaken him if he was 'to be saved from the fate of most 
aboriginal races' .9 It now seemed that the eventual fate projected for the 
Papuans by Atlee Hunt and Staniforth Smith only the year before, if work 
could not be found for them, had become immanent. 
The Royal Commission Recommendations 
Their recommendations were to betray the extent to which the 
Commissioners, having placed blame in an acceptable quarter, conceded that 
a vigorous development policy required much more of Australia than it had 
hitherto provided. Every part of the administratioh, it seemed, required reform 
or decisive new initiatives with the purpose of opening up the country at last 
to permanent and profitable white settlement and eventual incorporation into 
the Commonwealth as a state. The white community were to be provided with 
schools, better communications , higher government salaries,  trial by jury, and 
a hill station for local recuperation. The development of roads and ports was 
to be financed through an interest free loan and an Australian tariff protection 
given to territorial produce. All lands unclaimed by the Papuans were to be 
declared the property of the Crown and all lands 'which the natives are willing 
to sell should at once be purchased' . 10 The power of compulsory purchase of 
lands for purposes that might extend beyond public use was to be acquired, 
Report of the Royal Commission, xcviii, x, xiii. 
1 0  Ibid. ,  cxxiv. 
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the Crown's right to all minerals found on native lands unequivocally asserted 
and a geological survey of the country carried out. 
In return for the benefits of security and civilisation they now enjoyed and 
to arrest the 'present indolent, apathetic state into which Government 
protection [was] sinking a race capable of a more useful and worthy destiny', 
the Papuans were to be taxed, compelled to attend schools at which English 
was to be taught, and systematically recruited for employment through a 
government agency. Easy optimism over the prospects for economic 
development was thus matched by a similar certainty about the place to be 
accorded 'native' peoples in a future dominated by Europeans. For Europeans 
everywhere, however some of them might deplore the rapaciousness of their 
fellows, the evidence of their eyes in 1 906 could as yet suggest no other 
possibility than that there was a scale of humanity, biologically determined it 
seemed, for the races of men as for individuals, and a corresponding scale of 
civilisation only to be ascended with much time and labour. The casual and 
innocent expression of these assumptions recorded in the Report of the Royal 
Commission of 1 906 was entirely of its time; there could be no insuperable 
conflict between essential native interests and those of development in such 
a view of the world. 
Yet beyond the swift execution of its recommendations concerning officials 
who were to be retired, or in the case of the Commandant of the Armed 
Constabulary to have his position abolished, the Report was to be largely 
disregarded as a plan for immediate action. The areas of land already held by 
the Crown and available for settlement made further acquisition hardly an 
urgent matter. The proclamation of the Papua Act shortly after the 
Commissioners' arrival had ended all alienation to settlers in freehold and the 
passage of the Lands Ordinance 1 906 in the same month, drafted as it was by 
Murray but incorporating Captain Barton's strong concern to preserve the 
assurances given the Papuans in 1 884 and embodied since in the intervening 
Lands Ordinances, effectively forestalled any recommendation that the Crown 
assume the radical title to all lands - a step that Murray had advocated before 
the Commission and one with which in their questioning of Barton the 
Commissioners had implied they sympathised. The adoption of 'development' 
recommendations conceived in an expansive mood depended on a financial 
settlement that was not to be nearly as generous as the Commissioners had 
expected. 
But as a clarion call to investors and as encouragement to settlement the 
Report's influence was immediate and considerable - if still to an extent far 
less than that anticipated by its authors.  They had also recommended that 
Papua be advertised to overcome the ignorance or the unfortunate prejudices 
that prevailed about conditions there. The Territory they could affirm was not 
only potentially rich, but beautiful, relatively safe and healthy, facts that 
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should be brought together with statistics and information about the 
availability of land for settlement in the Commonwealth Year Book. Copies of 
this material separately bound might also be distributed, they suggested, 
'through those countries whose people would be most likely to be attracted by 
the information given' . 1 1  If it was the publication of the Commission's Report 
that in itself did most to stimulate public interest, the Commonwealth and the 
Papuan Governments accepted that advertising the Territory might help, and 
both proceeded in the following years to pay for further publicity. 
Neither the significance of the Commissioners' endorsement of the 
substance of his testimony nor an awareness of the impression of self­
assurance, high principles and intelligence he had succeeded in giving in the 
presentation of his evidence could have escaped Hubert Murray. Privately he 
could now dare to hope that by an unexpected turn of fortune he might be 
given an opportunity to test and employ talents he had long resigned to 
wither. With the tabling of the Commission's Report in February 1 907, 
Captain Barton began a face-saving leave of absence for one year. Deakin, in 
some haste to be away to London but with the advice of the Commission's 
chairman, Colonel Mackay, and after a first meeting with Murray himself, 
appointed the CJ 0 as Acting Administrator. The situation could scarcely have 
been more difficult for the appointee. He was naturally to be regarded as a 
traitor by the members of Barton's party, several of whom were to remain in 
Papua for many years, to acquire new allies , and to dog Murray's steps until 
by longevity and prolonged service in office he was to outlast or convert them. 
In November 1 907, Beatrice Grimshaw, an Anglo-Irish journalist then 
becoming well known, visited the 'new' Territory of Papua and quickly found 
rapport with Judge Murray. His views expressed before the Royal Commission 
had placed the Acting Administrator in a position where he was expected to 
promote vigorously development of the country at the very moment when, in 
a sense, an effort was no longer required. But Grimshaw attributed the great 
changes taking place, after decades of evident stagnation, to Murray's 
initiative while recognising his detached concern for Papuan welfare, her 
perceptions seasoned by finding her opinions in agreement with his over a 
wide range of issues religious and political. As 'an unprejudiced observer' in 
the following January she began a correspondence with Deakin that gave an 
analysis of the situation in Papua highly favourable to Murray and critical of 
the remaining Bartonites who, she could report, while they were completely 
outnumbered in the white community, had continued to intrigue. 12 In her 
letters and at two meetings with the Prime Minister she undoubtedly gave 
support to the impression developing in his mind that Judge Murray could not 
1 1  Ibid., lxiv. 
1 2  LaNauze, Alfred Deakln, 471 .  
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be passed over without 'an injustice to Papua, and to a deserving public 
servant' in the permanent appointment of an Australian Lieutenant 
Governor. 13 Beatrice Grimshaw was to live for extended periods in Papua over 
the next twenty-six years, initially as a publicist on contract to the 
government and subsequently as a dilettante planter supporting herself with 
her journalism, travel books and novels. 
Officers leaving the government service in 1 907 included two senior RMs, 
Henry Moreton and C. A. W. Monckton, the latter at least unwilling to work 
under Murray, and the eminence grise behind Barton, the Treasurer David 
Ballantine. Moreton and Monckton left the country but Ballantine stayed. A 
Scot, he had served for eighteen years without a break under MacGregor, 
LeHunte, Robinson and Barton. He retired to his plantation at Sogeri, there 
to die of alcoholism in 1 909 aged forty-one. One of the few legends preserved 
by a settler Papua which otherwise found native superstition ridiculous - and 
one kept alive, no doubt, by those who saw Ballantine as ill-used - related how 
his ghost riding the grey horse he had ridden in life was repeatedly seen by 
plantation labourers in the Sogeri area in the following years. 
As a device to rid the service of the impetuous Commandant of the Armed 
Constabulary, William Cunningham Bruce, the Commissioners had 
recommended the abolition of his office. Born in India, a veteran of the Boer 
War, a good cricketer and shot, Bruce epitomised the swagger and 
irresponsibility of the Barton regime that Murray could deplore. He had barely 
survived unscathed an earlier Royal Commission into the 'affray' at Goaribari 
in 1 904 when, in the belated attempt to arrest the murderers of the 
missionary James Chalmers, Bruce had been at first unable or unwilling to 
restrain the fire of panicking Papuan police. 14  In 1 906 the record of his 
having used obscene language in front of women on several occasions and his 
abuse of a missionary were considered. The evidence left little doubt that 
Barton had shielded Bruce from the consequences of his behaviour in allowing 
him to plead in each case that he had been drinking. The hurt to his pride 
now dealt him by the Commission, prompted by what he saw as Murray's 
sanctimonious duplicity, was to rankle and fester in Bruce's mind to the point 
where some believed it had become unhinged. Though he might have left the 
country he chose to stay on, to live by his wits and to hope, it can be 
presumed, to bring Murray down. He became for a period a planting 
contractor to companies entering the country after 1 907. He prospected for 
gold, obtained planting blocks at Sogeri and near Galley Reach, and milled 
timber cleared from the estates in the Galley Reach district and from 
concessions he obtained along the V anapa River at a sawmill he and a partner 
13 Ibid. ,  473. 
14 Report of the Royal Commission , pp. lxxv-lxxvll, 1 82-6 . 
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established at Manu Manu. As editor of the Territory's first newspaper from 
1 9 1 1 until 1 9 1 7  he pursued Murray with constant obloquy and denunciation. 
His bitterness was never assuaged. After the deaths of two of his children from 
dysentery and several years living beyond his means in grand style on 
Touaguba hill in Port Moresby he was to die, his health broken and in poverty, 
in a cottage at Sapphire Creek in 1 924. We will meet him again in the 
following chapters. 
Of other officers, A. C. English, ARM at Rigo, retired to his neighbouring 
sisal and flcus rubber plantation; Arthur Jewell, Barton's private secretary 
and one of those whom Murray was eventually to reconcile, resigned to work 
as a contractor on the Fairfax Harbour sisal estates subsequently becoming 
manager of a plantation company floated by Henry Wickham; and Guy 
Manning, ARM, contracted to develop land at Marshall Lagoon. Henry Lysaght 
Griffm,  RM for the Northern Division, was permitted to resign honourably the 
following year when discovered shooting birds of paradise in 'anticipation' of 
a change he expected in the law forbidding the killing of the birds. Griffin also 
went to work developing a plantation at Galley Reach for a Melbourne 
syndicate. In 1 908 he floated a company in which Arthur Jewell had an 
interest to plant sisal at Tavai near Gaire, thirty miles southeast of Port 
Moresby. This company would buy Ballantine's Sogeri plantation after the 
former Treasurer's death in 1 909. Capital soon exhausted, the properties were 
sold, Ballantine's block together with Henry Greene's at Sagoro Tano 
becoming the foundation of the ltikinumu Estate of the British New Guinea 
Development Company in 1 9 1 0. Anthony Musgrave, the irascible leader of the 
anti-Barton faction and Government Secretary since 1 888, retired in June 
1 908 to be succeeded by Alexander Malcolm Campbell, formerly the senior RM 
in the eastern divisions. 
In 1 909 the Commonwealth published Papua the Marvellous, the Country 
of Chances, a racy and provocative booklet advertising Papua prepared by 
Beatrice Grimshaw for distribution in England.15  It was of a kind with an 
abundance of promotional matter being printed and distributed at the time in 
books, journals and brochures by empire enthusiasts, colonial governments 
and capitalists urging others to settle in this colony or that, or to invest in 
particular tropical industries. The author began by confronting 
misconceptions actually or supposedly held about Papua's political status , its 
climate, native population and agricultural opportunities ,  and the health of 
Europeans in the country, proceeding to refute these notions with 
'astonishing' facts. Where MacGregor had straightforwardly sought and failed 
to attract yeoman farmers of sufficient means, Grimshaw, perhaps more 
115 Papua the Marvellous: The Country of Chances (Victorian Government Printer 1 909). 
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realistically, aimed her appeal at younger sons of 'county families' possessed 
of at least £2,000 and daring enough to tackle 'the country of the rough and 
ready' , knowing, it is likely, that rather less distinguished people impressed 
by such a pitch might the more readily be attracted. For while Papua, like 
British New Guinea before it, may have acquired a sprinkling of remittance 
men, there seems scarcely one identifiable 'younger son' among the generation 
of settlers that came to the country after 1 9 1 0. 
Alexander Campbell thought the exaggerations and inaccuracies in this 
propaganda amounted to deceit and he protested to Hunt.1 6  Murray wrote 
that because 'no one can speak from experience . . .  no useful purpose [would] 
be served by keeping back [its publication] . . .  The object of Miss Grimshaw's 
pamphlet is primarily to stimulate inquiry, and therefore . . .  the sooner it 
appears the better' . 1 7 In the following year Beatrice Grimshaw produced The 
New New Guinea, a book of 320 pages of anecdote and further astonishing 
revelations about Papua, with photographs by William Whitten, for which she 
apparently received some payment from the Papuan Government and editorial 
assistance from the Lieutenant Governor. 
1 6  Atlee Hunt Papers, item 23 1 ,  Campbell to Hunt, n.d. ( 1909). Grimshaw had shown 
Campbell an article for Chambers' Journal with "statements that have no foundation 1n fact'. 
17 Ibid . ,  item 292. Murray to Hunt, 28 Sept. 1 909 . 
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The country of chances 
IF FOR JUDGE Murray the arrival of Beatrice Grimshaw and her promotion 
of his cause was singularly opportune, the employment of her pen to puff 
Papua among investors and likely settlers was later to rebound on his 
administration as were his own easy certainties expressed before the Royal 
Commission and recorded in its Report. Disappointed planters one day were 
to claim fuat through Grimshaw's pamphlets the government had greatly 
exaggerated the opportunities the country offered and had understated the 
difficulties of development. In this view the settlers and investors had been the 
victims of a confidence trick. 
Effective though Miss Grimshaw's hyperbole may have been, the charge of 
deliberate misrepresentation was unfair. Influences far more substantial were 
at work in the larger world of investment in tropical commodities in the seven 
years before 1 9 1 4 to induce an interest in Papua like that being shown in 
almost all tropical territories. It now seemed merely to need its geographic 
existence drawn to the attention of the investing public to acquire a share of 
this interest and if time was to prove investors the dupes of hope then 
Beatrice Grimshaw, Hubert Murray and Staniforth Smith had shared their 
delusions. 
The first public intimations of the immense boom to come in the 
development of rubber plantations in Southeast Asia were felt in 1 906. 
Plantations of all kinds were attracting capital and it seemed, as Beatrice 
Grimshaw could write in 1 909 , that 
everybody knows somebody who knows somebody who has made a fortune in a 
surprisingly short time, tea planting in Ceylon, growing rubber in the Malay States, 
or raising cotton in West Africa . . .  the surpassing fertility of tropical soils is a true 
goldmine, for those who can find the capital to work it. 1 
In Australia rhetorical assertions of confidence in the future of New Guinea 
seemed at last matched with large and available resources of capital and with 
the resolution of the Federal and Papuan Governments to carry out a vigorous 
policy of development. 
Papua the Maroellous: The Country of Chances (Victorian Government Printer, 1 909), 
7.  This booklet was prepared by Beatrice Grimshaw. 
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As recently as 1 900 most of the copra in international commerce was still 
derived from the trade with indigenous producers of either fresh or dried 
kernel carried on by beach traders and visiting ships. From the late 1 860s, 
when the earliest commercial coconut plantations in Southeast Asia and the 
Pacific islands were being planted, coconut oil was becoming an important 
ingredient in competition with whale oil and tallow in the manufacture of 
soaps, especially of the finer kinds, and increasingly used as a cooking oil. By 
1 906 the demand for the oil for use in the preparation of margarine had risen 
to such an extent that a crisis of supply had developed, the average price 
doubling from the £ 1 4  a ton that had prevailed in the decade to 1903 to £28 
a ton in 1 9 1 4. In 1 9 1 2, Sir William (later Lord) Lever would write in an 
introduction to Coconuts, the consols of the East, a book promoting copra 
production, that he knew of 
no field of Tropical Agriculture that is so promising at the present moment as coco­
nut planting, and I do not think in the whole world there is the promise of so 
lucrative an investment of time and money as in this industry. The world is only 
just awakening to the value of coco-nut oil in the manufacture of artificial butter of 
the highest quality, and of the by-product, coprah cake, as a food for cattle . . .  2
As late as 1 9 14,  in another 'coconut' book, All about Coconuts, the authors 
believed that 
we are only on the fringe of gigantic developments in the industry . . .  that it was 
only a question of time before butter made from vegetable fat will entirely supersede 
the butter made from animal fat . . .  [and] that over-production, the bugbear of most 
industries, is practically impossible. 3 
• 
It was the same with rubber. In 1 907 Henry Ford introduced the assembly 
line into the manufacture of motor cars and sales of these vehicles in the 
United States rose from 44,000 in that year to 65,000 in 1 908, 1 27,000 in 
1 909 and 1 87,000 in 1 9 1 0.4 In the latter year rubber production throughout 
the world was still under 1 00,000 tons, 80% of which came from the finite 
resources of wild rubber trees. By 1 909- 1 0  . the rate of investment in 
plantation rubber flotations exceeded 'any previous boom known in our 
H .  Hamel Smith and F. A. G. Pape, Coconuts, the consols of the East (London 1 9 12 ), 
v .  
R .  Belfort and A .  Hoyer, All about Coconuts (London 19 1 4), vill-ix. Papua had 'very 
promising prospects' on p. 44. An article in The World's Work was quoted to say that Papuan 
palms yielded from 100 to 1 20 nuts a year, an incredible number, and an assessment by the 
'manager of one of the largest coconut plantations in the island' that had also appeared in 
Hamel Smith and Pape's book was repeated. This 'expert' had predicted that 'when Australia 
has realised what a valuable asset she possesses right at her very doors, Papua will become 
the most prolific and richest exporter of tropical products outside of Ceylon'. Nothing 
Beatrice Grimshaw wrote was bolder than this. But such was the cumulative effect of one 
optimistic claim upon another in that overheated age. 
4 John Drabble, Rubber ln Malaya 1876 - 1 922 (Kuala Lumpur 1 973), 62. 
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generation, eclipsing the Kaffir boom and . . . coming perilously near the 
South Sea Bubble'.5 In April 1 9 1 0  the price rose above 1 2s .  a pound. It was 
being 'estimated by experts that when rubber first falls as low as 3s. a pound, 
it will become available for use in street paving, and the demand will then be 
limitless'.6 With both extraordinary foresight a decade before and good luck 
since, investors in Malayan estates had prepared for this opportunity, and the 
enormous dividends that the pioneer companies were already paying out could 
only heighten undiscriminating investment in rubber wherever it might be 
grown. 
In Papua the passage of the Land Ordinance of 1 906 had finally settled the 
question of the form of tenure to be permitted over alienated land. Although 
the sale of crown lands in freehold was discontinued, the conditions offered 
to prospective buyers of leases were such as to justify Staniforth Smith's 
assertion that they were 'the most liberal in the tropics'7 - a ninety-nine year 
lease could now be obtained on the payment of a nominal deposit of as little 
as £ 1 0  a thousand acres, free of rent for a generous period, and with the costs 
of survey being met by the government. These were terms that were bound to 
encourage many an incautious application for land once a boom had begun 
and when the eventual fulfilment of the development conditions attached to 
the leases seemed underwritten by an insatiable world market in plantation 
products stretching far into the future. 
The appointment in May 1 907 of Staniforth Smith, a well known federal 
senator with a reputation for 'getting things done', to the new position of 
Director of Agriculture with a responsibility over all the 'development 
departments' of government in Papua undoubtedly increased confidence in the 
Territory's agricultural possibilities and of itself did much to create a sense of 
impending prosperity for the country. Atlee Hunt wrote to Smith in November, 
and not only to pander to the new Director's vanity, that he was 'the backbone 
of everything, the feeling is now "Oh, Staniforth Smith's there, it will be all 
right"' .8 Nor did Smith disappoint by want of achievement in those first years. 
With apparently tireless industry, and tormented all the while by the hope of 
greater preferment, he applied himself day and night 'making strenuous 
efforts to anticipate every difficulty that the planters will experience in this 
new country'. 9 
Ibid. ,  63.  
Papua the Marvellous , 27. Staniforth Smith also gave details of an experiment with 
rubber paving in his 1906 Report. 
7 Staniforth Smith, Handbook of the Territory of Papua (Canberra 1 927), 62.  
8 NLA Deposit 1 709, Staniforth Smith Papers, item 1 024, Hunt to Staniforth Smith, 2 
Nov. 1907. 
Ibid . ,  item 659 ,  Staniforth Smith to Hunt, 28 July 1 907. 
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A year earlier in March 1 906, while on his tour of Java and Malaya, 
Senator Smith had arranged for the purchase of 100,000 selected rubber 
seeds through the Director of Agriculture in the Federated Malay States. In 
the following May he had supplied careful instructions to enable Captain 
Barton to have a nursery prepared for their reception in October - rubber 
seeds having brief fertility. The nursery on the Laloki River had been 
established by the end of 1 906 and on taking up his duties as Papuan 
Director of Agriculture, Smith could feel that his foresight had gained a 
valuable year in the development of the rubber industry. 
By July 1 907, Staniforth Smith could already announce in the Government 
Gazette that the station plantation at Rigo had sisal suckers available. By 
October the first 7,000 hevea rubber seedlings were for sale at Laloki. In the 
same month an Economic Museum and Laboratory was opened and residents 
were asked to send in specimens of any useful plant or mineral that they 
might come across for identification and exhibition. A year later rubber plants 
were available from a second nursery on the Kemp Welch river, fifty miles to 
the south-east of Port Moresby beyond Rigo. Anticipating the early exhaustion 
of stock, orders were being taken for seed from a further one million ordered 
from Malaya. 
Before the end of 1 907 the Director of Agriculture and Commissioner for 
Lands had published his first Handbook of the Territory of Papua, of 1 08 
pages. It gave a brief description of the government, physical features and 
living conditions in the Territory and the opportunities, if yet untested, for 
plantation development - the matter-of-fact presentation all the more 
reassuring after the enthusiasm of the Royal Commission's Report. 
Subsequent and greatly expanded editions of the Handbook in 1909 , 1 !;}  1 2  and 
1 92 7 were to be regarded abroad as valuable compendia of information about 
tropical agriculture and health. 10 
Through much of 1 908 and in view of his aspiration to be the first 
Australian appointed Lieutenant Governor, Smith saw no virtue in excessive 
modesty and he continued to communicate with his former colleagues in the 
Federal Parliament - in optimistic letters that leave an unmistakable 
impression of nai·vete - to keep everyone well informed of his exhausting 
schedule. Responding appropriately to one letter, Senator Pearce wrote that 
Smith's 'last very interesting letter' had been received and had 'gone the 
ro411ds pretty well in both Houses and . . .  caused very favourable comment 
among those members to whom I have shown it' . 1 1  
1 0  Hamel Smith and Pape, Coconuts, the consols of the East, 75-82 . Staniforth Smith is 
commended as an au thorlty. 
1 1  Staniforth Smith Papers, Pearce to Smith, n.d. ( 1908). 
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Indeed so industrious was Staniforth Smith in this period that some 
thought that he might collapse from overwork. Hunt warned him not to 'knock 
himself out' and on another occasion to 'try and remember you are a valuable 
person and that . . .  a few score hours of overtime will not be compensated for 
by some months forced retiremenr . 12 H. H. Lewis, Chief Clerk of External 
Affairs, confided to Smith that Deakin intended bringing him to Melbourne 
early in 1 908 'to save you from a breakdown' as much as 'to afford Ministers 
an opportunity of discussing with you the policy to be followed in the 
future' . 13  Ignorant of the Prime Minister's intentions with regard to the 
Lieutenant Governorship until the last moment, Atlee Hunt continued to give 
encouragement to Smith's hopes. When Hubert Murray's appointment was 
finally announced in November 1 908, knowing his man and no doubt 
despairing of finding a replacement nearly so competent, Hunt played upon 
Smith's susceptibility to flattery to get him to stay on as Director of 
Agriculture. 14 He had little difficulty. 
Staniforth Smith remained Director of Agriculture and Commissioner for 
Lands in Papua for most of the years until he retired, aged sixty-one, in 1930. 
His period in office was interrupted by war service from 1 9 15 until 1 9 1 9  and 
by an appointment as Acting Administrator of the Northern Territory in 19 19-
21 .  He was also Administrator of  Papua, a confusingly named 'personal' 
position offered to him at the time Murray was appointed Lieutenant Governor 
and held dormant except in those periods when Murray was overseas and 
Smith became indeed the officer administering the Territory. The leading 
planters believed him to be far more sympathetic - or perhaps more easily 
influenced - than Hubert Murray, and at several points they proposed that he 
replace the Judge as Lieutenant Governor. Certainly Staniforth Smith saw a 
more active and expensive development policy as desirable in Papua and his 
draft of the 1 909- 1 0  Annual Report, prepared in Murray's absence, met with 
disapproval in Melbourne because in it he could see no reason why the white 
residents should not elect the unofficial members of the Legislative Council 'on 
a one man, one vote basis' . 1 5  
If for Atlee Hunt Staniforth Smith seemed for a time the 'backbone of 
everything' in Papua, Hunt was himself an indefatigable propagandist for 
investment in the Territory, the 'backbone' of Australian government interest 
through a rapid succession of federal ministries. Shrewd and conventional in 
much of his administration he conducted a most unconventional private 
12 Ibid. , Item 1 032,  Hunt to Staniforth Smith, 2 1  Oct. 1907. 
13 Ibid. , H. H. Lewis to Staniforth Smith. 
14 Atlee Hunt Papers, item 492, Hunt to Staniforth Smith, 30 Nov. 1 908. 
1 5  The rejected draft Administrator's Report 1 909-10  is in Staniforth Smith Papers, item 
1 1 20. 
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correspondence simultaneously with A. M. Campbell, Murray and Smith, 
seeming to speak to each with a disarming and exclusive candour. It was for 
Hunt a form of conversation at a distance that allowed him in his isolation to 
sound out opinion among the senior officials in the Territoty, but one which 
could hardly be considered fair to his correspondents. He carefully recorded 
evety small flurty of interest in Papuan investment being always at home to 
prospective investors and furnishing any who wished to visit the Territoty with 
letters of introduction to Smith or Murray. In September 1 909, writing to 
Smith, he noted that he was still 'continuing to give lectures to all and sundty, 
which your slides . . .  make of interest. In Ballarat on Monday [there was a] 
good audience' . 16  
Taking a punt on Papua 
In July 1 907 Fred W. Kitchen of the Melbourne soap making firm of J .  Kitchen 
and Sons, an applicant for a large lease at the head of Milne Bay and armed 
with a letter of introduction from Hunt, met Staniforth Smith in Port Moresby. 
Subsequently a subsidiaty of Kitchen and Sons, the Commonwealth Copra 
Company, was formed to develop some 5 ,000 acres at Giligili, for a time the 
largest single copra estate in the South Pacific. In 1 9 1 6  this property was 
acquired by Lever Brothers in their purchase of Kitchens becoming the only 
Papuan plantation of the great 'Combine' .  Giligili and its neighbours Hagita 
(also known as Maiwara) and Waigani were established on land that proved 
to lack elements necessaty to healthy palm growth. All three were to be 
relatively poor producers . 
In October 1 908 Kitchen and Sons complained to Hunt about the 'great 
deal of trouble' they had had with a consignment of labourers recruited in the 
Purari Delta. Since it was upon his 'representations' that the company had 
gone to Papua rather than to the Solomons, Hunt could claim in a letter to 
Murray enquiring into the matter that he took 'a vety special interest in their 
success'. 1 7 It was a claim that in the same letter he could also make with 
respect to the largest Australian investments in commercial plantation 
agriculture in Papua before 1 942 - those of Sir Rupert Clarke (Bt) and Robert 
Selmon Whiting that together were to exceed £200,000 by 1 922 .18 
It was through a friendly acquaintance of Hunt, Arthur Stoughton 
Bloomfield, that the attentions of Clarke and Whiting were first drawn to 
Papua. Bloomfield and Whiting were neighbours and friends at their countzy 
houses at Mount Macedon near Melbourne with business interests that 
touched in the city - Whiting a rich and successful solicitor and Bloomfield a 
16 Atlee Hunt Papers, item 50 1 ,  Hunt to Staniforth Smith, 22 Sept. 1 909. 
17 Atlee Hunt Papers, item 275, Hunt to Murray, 23 Oct. 1908. 
18 CRS Al 25 / 16087. 'Loans to Kemp Welch and New Guinea Rubber Estates. Papua' 
1921 - 1925 , Bloomfield to Minister, 29 July 1 92 1 .  
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prosperous chartered accountant and company secretary. Persuaded that a 
large return might be obtained by those who were the first with the courage 
to go into Papuan plantations on a large scale, the 'voluble' Bloomfield was to 
do more than any other man to attract and commit Victorian investors to 
'taking a punt' on the 'new' country. R. S. Whiting was a partner with Sir 
Rupert Clarke in the ownership of the Isis Downs sheep station in 
Queensland. Clarke, grandson of the most successful of the successful 
graziers of the Western District of Victoria, was probably the richest man in 
Australia, flamboyant in character and a taker of risks - in 1 9 1 4  in search of 
the reefs from which he and others thought the alluvial gold of Papua must 
have come, he was to finance and lead an expedition up the Fly River, a 
venture which to the great relief of the Papuan Government ended without 
major incident. Two years later having enlisted for active service in the war he 
was invalided home from Salonika aged fifty-one. 
In 1907 Clarke was prepared to invest very large sums by Australian 
standards in the proposals presented to him by Bloomfield. Without the 
example of Sir Rupert Clarke at the time, the Papuan 'boom' might have 
amounted to little and indeed, even he, with all his wealth, was later to regret 
his judgement with respect to Papua, so costly had it proved. 
As early as July 1906 Bloomfield had met and talked with Alexander 
Campbell and the Government Surveyor, Ralph Drummond, about the 
availability of land. With Bums Philp as his agents he took out one of the first 
leases under the new Ordinance, 1 ,000 acres at Galley Reach. To develop this 
property he floated a company in Melbourne which with the addition of a 
further lease of 1 ,280 acres acquired in his wife Ada's name became in 1908 
the Galley Reach Rubber Estates Limited. Having visited the Federated Malay 
States early in 1 907 to see the technical side of rubber planting for himself he 
returned to Papua in July to begin the work at Galley Reach and to make 
further applications for leases for companies yet to be formed. Writing to Atlee 
Hunt in September, Judge Murray reported that Bloomfield had 'succeeded 
in getting all the land he required. His people have, I think, 1 5 ,000 rubber 
stumps in the ground already - 80% of them growing - and have ordered a 
million seeds; so they are evidently in earnest'. 19 
The leases he obtained on the Kemp Welch River totalling 2,000 acres were 
soon assigned to two Melbourne companies promoted by Bloomfield in 1908 -
Kemp Welch River Rubber Estates Limited in which Atlee Hunt himself took 
up 500 £ 1 shares, and New Guinea Rubber Estates Limited where a 
controlling interest was held by Geoffrey Syme, literary editor and 
subsequently managing director of the Melbourne Age. Bloomfield disposed 
19 Atlee Hunt Papers, item 263, Murray to Hunt, 18 Sept. 1907. 
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of a lease of 1 ,000 acres at Marshall Lagoon to a Laka River Rubber Company. 
Partly developed this property was to be sold in 1 9 1 0  to the British New 
Guinea Development Company. 
In February 1 907 Sir Rupert Clarke and R. S. Whiting had registered a 
company in Victoria to be known as The Papua Rubber Plantations 
Proprietary, Limited, with Bloomfield as secretary. By July 5 ,000 acres on the 
western and northern sides of Galley Reach had been leased in Clarke's name 
and a further 3,800 acres on the Veimauri River entering Galley Reach from 
the northeast in Whiting's.  The P.R.P. Proprietary developed two plantations 
on Clarke's lease, Kanosia and Rorona, for rubber and copra respectively, with 
Veimauri maintained as a separate rubber plantation and concern. Thus, 
while Bloomfield acted as public officer of Clarke's and Whiting's companies 
in Australia until 1 9 16 ,  their general manager at Kanosia could superintend 
Bloomfield's nearby Galley Reach interests . Little expense was withheld in the 
establishment of the Clarke and Whiting properties. An experienced Ceylon 
planter was employed to develop the estates and the rubber stumps for 
Kanosia were shipped to Papua from Malaya in Wardian cases.20 
In 1 909 after a trader living at Porebada, John Exton, had shown that sisal 
grew well in the surrounding savannah, Clarke and Whiting extended their 
interests further by obtaining a lease of 1 0,000 acres between the western 
extremity of Fairfax Harbour and the sea at Boera to grow the plant from 
which a fibre used in rope manufacture was extracted. Two new companies, 
Fairfax Harbour Plantations and North Fairfax Harbour Plantations were set 
up to develop this land. 
A. S. Bloomfield was indeed as Staniforth Smith wrote to Hunt 'the most 
valuable man in the investment line we have had' for he had demonstrated 
more than the glib confidence of the promoter. He had put hard money into 
the country and his 'Galley Reach plantation [was] already a show place' .21 
By 1909 considered and considering himself another authority on the 
development of commercial plantations Bloomfield published a well produced 
promotional brochure called Tropical Agriculture in Papua.22 This incidentally 
showed that in four of the companies in which he had an interest, and which 
he used as examples to illustrate his argument, some £53,000 out of an 
issued capital of £68,000 had already been contributed and, it can be 
presumed, largely spent in developing a total of 927 acres on leases 
amounting to 13 ,980 acres. That the balance of the issued capital available 
for further calls amounted to only £15 ,000 when so large an acreage remained 
undeveloped and when the plantations were barely two years old might have 
20 See below p. 88. 
2 1  Atlee Hunt Papers, item 444. Staniforth Smith to  Hunt, 9 Feb. 1 908. 
22 A. S. Bloomfield, Troplcal Agrlculture Ln Papua (Melbourne 1909). 
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been thought ominous in less buoyant times. The reserves of the nominal 
capital of the companies remaining for issue amounted to little more than a 
further £ 1 5 ,  OOO . 
The Papuan contagion had nonetheless already proved widely infectious in 
Australia and among Australian connections in Great Britain. Of other 
Australian speculators one of the earliest was a well-known writer and mining 
engineer who had Visited British New Guinea in 1905 and denounced its 
government, Randolph Bedford.23 In 1907 Bedford applied for two leases 
totalling 4,950 acres on Eworogo Creek at Sogeri in the district between Burns 
Philps's old Warirata property and the plantations of DaVid Ballantine and of 
Garrioch and Greene, and a lease of 1 0,000 acres on the Maiwara River at the 
head of Milne Bay in the Eastern DiVision. The Sogeri lease was refused when 
the Papuan owners declined to sell but that at Milne Bay was trartsfered in 
1 9 1 0  to James Robert Osborne, a former Wesleyan missionary and managing 
director of a Milne Bay Rubber Company formed in Victoria in which the large 
retail grocery firm of Moran and Cato had an interest.24 Belying the 
company's name, its plantation, Hagita, was to be largely turned over to 
coconuts after rubber proved unsuited to the area. 
More land at Sogeri at the junction of Eworogo Creek and the Laloki River 
was taken up in 1907 by a Papua Para Rubber Company, an enterprise in 
which several government officers held shares .  Soon forfeited without 
development, the land was eventually to pass to a syndicate of old plantation 
managers employed by the British New Guinea Development Company in the 
late thirties to provide retirement security that the company itself could not 
afford. A neighbouring lease of 1 ,500 acres planted with 1 1 5 acres of hevea 
rubber in 1 908-09 by A. 0 .  Wallace was exchanged in 1 9 10 for 20,000 £1  
shares in Sogeri Para Rubber Plantations Limited o f  Sydney. This property, 
known as Koitakinumu or Koitaki, became the nucleus of a much larger 
estate and the best known of Papuan plantations under the continuous 
management from 19 13  until 1 953 of T. L. (Tom) Sefton. Nearby at Bisiatabu, 
the Australian Conference Association of the Seventh Day Adventist Church 
leased land in 1 9 1  7 and proceeded to plant rubber in a small way, twenty 
acres by 1940.  
Other Sydney based companies were the Papuan Rubber and Trading 
Company that developed a lease in the Sagarai valley, an isolated, fever-ridden 
and flood-prone district at the eastern end of Mullens Harbour in the Eastern 
Division, and Angabunga River Plantations Limited which took up the old Hall 
Sound Company lands in the Mekeo district beyond Galley Reach. The 
23 The Age (Melbourne), 1 7  Nov. 1905. 
24 Atlee Hunt Papers, item 552, Staniforth Smith to Hunt, 1 Oct. 1 9 1 2. 
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chairman of Angabunga was Sir Joseph Carruthers, onetime Premier of New 
South Wales .  
A second estate in th e  Sagarai valley was that o f  Mullens Harbour 
Plantations Limited, known as Sagarai Plantation and managed by Charles 
Boxhall. Boxhall was also a director of a Papua Rubber and Copra Company 
of Christchurch, New Zealand, which obtained leases in the Elai valley 
awkwardly separated from a well protected anchorage at Port Glasgow by a 
range of hills. A related New Zealand company, Papuan Products Limited, 
engaged the Samarai merchant William Whitten as its 'local' director and 
developed an adjacent property later merged with Mamai, the Papua Rubber 
and Copra Company's estate. Mamai was to prove a heavy drain on the capital 
of its proprietors and to pass fully developed to the Steamships Trading 
Company in 1 934 for a trtfle.25 
An Adelaide enterprise, Papuan Plantations Limited, applied for 5 ,500 
acres on both sides of the Laloki River at the ' 1 2  Mile' and a further 1 ,500 
acres at the '7 Mile' on the track from Port Moresby to Sapphire Creek and the 
Sogert district. The country about was savannah similar to the Fairfax 
Harbour lands being developed by Clarke and Whiting and thought suitable 
for sisal hemp. Under the management of Raymond Dubois, whose recent 
experience had been as a vigneron in South Australia, some 500 acres were 
planted with sisal by 19 1 4. The company then became the first in Papua ever 
to pay a dividend - a mistaken gesture that was quickly followed by liquidation 
and purchase of its properties and assets by the British New Guinea 
Development Company just before the outbreak of the European war. A 
second Adelaide syndicate, Adelaide Papuan Rubber, held a brief lease on 
lands at Galley Reach that passed to Clarke's Kanosia estate. 
Elsewhere on the coast between Port Moresby and Samarai development 
began in 1 908 of two estates on the Domara River, one on a lease of 2,000 
acres the property of Domara River Plantations Limited of Melbourne and 
known as Kauru or Domara, and the other on a lease of 900 acres held by the 
Port Moresby publican, Thomas McCrann and his wife, an.d called Baia. 
Further east on Amazon Bay a partnership between G. A. Loudon, then 
managing the trading operations of the British New Guinea Development 
Company (BNGD),  and Campbell Cowley, son of a BNGD director, began the 
development of a plantation at Mogubo in 1 9 1 4. Cowley went off to the Great 
War returning in bad health. He died in 1 920 and G. A. Loudon became sole 
owner of the property. 
In the Western Division new enterprise came from a different quarter. In 
1 905 the Reverend F. W. Walker resigned from the London Missionary Society 
215 See below p. 2 12 .  
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to manage a mission-supported commercial and industrial training 
undertaking, The Papuan Industries Limited, based at Badu in the Torres 
Strait. In 1908 Papuan Industries obtained plantation leases at Dirimu on the 
Binaturi River that enters the sea twelve miles to the west of Daru, and at 
Madiri at the head of the Fly River estuary. Madiri became thus the most 
isolated plantation in Papua, and were it not that labour recruiters in the west 
found it convenient or a matter of honour to call there, it might have been the 
loneliest. Madiri produced rubber, Dirimu copra. Dirimu had the peculiarity 
of having the palms arranged in a cartwheel pattern. These two estates 
together with the property developed by John and Janet Cowling on Mibu 
Island were to remain the only plantations in the vastness of the Western 
Division. If the government rubber plantation at Kikori, headquarters of the 
Delta Division, and the Kikori Plantation Company's estate begun in 1 9 14 
nearby at Ogamobu are added, there were to be only five plantations of any 
size in the entire western half of the country. 
The Kikori Plantation Company was formed in Adelaide in 1 9 1 4  to plant 
coconuts four miles above the government station on the Kikori River. Issued 
capital was £7,500.  The principals of the company included J. S. Burston of 
Adelaide, J. M. Mc Comas of Collins Street, Melbourne, and the 
Commonwealth Electoral Officer at Broken Hill, Percy Robinson. It was 
Robinson who had instigated the enterprise after a voyage to the Northern 
Territory of Australia in which he had paused at Kikori and been captivated 
by its overwhelming verdure . In 1 9 1 8, aged forty-five, he settled at Ogamobu 
taking over direct management of the plantation from his inept brother-in-law 
while meeting the costs of development from returns on the recruitment of 
Western and Delta labourers for the plantations of the Central Division. 
It was soon obvious that coconuts did not grow well in the Kikori area, a 
region with some of the heaviest rainfall on earth, and from 1 9 1 9  Robinson 
began the conversion of the plantation to rubber as clearing progressed. His 
very detailed letters to his wife until she joined him at Ogamobu in 1 92 1 ,  and 
Irene Robinson's letters to her mother and sister until 1 929 form the only 
extensive private correspondence from a planter source that we have from any 
part of the colonial period in Papua, a unique and invaluable record of 
plantation development and life , reassuringly humane, and, saving Percy and 
Irene's personal reticences ,  completely unguarded. The Robinson Letters are 
extensively used in later chapters. 2 6  The Kikori Plantation Company was 
succeeded in 19 18  by Kikori Plantations Limited with its office in Melbourne. 
In 1924 the second company was liquidated and ownership of Ogamobu was 
transfered to Ogamobu Plantation Limited in which Percy Robinson held a 
26 The Robinson Letters together with the Prospectus of Kikori Plantations Ltd made 
available by the late Mrs Penelope Hope of Canberra are now held by the family. 
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third of the shares with the other two thirds being held by G. A. Loudon, by 
then general manager of the BNGD Company, and by the Port Moresby hotel 
keeper, T. D. Ryan, respectively. In 1 929 with the collapse of the matket the 
plantation was sold to BNGD and the Robinsons left the country. For Percy 
Robinson, the defeat would gnaw at the heart. 
In addition to the government nurseries established in 1907 at Laloki, on 
Hombrom Bluff, and on the Kemp Welch River in the Central Division, at 
Kokoda in the Northern Division, and at Nari Island and Wagawaga in the 
Eastern Division, among the most important of Staniforth Smith's projects, as 
he saw them, was the development beginning in 19 1 1  of two large government 
plantations to be operated both for revenue and example. The first, 
Gobaregere (or Kapagere), on the Kemp Welch, was planted up with rubber, 
and the second, Baibara, on Orangerie Bay, with coconuts. Baibara became 
a showplace under the continuous management for thirty years of Harry Catt, 
previously a Bums Philp employee in the Solomons - he was 'a drinker, now 
reformed and a good worker' Smith wrote to Atlee Hunt at the outset. 27 
Established with a special Commonwealth loan of £25 ,OOO, both government 
plantations were run on economic lines, but gained an advantage from 
savings in freight and government levies that made comparisons with private 
undertakings occasionally invidious and a little smug. Staniforth Smith 
became very proud of his own 'commercial' success with these ventures, the 
Commonwealth's loan being repaid in full by 1927 'entirely out of profits' .28 
Much smaller plantations established on the government stations at loma, 
Kokoda, Kerema and Kikori were worked with prison labour. 
Enterprises qf vast possibilities 
Henry Alexander Wickham reminded the world of the place he had taken in 
the early development of the international rubber industry with the 
publication in 1 908 of his second book and the patenting in the same year of 
a rubber smoking process he had developed.29 His simultaneous emergence 
into the light of day in London after a long obscurity in the South Seas to 
promote a company to take over his interests in Papua was bound to excite 
interest. The new company was Mombiri Rubber Plantations Limited and 
floated with the backing of J.  H. Houldsworth, Sir George Manners and H. M. 
27 Atlee Hunt Papers, item 444, Staniforth Smith to Hunt, 9 Feb. 1 908. 
28 PAR 1 927-28, 1 .  A correspondence about the comparative costs of the government 
and private plantations is contained in the Papuan Courter of 2, 9 and 23 Aug. 1 929 . 
29 H. A. Wickham, On the plantatlon, cultivation and curing of Para Indian Rubber 
(London 1 908). Henry Wickham believed that plantation rubber would grow best in 
condiUons corresponding closely to those of the wild with the trees planted in cleared aisles 
separated by narrow belts of jungle scrub. In 19 1 0  the BNGD board considered and rejected 
'Wickham's System' for the company's plantations as impracticable. (BNGD Letterbooks, 1 2  
Aug. 1 9 10). His book contains several plates from drawings Wickham made in Papua. 
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de Courcy Hamilton , gentlemen investors. It received in addition to the claim 
to freehold of the Conflicts, the transfer of a lease (Mombiri) that Wickham 
had acquired at Collingwood Bay on the north coast in 1 907. Further leases 
were obtained in the Kanosia district and on the Giriwu River near Buna. 
Management was to be shared between Wickham and R. Tweed Baird, but in 
1 9 1 1 , on his returning to England again , Henry Wickham was feted at an 
International Rubber Banquet, presented with 1 ,000 Guineas, and given an 
annuity for life by the Rubber Growers Association and the Planters' 
Associations of Ceylon and Malaya. He did not return to Papua. 
Mombiri was managed until 1 9 1 3  by George Whybrow who resigned to 
begin a timber milling venture with William Bruce at Manu Manu. The 
company was reconstructed that year and became the Pacific and Papua 
Produce Company managed from 1 9 1 3  until 1942 by Arthur Jewell. The 
Collingwood Bay lands were never developed though there was interest in the 
area in later years when it was thought paper could be cheaply made from the 
kurukuru (kunai or lalang) grass which was abundant there.30 The company's 
plantation near Kanosia, Lolorua, became a major rubber estate. 
In May 1 909 a second London based venture , the Papua Trading and 
Planting Syndicate Limited, was registered under the chairmanship of Admiral 
E.H.M. Davis. Davis had raised the British flag in the Gilbert Islands in 1 892 . 
He had visited Papua in 1 906 . His company acquired 2,600 acres at 
Patakalana on the Kemp Welch River and 1 0 ,000 acres on the Imila River at 
Marshall Lagoon from a prospector and speculator, Albert Hayes. As its name 
might suggest this enterprise sought to establish itself initially as a trader and 
a hotel site in Port Moresby and trading stations at Hula and Kala on the 
south central coast were quickly obtained. When the prospectus of the British 
New Guinea Development Company appeared in January 1 9 1 0,  it contained 
a comment that disparaged the Patakalana property of the syndicate in 
comparison with lands to be acquired by the new company, and an action was 
commenced against British New Guinea Development for slander of title. By 
April 1 9 1 1 the plaintiff had become a large debtor of the defendant, already 
established as a major supplier and wholesaler in 'Port', and was ruined when 
BNGD won the case on appeal. In 1 9 1 4  the unfortunate directors were sued 
under the Director's Liability Act (U.K.)  for more than £5 ,000 subscribed for 
shares in the syndicate by a Danish gentlewoman, Sophie van Holstein 
Rathlou. The equally unfortunate Mme van Holstein Rathlou had been first 
interested in the investment by Bert Hayes himself when in 1 908 she joined 
the P & 0 ship at Alexandria that took him to London to promote the 
30 See below p. 242 . 
The country of chances 85 
enterprise.31 Her two sons had subsequently visited Papua where the Rigo 
planter Albert English had commended Patakalana. She lost her case.32 
Speculating on the boom a Queensland Papua Lands Syndicate had been 
formed late in 1 908 by a Brisbane commission agent, Claude Musson, to 
acquire lands in the Territory for disposal to plantation companies that might 
be formed. Among the members of the syndicate was the Chief Justice of 
Queensland, Sir Pope Cooper. In May 1 909 a company, Papuan Lands 
Limited, newly registered in London, accepted the syndicate's options and 
proceeded to obtain further leases prior to seeking support in a buoyant 
capital market for an undertaking that might develop the properties. The 
promoters of Papuan Lands Limited were John Greeley Jenkins, American 
born former premier of South Australia and the then South Australian Agent 
General in London, and a promoter of 'colonial industrial undertakings' ,  
Duncan Elliott Alves of 'The Braes', Tunbridge Wells. Musson retained an 
interest in the new company and became its Australian 'local' agent. 
Capital for the purchase of the leases was subscribed by an impressive list 
of public figures who then as vendors were prepared to guarantee subscription 
of over half of the initial issue of shares in the proposed plantation venture. 
These guarantors included the Earl of Ranfurly, a former Governor of New 
Zealand; Viscount Esher, an intimate of King Edward; the Hon. Geoffrey 
Howard, Liberal Whip in the House of Commons; and a number of prominent 
company directors in England and Australia. Among the Australians listed 
was W. L. Baillieu of Melbourne, an important Victorian investor, though one 
whose connection with this new company appears to have been brief. Late in 
1 909 Jenkins together with Charles Alfred Darling, a South Australian 
representing a family business in London, went out to Port Moresby to 
arrange the transfers and further purchases in subscribers' names of lands 
amounting to 1 1 2,000 acres distributed for the most part in large leases along 
the coast in both the 'wet' and 'dry' belts of Papua. Charles Darling was to 
remain in Port Moresby as general manager. In preparation for the prospectus 
for the planting flotation the best expert opinion available was engaged to 
appraise these leases together with several other properties that unconnected 
speculators hoped to sell to the company. Among the experts who reported to 
31 In NAPNG & CRS l 79 , Item 7 /2 ,  'Return shewing Europeans charged with Criminal 
Offences in the Territory of Papua since l st January 19 1 0' 1 92 1 ,  Albert Hayes is listed. In 
January 1 9 10 he failed to appear in the Central Court in Port Moresby on a charge of 
stealing. It can be assumed he was no longer in Papua. 
32 Flnanclal Tlmes (London), 13 ,  1 4, 1 5 ,  1 6  Feb. 1 9 1 4. The court ruled that the circular 
advertising the venture was not a prospectus. 
86 THE PLANTATION DREN'vt 
Papuan Lands were Henry Wickham, Arthur Bloomfield, and Major A. J .  Boyd 
of the Queensland Department of Agriculture and Stock.33 
There followed, with a considerable fanfare , the issue in January 1 9 10 of 
the prospectus of the British New Guinea Development Company Limited 
(BNGD). This company was to become the largest planting enterprise to 
establish itself in Papua, large also by comparison with plantation companies 
setting up in Malaya and Sumatra at the time. The nominal capital was 
£ 1 ,500,000. This was to comprise 500,000 ordinary shares of £1  each of 
which 275 ,000 shares and £68,000 in cash were transfered in settlement to 
the vendors , Papuan Lands Ltd, and one million £ 1  participating preference 
shares of which 500,000 were immediately issued to provide the working 
capital for the venture. 
Though not without its detractors among financial observers who thought 
that the Papuan Lands Syndicate had done rather too well out of the sale of 
unimproved tracts for which its members had paid practically nothing, BNGD 
appeared an impressive new enterprise, in name, scale and programme 
resembling a chartered company. And so at least some in the press regarded 
it, the correspondent of the British Australasian of 17  February 1 9 1 0  noting 
that 
One of the most important projects of Imperial development which have been 
brought before the British public since the Chartered Company was introduced by 
Mr Cecil Rhodes is that of the British New Guinea Development Company . . .  an 
enterprise of vast possibilities; and the fact that it is backed by such well known 
names (to mention but a few) as Viscount Esher . . .  gives some indication of how 
the project is regarded in high Imperial and financial circles.34 
In 192 1  Judge Murray was to attribute all the difficulties he had had with 
BNGD in the intervening years to its 'chartered company' pretensions , but 
although the company did develop large plantation and trading interests , 
provided a coastal shipping service, drilled for oil, manufactured tobacco, and 
had looked around in 1 9 1 0  for prospective tenant settlers , there is no evidence 
in the correspondence of the company's officers that they pretended to a 
'chartered company' role. There was , nonetheless , clearly a presumption 
among its principals in London and Port Moresby that by virtue of the size of 
its investment BNGD should be accorded a certain respect, and its interests 
given special consideration. Murray would be contemptuous of such 
33 ANUABL Deposit 95, M37, Prospectus of the British New Guinea Development 
Company L1m1ted, 1 9 10 .  W. L. Baillieu did become a large investor in the Laloki copper 
mines during the war years. 
34 Brltlsh Australastan (London), 1 7  Feb. 1 9 10, p. 1 6. 
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expectations in the years ahead when he and the company clashed over policy 
as it tested the constraints under which it laboured in Papua.35 
In addition to J. G. Jenkins and Lord Ranfurly, who became chairman, the 
board of directors of BNGD comprised Sir Westby Brook Perceval, Tasmanian 
born and New Zealand educated, and a director of the Union Bank of 
Australia; Ferdinand Charles Stanley, a brother of Lord Derby, a director of 
the Santa Fe Land Company and future Brigadier General; William Austin 
Hom, born in New South Wales, a director of the Bank of Adelaide, onetime 
boundary rider and sponsor of Northern Territory exploration whose interests 
extended from Malaya to the Argentine; Sir Alfred Sandlings Cowley, sugar 
magnate and former Minister for Lands in Queensland and Speaker of the 
Queensland Legislative Assembly; and Duncan Alves. Cowley was to be the 
'local' director of the company. 
The BNGD plantations laid down in 1 9 1 0- 1 4  were Aroa near Hisiu on 
Redscar Bay, Bomana and Katea on the dry savannah lowlands of the Laloki 
valley, ltikinumu on a tributary of the upper Laloki on the Sogeri plateau, 
Jawarere on the Musgrave River beyond ltikinumu, Otomata at Cape Rodney, 
Baubauguina near Abau, Gadaisu on Orangerie Bay, and Waigani at the head 
of Milne Bay near Giligili and Hagita. Paili or Paile , on Marshall Lagoon, was 
bought from the Laka River Rubber speculators. To these were added Obu 
near Aroa bought in 1 9 1 4  from Robert Hunter, Jaropa near Buna on the 
north coast established in 1 9 1  7 partly as a recruiting station for Mambare 
labour, and Doa, situated between Clarke's Kanosia property and Mombiri's 
Lolorua at Galley Reach acquired in the same year in settlement of debts to 
the company of William Bruce. A very large lease of 40,000 acres on the 
Brown River was never developed and relinquished in 1 92 1 .  While these 
properties taken together immediately established BNGD as by far the largest 
plantation interest in Papua, the company through its subsidiary British New 
Guinea Trading Company also became for a time a major trader with large 
wholesale and retail stores in both Port Moresby and Samarai. 
The BNGD leases, excepting the Brown River lands, amounted to over 
70,000 acres and plantings by 1 9 1 9  exceeded 1 2,000 acres. In addition, W. 
A. Hom, chairman of the company from 1 9 1 3  to 1 922 and the major 
shareholder in the Kuala Selangor Rubber Company of Malaya, decided to 
take a further risk in 1 9 15 by developing a separate estate at Robinson River 
near Abau planted and managed by BNGD until 1926 . Of these properties, 
Aroa, Baubauguina, Obu, Otomata, Gadaisu, Paili, Waigani and Jaropa were 
35 See below p. 1 84. It ls also very probable that for a time at least BNGD board 
members too readily assumed that Murray, being 'one of us' and a gentleman sharing their 
values, would make allowances for discrepancies that might exist between their 
unquestionably good intentions and the behaviour of their employees in Papua. 
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planted with coconuts, Itikinumu, Jawarere and Doa with rubber, Bomana 
with sisal and Katea with tobacco. Sea Island cotton was also grown for a 
period on Baubauguina, Gadaisu and Katea. Robinson River produced copra. 
As well as requiring the employment of dozens of new managers and 
overseers of varying experience or none, the flurry of clearing and planting 
provided work for many of the old Papua hands who, it was presumed, 'knew 
the natives' and the country and now contracted to clear scrub, prepare 
nurseries, recruit labour and lay down estates. As mentioned in a previous 
chapter, several retiring government officers of the Barton faction, William 
Bruce, Guy Manning, Henry Grifftn and Arthur Jewell, became contractors to 
the new companies - in the case of Bruce and Griffin at least, in order to 
provide a living while they built up properties of their own. Bruce and Griffin 
both worked on Bloomfield's estates at Galley Reach, Manning cleared Paili for 
the Laka River Company, and Jewell cleared the Fairfax Harbour leases of 
Clarke and Whiting to produce sisal hemp . These men otherwise all 
speculated in land, might have carried out alluvial mining in spells of 
inactivity or even shot birds of paradise illegally. They were prepared to tum 
their hands to anything that could help them re-establish the style of life to 
which their former offtce and education had led them to feel entitled. In 
unashamedly class and race conscious times and not wishing to descend to 
the level of the older resident knockabouts who openly consorted with the 
Papuans they must have found their predicament very trying. 
Other contractors - Daniel Horan, Alec Clunas,  James Driver, Charles 
Arbouin, Ernest Wythes, Robert Hunter, Elias Solomon, the Evenetts, the 
Auerbachs , and the Gors brothers were drawn from among the miners, 
recruiters , traders, small planters and just plain drifters of whom the Territory 
seemed never to be entirely free. To the management of estates though, were 
attracted a few men of experience from the larger plantation world. Clarke and 
Whiting's first manager at Kanosia, Wallace Westland, had managed an estate 
at Matale in Ceylon, a country to which he returned in 19 12 .  William 'Giligili' 
Wright, Kitchen and Levers' manager at Milne Bay until 1 929 and 
subsequently the partner with Arthur Bunting and 'Gus' Nelsson in a 
desiccated coconut factory at Ahioma, had also worked in Ceylon. Bloomfield's 
manager at Kemp Welch, William Jefferson, may have worked in the Cocos 
Islands prior to coming to Papua, and George Archibald Loudon, to be met 
with hereinafter as the strong-willed general manager of BNGD from 19 15  
until 1926 , had spent four years on a cotton estate on the Zambezi, and two 
years in the Argentine and three years in Nigeria as an investigator for British 
estancia and plantation investors. Henry Grifftn, William Jefferson, and Henry 
Greene of Sagoro Tana each went on later to obtain positions on Malayan 
estates on the basis of their Papuan experience. 
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Australian-born settlers probably comprised no more than half of the 
private white planters in Papua and fewer than half of the managers on the 
company owned estates. Many of these were Englishmen, Scotsmen or 
Irishmen. Names like George Bemesconi, Richard Thorvald Jensen, Helge 
Holm, Einar Johannessen and Kurt Hacke suggest other backgrounds. 
Plantation assistants were more likely to be Australians.  Of other 'Britishers', 
most, like William Bruce, were quick to demand the 'rights' of Australians, as 
they understood them, and prepared at times to use Australian precedents to 
justify demands they made on the government. Most of the officials under 
Murray were Australians. Certainly most Australians strongly supported the 
imperial tie in the period under review and clearly settlers were divided by 
social class and employment status. Yet other divisions could also exist, and 
the effect of the country of birth, as indeed of religious loyalties, might have 
been more significant in influencing the attitudes towards each other of 
groups within the white community than the records show.36 
36 W. C. Bruce was deeply anti-Catholic in his opinions and Captain Fitch's allegation 
in April 1 920 that Judge Murray had given the Catholic Mission favourable treatment over 
customs dues tried to suggest sectarian bias in Murray and may suggest the same in Fitch. 
See below p. 1 62 ,  note 6 .  
CHAPTER 8 
Smal l men , officials ,  capital ists 
Settlement by the 'small man ' in the boom years 
With the boom dozens of white miners, traders, and recruiters, many 
'battlers' and a few remittance men, long or newly resident in the Territory, 
applied for leases in large and small parcels at many points along the 
Papuan coast and in the islands of the Eastern and South Eastern 
Divisions . In the latter Divisions the more successful of the new individual 
planters came from among the established traders several of whom 
accumulated small coconut plantations and became substantial figures in 
the 'east' and in the small social world radiating out from Samarai. 
Principal among them was Arthur Bunting, a former Burns Philp employee 
and Samarai storekeeper since 1903, who had brought out his brothers 
Fred and Bob from England to help in his business.  Together the Bunting 
brothers were to separately hold or share with each other or others 
interests in more than twenty planting leases and to supersede the 
Whittens as the major private planters in the eastern Divisions. The 
Buntings began by planting on Imbert, Panamau, Teste (Wari) ,  Meilai and 
Quessant (Miligili), all small islands to the south of Samarai, on Panawina 
in the Calvados Chain, and in the Engineer Group. 
Another settler of this kind was the Swede, John Gusth 'Gus' Nelsson, a 
trader at Woodlark and since 1903 joint owner with the miner William 
Shedden of a plantation lease over Doini Island near Samarai. In 1909 he 
obtained 5 ,000 acres at Kwaiapan Bay on Woodlark for a much larger 
plantation. Nelsson continued to expand his interests both in plantations 
and other businesses and was a Member of the Legislative Council from 
1 9 1 4  until his death in 1 940. 
Yet another was Elizabeth Mahony, trader to the miners on Sudest and 
Misima, who now developed small plantations at Moguiva on Sudest, on 
Motorina in the Calvados Chain, at Dunvara on Rossel, and at Bonagai on 
Woodlark. In periods spent in Samarai between 1 9 1 4  and 1 9 1 8  the 
anthropologist Bronislaw Malinowski came to know Mrs Mahony well and 
was impressed by 'this 63 year old woman, tall, strong, with an ultra­
energetic Anglo-Saxon face, constantly using profane language (damn, 
blooming)', who intervened in Papuan village disputes and completely 
overshadowed her wayward and ineffectual husband in the management of 
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their interests. 1 Like other owners of strings of small properties in the 
eastern divisions, she lived much of her life aboard her boat collecting 
copra from her plantations in turn and leaving their operation between 
visits in the hands of trusted 'boss-boys'.  Finally crushed with the onset of 
the great depression Elizabeth Mahony would retire 'south' in 1930, a 
woman then in her seventies leaving two daughters and a son in Papua. 
Along the north coast of the Eastern Division between Bentley Bay and 
East Cape were now developed a string of small coconut plantations whose 
owners would remain dependent for a living primarily on trade and on 
recruiting 'Gosiagos' from the neighbouring D'Entrecasteaux islands or 
'lasi-lasis' from East Cape who came to be the preferred labour on the 
rubber estates of the Central Division. These small trader-planters and 
recruiters included John Gray of Annie Inlet, Landen Erringstone Forrester 
of Polotana, and Fred 'Brassy' Evenett of Moununa. Brassy Evenett also 
leased Deirina Island southwest of Samarai. With his brother, Arthur, he 
contracted for a time and worked beche-de-mer boats in the eastern 
divisions. This group was joined in the twenties by the Talbot brothers, 
Charlie and Dick, at Punipuni. On the other side of Goodenough Bay 
Hobart Spiller of Menapi also combined planting with trade and 
recruiting. 2 
Across the Ward Hunt and Goschen Straits the high islands of the 
D'Entrecasteaux filled the horizon. There John Olsen, another miner, 
planted a small property at Sebulagomwa on the southern promontory of 
Fergusson Island opposite the Methodist Mission head station on Dobu. 
Nearby at Kedidia a lease was taken out by George Harrison. When Olsen 
died in 1 9 1 5 ,  Sebulagomwa was leased by Harrison's brother Ernest, a 
former Methodist missionary on Woodlark, a notably unfruitful field in the 
evangelisation of Papua. Ernest Harrison had left the mission after his wife, 
a fellow missionary, fell ill and was forced to leave the country. Perhaps 
embittered, and like many of his new friends on plantations ,  Harrison 
became a heavy drinker. By 1 920 Arthur Bunting in partnership with 
Burns Philp's manager at Samarai, George Aumuller, and others held 
planting leases at Sewataitai on Normanby Island, and at Sanaroa Island in 
the group. 
Bronislaw Malinowski, A DLary fn the Strtct Sense of the Tenn {London 1967), 263 . 
After the war Hobart Spiller was joined as partner by William Maxwell Middleton, 
later a prominent planter in the Mandated Territory. Max Middleton had come to Papua 
as a bank officer at Samarai in 19 10. He went off to the war, was at Gallipoli, and lost an 
eye in France. In 1921  he was an unsuccessful applicant for a lease over the Duperre 
Group to the south of the Conflicts {NAPNG G67, Land Board Minutes, 10 Feb. 1921  ). 
Turning to New Guinea he became an assessor for the Board of Expropriated {German) 
Properties and acquired several estates on Karkar Island, Madang. 
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Nearer to Samarai, along the southern shore of Milne Bay, Fred Kruger, 
a miner retiring from the Waria gold-field, began planting in 19 15 at 
Gamododo or 'Dodo' where his trade store became a well-known stopping 
place for coastal boats and canoes for the next twenty-seven years. On the 
opposite shore in the same year Hanorah and John Leetch established 
Hihila - another modest plantation dependent on its store to survive. 
Hanorah was a daughter of Elizabeth and John Mahony.3 Across from 
Samarai, Loani, planted with palms by the Walker brothers , was now 
managed and partly owned by Elias Solomon who proceeded to grow 
rubber and experiment with vanilla and cocoa. He supplied milk to 
Samarai from a herd of cattle that came with the property. Further up the 
coast opposite Sariba Island was Borebore or Boliboli, the plantation of 
George Eichorn, son of a naturalist who had accompanied Donald Mackay's 
expedition up the Purari River in 1 908. There too was the Belesana slipway 
operated by James Ballantyne who,  in 1907, also leased a planting block of 
300 acres nearby. In 19 1 0  he assigned this property to his wife , Meta 
Ballantyne, who developed it. 
To the east of Samarai, in the Conflict Group, the plantation on 
Panasesa developed a decade earlier by Herny Wickham was managed after 
his departure by his onetime partner, Captain Herbert Holton, until 
Bolton's death in 1 9 1 0  and then by Bolton's wife until 1 9 1 2 . Thereafter 
until the thirties it was managed for the Mombiri Company and its 
successor, Pacific and Papua Produce, by Alphonse and Helene Bernier, an 
eccentric French couple notorious for requiring their labourers to wash 
daily with soap. The Berniers planted a small estate of their own on Misima 
that failed to flourish and where Bernier went out of his mind. Another 
Frenchman, Prosper Charpentier, similarly regarded as an odd if charming 
'character', held a planting lease on Woodlark. 'Charpy' had a penchant for 
writing highly idiosyncratic letters to newspapers and the government that 
made him occasionally a thorn in the side of those he attacked. 4 In the 
twenties Charpentier settled on a small-holding, Naruna, on the Laloki 
outside Port Moresby. 
On the numerous islands still further east and to the north of the 
Conflicts, the Calvados Chain, the Louisiades , Woodlark and the 
Trobriands, groups that made up the South Eastern Division , the scale of 
plantations was small though their number was large . Indeed here many 
Hanorah later married James Driver. They were still at Hihila in 1 94 1 .  
CRS A l  1 3 / 15743, 'Charges by Prosper Charpentier re: Papua', letter to Prime 
Minister [Joseph Cook), 10 July 1 9 1 3; letters in DaUy Mall, Brisbane, 17 Nov. 1 9 1 0  
(Papua's 'comic opera' Government) and 1 7  Mar. 19 1 1 ; in Papuan Courier, 6 and 1 3  Dec. 
1 9 18 and 23 Feb. 1 923 . 
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trader-planters made no pretence to the title of 'planter' at all as it became 
increasingly a name appropriated by the managers and especially the 
owner-managers of the larger estates on the mainland. 
On Nivani , a very small island in the Torlesse Group to the southwest of 
Misima, a government coconut plantation had been laid down in 1893 
using prison labour when Nivani was briefly headquarters of the Division. 
In 1 908 it was offered for lease and Elizabeth Mahony applied. She refused 
to pay the £300 the Lands Department asked for the palms and the lease 
was awarded to George Munt in 1 909 . Munt also planted on Panapompom 
nearby but failed to gain other holdings in the Torlesse under a policy 
whereby the government disallowed any further applications for the 
alienation of small uninhabited islands that might have been stopping 
places for Papuan canoes or visited by their fishermen. He established 
himself as a trader on Misima. 
Elsewhere in the Louisiades memorable figures included John 'Jack' 
Anderson, one of the first prospectors in the Sudest goldrush of 1888, who 
set up as a planter on Panamoti in 1 907 at the age of sixty-four, and Ah 
Gow, a Chinese settler from Protectorate days who planted coconuts and 
rice on Nimoa, an island opposite the Mahony's property at Griffin Point, 
Sudest. Across Sudest (or Tagula) on Hinai Bay, T. E. Craig developed 
Madaua, the property of Tagula Plantations Ltd, a venture of a group of old 
Sudest miners from North Queensland. Craig's father was master of a 
vessel murdered with his crew off Sudest by the men of Pana Tinani in 
1 886. In the extreme east of the Territory, the Osborne brothers, traders on 
Rossel, had also been planting there at Abuleti since 1 903 . In 1 9 1 1 it 
would be found that the brothers had intimidated the islanders and 
exploited resources to which they had no entitlement.5 Their nearest white 
neighbours to the north, Richard Ede and his son Isadore, traders in the 
Laughlin Group and, were it not for their lugger, perhaps the most isolated 
Europeans in all Papua, now developed a small plantation on Woodlark at 
Guasopa. 
Woodlark, or Murua, lies in the north of the Division and planters there 
have been mentioned in passing. Among others in the vicinity were Einar 
Johannessen and William Hughes, who together developed a property on 
nearby Madau. Hughes would one day buy out Charpentier's interest at 
Lauani. And to the northwest of this Division, in the Trobriand Islands, the 
brothers Samuel and Raphael Brudo held a small lease, Kavataria, on 
Kiriwina where they traded in pearls, and a plantation of 1 80 acres on 
Bomapau Island opposite where they cultivated coconuts. Malinowski said 
See below p. 280- 1 .  
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of Raphael that he was the only man in the islands he could meet with who 
could bring him into touch with civilisation. He was to stay with the 
Brudos on a visit to Paris.6 Ten miles across the lagoon from Kavataria to 
the south were the Brudos' neighbours, Edward 'Ted' Auerback and his 
brother George, who traded at Sinaketa and planted coconuts on nearby 
Muwo Island which they leased after Nelsson and Sheddon had forfeited it 
in 1 909. Ted recruited in the D'Entrecasteaux and was a contractor for 
BNGD on Waigani estate in Milne Bay. He was red-headed and a 
philanderer of note among Papuan women. 7 
Off the east coast of Kiriwina, Cyril 'King' Cameron leased land on 
Kitava Island. Cameron attracted a reputation as a Papuan Prospero who, 
it was believed, had forfeited a claim to chieftainship of the Clan Cameron 
on account of his Papuan children. He presided over his small domain for 
thirty years among a people the most beautiful and sexually free in 
Melanesia, resenting visitors who might interfere with 'his' women and in 
the thirties developing a passion for radio.8 
East of Amazon Bay on the south coast, all of these settlers along with 
their neighbours among the miners, traders and missionaries - and 
perhaps increasingly also some Papuans - looked towards Samarai as their 
centre. The small town occupying nearly all of the fifty-two acres of an 
island in the China Strait at the very easternmost point of the New Guinea 
mainland and surrounded by other palm-fringed islands drew the kind of 
sentimental regard in Papua shown elsewhere in the Pacific for Levuka, 
Tulagi, Apia and Papeete. There were settlers in the eastern divisions who 
had never seen the parched streets and glaring roofs of Port Moresby and 
who took pride in saying so. In 1 937 George Munt of Misima going on 
holiday could still claim that he was one of those white residents of eastern 
Papua who had 'never been to Port'. 9 
In the Northern, Central, and Gulf Divisions plantations developed by 
the 'small man' in the period 1 907- 1 4  were fewer if sometimes larger than 
those of the east. At Buna on the north coast, Ernest 'Ernie' Oates planted 
coconuts between recruiting sorties with his partner Les 'Jumbo' Joubert 
among the Orokaivas. A few miles away the goldfield trading partners 
Malinowski, Diary, 2 1 4. 
Much earlier, in April 1903, while recruiting for the goldfields, Ted Auerback was 
charged with fourteen offences under the NLO ( 1 900). He was convicted on two charges of 
failing to repatriate workers, two charges of recruiting using false pretenses and another 
of arming his native crew with the intention of intimidating recruits. He was fined £60 
and imprisoned for a month (BNGAR, 1902-03 , Report of the Resident Magistrate, 
Eastern Division). 
8 Interview: Fred Craig, Alotau, May 1 975. 
Papuan Courier, 25 Mar. 1 937.  
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Alexander 'Alec' Clunas and Mort Clark leased land on the Yodda road at 
the Giriwu River on which they grew cotton. Clark also leased 10,000 acres 
on Ora Bay but he died in 1 9 12 and the land was passed in. It may have 
been the same land taken up by Ora Bay Plantations Limited in 1 9 15 and 
called Wiresota, a property that would be owned by one of the Bunting 
partnerships by 1 930. Government stations were established at Kokoda in 
1 904 and Ioma in 1 905 to cover the activities of miners on the Yodda and 
Gira goldfields. As mentioned previously, small plantations - of hevea 
rubber - were subsequently laid down on both using prisoners to clear 
scrub and plant the stumps. In later years the Kokoda area was to attract 
interest and the Kienzle brothers began development of Mamba Estate in 
1936. 10 
After 1 9 1 0  there was little further planting by individual settlers in the 
Central Division where the larger companies had come to dominate 
commercial agriculture. On Redscar Bay, on the stretch of coast known as 
Hisiu, the brothers of Walter Gors - Leo, Otto and Arthur - established 
several small plantations alongside BNGD's Obu and Aroa, and the 
properties of A. S. Anthony and Dr Colin Simson.1 1  'The Palms', another 
small Hisiu plantation, was developed by Allan MacGregor Sinclair and his 
wife. Sinclair was one of those who assigned leases they had acquired 
speculatively to BNGD in return for shares in 1 9 1 0. He was occasionally a 
relief manager on BNGD estates. Coconuts were planted further west at Ou 
Ou Creek near Delena by Louis Clunn, a son of the Milne Bay planter John 
Clunn. The BNGD general manager, G. A. Loudon, later became a partner 
in the property with Clunn and then sole owner. In the east of the Division 
at Cape Rodney a lease of 500 acres had been taken up in 1907 by Frank 
Hom. He died intestate in 1 9 1 6  and the Papuan Times organised an appeal 
for his destitute family, the plantation being sold the following year to 
Demara River Plantations. Nearby at Baramata after the war a Papuan 
Government Soldier Settlement lease was granted to G .  Harden and Partner 
but relinquished soon after. It was then leased to Arturo Carlo Pilotti, an 
apparently trouble-prone Sicilian some supposed wanted for rape in 
Australia who married a Papuan only to be stabbed by her father. 12 He 
was still alive there in 1 939 when he sold the property fully developed. 
1° For later developments at Kokoda see below p. 226. The station at Ioma on the 
Gira River replaced that at Tamata on the Mambare established in 1897. 
1 1  See below p. 102 for Dr Simson. The Gors plantations were later consolidated as 
'Iki-lkina'. 
12 Pilotti shot himself in the knee in Jan. 1 930. NAPNG & CRS Serles 09 1 ,  Abau 
Station Journal, 18,  1 9  Jan. 1 930 (Report by Leo Flint ARM , 9 Feb.) .  Another soldier 
settler block had been taken up on the Upagau River at Aroma by Reginald Chancellor. 
See note 3, p. 194  and p. 282 below. 
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Further east still, on Baxter Bay near the Mogubo property of G. A. Loudon 
and Campbell Cowley, Alfred Greenaway, an Englishman 'from Ramsgate 
or Margate' , planted coconuts. Malinowski recorded that Alf was 'married to 
a native woman and feels miserable in respectable company, particularly 
feminine. [He] Has not the slightest wish to leave New Guinea'. 13 There 
were a dozen others like Greenaway along the coast. 
Over 200 miles to the west, in the Gulf Division, coconuts were planted 
by the traders Ernest McGowan at Moveave; Donald McDonald at Vaiviri; 
Robert Mawson, father of the Antarctic explorer, at Orokolo; 14  Braham 
and Pope at Kukipi; Mrs Ashton at Huiva on le Inlet; F. W. Clark at Koaru; 
and W. 'Scotty' Currie at Oiapu. Of these plantations, McGowan's, begun in 
1 908, was the earliest, and McDonald's by far the largest - 350 acres by 
1 93 7. Like the trader-planters of the northeast coast who recruited 
Gosiagos and Iasi-lasis , these men probably did some recruiting for the 
estates in the Central Division, as labourers from the neighbouring Delta 
Division, collectively called 'Goaribaris' and from the Gulf, the 'Keremas' 
and 'Orokolos' ,  were in demand at various times. A much larger plantation 
begun before the war in the Gulf Division was at Maira, on the Vailala River 
above Vaiviri. The planter was Lewis Lett, first engineer on the Bentlnck, 
the tramp steamer that had brought out the supplies for the establishment 
of BNGD in 1 9 1 0. Lett was co-discoverer of an oil show on the Vailala in 
1 9 1 1 and much later a writer and biographer of Hubert Murray. His house 
at Maira with a tiled roof and ornamental garden was the finest on the 
coast in 1 9 1 8. 15 After the war cotton was grown in commercial quantities 
for a period by Frank Mahony, son of Elizabeth and John Mahony of 
Sudest and a returned soldier, and by Robert Shaw-Moody, a former 
plantation overseer, at Keuru near Mrs Ashton's place halfway between the 
Vailala and Kerema.16 
The only plantations in the Delta remained the government plantation at 
Kikori and its neighbour, Ogamobu, and in the Western Division 
development had ceased with the work undertaken by Papuan Industries 
Limited and the Cowlings. Until 193 1 the Papuan Industries properties 
were managed from Madiri on the Fly by James Freshwater and for periods 
by a Daru recruiter, Hugh 'Percy' Beach. Ownership was then transfered to 
the Unevangelised Fields Mission which leased out Madiri to Janet Cowling 
1 3  Malinowski, A Diary, 39. Greenaway's property was later absorbed into Mogubo. 
1 4  Robert Ellis Mawson's lease at Kavauvau, Orokolo, was issued in 1 906. He may 
already have been there for some time. He obtained leases totalling 2,500 acres on the 
Vailala in 1909 which he may have transferred to Lewis Lett. He died at Orokolo in 1 9 1 3 .  
1 5  Percy Robinson, Robinson Letters, 1 4  Dec. 19 1 8. 
1 6  See below p.  235. 
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and Dirimu to Leonard Luff, the principal Darn trader. The only 'town' in 
the west, Darn, with a white population of perhaps twenty, lay on a low 
mangrove ringed island that barely escaped inundation by the tides. 
Depending on the trading houses of Port Moresby for supplies it remained 
essentially a recruiting station for Papuans indentured in the pearling 
industry in Queensland waters and on plantations in the Central Division 
and a place where the returning 'Kiwai' labourers alongside the plantation 
managers could spend accumulated wages. 17  
If the miners of the 1 880s constituted the first generation of 'white 
pioneers' in southeastern New Guinea, the small planters who from 1 907 
came to take advantage of the 'most liberal land laws in the tropics' 
alongside the managers and assistants brought to Papua by the investment 
boom made up a second generation. Leasehold tenure had indeed provided 
opportunities for settlement in Papua by white men and women of small 
means who might never have afforded the purchase price of a freehold 
grant. Despite their hopes, and like their predecessors in the interregnum 
and before, most of these men and women never became planters 
independent of trading. Planting carried prestige but trade was to provide a 
surer living whether the enterprise was large or small throughout the 
history of colonial Papua. Like many of the nameless assistants on the 
larger company owned estates perhaps a majority of these settlers died in 
Papua, a memory for a time among their peers, labourers and servants and 
in not a few cases among Papuan descendants. In 1 909 there were forty­
five planters, twenty-eight traders and fifteen recruiters in the Territory 
among an adult white population of 489 . By 1 9 1  7, when the adult white 
male population reached 70 1 ,  there were 139 planters, managers and 
assistants, twenty-three traders and nineteen recruiters. A further dozen 
settlers like the Whittens and the Buntings, while they were classified as 
'storekeepers' in the Annual Reports , were also significant planters. 18  In 
total, planters and their families comprised about a third of, the European 
population. Another group of about half their number served them as 
agents and recruiters,  operators of small ships, tradesmen and suppliers. It 
is doubtful that those engaged directly in planting in Papua were ever 
much more numerous than in 1 9 1  7. In the period 1 930-34 there were at 
times fewer than a hundred active planters. 
17 For the peoples of the Western Division, much of which was low-lying and 
relatively infertile, indentured service remained the only channel open for satisfaction of 
the new needs European intrusion had brought. Often tall and strong above the average 
in Papua, workers from this region were regarded as especially valuable, along with the 
Motu of the Central Division, on coastal boats. 
18 PAR 1 908-09, 25;  and PAR 1 91 6-1 7, 1 2 .  
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Officials interested in land 
Government officials were as quick now to see advantage in obtaining an 
interest in land as were the 'unofficial' (non-official) population, and until 
an Executive Council meeting of 24 December 1 907 decided that officers of 
the Lands Department could no longer apply for or hold leases there were 
no restrictions whatever placed upon applications for Crown Lands by 
officers of the Papuan Government. The service as yet provided no pension 
scheme for retiring officers and though A. C. English had been accused 
before the Royal Commission of a conflict of interest between his official 
responsibilities and his plantation and obliged to resign, his fellow officers 
had continued to acquire lands in their own names. 
Up until June 1908 these interests included those of H. L. Griffin, RM 
for the Northern Division, who had applied for and been granted 640 acres 
on the Vama Creek at Galley Reach and who proposed to take leave in 
1 908 to float a company to develop the lease; and Charles Garrioch, Clerk 
of the Executive Council, who retained his half share with Henry Greene in 
Sagoro Tano. Garrioch along with John Bensted, Clerk of Government 
Stores, and Cyril Havilland and Albert Ardlie, field assistants to the 
Government Surveyor, each held £ 100 shares in the soon to be aborted 
Papua Para Rubber Company. This venture apparently succeeded where 
Randolph Bedford had failed in obtaining a lease between the Laloki and 
Koitaki at Sogeri. The master of the government yacht, Merrie England, 
Captain Archibald A. H. Hunter, held 600 acres near Garrioch's and 
Ballantine's blocks and was one of the syndicators in the BNGD flotation, 
his land being transfered to the new company as part of Itikinumu Estate 
in return for shares.  The gaolers John MacDonald and Horace Hides each 
held a 500 acre lease on the lower Laloki, the Government Medical Officer 
at Samarai, Dr R. F. Jones, held a sixth share in Henry Wickham's Conflict 
Islands Planting Association, and the only Papuan appointed to the regular 
service, Teina Materua, a clerk in the Treasury, held a lease of 1 00 acres at 
Hisiu. The ARM at Samarai, Charles Owen-Turner, held an interest in 1 25 
acres on Milne Bay acquired in the name of his wife - another daughter of 
John and Elizabeth Mahony - who indeed worked the property. Over the 
years many officers out of necessity purchased town allotments in 'Port' or 
Samarai on which to build houses. 
That restrictions should be placed upon the nature and extent of the 
interests of officials in land became obvious at the end of 1 907 when it 
appeared that members of the Lands Department had acted improperly in 
manipulating applications and in seeking subsequently to evade an 
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Executive Council Order that prohibited them specifically from having any 
direct interest in plantations. 19  
In October, Archie MacAlpine, assistant manager on the new Clarke and 
Whiting estates at Kanosia, had begun looking at land nearby for possible 
development by a syndicate comprising himself, the Chief Clerk of the 
Treasury, Herbert Champion, Champion's junior clerk, J . C.  Watt, and the 
acting Chief Government Surveyor, Ralph Drummond, and his assistants, 
Charles Pinney and Albert Ardlie. Drummond had been an officer 
reprimanded by the Royal Commissioners f<;>r insubordination towards 
Anthony Musgrave in going past the Government Secretary to seek Captain 
Barton's support in a matter where Musgrave had opposed him. In J .  H. P. 
Murray's confidential account of affairs that led the Prime Minister to 
establish the Commission, Drummond was described as a 'young man of 
very limited education, and his conversation, general demeanour, and 
general principles are such that he could never hope to command the 
respect of the officers of the Department' .20 He survived in his acting 
position under Murray but was lmown to be of the Barton faction that 
chafed under the Judge's administration. 
It happened that early in December, H. A. Mola, an agent acting both on 
his own behalf and for Bloomfield's Dundee River Rubber Company, saw 
Drummond about leases Mola wanted to obtain at Galley Reach. On the 
1 3th, the day after he had lodged his formal application for the land, Mola 
was handed a sketch map showing that two 250 acre portions of the land 
he had chosen had already been applied for by Drummond and Pinney -
the actual dates on Pinney's application being the 1 1  th and on 
Drummond's , the 13th, - facts not communicated to Mola. At the Executive 
Council meeting held on Christmas Eve Drummond's and Pinney's 
applications were rejected on grounds that officers of the Lands 
Department were not to have the privilege thenceforth of acquiring lands in 
their own names though their interest in a registered company that 
obtained lands might not be deemed improper.2 1 
Over the Christmas period Champion and Drummond were both house 
guests of Wallace Westland, general manager at Kanosia, while Pinney and 
Ardlie were staying nearby at MacAlpine's house at Rorona. In the course of 
19 'Correspondence relating to dealings in land by otncials' was tabled in Parliament 
and printed in CPP 1 907-08, pp. 1575-88. Other correspondence is in CRS A l  1 4/5 1 45 ,  
'Dealings in Shares and Land b y  Papuan Officials, 1 908- 1 9 1 4'. 
2° Francis West, Selected Letters of Hubert Murray (Melbourne 1 97 1 ), letter No. 32, 
p.  43 . 
2 1  CPP 1 907-08, 'Correspondence relating to dealings in land by otncials: Precis of 
events etc.' ,  p. 1 575 . Staniforth Smith had suggested Mola look at Galley Reach lands as 
the Dundee (or Waipara) River lands at Hood Lagoon were unsuitable (ibid. ,  p. 1585). 
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a week said to have been spent hunting goura pigeons and maganl much of 
the area that included the portions refused to Drummond and Pinney was 
traversed and, no doubt, carefully examined by the holidaying parties.  On 
the re-opening of the Lands Office on 2 January 1908 applications were 
lodged by MacAlpine and J. C. Watt for land that included the blocks 
previously applied for - just two hours before H. A. Mola resubmitted his 
applications for the same area. 
As a member of the Land Board that made recommendations for the 
Executive Council's approval , Drummond met his immediate superior, 
Staniforth Smith, to constitute a meeting of the Board, the quorum of 
which was two, and, as with the previous applications by Drummond and 
Pinney, the applications with apparent priority - those of MacAlpine and 
Watt - were recommended. Drummond told Smith of his intention to take 
up an interest in any subsequent undertaking to develop the land and 
Smith understood this to be acceptable within the meaning of the Order of 
24 December. Mola, now thwarted twice, appealed to the Executive Council 
accusing MacAlpine and Watt of being in a syndicate with Drummond and 
Pinney and effectively their instruments in an attempt to evade the 
Council's Order. At the February meeting of the Council, Drummond and 
Pinney were asked to answer this charge together with charges of 
attempting to obtain priority for 'their' application over that of a member of 
the public and of failure to render Mola proper assistance. The Council 
comprising Murray, Musgrave, Campbell , Staniforth Smith and Champion 
was divided, the first three finding Drummond and Pinney guilty on the 
first count at least. Drummond was suspended shortly to resign and 
Pinney's salary reduced. Staniforth Smith continued to affirm his belief in 
Drummond's good faith and privately believed the whole affair part of a 
scheme contrived by Murray's party to damage his credibility in the matter 
of the Lieutenant Governorship. He could 
see the whole vile conspiracy now. Drummond was to be sacrificed although 
innocent in order to discredit the Lands Department of which I am the head. I 
have been the real prey and others merely the stalking horses . . .  [It was] a 
carefully and maliciously organised plot to destroy my reputation and good 
name.22 
But the damage was done without Murray or his supporters' intervention 
since the propriety of Smith twice permitting Drummond to sit with him as 
the Land Board to consider applications in which the acting CGS had an 
interest was unavoidably brought into question. Murray could indeed 
permit himself to say in a letter tabled in the House of Representatives that 
22 NLA Deposit 52, Atlee Hunt Papers, item 469, Staniforth Smith to Hunt, 28 Apr. 
1 908. 
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Smith 'should have realized how absolutely it was opposed to all rules, not 
only of justice but of common sense, that Drummond should sit in 
consideration of his own application' ,  but that it might be urged in Smith's 
defence 'that his total want of experience in departmental procedure and 
administration' was at fault.23 The judgement was harsh but what else 
could he have said? 
To retrieve the situation, Staniforth Smith offered Deakin his 
resignation. In a letter, also tabled,  the former senator admitted his error of 
judgement finding it necessary now to defend himself against wild 
assertions in the Parliament that he had interests in land himself. His 
private humiliation seemed complete when towards the end of June A. S. 
Bloomfield revealed to Smith that Drummond had all the while held 1 ,000 
shares in Clarke's Papua Rubber Proprietary and that this interest had 
entitled him indirectly to 250 shares in the subsidiary Fairfax Harbour 
Plantations that were taken up in his wife's name. The Director of 
Agriculture and Commissioner for Lands was deeply shocked. He had 
'implicitly believed' Drummond's assurances given 'time and again . . .  that 
he had no interests in any land transactions'.24 He ordered the surveyor 
out of his office and was later to learn that both Champion and Campbell 
had known from the beginning of Drummond's involvement in shares in 
land.25 Judge Murray could stand back almost benevolently and watch 
the self-destruction of his rival. 
The outcome of the Drummond affair was the inclusion of a regulation 
under Section XVI of the Land Ordinance, drafted by Atlee Hunt on 
Deakin's instructions, that permitted serving officers other than members 
of the Lands Department to acquire a whole or part interest in lands other 
than for a place of residence only in those districts in which they were not 
employed, where they did not personally manage the property and where 
their official duties were not compromised. Shares could be held in public 
companies in the Territory provided officers took no part in the conduct of 
the enterprise and held no controlling interest. The regulation did not apply 
retrospectively although all eXisting interests were to be revealed to the 
Lieutenant Governor. By 1 9 1 4  officers of the Lands Department were once 
more allowed to acquire land subject to an extended waiting period in 
which applications by others would be given priority. In the years ahead 
officers of the Papuan service continued to acquire plantation and other 
23 CCP 1907-08, J. H. P. Murray to Minister for External Affairs, 1 Mar. 1 908 (p.  
1577). 
2 4  NLA Deposit 52, Atlee Hunt Papers, item 478, Staniforth Smith to Hunt, 25 June 
1 908. 
25 Ibid . ,  item 484 (n.d. ), Staniforth Smith to Hunt. 
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leases subject to these conditions loosely applied where the need to transfer 
officers from division to division sometimes placed them near properties in 
which they were interested. 
Government Medical Officers in particular were attracted to plantation 
enterprise. Dr Cecil Vaughan who had unsuccessfully sought to develop a 
block on the Musa River in 1 899 and Dr Jones's shares in the Conflict 
Islands Planting Association have been mentioned. In 1 906 Dr Colin Coape 
Simson resigned on taking up 5 00 acres at Hisiu adjoining A. S. Anthony's 
property. He continued in private practice in Port Moresby for a time before 
1 9 1 4, his plantation managed by Fred Weekley - an old prospector and a 
nominated Member of the Legislative Council. Dr Simson became a major 
shareholder in the Laloki Copper Mine and in 1 9 1 5  was deputed by a 
meeting of citizens in Port to publicise the qissatisfactions of the white 
community of Papua in Australia. Living in Australia after 1 9 1 8  Simson 
continued to make an annual visit to Hisiu until 1 94 1 .  
Other GMOs to take up land were Dr Julius Streeter, Chief Medical 
Officer in 1 9 1 0, who was partner with Robert Bunting in the purchase of 
leases in the Elai Valley at Port Glasgow developed by the Papua Rubber 
and Copra Company of Christchurch, New Zealand; Dr Walter Harse, a 
shareholder in the Milne Bay Rubber Company who in 1 9 1 7  bought 
Tomanau, the plantation in the Sagarai valley of the Papuan Rubber and 
Trading Company; Dr F. Goldsmith who obtained a lease in 1 9 1 0  of 5 ,000 
acres on the Vanapa River in a partnership with an 'old-timer', S. F. H. 
Thoresby;26 Dr W. E. Giblin who, from 1 920, developed Nonowai Plantation 
opposite Samarai; and much later, Dr G .  H. Vernon, GMO at Daru, who 
'realised his ambition' by beginning a planter's life at Oni-Oni, Port 
Glasgow, in 1 938.27 
Of other officers taking up land after 1 9 1 4, Lionel Percy Barton Armit 
AR:tv,1, the son of an officer who served under MacGregor, and Alfred 
Edward Pratt, the then CGS, took up neighbouring blocks at Sogeri where 
Armit's widowed mother and Mrs Pratt planted rubber. Both properties 
were eventually sold and incorporated into Koitaki. 
Capitalists 
Sir Rupert Clarke and Geoffrey Syme were eminent men in Australian 
public life whose substantial investment might be expected to have 
stimulated interest in Papua among others of their class and wealth. Yet 
apart from the concentration of investment that derived from the 
26 Goldsmith and Thoresby's lease was not developed. 
27 Papuan Courter, 8 Apr. 1 938. Dr Walter Strong, CMO 1 9 1 5-37, planted an 
'experimental garden' on his private lease at Sapphire Creek in the thirties. The Annual 
Report, 1 934-35, p. 7, noted that he was testing tobacco. See below p. 23 L 
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Bloomfield and Clarke connection and the coming together of Australians 
and Englishmen with antipodean experience to promote the formation of 
the British New Guinea Development Company in 19 1 0, capital entering 
Papua in the boom years from 1 907 to 1 9 14 came from diverse and widely 
dispersed sources.  Australasian investment proved more typically to come 
from small syndicates of middle-class business and professional men who, 
perhaps reassured by the risks taken by Clarke and Whiting, and prompted 
by an exceptionally favourable international investment climate for tropical 
agriculture, thought Papua now a safe place into which to put their money 
close at hand. 
The lists of shareholders in two of A. S. Bloomfield's promotions have 
survived.28 In Kemp Welch River Rubber Estates Limited there were 
seventy-seven shareholders in 1 92 1 ,  most of whom had taken up their 
shares at the outset. Of 1 9, 7 1 0  £ 1 shares the largest parcel was one of only 
1 ,2 73 held by Major General E .  Tivey of Queen Street, Melbourne. Atlee 
Hunt held 500 shares, Geoffrey Syme of the Age 333, and Bloomfield 
himself 40 1 .  Most shareholders held fewer shares. About half were in the 
hands of Melbourne 'city' men who might have been clients of Bloomfield, 
the balance being held by smaller investors, widows and retired people. 
Several shareholders were members of the Melbourne Club or connected 
with Collins House, two of the principal gathering places of Australian 
capitalists, but they constituted no dominating group. Other noteworthy 
investors in the company were A. C. English of Rigo with 200 shares, Otto 
Gors of Hisiu with 150,  Ernest Glass of the Barnet Glass Rubber Company 
with 1 74 shares, J.  W. McComas of Collins Street and a director from 19 1 4  
of Kikori Plantations Limited with twenty-five shares, and one E .  Griffin -
perhaps the wife of H. L. Griffin - of 'Galley Reach Park', Fish Creek, South 
Gippsland, who also held twenty-five shares .  
The company that developed the neighbouring plantation on the Kemp 
Welch, New Guinea Rubber Estates, had an issued capital of £25 ,888. It 
was in this company that Mr Syme held 1 0,500 shares and where he was 
by far the largest shareholder. His fellow investors were similar to and in a 
few cases the same people who had fmanced Kemp Welch River Rubber 
and included, again, 0 .  C. Gors, A. C. English and E. Griffm.29 
The interests of Sir Rupert Clarke and R. S. Whiting were in enterprises 
almost wholly their own . In 1 92 1 ,  at a time when he had severed his 
connections with Clarke in a separation marked by some acrimony and had 
no reason to exaggerate, A. S. Bloomfield estimated that Clarke's and 
28 CRS Al 25 / 1 6087, Loans to Kemp Welch & N.G. Rubber Estates Ltd. Papua. 
192 1 - 1 925 . Lists of shareholders, 30 Aug. 192 1 .  
29 Ibid. 
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Whiting's personal investments in their Papuan plantations together 
amounted to £220,000.30 Bloomfield's own investment in Galley Reach 
and the Kemp Welch plantations could hardly have been less than 
£20, 000. Galley Reach was sold to Clarke and Whiting in 1 922 in 
settlement of accounts after the failure with a considerable loss of 
Bloomfield's managing agency, the Moresby Trading and Agency Company, 
in 1 92 1 .  
Of the 'English' companies, the principal shareholders in BNGD were 
the directors themselves and the Australian members of the Papuan Lands 
Syndicate who had promoted the development company. In 1 923 Staniforth 
Smith agreed that the investment of the BNGD shareholders amounted to 
£620,000, no dividend at the time having yet been paid.31 Others in 
England interested in Papuan plantations were like those in Australia a 
dispersed group. The directors and shareholders of the Pacific and Papua 
Produce Company (later Anglo-Papuan Plantations Ltd) , successors to 
Mombiri, were probably old friends or associates of Henry Wickham and 
whose only connection with BNGD or Admiral Davis's company was their 
common interest in Papua. One director of Pacific and Papua Produce at 
least, H. M. de Courcy Hamilton, was among the audience with Lord 
Ranfurly of BNGD and Sir Pope Cooper of the late Papuan Lands Syndicate 
at a lecture about commercial opportunities in Papua given by John 
Greeley Jenkins before the Royal Colonial Institute in 1 9 1 1 .  The occasion 
was chaired by J. H. P. Murray himself on leave in London.32 
Undoubtedly many of the new white 'Papuans' or 'Anglo-Papuans' , their 
number reaching 700 in 1 909 and over 900 in 1 9 1 4, shared the optimism 
in the years 1 907 - 1 4  about the new Territory of Papua, a country which in 
their minds they had appropriated as their own. There was a prospect 
ahead of unlimited expansion, a confidence that they were present at the 
beginning of great undertakings. The infusion of new capital into plantation 
development exceeded £ 1 million in this period and provided work directly 
and indirectly for several hundred white employees and suppliers of 
services, and for numbers of Papuans indentured as agricultural labourers 
that were increasing by 1 9 1 0  to over 5 ,000 annually. 
With the outbreak of the European war in August 1 9 1 4  the boom ended. 
While plantations might change hands thereafter, the planted areas 
30 Ibid . ,  Arthur Bloomfield to Minister, 29 July 1 92 1 .  
31 NAPNG, G69 23 /5 / l ,  Staniforth Smith to Minister, 1 4  May 1 923. Smith's estimate 
was merely the sum of the paid up capital of the company in shares and debentures by 
1 922. The undistributed profits from the company's large trading operations ploughed 
back into completing plantation development or appropriated over the years to cover 
plantation losses might be claimed to represent yet further investment by the BNGD 
shareholders. See below p. 1 93-4 and note 14, p. 2 1 2.  
32 Morning Post (London), 24 Jan. 1 9 1 1 .  
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expanded on the existing leases,  and there were to be short flurries of 
interest and investment in the years after 1 922 in cotton, sisal, coffee and 
sugar, there was no substantial expansion again in plantation agriculture 
until the late thirties when the threat of a second war rekindled Australian 
interest in securing supplies of rubber near at hand. The area under 
cultivation on land owned or leased by Europeans had risen from 1 ,5 00 
acres in 1 906 to 44,447 acres in 1 9 1 4- 1 5 .33 The total area under lease for 
agricultural purposes in the latter year was over 200,000 acres but no 
plantations had completed their development. Forfeitures of lands 
speculatively leased and for which development capital could not be found 
had amounted to 1 74,355 acres since 1 9 1 0. Of the planted areas, 32 , 722 
acres were given to coconuts, 6 ,203 to rubber and 4,244 to sisal.34 
By 1 920 the cultivated areas amounted to 62,  1 62 acres or about one 
hundred square miles in the 90,000 square miles of Papua. The number of 
plantations rose from seventy-six in 1 908 with an average area of sixty-five 
acres, much of it just being cleared, to 259 in 1 922 and an average area of 
232 acres under cultivation. Many of these plantations were very much 
smaller than the average and more than half of them had no resident 
planter. Rubber would be planted on fewer than thirty properties all told, 
and of these, only Itikinumu, Koitaki, Lolorua and Kanosia would exceed 
1 ,000 planted acres. Of the 200 coconut plantations only thirty would 
reach a size where they produced more than 1 00 tons of copra a year, and 
of these only five would be producing more than 5 00 tons in 1 940 .35 
The total of the areas under production declined to 6 1 ,  1 22 acres in 
1 93 1 -32 and to 5 8,24 1 acres in 1 933-34. The expansion in rubber planting 
towards the end of the 1 930s was masked by the reduction in the areas 
under other cultures and in 1 940-41 only 63 , 609 acres were being 
cultivated. Rubber now accounted for over 1 8 ,000 acres , nearly 8,000 acres 
of it planted since 1 936 , with coconut plantations having declined in area 
from 48,000 acres in 1 934 to 45 , 5 00 acres, and the area cultivated with all 
other crops now less than 800 acres.36 
33 PAR 1914-15,  1 32. 
34 Ibid. 
35 For the copra tonnages in 1940 see NAPNG & CRS G69, Item 25 / 20, Treasurer to 
Acting Administrator, 2 1  Nov. 1 940; for details of the number and size of rubber estates 
1 940, CRS A5 18 Item P8 1 2/ l /5 Part 4, 'Papuan Commerce: Rubber Industry' , 1938-
1 940, Return of Rubber Plantations, 15 May 1 940. For copra and rubber exports see 
below, p. 3 10. The limits given here for the size of rubber plantations are for the period 
under review. They were exceeded after 1945.  
36 PAR 1 920-21 , 89 ; PAR 1 93 1 -32, 26;  PAR 1 933-34, 32; PAR 1940-41 ,  26.  See 
Appendix A below, Tables 1 and 2, pp. 305-9. 

PART I l l  
Testing the constraints 1908-1921 
My impression is that Mr Charpentier has hardly grasped the 
attitude of this country towards New Guinea. Our people desire that 
we should administer New Guinea in the interests of the natives. 
E.L. Batchelor (Minister) commenting upon a letter from Prosper Charpentier 
published in the Dally Mall, Brisbane, 17 Nov. 1910. 
The preposterous assertion in the Government annual report that 
Papua will never be a white man's country causes one to spring on 
to his hind legs, and ejaculate 'Whatfor' . Is the wish father to the 
thought for this ridiculous statement? Why this cry of 'stinking fish' 
when there is ample evidence that this is as much a white man's 
country as any part of the tropics. 
Editorial, Papuan Courier, 12 Apr. 1918. 

CHAPTE R 9 
Acting Adm in istrator and Lieutenant G overnor 
IN HIS FIRST Annual Report as Acting Administrator, Judge Murray found it 
'gratifying to be able to state that during the whole of the year, although land 
applied for had in most cases to be bought from the native owners, there is 
not a single case in which it has been alleged that the interests of the natives 
have been in any way disregarded' . He noted that 'the efforts of a 
conscientious and hardworking staff have shown that the white settlers may 
be placed upon the land without the slightest suspicion of injustice to the 
native owners' . 1  
Mindful o f  the Drummond affair Murray knew that h e  could suspect 
several officers of 'land fraud' - at least to the extent of attempting to evade an 
Executive Council order.2 And others were not quite sure that present justice 
had been everywhere dealt the Papuans in land purchases - or that an 
injustice to them might in future be thought to have been avoided. In July 
1 907, Alexander Campbell, then RM at Samarai , wrote to Atlee Hunt that 
great care was being taken in the Eastern Division to see that the boundaries 
of acquired land were marked and that villagers were 'quite willing to sell it, 
as anything like a breach of faith with regard to lands will be attended with 
grave danger' .  3 In August he wrote that 'we are not having the least trouble 
in acquiring land from the natives', and submitted a scheme for compulsory 
acquisition for settlement where land seemed so abundant and Papuan claims 
to tenure dubious. In October Hunt responded that since there was no present 
necessity for such a measure there was no need 'to arouse the storm that 
would undoubtedly burst if we placed upon the statute book a provision 
contrary to promises made to the native'. He enquired 
One point occurs to me . . .  Do the natives get anything like a fair return for their 
land? The prices paid to them seem ridiculously small in comparison to the area 
acquired. I suppose they are satisfied but a child might be satisfied if you took from 
it a gold watch and gave it a penn'orth of sweets and a yard of blue ribbon.4 
PAR 1906-07, 20. 
Francis West, Selected Letters of Hubert Murray (Melbourne 1 97 1 ), letter No. 36, to 
Gilbert Murray, 1 9  Jan. 1 908. 
3 NLA, Deposit 52, Atlee Hunt Papers, item 1 74. A. M. Campbell to Hunt, 8 July 1 907. 
Ibid. ,  item 185,  Hunt to Campbell, 1 Oct. 1 907. 
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In the same month a Samoan mission teacher from the Rev. Charles Abel's 
Kwato mission had begun spreading 'wild reports' aronnd Milne Bay that the 
dimdims intended taking all the land from the Papuans. Abel proceeded 
quickly to calm the man Judge Murray a little cruelly later referred to as a 
'mad mullah' and by January the 'scare' in Milne Bay was apparently over.5 
Campbell may have been embarrassed by this quite unexpected 
manifestation of Papuan anxiety in his Division. In the following month - and, 
it is possible mainly with a desire to redirect any concern there might be in 
Melbourne - he drew Hnnt's attention to 'trouble at Port Moresby in land 
matters . . . ' commenting that 'candidly speaking I do not at all like the 
manner in which land has been acquired from natives in the Central Division. 
In one instance an officer purchased some 2 1 ,  OOO acres . . . in the space of 
two hours'.6  And indeed in 1908 villagers at Saroa near Rigo regretted that 
in selling land along the Kemp Welch they had sold gardens still in use.  This 
might suggest that they had been pressured into sale and certainly indicates 
that the purchase was too hastily concluded. The Executive Council granted 
them a year's ac cess but the purchase was not rescinded. 
Alexander Campbell was appointed Government Secretary to succeed 
Anthony Musgrave in 1908. The position at the time entailed responsibility 
through the Resident Magistrates not only for judicial and administrative 
services in the nine Divisions, but also for 'Native Affairs' - the supervision of 
the indentured labour system. In the rather tense atmosphere in Port Moresby 
where the remaining Bartonites and those who were prepared to work with 
Judge Murray could hardly be friends, Campbell generally sided with the new 
regime, keeping Atlee Hunt informed about developments. He now 'instructed 
the Land Buyers to interview the late owners of all land bought in the Central 
Division during the past two or three years and ascertain whether they are 
satisfied with the payment they received'.7 If Papuan sellers had been paid too 
little he nndertook to authorise a further payment. He also noted that thirty­
nine square miles of Woodlark (Murua) in the South Eastern Division had 
been declared waste and vacant, and 'all I can say is that the population must 
have died out very rapidly since I was there' .  Two years later he reported that 
he had made additional payments in all cases where he was satisfied the 
Papuans had been underpaid.8 Conscientious, self-righteous and pedantic, 
Campbell could confidently assert that 'I have never yet to my knowledge 
Ibid. , item 265, Murray to Hunt, 4 Nov. 1 907. See note 1 1  below. 
Ibid. ,  item 1 90, Campbell to Hunt, 18 Feb. 1 908. The officer involved appears to have 
been Henry Griffin. 
7 Ibid. , item 22 1 ,  Campbell to Hunt, 1 2  Oct. 1 908. The complaint of the Saroakai 
villagers above is noted in NAPNG G66 ,  Land Board Minutes, (Meeting No 24 of 1908). 
8 Ibid. ,  item 242, Campbell to Hunt, 1 1  Feb. 1 9 1 0. 
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broken my word with a native'.9 There is no reason to disbelieve him. But 
outside the Central Division and despite the Government Secretary"s 
commitment to fairness in land dealings, some cases of injustice - or at least 
serious misunderstanding - might yet have escaped his eye. C. B. Higginson 
RM, on patrol in the Eastern Division in 1 9 1 1 ,  could still report that labourers 
employed by George Auerback, contractor on Hagita estate at Milne Bay, were 
threatened by local villagers who claimed they had never been paid for some 
of the land being cleared. They said that they had refused an earlier offer of 
payment on instruction from a Kwato 'mission boy' . 10 
As long as his position was unconfirmed Murray remained very vulnerable 
in his dealings with both Melbourne and the new investors entering the 
country. He was expected to do everything necessary to ensure easy access to 
land and labour for the planters. To have begun to scruple publicly over the 
detail ofland transactions at this point would have fuelled opposition from the 
groups who were likely at the time to extend him their support, and to have 
allowed the Bartonites an unexpected advantage. But in 1 908 as Acting 
Administrator, he seemed still to share the settler assumptions about the 
future and there is ample evidence that he as yet saw no essential conflict 
between their interests and those of the Papuans. In March 1 908, Fred 
Weekley and William Little , the 'unofficial' members of the Legislative Council 
representing the planting and mining interests , signed a petition supporting 
his candidature for the Lieutenant Governorship. 
It was also imperative for Murray to gain the confidence of the 
'hardworking staff ,  of whom some could be expected to feel that Captain 
Barton had been badly treated, by demonstrating his confidence in them. 
Among officers remaining in the depleted service who gained promotion was 
Herbert Champion, 'a most cautious and almost pessimistic person' who in 
1 9 1 4  succeeded Campbell as Government Secretary.1 1  He responded to 
Murray's trust with many years of exceptional industry in maintaining order 
in the administration. Another was Bertram Bramell, a Bartonite whom 
Murray chose to consult on 'native' matters when his own understanding was 
still rudimentary. Bramell was soon won over and in 1 � 1 0  appointed 
Commissioner for Native Affairs and Control, a position newly separated from 
that of the Government Secretary, and given the responsibility of policing the 
indentured labour system. Their function bound to be unpopular with 
planters, officers of the Native Affairs Department consisting of the 
Ibid. ,  item 236 ,  Campbell to Hunt, 28 Feb. 1909. 
10 NAPNG & CRS G9 1 ,  Patrol Reports Eastern Division. Report of 1 Oct. 1 9 1 1 .  The 
Kwato 'mission boy' was very probably Murray's ·mad mullah· . 
1 1  Francis West, Selected Letters of Hubert Murray, letter No. 57, 3 0  Dec. 1 9 1 3 ,  Murray 
to Hunt. 
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Commissioner and two or three Inspectors were entitled to enter all places of 
employment of Papuans and to prosecute employers in breach of the Labour 
Ordinance. 
With his appointment as Lieutenant Governor, Judge Murray's view of the 
government's responsibilities towards the Papuans began to alter. He was no 
longer sure that they were being too well treated under the regime Europeans 
had imposed upon them. At the same time, while land resources were more 
than sufficient for any foreseeable requirements of white settlement the native 
population was small and its capacity to provide an adequate supply of labour 
appeared to place a limit on development. There was still the possibility that 
Papuan numbers were declining as a result of European intrusion. Not only 
were epidemic diseases more severe in their effect on peoples until recently 
isolated but the increased leisure time made available with the introduction 
of metal tools and the suppression of warfare was widely supposed to create 
indolence and a despair that would lead to a decline in the birth rate. The 
problem - perceived much in these terms earlier by both Atlee Hunt and 
Staniforth Smith in 1905-06 in their reports to the Commonwealth Parliament 
- was to ftnd meaningful work for the Papuans to do. Since it seemed unlikely 
that they would begin to produce commodities for export on their own behalf 
for many years, labour, educative and restorative, on European owned 
plantations and in mining seemed the only remedy to hand, for, as Murray 
repeated, 'if the natives won't work it appears to me that they are doomed; 
idleness does not do them any more good than it does to white men' . 1 2  
To overcome Papuan indolence and to prevent its supposed consequences, 
as Acting Administrator Murray had been willing to go so far as to press 
Papuans into service for the government through a forced labour scheme 
proposed by Alexander Campbell. 
In September 1 907, Campbell sent a draft of a proposal to 'tax' the 
Papuans to Atlee Hunt. Conceived not as a revenue measure but as a device 
to pressure into 'habits of industry . . .  those indolent and licentious young 
natives who now spend most of their time hanging about the villages, living 
upon their more energetic fellows and interfering with the wives and 
daughters of those who may be absent from their homes' ,  13 it provided that 
men between the ages of sixteen and thirty undertake compulsory unpaid 
labour and carry for the government for a month a year. It was a tax in the 
form of labour as a tax in cash might not necessarily compel 'the lazy' to work 
and the wages of those already under indenture might be stretched to cover 
the obligations of those who were not. Indentured labourers under the 
proposed scheme were to be exempt from its requirements since they already 
1 2  Ibid. ,  letter No.  38,  1 4  Nov. 1908, to Gilbert Murray. 
1 3  Atlee Hunt Papers, item 1 83,  A. M .  Campbell to Hunt, 13 Sept. 1 907. 
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contributed substantially to the revenue through their purchase of goods 
upon which duty had been paid. A rebate of the compulsory service might also 
be allowed labourers whose indenture had ended and to growers of cash 
crops. 
Atlee Hunt had himself recommended in 1905 the imposition of a tax on 
the wages of a compulsory levy of workers to be drawn from each village for 
labour on plantations. Campbell's scheme he now thought 'quite the best' he 
had seen and 'perfectly practicable'. 1 4  He responded privately that it would 
receive his support if it was brought forward officially. 
On 29 May 1 908 the Legislative Council passed, subject to the assent of 
the Commonwealth Government, an ordinance embodying Campbell's 
proposals 'to encourage the natives of Papua in habits of industry'. The 
Encouragement of Industry Ordinance had the support of Judge Murray, who 
drafted it, and of the Treasurer, Herbert Champion, and of the three 
'unofficial' (nominated) members of the Council, Fred Weekley, William 
Whitten and Bill Little. It was opposed by Staniforth Smith and the retiring 
Government Secretary, Anthony Musgrave . Smith was indignant that he had 
not been consulted in the drafting of the bill which touched substantially, he 
thought, on agricultural development, nor had he seen a copy of the draft 
before Whitten had - the integrity of his stand perhaps a little compromised 
by an opposition to Murray's handling of the administration that had become 
predictable . Musgrave , Smith reported to Hunt, regarded the ordinance as 'an 
abandonment of all the principles that have made the Empire great' . 1 5  
Though Atlee Hunt had indicated his sympathy with Campbell's scheme, 
he was caught at a disadvantage when attacks on the provisions of the 
legislation passed in Port Moresby began appearing in the Australian papers 
even before a copy of the ordinance had been received by his department. 
Obviously primed by persons in Papua opposed to the scheme either out of 
principle, or, as is more likely with a few, out of a desire to discredit Murray, 
the Sydney Dally Telegraph editorial of 1 7 June labelled the ordinance a 
'slavery' bill. The measure was disallowed. 16 
Employers wanted a guarantee of a continuous stream of labour and to 
secure for themselves the benefit of the 'education' they were providing the 
Papuan through the experience of employment. The unpredictability of the 
supply and the burden of continuously inducting into the routines of 
plantation life batches of 'raw recruits' from the bush, most of whom in 1908 
1 4  Ibid. ,  Hunt to Campbell, 26 Nov. 1 907. 
111 Ibid. ,  item 473, Staniforth Smith to Hunt, 3 1 May 1 908. 
1 6  Dally Telegmph (Sydney), 1 7  June 1 908. In the Atlee Hunt Papers (item 208) is a 
letter Hunt wrote to Campbell on 7 Aug. recording oppos1t1on in the British and continental 
press. 
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were on one year contracts - when few of their white overseers themselves 
knew how to proceed - placed a very great pressure on managers developing 
company owned estates, pressure that could only lead them to consider and 
propose alternative systems that might better satisfy the need for a skilled and 
'reliable' workforce. For some the indenture of women as plantation workers 
alongside their husbands seemed to offer a solution. 
In August 1908, Wallace Westland, general manager for Clarke and 
Whiting's Papua Rubber Plantation Proprietary at Kanosia, wrote to his 
directors drawing their attention to a prospective shortage oflabour that made 
it difficult for him to justify 'asking you to spend more money in fresh 
extensions for next year' . 1 7  Coming to Papua with an experience of planting 
in Ceylon, Westland was alarmed at the comparative cost of Papuan labour 
and recruitment. He thought the short term of indenture unsatisfactory 
because the training of a labour force was 'a gradual and expensive process', 
but that this difficulty could be overcome if women and children could be 
engaged. In the meantime he could 'not accept the responsibility of asking you 
to increase your stake in the country' and submitted his resignation.18 A 
month later in a private letter to R. S. Whiting he noted that with the opening 
of the Astrolabe copper mines the competition for available labour would 
increase. If the 'village' system could be established on the estates then 
plantations would survive as the 'Native will always prefer agriculture to 
mining and will sooner go where he can have his women folks around him 
than to the barracks of a Mine but we must have complete Villages and we 
must keep down the rates of pay' . 1 9  
In May Westland had submitted a scheme to the Government Secretary for 
the settlement of married Papuans on the Clarke and Whiting estates, the 
'result of much earnest thought and some practical experience' .20 He set out 
the social benefits he thought would accrue - the tendency labourers would 
have to enter successive terms of indenture with their families about them -
and he listed the additional measures that would need to be taken, at some 
considerable expense to the planters, to accommodate women and children. 
He did not mention the economic advantage that planters would sooner or 
later acquire as a result of having a dependent labour force living permanently 
on the estates, an advantage he well knew had greatly benefited 'Far-Eastern' 
producers . Judge Murray forwarded the proposals on to the Minister for 
17 Atlee Hunt Papers, item 277, Westland to the directors of Papua Rubber Plantations 
Proprietary (Clarke and Whiting), 15 Aug. 1 908. 
18 Ibid. 
1 9  Ibid. , item 276,  Westland to R. S. Whiting, 15 Sept. 1 908. 
2° CRSA5 18 S800 I 1 /5, 'Indenture of Native Women' 1 907- 1 925 , Westland to Campbell, 
1 2  May 1908. 
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External Affairs 'entirely in favour of the proposal which, in my opinion, will 
remove any difficulties that may be felt in connexion with the present 
system'.21 Twenty three residents including missionaries , planters, 
merchants and officials, were asked for their opinions about the indenture of 
married women under the scheme in a 'plebiscite' .22 A majority, thirteen, 
including three missionaries were in favour. Those against included the 
planters A. C. English and Guy Manning, and six missionaries. A tenth 
missionary, C. F. Rich, was prepared to support the scheme if labourers were 
obtained from the district in which the plantation was situated. As with his 
support of the Encouragement of Industry Ordinance considered by the 
Legislative Council in May, Murray's ready endorsement of Westland's 
proposals in June gave no hint of the transformation in his attitudes to come. 
Again there were misgivings in Melbourne - and the scheme was not adopted. 
Privately the Acting Administrator confessed that accusations of 'judicial 
corruption', preferential treatment of friends, and official dishonesty being 
levelled at him at the time by those opposed to the confirmation of his 
appointment seemed 'so strange that I sometimes doubt my own identity' .23 
And if his enemies had misjudged their man, Murray was still coming to terms 
with both his new role and the limited outlook of those upon whose support 
he had been relying. In later years in letters to his family Murray would 
ridicule Atlee Hunt as 'a safe man for the capitalists' ,24 but in 1 908 it was 
Atlee Hunt and not Hubert Murray who hesitated to risk public opposition to 
schemes Murray's opponents at the time could readily attack as damaging to 
the interests of the Papuans. By 1 9 1 3 when the question of the indenture of 
women in agriculture was again raised and considered by the Legislative 
Council, Murray, now firm in office and opinion, would be entirely opposed to 
the idea. 
In July 1 9 1 0  three planters managing for planting companies , Guy 
Manning of Laka River Rubber Estates, Raymond Dubois of Papua Plantations 
Limited, and Wallace Westland for Clarke and Whiting, complained that they 
were finding difficulty in getting labour. 25 One of the companies had had a 
schooner looking for recruits along the south coast between Kapakapa and 
Samarai for six weeks and had obtained only seven men, five of whom merely 
replaced members of the crew whose contracts were ending. Staniforth Smith, 
Administrator in Judge Murray's absence, was challenged to support the 
claims published a year before in the second edition of his Handbook of 
2 1  Ibid . ,  Murray to Minister, 1 June 1908. 
22 Ibid. ,  Schedule of replies to the Government Secretary's Circular No. 08/ 1 6 25.  
23 West, Selected Letters of Hubert Murray, letter No. 37, 2 Oct. 1 908, to Gilbert Murray. 
24 Ibid. ,  Letter No. 76, 27 May 1 92 1 ,  to Lady Mary Murray. 
25 CPP 1 910,  Vol. 3, pp. 15 1 -4,  Papua: Native Labour Supply. 
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Papua, that there was 'apparently no difficulty . . . experienced in obtaining 
all labour required' . 26 A second letter bearing the signatures of the 
missionary Charles Abel and the BNGD general manager Charles Darling, 
together with those of eight prominent plantation managers and directors 
including Westland and Dubois,  requested the setting up of a commission to 
inquire into labour resources . 
Staniforth Smith forwarded the letters on to the Minister in Melbourne 
where they were tabled in Parliament together with an explanatory letter of his 
own. He was able to point out that of the 1 40 plantations of all sizes in the 
Territory, sixty-one of them in the Central Division, the managers of only five 
had complained of a labour shortage.27 He attributed the current difficulty to 
the many deaths from dysentery on the Lakekamu goldfield that lay in the 
west of the Central Division. Men from districts east of Port Moresby did not 
currently want to work to the west. There appeared no dearth of labour in the 
Western and Eastern Divisions. In November Staniforth Smith forwarded a 
lengthy despatch, also tabled in Parliament, in which he set out, with a 
characteristic show of industry and care, projections of labour requirements 
and supply for the following twenty years.28 His figures were based on a 
calculation that no more than 1 0% of the Papuan population could be spared 
simultaneously for employment by Europeans. Murray would use Smith's 
estimates whenever the question of the labour supply came up in subsequent 
years. No commission was appointed. 
Meanwhile Judge Murray was in London and in September he was 
entertained to dinner by the directors of the new BNGD Company. The 
company's secretary, Samuel Thompson, in a letter to the general manager in 
Port Moresby noted that 'He [Murray] does not appear to think well of labour 
prospects in Papua' .29 Thompson cautioned Darling not to arrange further 
contracts for the laying down of plantations until it was known if labour was 
available in sufficient numbers to proceed. He asked to be kept fully informed 
about fluctuations in the supply. The Lieutenant Governor was quoted in the 
London Morning Post in January 1 9 1 1 as of the opinion 'that some gentle 
compulsion to labour is necessary for the Papuan' .30 Beatrice Grimshaw, 
writing in 'a Colonial newspaper' in 1 9 1 0  wrote that 'it was extremely 
improbable' that there would be sufficient labour in future secured on the 
26 Ibid. ,  p. 3 (p. 153).  
2 7  CPP 1910, Vol. 3 ,  pp. 155-9 ,  Papua: Despatch from Administrator of Papua relating 
to Native Labour. 
28 Ibid. , pp. 4-5 (pp. 1 58-9). 
29 ANUABL Deposit 95 / 1 ,  British New Guinea Development Company Limited. 
Letterbooks, Vol 1 .  S. L. Thompson to Lewis Cowley, Sept. 1 9 10.  
30 ANUABL Deposit 95 /3,  BNGD Volume of newspaper cuttings, Morning Post (London), 
28 Jan. 1 9 1 1 .  
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existing voluntary basis. The choice was 'compulsory labour' or 'foreign labour' 
and she suggested that taxation be used to induce Papuans to enter 
employment. 31 
Planters on the larger company owned estates, relying on licensed 
recruiters to secure labour of unpredictable quality in distant districts, 
remained unreconciled to the situation . It was not that they thought that 
there was not sufficient potential labour available - it seemed to them that 
they were surrounded by a large population of Papuans who, for the most 
part, appeared not to work at all - but that the voluntary principle was too 
insecure a basis upon which to proceed with plantation development. In 19 12 ,  
again fmding labour hard to get for his sisal plantation on the Laloki, 
Raymond Dubois proposed that the government undertake the direct 
responsibility of providing a steady supply of labour for private employers by 
employing government officers as recruiters just as it did in supplying its own 
needs.32 J. T. O'Malley, RM in the Central Division, found that other 
plantations in the Division had sufficient labour and suggested that because 
coastal Papuans would not work inland,  planters like Dubois with estates 
situated away from the coast should try to obtain their workers from up­
country. Murray had no wish to compromise the government and its officers 
by having them recruit on behalf of the companies and Dubois' proposal was 
gently rejected. 
As to the introduction of 'foreign labour', J. K. Samuel, the secretary in 
Adelaide of Dubois' company, had written to the Minister in February 19 1 1  
asking if Papua Plantations Limited could bring in 'one or two' Javanese to 
teach Papuans how to work decorticating machinery.33 On a similar 
application by Dubois himself, Staniforth Smith, acting for Murray in June, 
allowed the request under a clause in the Papuan Immigration Restriction 
Ordinance that permitted the admission of a few skilled aliens. Similar 
applications were submitted on behalf of the Clarke and Whiting companies 
by A. S. Bloomfield in September and October.34 Probably prompted by one 
of these interests a writer in the Sydney Daily Telegraph raised the question 
'Do we propose to let Papua be undeveloped for an indefmite period, or to 
accept the alternative which is the importation of coloured labour?'35 But if 
3 1  Ibid. Which newspaper is unknown. 
32 CRS A l  1 3 / 7 1 ,  "Recruiting of native labour, Papua' 1 9 12- 1 9 13 ,  Dubois to Murray, 
1 5  May 1 9 1 2 . Murray's comments and O'Malley's response to the Government Secretary's 
Circular No. 56 / 1 9 1 2  are on this file. 
33 CRS A l  1 2 / 1 9567, "Papua Admission of Javanese Labourers' 1 9 1 1 - 1 2, J. K. Samuel 
to Atlee Hunt, 9 Feb.9 1 1 ; Staniforth Smith to Minister, 5 June 1 9 1 1 ;  Bloomfield to Murray, 
3 1 Oct. 1 9 1 1 .  
34 Ibid. ,  Bloomfield to Murray, 3 1  Oct. 1 9 1 1 .  
315 Reported in Papuan Times , 22 Nov. 1 9 1 1 .  
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larger companies were interested in exploring the possibilities ,  the white 
community were clearly not united on what was, for any Australian in that 
generation , a momentous issue, and one of several petitions submitted in 
September to the visiting Minister, E .  L. Batchelor, contained the names of 
ninety-three residents of the Eastern Division who were opposed to the 
admission of 'Asiatic labourers'.36 In January 1 9 12 ,  before any such workers 
had actually been admitted, Murray reported that his Executive Council had 
recommended that up to 1 0% of the labourers on rubber estates and 6% on 
sisal estates could be brought in from Java. They were in every case to be 
accompanied by their wives , be subject to strict medical checks, and be 
allowed to stay for a period no longer than three years. These conditions could 
only have been seen as placing a prohibitively high cost on such a scheme -
as Murray may well have intended - though the numbers he seemed prepared 
to admit greatly exceeded those being requested.37 
In July at a public meeting of planters from around Port Moresby 
resolutions were passed urging the government to encourage longer terms of 
indenture and to admit Javanese 'instructors' for the rubber industry.38 
Perhaps Murray knew that no Australian ministry would ever allow as much 
as 10% of a labour force to be imported - he could now be politically devious -
and in September he wrote to the planters to say that the Minister had 
refused to sanction the admission of the Javanese while approving the 
encouragement of three year contracts for Papuans.39 A year later he told 
Lewis Cowley, Charles Darling's successor at BNGD, that he might consider 
the admission of a few 'Manilla men'. No planter pursued the matter.40 The 
question of whether 'coolies' might be allowed into Papua was raised again in 
other years but would never be seriously considered. 
By 1 9 12 ,  in spite of a widespread epidemic of dysentery in that year, Judge 
Murray could believe that there was no considerable population decline. In 
36 CRS Al 1 1 / 16363, 'Petitions of residents of the eastern division of Papua . . .  1 9 1 1  ' .  
1 1  Sept. 1 9 1 1 .  
37 CRS Al 1 2 / 1 9567, 'Papua Admission of Javanese Labourers' 1 9 1 1 - 1 2, Murray to 
Minister, 13 Jan. 1 9 1 2 .  
3 8  Papuan Courter, 3 1 July 1 9 1 2 ,  gave a detailed account. 
39 NAPNG & CRS 0 1 28 Item 2. Murray to Cowley et al. ,  2 1  Sept. 1 9 1 2 .  Much earlier 
in June 1907, Murray had written to the Minister that the admission of Japanese and other 
imported labour 'would cause the ruin of the Papuan native' . (CRS Al 25 I 1 8522 . 'Deportation 
of undesirables'. 1 907 - 1 925 ). It is likely that this was his real opinion and that in 19 1 2  he 
was being forced to appear an 'honest broker' between the planters and the Commonwealth. 
Hunt had privately assured Staniforth Smith, acting for Murray in 19 10, that while 'of 
course, we recognize here that you are up against a very big problem . . .  There will be no assent 
by our Parliament to the introduction of coloured labour· (Atlee Hunt Papers, item 528, 1 2  
Aug. 1 9 10). 
40 Ibid. ,  Murray to Cowley, 4 Aug. 1 9 1 3. 
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December he wrote to the new Minister, Patrick McMahon Glynn, giving a 
general outline of the dual policy he thought the Commonwealth had 
endorsed, one 'combining the development of the resources of the Territory 
with the gradual elevation of the natives to such a standard of civilisation as 
they may prove themselves capable of attaining' .4 1  In the elevation of the 
Papuans , the pacification of the remainder of the Territory still remained the 
most important objective of the government. Subsequently employment by 
Europeans would teach the villagers 'industrial habits' so that eventually they 
might be taxed in their own interest. As for 'Development', this should be left 
to 'the skill and judgement of the settlers'. 42 Apart from being provided with 
government services and sufficient labour, these people required, he advised, 
no other 'direct' assistance. 
In his first book, Papua or British New Guinea, published in that year, he 
again affirmed the value for the Papuans of an experience of working for 
Europeans. Indeed by accepting employment villagers were already making a 
contribution to the development of the country. Murray wrote 
Papua must be developed: can it be developed without evil results to the Papuan? 
Personally I think it can, not only without evil results but with the best possible . 
. . An official who expresses these opinions, who thinks that (altogether apart from 
the interests of the settlers) it is to the advantage of the Papuan to learn to work, 
and that the best available schools are the plantation and the mining field runs the 
risk of being looked upon as a hypocrite who seeks to curry favour with the 
employer while posing as a friend of the native. 
But he added that it was 'no part of our policy to convert them [the Papuans] 
from what they are now, peasant producers , into a landless proletariat' .43 
The emphasis of policy had shifted since 1 908. Having already provided the 
minimum conditions necessary for Europeans to undertake the work of 
development - sufficient land and sufficient labour - the duty of the 
government now lay in control, in policing the limits of reasonable change in 
order that Papuan society could transform itself. The implication, not yet spelt 
out, was that if work for the white man was a school where Papuans could 
obtain a present income and acquire the skills and habits of thrift and 
industry, the education they received might in the future lead to their direct 
participation in the production of exports on their own account. And if Papuan 
village society was not in the meantime to be overwhelmed then. the maximum 
number of labourers that could be engaged under contracts of service in any 
one period would remain as estimated by Staniforth Smith in 1 9 1 0  - 1 0% of 
41 CRS Al 1 4/5413,  ·Papua. Taxation and Education of natives' 1 9 1 3- 1 4, Murray to 
Minister, 9 Dec. 1 9 1 2 .  
42 Ibid. 
43 J. H . P. Murray, Papua or British New Guinea (London 19 1 2),  36 1 ,  350. 
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the population calculated as two out of five of the 25% of the population 
regarded as 'able-bodied' males , or 25,000.44 In the end the needs of 
employers were never to provide a demand for nearly as many as 25 ,000 
workers before 1 942 . 
In other respects also, Murray had changed his mind. In 1 906 as the 
'Australian' champion of development he had attracted the suspicion of the 
missionaries and the admiration of the miners - and in accordance with his 
stance in favour of Australian democracy he had suggested to the Royal 
Commissioners that the time had arrived for the system of nominating 
representatives of the white community to the Legislative Council to be 
replaced by elected representation. But the experience of office suggested 
caution. How could the interests of the Papuans be protected once the 
movement towards elected representation by a fiercely partisan white 
community was begun? His failure in the following years to proceed with the 
enfranchisement of the settlers together with his change of mind about so 
much else he had averred before the Royal Commission , while it perplexed 
some, could only have confirmed the opinion of others like William Bruce, that 
Murray had been an ambitious liar. 
In 1 908 Murray had seen Exeter Hall as an enemy and the influence of the 
Protestant missionaries in Australia as 'appalling'.45 Yet here too he was to 
reverse his opinions. By 1 9 1 2  the members of the London Missionary Society, 
the Methodist Mission and the New Guinea Anglican Mission, apprehensive 
in 1 908 about a Catholic governor and seeing themselves as the only party 
disinterestedly concerned about Papuan welfare, had come to see Murray in 
a different light. His adherence to legal principle and resistance to settler 
pressures had secured their firm support. Here, after all, was an 
administrator to be trusted to consider the Papuan interest, his policies 
corresponding closely with their own benevolent and authoritarian outlook. 
In the years ahead Murray had good reason to value their friendship. 
For even as his book was being praised by reviewers Murray was privately 
doubtful that settlers were either willing or able to deal justly with the 
Papuans . The interests of 'capitalists' and 'natives' were not, as he had said 
again and again, conveniently concurrent, but were in fact - without a very 
strong control being exercised by government - in profound opposition. In 
January 1 9 1 3  he wrote to his brother, Gilbert Murray, Regius Professor of 
Greek at Oxford, that he was 'coming to the conclusion that any white 
community left with absolute power over "natives" would resort to slavery 
44 CPP 1 9 1 0, Despatch from Administrator of Papua relating to native Labour ln the 
Territory, p. 1 59.  
45 West, Selected Letters of Hubert Murray. letters No. 35 , 16 Dec. 1 907; No. 36 , 29 Jan. 
1 908; and No. 38, 1 4  Nov. 1 908. 
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within three generations - I can feel the tendency myself. In November he 
could 'see danger ahead with regard to the natives of the Territory' where 'the 
general sense of honour among the community is very low'. 46 And time was 
to intensify a conviction growing in his mind that the experience of 
employment by Europeans was of itself of limited benefit to the Papuans. By 
1 925 in his second book, Papua of Today, Murray would write of the 
plantation worker that 
He has learned to chop, scrub and pick weeds but it is quite possible that he may 
have learned little else . . .  And if we are going to keep him till the end of time as an 
unskilled labourer working for the white man at a wage of two and six a week . . .  
he will [not] have much to thank us for.47 
If for the settlers the logic of their position in the years ahead would dictate 
with an almost Marxian degree of predictability their stance in relation to the 
government's dual policy - that it was weighted against them and in favour of 
the undeserving Papuans - so also did the logic of his position form Murray's 
views. He alone bore the task of balancing the conflicting demands of 
development and protection. He alone could see the whole predicament that 
he faced, both moral and practical , increasingly accused of the same 
indifference to settlement that had brought Captain Barton, with Murray's 
help, into disgrace. 
Perhaps also Hubert Murray, in a deep sense, was discovering his truer 
self. Though Australian born, he belonged to a class and generation of 
Australians , usually with a landed background, that moved freely between 
colonial society and the home counties.  His later education had been in 
England and might have been that of many a late Victorian Anglo-Irishman 
of moderately privileged background. Like the Anglo-Irish he could distance 
himself from the English, his Australianness and a residual Irishness showing 
in the extent he was always to eschew empty ceremony and the 'dressing up' 
that some thought an essential accompaniment to the role of colonial 
governor.48 But if as an Australian in England and South Africa Hubert 
Murray had found himself alienated by the condescension shown towards 
colonials by some and perhaps many insensitive Englishmen, he clearly 
46 Ibid. ,  Letter No. 52,  Murray to Gilbert Murray, 1 9  Jan. 19 13;  Letter No. 56,  3 Nov. 
1 9 13 .  
47 J. H. P. Murray, Papua of Today (London 1925), 271 . 
48 Murray was a second generation Australian. His father, Sir Terence Murray, 
pastoralist and onetime president of the Legislative Council of New South Wales, was Irish 
by birth. Hubert Murray's attitude towards the trappings of office drew criticism from J. F. 
Horn a director of Robinson River Plantation visiting Papua in 1932. Horn thought that 
Murray 'should ginger things up, starting with himself. Sentries on G. H . ,  Guard etc. R.M's 
to wear some sort of uniform etc'. In J. F. Horn. (Diary oO 'Trip from Sydney to Robinson 
River to inspect property', in the possession of Commander J. F. Horn, Sydney 1 975 . 
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shared the education, ethical outlook and accent of yet other Englishmen. And 
in England and at Oxford in the heyday of late liberalism he had not remained 
uninfluenced by the ideals of honour, duty, and public service held by a ruling 
class still confident that Britain was the 'Tutelary Angel of the Human 
Race' .49 
It was a preparation that had laid in store for the opportunity and 
responsibilities he now faced, a grounding in a code of ethics and behaviour 
profoundly in opposition to the petlt-bourgeols values (he would have called 
them 'capitalist' attitudes) of the middle-class settlers who came to Papua with 
the boom. His own assumption of superiority was effortless and much of the 
time quite unconscious. His attitude to the Papuans had much about it of 
noblesse oblige, the duty of care and consideration a gentleman owed 
members of a less fortunate class or race. His apparent empathy with the 
rough white miners in Papua too might at bottom have been no more than 
this .  His 'Irish' concerns and his Catholicism might indeed be construed as 
the provisional loyalties , even eccentricities, of an isolated man, his Labor 
Party sympathies an attachment of a patrician to the only Australian party 
that by reason of its white working-class exclusivism was opposed to 
'exploitation' of coloured people. And in the end he did not trust the white 
democracy that he had espoused so convincingly in 1 906 . Beatrice Grimshaw, 
shallow as her judgements mostly were, had been right in her appraisal of 
Murray to Deakin. He could, she said, have fitted easily as an administrator 
into the larger world of the Crown Colonies or an Indian Presidency.50 In 
several periods Murray himself would privately hope for an imperial 
appointment - though in such a post and constrained by the career 
considerations and frequent transfers of the larger service it is possible that 
his merits might have seemed but average. He came indeed to measure his 
administration in the light of the imperial standard and towards the end of his 
life in his 1 93 7 -38 Annual Report, the onetime sympathiser with Great 
Britain's enemies in Ireland and South Africa could write, without a trace of 
irony, that 'after all, however far we may be from the important centres of 
civilization, we are still an integral part of the greatest empire the world has 
known'.5 1 
Murray's private letters reveal the out of time out of place reality of his 
position as the governor of an Australian dependency, the ennui, the reluctant 
response to a sense of unavoidable duty that drove him on. Australians were 
49 In Peter Spartalis, The Diplomatic Battles of Billy Hughes (Sydney 1983 ), 77, Lord 
Esher to Sir Maurice Hankey, 29 Aug. 1 9 1 8. 
50 In J. A La Nauze, Alfred Deakin (Melbourne 1 965 ), Vol. 1 ,  p. 470, Beatrice Grimshaw 
to Deakin, 2 1  Mar. 1908. 
51 PAR 1 937-38, 1 .  
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increasingly impressed by so rare a plant sprung from their soil while Murray 
became rapidly aware of how little he could trust his countrymen, their 
politicians, their press and their entrepreneurs. Publicly he affirmed again and 
again his confidence in the good sense of Australian governments and 
gratitude for the Australian subsidy while privately expecting betrayal. 
Certainly no one remotely like him was appointed to be Administrator of the 
Mandated Territory of New Guinea after 1 9 1 9. Had such a one been sought 
he could not have been found. 
Among settlers it was soon to become commonplace to regard the 
Lieutenant Governor as quite indifferent to the needs of industiy and 
commerce, and to find in his natural aloofness a cold disregard for those 
whose work and risk-taking maintained the administration. One long-serving 
officer, certainly, took the view that Murray was quite unbusinesslike himself. 
J .  T. Bensted, the Papuan Government Agent in Sydney from 1 9 13 until 1 922 
and subsequently Director of Public Works, later recalled that 'Sir Hubert 
Murray understood little of financial principles or business methods and was 
quite hostile to any claim that system should enter into anything . . .  He was 
not systematic himself and was impatient with others who were'.52 He had 
chided Bensted for running his department 'like a business concern', and 
Bensted commented 'I accepted it as a compliment but he meant it as a 
reprimand' .53 If this assessment of Murray was accurate - and Bensted may 
have mistaken an attitude that Murray merely affected for something more 
substantial - then the Lieutenant Governor was well served by officers who 
were systematic. These included his Official Secretary and nephew, Leonard 
Murray, the Government Secretaiy Herbert Champion, the Treasurers William 
Kendrick and Edward Harris, Staniforth Smith certainly and Bensted 
probably, who maintained careful records and an effective control over 
expenditure. The thoroughness of the Territory's bureaucracy is indeed 
impressive. Murray's legal drafting, letters, reports, and occasional writings 
all demonstrate a high degree of internal organisation and indicate a 
systematic mind. His court notes are more casual but suggest that he could 
reconstruct a fuller account from memory. He may have casually derided 
business practices because he did not care for people who were obsessed with 
them. 
In Januaiy 1 9 1 1 ,  the Papuan Times began publication as a weekly 
newspaper with a distribution of about 300 copies. It was a valuable amenity 
for the growing white population and quickly attracted advertisements and a 
readership of almost the whole community. Its owners were Edward Baker, a 
82 NLA MS 2057, Bensted Papers, Serles 1 .  Bensted was commenting on Lewis Lett's 
biography of Murray published in 1 949 . 
83 Ibid. 
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printer formerly working for the government, William Bruce, and Charles 
Baldwin the Port merchant. Baker became Government Printer within a year 
and relinquished his share in the paper to Charles Elston, another printer. 
Bruce was the editor and author of much of the copy, fitting the work into his 
overfull schedule as planter, planting contractor and timber merchant. From 
the beginning the paper became a vehicle for every hostile criticism of the 
government as well as a means by which Bruce could pursue his personal 
vendetta against Murray. 'Entirely independent' and 'run in the national 
interests', the Papuan Times derided as 'suicidal' the policy that was placing 
the interests of 'brown brother' above those of the 'law abiding sturdy white 
pioneers . . .  the revenue producers' .54 In one of a series of open letters Bruce 
assured the Minister for Home and Territories that 
There are not many whites in the whole country who would not give the native an 
honest go! The Australian who crosses over to Papua does not lose his identity and 
become a different creature . . .  He is exactly the same as on his native soil! but, he 
won't play second fiddle to the Papuan native not for all the tea in China, or, for all 
the politicians in Australia. Nor will his enfranchised brother permit such a thing 
. . . there is no doubt in their mind as to the inferiority of the brown person. 55 
The editor looked forward to a 'distant future' when boat races would be 
held on Galley Reach, 'a glorious stretch of water . . .  its banks , at present 
crowded with mangroves . . .  [then] thronged with thousands of spectators' .56 
Without doubt he believed that those spectators would be representatives of 
a large , dominant and permanent white settler population. Indeed, the idea 
apparently held by 'the little crowd of sycophants' of the Lieutenant Governor 
in the southern press and some politicians in Melbourne that Papua could not 
in time become a 'white man's country' was anathema, held only by 
'effeminate' , 'hysterical' and 'misguided humanitarians'57 given over to race 
betrayal. 
James Fowler - much later a government officer himself, but briefly a 
settler on the Vailala in 1909 and a manager on various estates in the 
following decade - was among others who submitted verse for publication in 
the Papuan Times . His 'Wake up Papua' appeared in the paper in June 19 1 1 .  
In a pastiche of Kipling it caught the mood and sense of the extreme settler 
ethos. 
54 Papuan Times, 3 June 1 9 1 4, 7 May 1 9 1 3 .  
5 5  Ibid. 
56 Papuan Tlmes, 9 June 1 9 1 5 .  
57 Ibid . ,  3 June 1 9 1 4, 10 Feb. 1 9 15 .  An editorial in the Papuan Courter in 1 9 1 9, possibly 
written by G. A. Loudon of BNGD, declared that it was not climate that had in the interim 
prevented Papua becoming a 'white man's country' but the 'Government that do not want 
him' (Papuan Courler, 6 June 1 9 1 9). 
Acting Administrator and Lieutenant Governor 
Wake Up Papua - The White Race Will Win Through 
Haul up the white man's standard, fall in the little band 
Of plucky Europeans who suffer in this land. 
We can't be taxed for Papuans, [who) neither toil nor spin; 
The Papuans can't be 'lillies', or be preserved in tin. 
The fittest must 'gang forward', the weakest lag behind, 
Despite the ranting bigots and people of that kind, 
The coloured races ere this have for the white made room, 
And so it ever must be until the crack of doom. 58 
. 
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Contrary views expressed in letters to the editor were indeed given space, 
but more, it seems, in order to draw the enemy and expose his folly. Scorn 
came easily to William Bruce. In particular he used the paper to denounce 
again and again the 'pernicious nominee system' by which Murray chose the 
'unofficial' members of the Legislative Council. He saw, and probably correctly, 
that elected representation was the key to gaining a better hearing for the 
Papuan pioneer interest in Australia. Settlers were not seeking responsible 
government - even Bruce could see that such a claim would not yet be 
credible - but to obtain the bargaining power of the franchise was imperative 
if the 'chief wowser' who ran the country was to be side-stepped or 
replaced.59 Without the vote the pioneers would remain 'Unweptt 
Unhonouredl and Unknown!'60 He was confident that though 
Cranks may scream in opposition, interested parties may bellow their disapproval 
. . .  it must come all the same. The most democratic Parliament in the wor[l)d 
cannot afford such a blot on its escutcheon for very long. Ministers may endeavour 
to shelve the question and local potentates struggle to fog the issue, but in spite of 
all it must come.61  
Characteristically Bruce's,  this kind of emotional writing repeated week after 
week, if it amused a few, set the agenda for conversation and did much to 
polarise the community, particularly in Port Moresby, into two camps. On the 
one hand were the derided officials, with their safe incomes at least partly 
squeezed out of the sweat of the private settlers. With their missionary allies 
many of these government officers were strong defenders of both the 
Lieutenant Governor and his policies. On the other hand there were the 
embattled settlers, perhaps like Bruce himself with a family to support, 
unfairly taxed and badgered they thought, precariously clinging to a job or 
58 Ibid., 2 1  June 19 1 1 . James Fowler, born 1 87 1 ,  was appointed ARM in Aug. 1 9 1 8  
(PAR 1 925-26). He married a sister o f  Archibald and Alexander MacAlpine. 
59 Papuan Tlmes, Editorial, 3 June 1 9 1 4. The 'wowser' epithet had appeared in the paper 
of 3 1  Jan. 1 9 1 2. 
80 Ibid., 9 Oct. 1 9 1 1 . 
6 1  Ibid . ,  9 Oct. 1 9 1 1 ,  3 June 1 9 1 4 .  
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developing a land-holding where profitability lay years ahead. Many of them 
came from the same social class as the officials and there continued to be 
movement across the divide. But the means of livelihood determined attitude, 
and interests seemed utterly opposed. Two contending moralities were at war 
in Papua among a white population hardly larger than a good crowd at an 
Australian country race meeting. 
1 .  Samara! in 1905 , taken from the deck of a ship. The picture is evocative of o ther 
nineteenth century Pacific port towns. The wharf has not yet been built and copra stored 
in the sheds is taken out to ships by lighter. Clunn's store is at the left next to his hotel. 
Whittens Brothers own the Cosmopolitan across The Parade. 
( Louis Buderus, photographer, Samarai, 1905, Collection John Oxley Library, Brisbane! 
2 .  Returning plantation workers at Port Moresby. Whittens' coastal vessel Kta-ora is at 
the wharf. The photograph conveys the busy atmosphere at times in the small ports, the 
heavy dependence on coastal shipping, and an order of things that seemed immutable. 
[E. Nixonwestwood: New Guinea-Tonga Album, National Library of Australia! 
3. Henry Alexander Wickham, 
( 1 846?- 1 928), pioneer planter at 
Panasesa, Conflict Group. That 
Wickham spent fifteen years in 
British New Guinea and Papua 
was a surprising discovery. 
[H. A. Wickham, On the plantatton, 
cultivation and curing of Para 
Indian Rubber, 1 908 ) 
4. Sir John Hubert Plunkett Murray, KCMG ( 1 86 1 - 1 940 ), Lieutenant Governor of Papua, 
1 908-40. Routinely avoiding all such display, Murray nonetheless permitted the visiting 
photographer and broadcaster Basil Hall to take this portrait at Cape Nelson in 1 938. 
[The late Mrs Ellen Hall, Melbourne) 
6. George Archibald Loudon 
( 1 88 1 - 1 964), general manager of 
British New Guinea Develop­
ment Company, 1 9 1 5 -26,  and 
subsequently planter at Eilogo. 
[The late Mrs Winifred Loudon, 
Sydney] 
5. William Cunningham Bruce 
( 1 8 6 7 - 1 9 2 4 ) .  Police Com­
mandant 1 903-06, later planting 
contractor, planter, timber miller 
and merchant. and newspaper 
editor bitterly opposed to 
Murray. Probably taken at the 
time of the South African War 
before Bruce arrived in British 
New Guinea. 
!The late Mrs Ellen Bruce, 
Brisbane] 
7. The small planter: John Clunn and his workers at Ramaga, M ilne Bay, c. 1 9 1 0 .  Clunn 
came as a goldminer, became a storekeeper and publican, and attracted to the planter llfe 
began developing Ramaga in 1 903 . !Frank Burnett, Through Polynesia and Pap ua ,  1 9 1 1 I 
8. Clearing for rubber in the Astrolabe Range .  This photo ls believed to have been taken 
from the steps of the first plantation house at Koltaki in 1 908; a scene representative of 
many estates at the outset. [ J .  H. P. Murray, Papua or British New Guinea , 1 9 1 2 1  
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Contending moral ities 
BY EARLY 1 9 14 the atmosphere had become uncomfortable and Hubert 
Murray privately anxious about his position. Others more influential than 
William Bruce had begun to make unfavourable, highly partial and generally 
inaccurate comments in Australia about the Papuan administration. In April, 
in connection with criticisms levelled at his policies by Sir Rupert Clarke in 
Melbourne, Murray wrote to his brother in Oxford that he had discerned in 
Australia 'a gang of capitalists interested in Papua who want to get rid of me 
in order to have a free hand with the natives'.1 This suggested a conspiracy. 
If nothing nearly so tangible as a plot existed, undoubtedly the larger 
investors in Papuan plantations had concerns in common and were coming 
to view Murray as pursuing a 'native' policy at the expense of white capital. 
Sir Rupert Clarke was only an occasional critic, and Arthur Bloomfield, the 
secretary and a director of the Clarke and Whiting companies, remained on 
good terms with the Lieutenant Governor. Much more significant and 
sustained challenges to his administration would be an outcome of the 
appointment in Port later in the year of a new and resourceful general 
manager in the largest of the plantation companies, the British New Guinea 
Development Company. 
Matters came to a head in May when while he was in Australia Murray was 
approached by T. J. Craig, a former employer of BNGD who had worked for 
five months on Baubauguina estate. Craig alleged that the manager, George 
Bemesconi, had seriously ill-treated the workers and had, among other 
things, attempted to hang a labourer for desertion.2 Bemesconi had been 
previously convicted and fined late in 1 9 1 3  for neglecting to treat a sick 
labourer who had died. Murray instructed Staniforth Smith, Administrator in 
his absence, to arrange a full inquiry at Baubauguina into the new charges 
before C. E. Herbert, the DCJO, and Craig was asked to return to Port 
Moresby. At the hearing in June, Bemesconi was acquitted of one charge of 
hanging a labourer to a bell post. As the labourer that Craig referred to had 
left the plantation, the particular 'hanging' accusation that he had made could 
Francis West, Selected Letters of Hubert Murray, (Melbourne 197 1  ), letter No. 48, 22 
Apr. 19 14, Murray to Gilbert Murray. An article reporting Sir Rupert Clarke's opinions was 
published in the Sunday Tlmes (Sydney), 22 Mar. 1 9 14. 
2 NAPNG & CRS 0 126/3, Murray to Staniforth Smith, 2 1 May 1 9 1 4. 
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not be immediately pursued. Bernesconi and an assistant, R. H.  P. Marsham, 
were nonetheless convicted and fmed on nine out of twelve lesser charges. The 
manager was subsequently convicted on yet two more counts of assault and 
in October, the labourer of Craig's allegation, Lauboiboio, having been found, 
the principal charge of causing grievous bodily harm was heard before Murray 
himself.3 
Lauboiboio testified that at some date earlier than August 1 9 1 3  he had 
been caught deserting the plantation and taken to Bernesconi who had bound 
his hands and hanged him by the neck from a rafter, clear of the ground,  from 
6 am. until 1 1  am . Three Papuan witnesses corroborated this account though 
they differed in details. The Chief Medical Officer, Dr Buchanan, declared it 
to be incredible as death would have resulted from such treatment within half 
an hour, and L. P. B. Armit, the RM at Abau, affirmed that he had dismissed 
a similar allegation after questioning Lauboiboio about it in August and 
September 1 9 1 3 . The man had been prosecuted for desertion three times and 
Armit regarded him as not sane. Bernesconi defended himself by saying that 
desertions were relatively frequent at Baubauguina not because of ill­
treatment but because 'boys' preferred plantations closer to the coast. He 
admitted to having had Lauboiboio tied up on two occasions though not by 
the neck. The Criminal Code of Queensland adopted in Papua made it an 
offence with up to three years gaol to illegally confine a person. The manager 
was found guilty on this count on 30 October and sentenced to twelve months 
imprisonment. 
Bruce in the Papuan Times , appalled by the outcome of the case , wrote that 
Not everyone may be a judge of a native's evidence but everyone has a right to his 
belief whether this was a cock and bull story invented by a few cunning natives to 
get even with a master who had made them work hard or whether it rings like a 
true story. 4 
An appeal to the High Court in Melbourne was lodged immediately and the 
paper ran a public collection to support Bernesconi. Editorials and articles 
throughout 1 9 1 4  attacked the government's policies in Bruce's most 
intemperate style . With allusions to the Bernesconi trial and to other 
prosecutions and inquiries under way that must have been obvious to 
everyone , the paper declared the Papuans to be children and often in need of 
chastisement. At the same time they were also 'crude savages' and 'minor 
assaults must occur on plantations'.5 The 'lying propensities' of the Papuan 
were proverbial and 'native evidence alone should never convict a white man -
The trial was reported in detail in the Papuan Times of 4 Nov. 191 4. Murray's notes 
are in NAPNG & CRS Series G 1 79 . 
Papuan Times, 4 Nov. 1 9 1 4. 
Ibid. ,  4 Nov. 1 9 14,  15 July 1 9 1 4, 30 Sept. 19 1 4. 
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unless there is very strong circumstantial evidence to corroborate the case'. 
The government by giving credence to every trivial or fabricated claim made 
by labourers wanting to desert and by applying punishments that were too 
lenient to Papuan offenders was contributing to a loss of respect for 
Europeans and a breakdown of order. Bruce prophesied that The time will 
come - and before very long - when the white man will have to walk in the 
road whilst the buck nigger occupies the footpath if things are not altered' .6 
Settlers could indeed be shocked by the government's evenhanded policy 
in accepting the evidence of Papuans before a court. No doubt most of them 
would have accorded the law their formal assent but at the same time they did 
not expect to be held to account for the many 'petty' and 'inevitable' breaches 
of the NLO and the Criminal Code that occurred in 'temporary' circumstances 
or the extremity of the moment in the isolation of the estates or the privacy of 
the kitchen. As Murray had suggested in his remark about the tendency of 
settlers, if unchecked, to reduce 'natives' to slavery, white men in the 
predicament of settlers could readily see the laws as basically having 
application between 'civilised' men whose societies had developed them. 
Otherwise as in Papua, they thought, laws should exist primarily to protect 
the white residents. Only in time - and certainly not yet, it. could seem -
should Papuans be allowed something approaching legal equality. Settlers in 
similar circumstances in many parts of the world throughout the nineteenth 
century had literally 'got away with murder' as they were still to do in the 
Northern Territory of Australia itself for years to come where the same Federal 
Government that was so sensitive in its administration of Papua turned a 
blind eye. Settlers could not admit that their behaviour was cruel or unjust -
so deeply had the popular version of Darwin's theory of the survival of the 
fittest penetrated; they were merely instruments of an irresistible historical 
and biological movement. Even the 'protection' of the Papuans as undertaken 
by Australia could be seen in this view as a voluntary act of restraint made 
entirely for reasons of humanity and in the face of historical necessity. Those 
planters With relatively humane attitudes who believed that the laws ought to 
be applied impartially were just as annoyed as those With a cruder outlook at 
interference in their affairs by officials who possessed neither expeqence in 
the management of Papuan labour nor any understanding of how to run a 
business. Until the twenties planters generally believed the visits of Native 
Affairs officers to be unwarranted intrusions and were inclined to gtve their 
peers charged with an offence the benefit of the doubt. 
And to add to the frustrations of some planters in 1 9 14 a drought in the 
Central Division unprecedented in the brief memory of settlers afilicted their 
Ibid.,  2 1  Oct. 1 9 1 4. 
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plantations and tested their patience. In October and November frres lit by 
hunting parties from the Kabadi villages as they undertook their annual dry 
season game drive swept into Rorona where 200 acres of sisal were burnt out, 
and into Kanosia, Lolorua and Galley Reach destroying large quantities of 
young rubber. Archibald 'Archie' MacAlpine, Wallace Westland's successor as 
general manager of the Clarke and Whiting companies,  gave way to his 
irritation in a circular letter to his managers telling them to rumour abroad 
among the Kabadis that they were 'apt to be shot' if found trespassing on the 
estates,  and suggesting that staff should not be afraid to use the whip in 
chasing any actual trespassers away. The villagers 'apparently . . .  think they 
can do as they like and if the Government won't protect us we'll have to do the 
best we can for ourselves', he wrote .7  Fires became an annual problem in this 
Division. In July 1 9 1 7  thirty acres of sisal were destroyed at Bomana.8 The 
apparent inability of the government to protect planters from a hazard 
inseparable from proximity to Papuan communities could seem to provide yet 
further grounds for indignation even as Murray sought to have the Native 
Regulations enforced that forbade the 'wilful or careless use of fire' by villagers 
near the property of others. 
Bernesconi's appeal, heard in the High Court in March 1 9 1 5 ,  was 
dismissed after long digressions into whether Commonwealth Law applied in 
Papua and whether a jury system was desirable in Papuan circumstances in 
which the Court deferred in every respect to Murray's opinion.9 Lewis Cowley, 
general manager of BNGD since 1 9 1 1 and a member of the Legislative Council 
(MLC), chose December 1 9 1 4  as the moment to resign. A sociable man who 
had sided with the government against the other two 'unofficial' members in 
the Council over the indenture of women in August 1 9 1 3 ,  Cowley had lost one 
of his children in the dysentery epidemic of 1 9 1 2. He now claimed ill health 
as the reason for leaving. 10 He may have found his position untenable as both 
general manager of BNGD and an MLC on good terms with the Lieutenant 
Governor when it was revealed he had known of T. J .  Craig's allegations 
Kanosia Letterbooks 19 1 4- 15 ,  MacAlpine to Clarke, 5 Nov. 1 9 14. Writing to A. S. 
Bloomfield on 1 0  Nov. , MacAlpine noted that he had 'never seen weather like this before in 
Papua, the jungle all around us is burning' . Reporting the fires on 'Cameron's Block' 
[ Rorona),  the Papuan Times of 18 Nov. demanded that 'The white capitalists . . .  be protected'. 
8 Papuan Courier, 27 July 1 9 1 7. In 1 920 the Planters' Association would press, without 
success, to have Papuans required, as a fire control, to ·keep an area two chains wide cleared 
round their reserves from June or July onwards to the advent of the rainy season' (Al 
20/9009, Planters' Association of Papua, Bulletln, No 3, p.  1 5 ). 
9 George Bernesconi served his sentence in Badili Gaol. He is believed to have become 
much later a newsagent at Elwood, Victoria. (Interview, Mrs Haidee Champion, 2 1  Oct. 
1973 . )  
1 0  NLA Deposit 52,  Atlee Hunt Papers, item 349, Murray to Hunt, 13  Dec. 1 9 1 4. Murray 
thought Cowley might be suffering from tropical sprue. 
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against Bemesconi since late 1 9 13 and had failed to act upon them. A director 
of the company, Evelyn Metcalfe, was in Port Moresby having been sent out 
to Papua to find ways to check the alarming rate at which the development of 
its properties was drawing on BNGD's capital. 1 1  He immediately appointed 
the company's commercial manager in Port, G .  A. Loudon, to the senior 
position. George Archibald Loudon, born in 1 882, had been commercial 
manager since 1 9 1 3  and was of a temperament very different from Cowley's .  
Handsome, capable and energetic, a taker ofrisks, he had come to Papua with 
a considerable experience of the plantation world. He was determined to 'bring 
the company to a dividend paying basis', to press for every advantage and 
oppose every restriction placed before his objective. Bertram Bramell advised 
Murray that the new general manager would 'need watching'. He was, Murray 
feared, 'a bit of a nipper' . 12 
At the same time as the Bemesconi affair was simmering, a recruiting 
scandal involving a Resident Magtstrate came to light in which BNGD was to 
suffer considerable losses as an innocent third party. At an inquiry in camera 
ending in August 1 9 1 4, Alexander Campbell, the Government Secretary since 
retired, had cancelled the contracts of thirteen Eroro labourers on the grounds 
that there had been collusion between the RM in the Kumusi (Northern) 
Division, A. E. Oelrichs, and the recruiters Les Joubert and Ernie Oates to 
pressure men into signing on. It appeared that Oelrichs had threatened to 
bum down villages and kill pigs if men did not agree to engagement. 13 As the 
labourers so pressed into service were among a large consignment for BNGD, 
the company settled its account with Joubert and Oates for the remainder, 
550 in all, after Campbell's decision was known. Campbell gave Loudon a 
verbal assurance that there would be no further action taken in the case. In 
July the government announced that new disclosures necessitated the re­
opening of the inquiry and by February 1 9 15 the contracts of a further 1 30 
Orokaivas had been cancelled. BNGD submitted that the government should 
bear the cost of these cancellations, including the expenses in repatriating the 
labourers, since a qualified officer, if in illegal circumstances, had witnessed 
the contracts. 14 Loudon at first seemed to flout the law by keeping the 
1 1  BNGD Letterbooks, Vol. l ,  1 0  Oct. 1 9 1 3 .  Capital for development of the BNGD 
properties was being drawn upon at the rate of £5,000 a month while receipts coming in from 
BNG Trading were less than a sixth of this. See note 23, p. 158 below. 
1 2  Atlee Hunt Papers, Murray to Hunt, 13 Dec. 1 9 14. For Loudon's previous experience 
see above, p. 88. 
13 CRS Al 1 3 / 1 9589 and 1 6 / 15 1 22 contain the correspondence dealing with the 
Oelrichs case. 
1 4  NAPNG & CRS 0 1 2 6 /3, Loudon to Murray, 23 June 1 9 1 4. Binandere speaking 
labourers from the Northern Division were identified, not always very accurately, as 
'Orokaiva' , 'Eroro', 'Kumusi' or 'Mambare' depending on the general area of their recruitment. 
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Orokaivas at work after the decision of the court was made known. This led 
Murray to believe that the company was attempting a trial of strength With the 
government and that whilst BNGD may have been an innocent party in the 
recruiting scandal , it was now evidently prepared to challenge the law over its 
obligation to repatriate the labourers in question.15  Native Affairs demanded 
that the company immediately release the Orokaivas from service and return 
them home Without delay or face an action that would deprive BNGD of the 
right to have labour signed on. 
Murray's attention was also drawn to a recent report of the CNA that 
referred to an incident at BNGD's Katea estate where the manager, James 
Matley, had apparently sent a horse and rider to bring back an absconding 
labourer making his way to Port Moresby to lodge a complaint. Fortunately 
the labourer had evaded the pursuit which, Murray concluded, amounted to 
an attempt 'to terrorise' the man, and conduct on the part of the manager that 
could hardly be regarded as the 'fair treatment' to which RMs were expected 
to assign Papuans entering contracts of service. He asked that these details 
be sent to Loudon.16  
On 2 January an interview With Evelyn Metcalfe in which he was highly 
critical of affairs in Papua was published in the Melbourne Argus. 1 7  He 
accused the Murray administration of 'harassing [his ] company out of 
existence'. Murray was prompted to ask the general manager why Metcalfe 
should have formed such opinions , and Loudon - no doubt With the director's 
advice - set out a long statement of grievances. 18  In addition to the claim for 
the costs of the Orokaiva cancellations BNGD complained that the government 
had, Without warning, reduced the permitted passenger complement of the 
company's coastal steamer, the Wakefield, from 106 to thirty-four at the very 
moment when it was obliging its owners to return the illegally recruited 
Orokaivas home. It was on the day that the restriction was lifted that the 
company was advised that its rights to engage labour might be cancelled. 
Loudon went on to complain of inconsistent treatment by the Customs 
Department, and of an excise tax being contemplated for locally grown tobacco 
while the industry was still in the experimental stage and certainly before it 
had become profitable. He objected that the Native Affairs Inspectors did not 
seem to accept the truth of plantation returns With regard to ration issues and 
that the Commissioner did not allow the payment of advances on wages to 
labourers on the estates , a measure that if permitted, Loudon suggested, 
1 5 CRS A l  Item 1 7  / 1 0895 . Murray to Minister, 23 Feb. 1 9 1 5 .  
1 6  Ibid. 
1 7  Melbourne Argus, 2 Jan. 1 9 1 5 . On 4 Jan. the paper published a reply by the Minister, 
Hugh Mahon, and on 5 Jan. the leader article covered the controversy. 
1 8  NAPNG Series G l 26,  Item 3,  G. A. Loudon to Murray, 25 Feb. 1 9 15 .  
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would go far to making the period of indenture more tolerable. Implying that 
the administration was prejudiced against business in general, he referred to 
yet another hearing that had taken place since Bernesconi's in which 'the 
word of a native' was used to convict the manager of Clarke and Whiting's 
Fairfax Harbour plantation, J .  R. A. Wilkes, against the sworn testimony of 
three reputable European witnesses. 
Murray responded distantly to these charges through the Official Secretary. 
Loudon was, His Excellency had suggested, 'over-sensitive' in the 
'misunderstanding' over the Wake.field, and in the matter of the Fairfax 
inquiry the Lieutenant Governor had observed that 'it is impossible to say 
whether the decision was right or wrong, - so much depends, sometimes, 
upon the demeanour of witnesses and the manner in which they give their 
evidence' . 1 9  True as this may have been of the processes of law in Australia 
or England, it was an extraordinary remark for Murray to make and could 
only have been understood by Loudon to mean that the Lieutenant Governor 
believed it was more incumbent on the government to make the law appear 
impartial than that justice should be done. Murray added that it was 'clearly 
impossible to lay down a rule that a magistrate should always decide 
according to number and colour' . Loudon was hardly likely to see this as more 
than cant. 
Indeed, Murray was to break off his private correspondence with Atlee 
Hunt in June 1 9 1 5  over the Wilkes case when, after Arthur Bloomfield had 
protested to him, Hunt was inclined to agree that the judgement in the Port 
Moresby RM's court was questionable.20 Wilkes had been fined for failure to 
provide good and sufficient food for six Bamu River labourers who had been 
admitted to hospital in February 1 9 1 5  in a feeble condition. The defence had 
claimed that the 'boys' in question had been 'weedy' and 'thin' on arrival at the 
plantation having passed a government inspection and that 200 others on 
Fairfax Harbour had not complained of a shortage of food. The fmes imposed 
on the manager were small and the costs involved inconsiderable in 
comparison with those incurred by the employer in the BNGD cases. An 
appeal was made against Wilkes's conviction and dismissed. Of this case 
Bruce indignantly noted in the Papuan Times of 1 9  May that 'some evil 
minded crank [had] sent to a southern paper a photograph of diseased and 
emaciated boys who were the cause of a recent prosecution' and had described 
them as 'Victims to Capitalism in Papua' .21 
A subsequent letter informed Loudon that nothing on the Government 
Secretary's files could be found to show that Campbell had given BNGD any 
19 NAPNG Series 0 1 28, Item 3,  Lieutenant Governor to G. A. Loudon, 5 Mar. 1 9 1 5 .  
20 West, Selected Letters of Hubert Murray, letter No. 64, 16  June 19 15,  Murray t o  Hunt. 
21 Papuan TlTnes, 19 May 19 15,  p.2. 
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assurances after the first Oelrichs inquiry. Yet in this Loudon had not lied -
Campbell later admitted in a letter that he had indeed given the verbal 
assurances Loudon claimed.22 In correspondence with the Minister, Murray 
argued strongly that as the law stood the government was not liable for the 
costs which BNGD, even as an innocent party, was now obliged to meet. 
Murray also clashed with Evelyn Metcalfe more directly. A director 
experienced in Australian conditions, Metcalfe had managed a pastoral 
property in Queensland, and was prepared to play the rougher game thought 
by the other members of the board of BNGD to be necessary in dealing with 
Australians.23 In an interview with the Papuan Treasurer, William Kendrick, 
he had referred to the Lieutenant Governor as 'a bloody liar'. Kendrick 
reported this to Murray who wrote declining any further contact.24 Receiving 
the letter back in England, Metcalfe rejected the charge of using bad language 
attributing it to the factionalism in Port Moresby that made 
misrepresentation always possible. He responded in a letter that his criticisms 
of the Australian and Papuan governments' policies were not personally 
aimed, adding with characteristic assurance that, 
I go to Papua seldom, and when there rarely find you at home . . .  I have just heard 
on my return . . .  that things are if anything worse than when I was there. I trust 
therefore that you will give further attention . . . and endeavour to prevent a serious 
calamity. My Company is at all times willing to assist the Government in every way 
but some actions of your Government leave us powerless to even carry out the 
instructions of the Government.25 
In the Melbourne Age in May 1 9 1 4 inflated reporting of the Bernesconi and 
Oelrichs cases had led to allegations that there was 'slavery' in Papua.26 
Papers in England took up the story. The Melbourne correspondent of the 
London Daily Chronicle of 1 July reported that there was 'no doubt that 
slavery has been flourishing in the Territory of Papua for years'. The Papuan 
Times did 'not believe for one moment' that there was the remotest cause for 
anxiety and that, on the contrary, the Murray administration was 'inclined to 
err in the milk and water manner' exactly in the opposite direction by 
'coddling the natives' .  Murray too felt the need to respond to the reports and 
in his next Annual Report noted that only sixty-five of 1 20 Orokaiva labourers 
22 CRS Al 1 7 I 10895 , Campbell to Hunt, 14 Aug. 1 9 1 5 .  
23 Evelyn Metcalfe had earlier been the member of the BNGD Board sent out in 19 1 1  to 
straighten out the company's affairs. He had been selected as 'a strong man to go out and 
see what was the matter and to deal with the situation with no gloved hand' (ANUABL, 
Deposit No. 95 , Microfilm M37, BNGD Annual General Meeting, 1 9 1 1 ). 
24 NAPNG Series 0 1 28, Item 3, Murray to Metcalfe, 3 Feb. 1 9 1 5. 
25 NAPNG Series 0 1 26 Item 4, Metcalfe to Murray, 1 9  Mar. 1 9 1 5 .  
26 CRS Al 1 7/ 4904 'Slavery in Papua. Protection of Native Races'. The Age (Melbourne) 
article appeared in May, that in the Dally Chronicle (London) on 1 July 1 9 1 4. 
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whose contracts had been recently cancelled had chosen to return home. This 
spoke well , he suggested, for the general conditions of employment. And 
clearly to mollify Loudon's sense of injury, he now publicly acknowledged that 
the employer certainly was rather badly treated. There was nothing in the very 
voluminous evtdence which even suggested that he had done anything wrong -all 
he had got out of the affair was a lot of annoyance and the loss of 1 20 boys - and 
it did seem rather hard that on top of all this, he should be denounced as a slave­
owner. 27 
Elsewhere in the Report he noted that the 'haunting terror' of labour 
scarcity seemed to have disappeared and that this was due to the faii 
treatment Papuans could expect 'in the great majority of cases' when they 
engaged. He went on to add with an eye to his readers in Papua as much as 
to his wider audience that 
Doubtless there have been, even in Papua, employers of violent and even brutal 
temper, as well as employers who regard the question of their employee's welfare 
with callous indifference; but so far as I know there has never been anything like 
systematic illtreatment of labourers either by miners of planters.28 
In London the directors of BNGD on hearing of the dismissal of Bernesconi 
and Marsham instructed the secretary, Samuel Thompson, to inform the 
general manager 'that ill-treatment of natives is against the policy of the Board 
and they regret to hear of this occurring. They think that every precaution 
should be taken to prevent such an occurrence in the future'.29 In 
connection with the cancellation of the Orokaivas' contracts the directors 
noted approvingly that G. A. Loudon had sought the help of Sir Rupert Clarke 
in an attempt to quash the second enquiry, but when this could not be done 
they reluctantly supported the application for costs lodged by the Port 
Moresby office against the govemment.30 The company's claim for over 
£2,000 was to be eventually met with a payment of £409 in compensation in 
May 1 9 1 7. 
At the annual general meeting of BNGD in London in July 19 14,  W. A. 
Hom, who had succeeded Lord Ranfurly as chairman, had drawn attention 
to the difficulties the company experienced in obtaining suitable white 
employees. A 'new' country, it seemed, tended to attract wasters and 
adventurers from the 'old'.31 This may have been an early allusion to 
Bemesconi but BNGD and other planting companies were to claim on many 
27 PAR 1 91 4-15 ,  7. 
28 Ibid. , 6 .  
29 BNGD Letterbooks, Vol. l ,  25 Sept. 1 9 1 4, Thompson to Loudon. 
30 Ibid. , 25 Oct. 1 9 14, Thompson to Loudon. The full correspondence over the claim is 
in CRS Al 1 7I 10895. 
31 Ftnanclal Times (London), 1 8  July 1 9 1 4. ANUABL Deposit 95, M37. 
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occasions that the government could show sympathy to the larger employers 
in circumstances where it was difficult to police the conduct of subordinate 
personnel. On 1 1  March 1 9 1 4  Archie MacAlpine at Kanosia wrote to his 
superintendent at Rorona, Edgar Collins , concerning forty-eight Mambare [ or 
'Orokaiva' ] labourers , also among those recruited by Joubert and Oates in the 
Oelrichs scandal , who a few days before had deserted Rorona and gone off to 
Port Moresby to lay complaints against their overseers. The Mambares, he 
conceded, were a 'particularly troublesome lot ever since they learned that the 
Govt might be taking steps to enquire into the way they were recruited' .32 His 
concern to recoup any costs if the labourers' contracts were cancelled was 
uppermost in his mind but a lack of confidence in the reliability of his white 
staff is apparent in the letter. There was 'of course, probably nothing' in the 
Orokaivas' complaint 'but it has occurred to me as being strange that it is 
always from Rorona that boys desert and it might be well for you to consider 
your methods of handling labor [sic ]' .33 Rorona was known to be unpopular 
with Papuan workers both because they disliked working sisal and because 
the plantation was not directly on the beach. But it was only a few miles from 
Kanosia and from MacAlpine's eye. If he could be uncertain about Collins's 
dealings with his labour, how much more difficult might it have been for a 
general manager of much more widely separated estates to superintend his 
superintendents? It is very probable that dishonesty and want of care among 
white employees were generally much greater causes of anxiety for managers 
responsible to overseas directors and shareholders than the proverbial vis 
inertiae of the Papuan. 
Indeed government officers would later acknowledge that some of the 
difficulties experienced with the law by the companies in general could be 
attributed to the unreliability of the staff they were forced to employ. But it is 
clear that by late 1 9 1 4  the Lieutenant Governor had begun to believe that 
transgressions by employees of BNGD in particular were of another order and 
that this company, in the persons of its agents, G. A. Loudon and Evelyn 
Metcalfe, represented a real and powerful threat to his administration . On 9 
March 1 9 1 5  Murray wrote to his brother that 
I have been doing battle with the British New Guinea Company, or rather they have 
been doing battle with me. This is the Company of which Geoffrey Howard was a 
shareholder - I hope he has sold out, for they are the weirdest lot of people I have 
met. We had to refuse to sign on any more labour to them until they complied with 
32 Kanosia Letterbooks, 1 1  Mar. 1 9 1 4. See below note 4, p. 1 43.  
33 Ibid. In a letter written on the same day to the ARM in Port Moresby MacAlpine could 
not 'imagine any reasonable cause that [ the deserters) can have had for running away as I 
personally at all times do my utmost to rectify any differences'. A charge of assault made 
against Collins by other labourers was dismissed in June 1 9 1 5  (Papuan Times, 1 6  June 
1 9 1 5 ). 
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the law about sending their labourers home. They have a notion that being a strong 
company we must be afraid of them, and are absolutely aghast when asked to obey 
the ordinary law. However I think they are fairly quiet now, though they require 
much watching. 34 
The Papuan Times continued its unrelenting attack on his administration 
throughout 1 9 1 5 .  On 3 March an editorial appeared that marked the high 
point of Bruce's incendiary journalism in which he compared the government 
to a 'Muscovite autocracy' and the settlers to the miners at Eureka who in 
1 854 had taken up arms to resist arbitrary government in the colony of 
Victoria. The 'people' were 'being "bled white" . . .  fmding the money to pay the 
salaries of servants whose chief aim is to penalise and torment their masters' . 
The 'breaking point', Bruce declared, had been reached. 35 
It is difficult to believe that in a community as small as that of white Port 
Moresby such extreme statements could have been taken seriously, but on 
paper, at least, here was the suggestion that settlers might actually rebel. 
There is no other evidence at all that civil disturbance was being remotely 
considered, but here was seditious language meant to provoke a reaction and 
perhaps a crisis that Bruce, and no doubt others, hoped Melbourne could not 
ignore. Murray was determined not to magnify the significance of such 
desperate and dangerous press agitation by appearing to give it the slightest 
attention. 
A 'Citizens' Meeting' to consider the community's grievances was called for 
22 April and in the Papuan Times Bruce tilled the soil of righteous indignation 
in the preceding weeks with long editorials attacking the 'hypocritical 
Australian press' , the 'breach of faith' by the Commonwealth in not proceeding 
with a previously approved railway line to Sapphire Creek, and the failure of 
the government to prevent the recent murder of a white man at Jawarere.36 
On 7 April, noting figures given in the 1 9 13- 1 4  Annual Report, the editorial 
bitterly reflected that while the 'territorial revenue provided by the white trash 
who are pioneering the Territory' amounted to some £54,000 or £6,000 more 
than the previous year, for every £1  being spent on development on roads and 
services for the white community, £20 was being spent on 'native' 
administration. On 1 4  April the editor questioned the capacity of any official 
still in the government service to work Papuan labour and attacked the prying 
34 West, Selected Letters of Hubert Murray, letter No. 62, Murray to Gilbert Murray, 9 
Mar. 1 9 15 .  Geoffrey Howard, younger son of the Earl of Carlisle, was Gilbert Murray's 
brother-in-law. 
315 Papuan Ttmes, 3 Mar. 1 9 15. 
36 Ibid. , "The hypocritical Australian press . . .  always poses as the champions of the poor 
blacks', 10 Feb. 1 9 15.  Editorials on the projected railway to Sapphire Creek: 9 Dec. 1 9 1 4, 
1 7  Feb. 19 15, and 1 0  Mar. 1 9 1 5  when the failure to proceed was "A Breach of Faith' . The 
report of Harry Ballot's murder appeared on 10 Mar. 
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inspectors who, if they badgered labourers long enough, were bound to find 
something 'wrong' - the whole liberally sprinkled with references to 'the lazy 
brutes' and 'the inferior race' and 'the present policy of the Government [that] 
belittles the white man'.37 
The Citizens' Meeting was well attended and addressed by Arthur Jewell, 
William Bruce, Dr Colin Simson and G. A. Loudon. In his speech Loudon 
claimed that labour could only be recruited on the verges of control because 
Papuans within the pacified areas quickly became slothful and dependent on 
government assistance. An irresistible conclusion to be drawn was that there 
was a 'want of sympathy on the part of the Government in regard to the 
industrial development of the country'. 38 And so it could seem. 
Resolutions demanding electoral representation and 'democratic' rights 
were passed and sent to Murray, and Dr Simson was deputed to publicise the 
dissatisfactions of the white community of Papua in Australia. Aware of the 
importance of keeping public opinion in Sydney and Melbourne well informed 
of his side in any controversy, Murray instructed the Papuan Agent in Sydney, 
John Bensted, to spread information contradicting Dr Simson's assertions. 
Although it had been his view that J. R. A. Wilkes had been unfairly treated 
in the Fairfax Harbour case, Arthur Bloomfield too was prepared to defend the 
government against its detractors in a letter to the papers.39 Bruce castigated 
him in the Papuan Times for believing 'it wise to keep in with the government 
at any price'. Murray was lampooned through the year as readers of the local 
paper were invited to regard the Lieutenant Governor as 'this dreamer' and as 
'a crusty incapable old Tory', his policy as 'suicidal' and 'claptrap', his 
administration as 'a relic of feudal times'.40 
In London, the BNGD directors had accepted Evelyn Metcalfe's account of 
the hostility of the Papuan Government towards the planters. At the annual 
general meeting in August 1 9 1 5 ,  W. A. Horn accused Australians of 
inconsistency. They had dispossessed their 'own' natives of their land and 
were allowing the remnants to slowly die of starvation and disease.  No one, he 
suggested, wanted this to be repeated in Papua. Yet, if Papuans retained the 
ownership of their land and were permitted under control to sell it 'there is 
37 Ibid. ,  7 Apr. 1 9 1 5, 1 4  Apr. 1 9 15 .  
38 Ibid. ,  28 Apr. 1 9 15 .  
39 NAPNG & CRS G l 28 / 4, Murray to Bensted, 1 5  Aug. 1 9 1 5 .  Murray forwarded a copy 
of a speech by Bloomfield praising the government for publication in the Sydney Morning 
Herald in which in an article Simson had named Bloomfield's companies as among those 
·persecuted' by Native Affairs. 
40 Papuan Times, 2 1 July 1 9 1 5, p. 4; 2 June 1 9 1 5; 6 Jan. 1 9 1 5 ;  24 Mar. 1 9 1 5 ;  23 June 
1 9 15 ;  2 1 July 1 9 1 5  and 1 Mar. 1 9 1 6 .  
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little advantage in that unless the purchasers are assisted in the 
development' . 4 1  
But Loudon had been wrong in his claims about the pattern of labour 
recruitment made at the Citizens' meeting in April, and Murray in an obvious 
response in the 19 1 5 - 1 6  Annual Report would draw attention to the evidence 
that most labour still came from 'the old recruiting grounds' and not from 
newly opened up areas.42 This he put down to the dependence on imported 
goods among coastal Papuans and the confidence that experience of 
indentured labour had given them. And qualified as Murray's view had 
become about the developers he could not admit that his commitment to the 
development of Papua by settlers was less than it once had been - nor indeed, 
once he had finally mastered them, would he prove less than a persistent and 
eloquent advocate for the planters and their interests in straitened times. 
There was much to be settled in the years ahead before this would become 
clear. 
41 Financial Tlmes (London), 5 Aug. 19 15,  p. 3 .  ANUABL, Deposit 95, M37. 
42 PAR 1 9 1 4-15 ,  6. 
CHAPTER 1 1  
Papuans and progress 
THE BERNESCONI AND Oelrichs affairs had bruised both Murray and the 
management of the largest of the plantation companies.  A mutual distrust had 
emerged that would be re-inforced by other irritations and further 
prosecutions in the next seven years in which both the government and BNGD 
- and neither perhaps without justification - could assume hostility and bad 
faith in the other. If Murray now had little confidence in the good intentions 
of plantation companies even as he depended on the revenue they generated, 
planters had no confidence in his government's capacity or desire to work to 
secure remunerative conditions for commercial agriculture. The larger 
employers assumed that economic rationality would oblige the Papuan 
administration to cheapen the cost of labour whilst ensuring the maintenance 
of the supply, to lower charges and duties, to make allowances over the 
supervision of white employees, and in consideration of their economic 
difficulties, to press for and secure from the Commonwealth preferential 
tariffs, bounties, development loans and increased subsidies - sufficient 
tariffs, greater bounties, higher subsidies, cheaper labour or lower taxation as 
the exigencies of the times dictated.  But Australian willingness to under-write 
the development of Papua proved much too slight and the margin that Murray 
was resolved to preserve for the Papuan labourer seemed far too slender for 
there to be much room for manoeuvre. 
Publicly accused of indifference to the difficulties encountered by settlers -
an accusation he could deny claiming that his government was determined 
to maintain a balance between the interests of white and brown - Murray 
privately might well have come to the conclusion that given the strength of 
settler hostility his position and reputation did indeed rest finally on the 
defence of his 'native' policy. He could now consider only minor changes in the 
NLO provided these did not diminish the broader safeguards for Papuan 
workers that he had inherited and since strengthened. These safeguards, he 
tried to remind settlers again and again, were in their own best interest if the 
continuation of the labour supply was to be assured. He also saw danger in 
proceeding with any development that could outstrip this supply and open up 
demands by employers for a compulsory labour system. Large enterprises, 
once admitted, constituted a particular threat not only because of their 
greater capacity to lobby members of Parliament and receive press coverage 
but because, as major contributors to the revenue, their very existence could 
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hold an administration to ransom. In January 1 9 1  7 the Lieutenant Governor 
gave Atlee Hunt his reasons why he did not want a policy allowing oil 
prospecting by private interests in Papua. If such a policy were permitted and 
large oil deposits discovered there could develop 
what most of those concerned with the Government of tropical dependencies will, 
I think, agree is a very common and sometimes dangerous feature of administration. 
This is the presence of some powerful company, financially perhaps stronger than 
the Government, and determined if possible to 'capture' the Government and make 
Government's policy subordinate to the company's interests. The result is a 
continual conflict (the nature of which is of course misrepresented outside the 
dependency), in which the Government is sometimes successful, and sometimes, 
I am told, is not . . . 1 
It is impossible not to think that Murray had British New Guinea 
Development specifically in mind as the chief contender in Papua for the part 
of a 'powerful company fmancially perhaps stronger than the Government', 
and such an attitude could hardly be construed as favourable even to what 
might be regarded as the legitimate activities of a large enterprise wishing to 
expand its business in the country. Indeed, BNGD had already declared an 
interest in securing oil concessions in the Gulf Division. The company was the 
first to cany out serious exploration when in 1 9 1 2  at considerable expense it 
sent out a German geologist and drilling plant. By 1 9 1 7  BNGD's planting and 
trading interests were by far the most extensive in Papua, the developed area 
of its estates amounting to 1 2,000 acres or nearly a quarter of the total for the 
Territory. Its properties were widely distributed. The company's store in Port 
was as big as Burns Philp's and there was a large branch at Samarai. BNGD 
ran the principal coastal steamer, a tobacco twist factory, a joinery, and an 
engmeertng workshop. Employing eighty Europeans and 2 ,000 Papuans it was 
indeed only rivalled by the government in the size of its operations.2 
It is also difficult to believe that the Lieutenant Governor did not now fmd 
that the limits he and Staniforth Smith - and by its continued acquiescence 
the Commonwealth too - had set on the labour supply in Papua formed a 
convenient restraint on further large scale development. In the Report made 
of a visit to the British Solomon Islands Protectorate in 1 9 1 6  Murray had 
defined a principle of his administration that he now re-affirmed in his letter 
opposing private oil-drilling, - 'that the progress of development shall bear 
some proportion to the labour available'.3 An oil-field requiring large numbers 
NAPNG Series 0 1 28,  Item 4, Murray to Hunt, 3 Jan. 1 9 1 7 .  
CRS A 1 1 8  / 1 463, Loudon to Minister, 20 Dec. 19 1 7 .  
NAPNG, Series G 1 28,  item 4, 3 Jan. 1 9 1 7, Murray t o  Hunt. Murray's Report o n  the 
British Solomon Islands is in the Public Records Office, London, C0225 / 1 48, 29 Apr. 1 9 16 .  
I am indebted to Peter Corris fo r  sight o f  this. The same words ar e  used in CRS A l  1 7I 1 4 18, 
Address by Murray in Melbourne: Native Labour in Papua, May 191 7. 
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of labourers, Murray proposed, should remain under firm government control 
so that the demand for additional labour 'should come not suddenly but by 
degrees' and excessive pressure on the supply under the existing constraints 
could be avoided. If there was to be no compulsion for Papuans to work for 
Europeans, and if no 'foreign' labour was to be imported into the country, 
then, within the 1 0% of the population available, the willingness of the 
Papuans to enter contracts would continue to depend on the sufficiency of the 
inducements in wages, conditions and excitement that indentured service 
offered. And this, he thought, was quite enough. 
With other costs out of their control, the pressures on planters to make 
savings in labour costs, if these in any way could be achieved, were 
considerable. Several of the more noteworthy contests in the courts in the 
years ahead, like the Wilkes case before them, would be over the supply of 
'good and sufficient' food to indentured labourers. The NLO Regulations set 
down the minimum to be issued, and some employers, particularly the 
companies , tried to maintain only the minimum, the managers being under 
a general instruction to be efficient and not wasteful. Where overseers could 
be neglectful in supervising food distribution and some labourers could 
intimidate others, the supply of food to the labour lines at the minimum rate 
could only lead to inequities and, in effect, the starvation of some workers. 
The desertions that could result might appear to plantation managers and 
company officials as quite unjustified. In test cases in 1 9 1 8  and 1921  
examined in succeeding chapters , both fought out with BNGD, the 
government sought to establish in the minds of employers their overriding 
responsibility for the proper feeding of all their Papuan workers, and by the 
1 920s few planters would restrict the food available to their labourers to the 
amounts prescribed in the regulations. 
And there were the pressures imposed on the size of a work force by the 
way the indentured labour system operated in Papua. Since, where labour was 
recruited at a distance, to have more workers than were currently necessary 
on a plantation was a very heavy cost, prudent managers preferred to have too 
few rather than too many labourers on their estates and the larger Papuan 
plantations generally employed fewer workers, if more European overseers, 
than did estates of a corresponding size in the East. The big employers were 
constantly anxious about fluctuations in the numbers of Papuans offering for 
work just as individual plantation managers were sensitive to quite small 
variations in the numbers of 'boys' on an estate. The Kanosia Plantation letter­
books, surviving for the years 1 9 14- 1 5 ,  contain what seems at first a 
surprising amount of attention to the health, reception, and whereabouts of 
individually named labourers punctuating the general correspondence over 
shipping, plantation development and the arrival and breakdown of 
machinery. It was an imperative for managers to maximise the return from the 
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service of evety labourer for whom recruiting fees of £3 a year had been paid, 
and, at least at Kanosia, it was an urgent matter to keep abreast of labour 
health and disaffection.4 Bazel Wharton-Kirke, manager for a time at 
Jawarere, was delegated by the Returned Soldiers' League in 1 920 to 
investigate the opportunities existing for members in Late German New 
Guinea. In a report that made biting comparisons between Papua and its 
northern neighbour he concluded that 'at the present moment there is not a 
plantation in the whole of Papua that has an adequate labour force to develop 
it to its full extent. This is a serious statement I know'.5 In 1 9 18 George 
Wiseman of Glenealy Estate, Perak (FMS), was brought to Papua by BNGD, 
Pacific and Papua Produce (formerly Mombiri), and Clarke and Whiting to 
advise on their rubber plantations. In a report to the BNGD directors he 
remarked that an estate in Malaya the size of ltikinumu would require 350 
'coolies' whereas Itikinumu had only 1 50 'boys'.6 Figures supplied to Murray 
by the governors of the FMS and British North Borneo suggested that this was 
only a small exaggeration. 7 In the rubber industty in those dependencies, 
about thirty-five workers were employed for evety hundred acres. Thus in 
1 9 1 9, ltikinumu, with 907 acres and 1 98 labourers, might have 'required' over 
300. 
The higher ratio of white assistants and overseers to Papuan workers, and 
the higher salaries these Europeans commanded in comparison with those 
paid to Chinese overseers and Tamil kangantes in Malaya, may also account 
in part for the less than optimum numbers of Papuan labourers that could be 
afforded. Indeed, to this ratio would be attributed at least part of the chronic 
cost disadvantage Papuan commodities were to bear throughout the colonial 
period.8 
After 1 9 1 6 when most of the plantations laid down in the boom years were 
coming into production, the size of the workforce needed on estates depended 
partly on the profitable sale of the commodities produced. In 1 9 1 9  there would 
be a surplus of Papuans offering for work, in 1 920 a dearth, and in 1 92 1 -22 
an urgent need to reduce the numbers of labourers to maintenance levels as 
Kanosia Letterbooks, 3 Mar. 1 9 1 4  - 2 May 1 9 1 5 .  Nearly all letters were written by 
Archibald MacAlpine, Clarke and Whiting's general manager 1 9 1 2 - 1 6 .  While MacAlpine was 
away accompanying Sir Rupert Clarke on his expedition up the Fly River in June and July 
1 9 1 4, Richard Walshe - then the company's accountant - acted in MacAlpine's place. 
5 P(l.puan Court.er, 13 Mar. 1 920. 
CRS A l  Item 18/ 1 2377. A copy of Wiseman's report was sent by G. A. Loudon to 
Atlee Hunt. The report was dated 25 May 1 9 18.  
7 NAPNG Series G 1 26,  Item 9, pp. 1 1 78, 1 1 79 . Figures were also obtained from the 
Government of Ceylon. They included information about the very large numbers of workers 
required seasonally for tea picking and Murray suppressed this in a copy of the report sent 
to the Planters' Association. (Ceylon letter, 20 July 1 920. ) 
8 See below p. 222, and note 48, p. 224. 
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the markets for the Territory's products collapsed. The NLO permitted no 
standing down of labour and employers were still bound to bear the costs of 
provisioning and repatriating labourers whose contracts were abruptly 
cancelled for want of a return on production. Conversely, once the force was 
reduced, no immediate advantage could be taken of rapid increases in prices 
until the number of workers could be restored to an operating level. 
The time taken in recruitment, signing-on, transport, and training had led 
planters to press for three year contracts in 1 9 1 2 as they could get no more 
than nine months' labour from a 'one year boy' who at the expiry of his 
contract was promptly lost to them - only to be replaced by yet another 
inexperienced recruit. The three year contracts that then became normal on 
larger estates allowed employers the longer benefit of trained workers and 
some staggering of labour turnover. 9 
By the late 1 920s, the government was to try to encourage a return to one 
year terms because it was thought that there were by then many skilled 
former labourers in the villages who might wish to work but who baulked at 
signing on for three years. Murray thought that 'free' labour could be 
subsequently encouraged and the system of indenture gradually allowed to 
wither.10 Yet, if planters were not to be permitted to have a reservoir of 
dependent labour confined in plantation kampongs as in the East that might 
allow them to respond promptly to price movements, they certainly did not 
want free labour in a scarce labour market able to desert estates at any time 
on account of a temporary grievance, real or imagined, or asking for time-off 
to attend local feasts. Murray had to observe in 1 930 that Papuans too 
seemed to prefer the system that bound employers to known conditions, and 
that it would be many years before indenture could be dispensed with . 1 1  
While some o f  the smaller planters, especially in the eastern divisions, did 
come to rely wholly on local casual labour, most others preferred under the 
existing dispensation to secure their workers from more distant districts just 
See Appendix A, pp. 3 1 6-8, for a discussion of recent research into the indentured 
labour system in Papua. 
1 0  In 1 927 the Natives (Non-Indentured Serolce) Ordinance was introduced. Papuans 
could now undertake ·casual' employment for unrestricted periods provided the work was 
within twenty miles of their homes. Previously contracts were mandatory if employment was 
to be for a period longer than three months. 
1 1  PAR 1 930-3 1 ,  p .  6 .  In his report in the Annual Report for 1 927- 28 (pp. 62-6)  J .  T. 
O'Malley CNA set out the arguments in favour of free labour in some detail using the 
experience of South African employers in illustration. He also conceded there were some 'rare' 
Papuans like those from the Purari delta who would willingly re-engage for successive three 
year contracts of employment if they were permitted to do so. Perhaps they were not so rare. 
The Goaribari villagers of Beiovo and Gebumiri in the Kikori delta formally changed the 
village names to 'Baboguina' and 'Paile' respectively to commemorate plantations upon which 
many of the men had served, and we might suppose, had worked happily. 
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as Papuans had come to look on a term of indentured labour in some part of 
the country other than their own as a rite of passage , an indispensable 
experience, an adventure. 
J .  F. Horn , a son of the former chairman ( 1 9 1 3 - 1 922 ) of BNGD, W. A. 
Horn, and a director of Robinson River Plantation visiting Papua in 1 932 , 
recorded the 'all-in' average cost to the company of an indentured labourer as 
32s. a month.12  This cost can hardly have changed much in the whole period 
1 9 1 0- 1 940, and since the information was for the eyes of the other directors 
only, it is likely to be reliable. Papuans, it seems, could be employed for as 
little as a shilling a day. If the salaries paid to government officers are a guide, 
the incomes of employed Europeans on the other hand increased by over 70% 
in the period 1 906- 1 925.  The war had brought inflation and the collapse of 
the gold standard. The purchasing power of Papuan wages had certainly 
diminished. And perhaps the real incomes of whites had not risen, the £3 70 
paid to an ARM in 1 925 purchasing scarcely more than the £225 of 1 906 .13  
The Papuan Annual Report 1 9 1 2- 1 3  shows the salaries of the managers of the 
government plantations at Baibara and Kemp Welch River to be £250 and that 
of an assistant £200. By 1 925-26 these had risen at Kemp Welch to between 
£420 and £5 1 0  for the manager, and between £328 and £400 for the 
assistant. Private employees generally were paid less, though Percy Robinson 
of Ogamobu recorded that Tom Sefton of Koitaki had an income of £800 a 
year in 1 9 1 9  - probably the highest salary paid to an employed plantation 
manager in Papua and equal to that of the Papuan Treasurer . 14  Robinson 
was draWing under half this amount. Many smaller planters might have 
subsisted for long periods on a quarter or less of Sefton's income, and on their 
fishing, cattle, chickens, eggs and fruit. 
And Papuan workers were not entirely without bargaining power. They 
could respond in the market for their labour if the value of wages fell too 
quickly or conditions to which they were accustomed were suddenly altered -
by refusing to 'sign on'. This they did in 1 920 en masse as prices for trade 
goods rose rapidly and rice became unavailable as food on many estates. At 
other times, knoWing their worth with a particular employer, Papuans with 
experience and skills did not hesitate to ask for more than the 1 0s.  a month 
that by 1 9 10 had become the minimum recognised as 'fair remuneration' by 
RMs witnessing the signing of contracts. Wages of £ 1  1 0s.  a month or more 
were commonly paid to valued boats crew and boss-boys, in some cases 
bringing their total earnings in cash and keep to above a half of what a locally 
1 2 J. F. Horn. [ Diary of) 0Trip from Sydney to Robinson River to inspect property, 1 932'.  
In the possession of Commander J. F. Horn, Sydney, 1975. 
1 3  PAR 1 91 2-13 ,  p. 25; PAR 1 925-26, p. 33.  
14 Robinson Letters, 1 3  Aug. 1 9 1 9. 
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employed white overseer might cost an employer. In January 1 9 1 9  Percy 
Robinson of Ogamobu was forced to increase the monthly wage of Heagi, 
skipper of his recruiting boat, the Varoe, from £7 to £8, because Whittens' 
recruiter Butterworth had offered the Hanuabadan as much as £ 1 0.15  Such 
Papuans earning sixteen times the minimum wage were receiving considerably 
more than skilled Asian artisans and clerks on plantations in the East. The 
NLO and Native Labour Regulations laid down no scale of wages for private 
employers to observe, but 1 0s. a month was the minimum paid to Crown 
servants - so setting an actual standard. In their ninth year of service the one 
or two Papuan clerks working for the government could be paid £8 a month 
and retain their entitlement to rations and a clothing issue.16  By comparison 
many unskilled Australian workers were still earning less than £ 1 6  a month 
in 1 938.17  
The campaign of public opposition to the government throughout 1 9 1 5  had 
been without result and Judge Murray's position remained quite secure where 
Australians were pre-occupied by a far greater conflict further afield. In 1 9 1 6 
there was a lull. In March and April there had been the Lieutenant Governor's 
visit to the British Solomon Islands Protectorate. On his return he asked the 
businessmen of Port Moresby to prepare proposals for discussions 'relating to 
the welfare of the Territory'. Bruce could write in the paper of 1 7 May that 
there was 'no doubt that since the big public meeting held in the Institute 
twelve man ths ago the policy of the Administration has changed for the better 
. . .  now the tension is over, matters which in the past have been used as 
sticks to beat the Administration with, can be discussed in an amicable way 
and adjusted' . 1 8  It was the nearest he was ever to come to a conciliatory 
word, the article elsewhere bearing his unmistakable stamp. At a meeting held 
on 25 May attended by three principal merchants , F. 0. Greenwood of Burns 
Philp, Charles Baldwin, and Robert Whitten, J. C. Smith of the Bank of New 
South Wales , G. A. Loudon (as both principal planter and merchant} , and the 
planters Arthur Jewell of Lolorua and Tom Sefton of Koitaki , quite innocuous 
proposals were prepared for Murray's consideration. Coastal beacons, the 
Sapphire Creek road, Asians as domestic servants, an agricultural expertt 
Nothing related to the demands of 1 9 1 5 for elected representation , trial by 
jury, or policies more 'sympathetic' to those engaged in the. 'industrial 
1 5 Robinson Letters, 27 Jan. 1 9 1 9 .  'Civilised' Papuans, llke Heagi, from villages close to 
Port Moresby, Samarai or Daru could be exempted by the CNA from the repatriation 
conditions of the NLO and repeatedly re-engaged. 
1 6 Laws of the Territory of Papua 1 888- 1 945 , Vol 4, Notices relating to Government 
Employees, Notice of 25 Nov. 1 925, p.34 1 6 .  
1 7 See Appendix A, pp. 3 1 6-8, where in a discussion of recent research into the 
indentured labour system in Papua wages are further considered. See also pp. 20 1 - 2  below. 
16  Papuan Times, 1 7  May 19 1 6. 
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development of the country' was included, except perhaps the suggestion that 
the Papuans be taxed at last.19 
In September, in response to a protest from the Samarai Chamber of 
Commerce, Loudon defended the increase in duty on imported American twist 
tobacco that the government had found it convenient to impose to protect the 
new local 'Bung' twist produced by BNGD.20 The directors in London 
congratulated the general manager on the apparently 'better relations' 
prevailing with the administration.21 For eighteen months the government 
stores were a major purchaser of the company's tobacco grown and 
manufactured at Katea before the 1 9 1 7- 1 8  crop was wiped out by disease. 
With the tree crops planted in the boom years coming into full bearing the 
value of the agricultural exports of the Territory exceeded that of gold for the 
first time in 1 9 1 5 - 1 6 .  It is true that proceeds of gold production had dropped 
from nearly £70,000 in 1 9 1 0 - 1 1 to under £40, 000, but the value of Papuan 
rubber had risen from only £ 1  ,500 to £ 1 4,846 in twelve months. In the 
following year, 1 9 1 6 - 1 7, the value of copra alone, £40, 000, exceeded that of 
gold, and rubber proceeds approached £30,000. By 1 9 1 9-20 copra exports 
would be valued at £ 1 24,000, rubber at £4 1 ,542 and sisal hemp at over 
£ 1 2 , 000.22 Yet the returns were deeply disappointing in terms of outlay, 
costs and expectations. With shipping scarce on account of the war, freight 
charges were increasing, inflation rapidly raising the prices of the imported 
rice, calico and blankets supplied on issue to indentured labourers just as it 
lowered the real value ofreceipts, white salaries and native wages. In 1 9 1 3- 1 4, 
929 vessels had entered and were cleared from Papuan ports with a combined 
displacement of 358,506 tons, some sixty-six of these clearances being for 
'foreign' - mostly Dutch - ships . The figures included coastal shipping but the 
tonnage was very large indeed for two ports the size of Port Moresby and 
Samarai with .1_10 week passing, it seems, without an overseas vessel in one or 
both ports. From 1 9 1 8  until 1 923 no foreign ships at all called, the number 
of vessels cleared falling to eighty-six all told in 1 9 1 9 -20 with a combined 
tonnage of only 59, 1 89 tons.23 And for much of the produce only the 
Australian market was accessible. Southern buyers were greatly advantaged. 
Sisal hemp could not be sold in Sydney for as much as £30 a ton when it was 
fetching £60 in London and more in New York.24 Able to sell all its rubber in 
Australia, Koitaki was alone in being able to pay a dividend of 5d. a share in 
19 Ibid., 2 Aug. 1 9 1 6. 
20 Ibid., 13 Sept. 1 9 1 6. 
2 1  BNOD Letterbooks, Vol. 2,  1 6  Jan. 1 9 1 6, Thompson t o  Loudon. 
22 PAR 1 91 9-20, 77-8. 
23 PAR 1 921-22, 108. 
24 See below p. 232. 
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1 9 1 7.25 But for anyone producing copra and unable to fmd shipping to the 
European markets a return on investment in Papua seemed unlikely for years. 
The general manager since 1 9 1 2 of the Clarke and Whiting properties at 
Kanosia and Fairfax Harbour, Archibald MacAlpine, resigned in 1 9 1 6 .  A 
conscientious, short-tempered, red-haired Scot, 'Archie' had been in Papua 
since 1 908. He now left the country but would return again in 1 9 1 8  as 
plantation inspector for BNGD. Out of necessity or the opportunity presented 
by MacAlpine's departure, Arthur Bloomfield, as public officer for the Clarke 
and Whiting companies, and a principal in the two Kemp Welch River 
ventures and Galley Reach Plantation, established the Moresby Trading and 
Agency Company to manage all these interests. A frequent visitor to Papua 
staying for months at a time, the 'magnificent' Bloomfield remained based in 
Melbourne employing a manager and accountant in Port. The Moresby 
Trading and Agency Co. was perhaps conceived also in the expectation of an 
expansion to follow the war but would be a casualty of the collapse of trade 
in 1 92 1 .  The role it pioneered as a small 'agency house' was taken up in 1 922 
by G. A. Loudon and Co. and subsequently the British New Guinea Trading 
Company, both wholly owned subsidiaries of BNGD that acted as managing 
agents for the plantations of BNGD and Clarke and Whiting from 1 922 until 
1 934 when the parent companies resumed direct control over their estates.  
In 1 9 1 6- 1  7 planters generally were pre-occupied with the change in 
plantation management and routines brought on by the transition from 
'development' to production. Opposition to Murray's administration from the 
editor of the Papuan Times also lost some of its intensity as William Bruce's 
other business interests deteriorated. His indebtedness to BNG Trading, the 
BNGD commercial subsidiary, reached an alarming degree as the company 
had been prepared to allow him extended credit - apparently on account of 
'the business he could bring the company's way'.26 It is perhaps more likely 
that it was for his editorials in the local paper that he was shown particular 
forbearance. But in April 1 9 1  7 on instructions from London the company 
sought to recover £600 out of over £ 1 ,300 he owed in a court action and to 
meet the debt Bruce was forced to transfer to BNGD the proceeds of the sale 
to Houlder Brothers Ltd of his timber licences and of his half share in the 
Manu Manu sawmill enterprise, The Papua Company.27 Shortly afterwards he 
also sold his rubber plantation at Galley Reach, Doa, to BNGD so that he 
could settle other accounts. He could no longer maintain his interest in the 
25 Papuan Courter, 9 Nov. 1 9 1 7. 
26 BNGD Letterbooks, Vol. 2, 24 Feb. 1 9 1 6, Thompson to Loudon. 
27 Ibid. Bruce's debts amounted to £1 , 353,  those of Richard de Moleyns to £73 1 ,  and 
those of Captain Archibald Hunter and his family to £3,353 . Hunter was a BNGD 
shareholder. The action against Bruce was reported in the Papuan Courter, 18 Apr. 1 9 1 7. 
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Papuan Times. Under a changed name, the Papuan Courter, the paper limped 
through the year appealing to readers to buy rather than borrow copies and 
in February 19 18 a company, the Papuan Courier Ltd, was formed to take 
over publication, with G. A. Loudon a substantial shareholder. Bruce 
continued to live on Touaguba hill in Port in increasingly desperate straits. In 
1 9 1 8  year he was forced to pay fines in a case brought by the Collector of 
Customs. In 1 920 his house was burnt down in circumstances where arson 
was suspected.28 
G. A. Loudon might himself have been the author of some of the editorials 
in the Papuan Courter of the next two years as the frustrations of the 
disappointing market in Papuan commodities and the shipping shortages were 
prolonged into the post-war period - confounding the hope that peace would 
bring prosperity, and bringing tensions to the surface again in several court 
actions where the paper seemed to speak exclusively as the voice of BNGD. 
With the failure of its tobacco manufacturing industry the company was no 
longer obliged to tread carefully in its dealings with the government. While 
Murray could not be blamed for a tobacco disease - he responded with the 
appointment of J. T. Zimmer as an 'agricultural expert' in 1918  - somehow his 
administration could still seem responsible for the general malaise. It just did 
not appear to have tried hard enough to secure for the planters the conditions 
that would assure them profits. 
Indeed, from the planters' point of view, the Lieutenant Governor now 
appeared to be taking a new direction in development in which they had no 
part at all. In 1 9 1 8, perhaps disappointed at the progress of settler based 
agriculture and affected by planter hostility, but certainly becoming aware of 
the limited value of plantation work experience for the Papuans, Murray 
prepared two measures to stimulate cash crop production in the villages. In 
January 19 19  the Native Twces Ordinance came into operation. It levied a tax 
of 10s. a year on indentured labourers and £1  (20s. ) a year on 'natives other 
than native labourers' in areas to be declared tax districts. The latter could, 
however, remit their tax in the form of a given amount of produce or through 
labour on 'Native Plantations' which were to be established in many places 
under a separate ordinance. The proceeds of the tax on wages and the sale of 
tax in kind, together with approximately a half of the value of the production 
of the native plantations reserved as the government's share, were to be placed 
in a Native Education Fund. 
This was a carefully planned attempt to encourage Papuans to participate 
in production on their own behalf and at the same time contribute towards 
aa Bruce died and was burled at Sapphire Creek on 30 May 1924. Mrs Bruce had only 
recently returned from hospital 1n Port recovering from blackwater fever. After her departure 
for Australia the Executive Council agreed to wrlte off her hospital bills. 
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the costs of their 'elevation'.29 But by making it appear that villagers were 
being taxed more than indentured labourers while allowing them to pay in 
kind, it seemed to planters that the new taxation scheme was another of 
Murray's tricks and likely to prove prejudicial to recruitment. If plantation 
agriculture was not flourishing, should not the tax have been in cash alone 
to encourage indenture rather than to discourage it? The Lieutenant Governor 
admitted that the object of the ordinance was not to increase recruitment. He 
29 NAPNG & CRS G 1 28, Item 8, 1 1  June 1 920. The government's Native Plantations 
scheme never fulfilled the sanguine hopes held out for it at the outset. While for many years 
villagers had been at times compelled to plant coconut palms and other useful trees under 
the Native Regulations there was also the hint of compulsion in the way RMs put pressure 
on communities to plant the new Native Plantations. These were to be 'jointly-owned' by 
villagers and the government. Like the planters, villagers were disappointed by the low 
returns they obtained - returns for them even further reduced after the government's 50% 
share was taken out of the proceeds of sale. Getting villagers to co-operate was 'up-hill 
work' , Murray noted in the 1 926-27 Annual Report (p. 10) where it was calculated that the 
total area of commercial crops cultivated by villagers - under both the Native Regulations and 
the Native Plantation Ordinance - had reached 7 ,OOO acres. But by 1 932-33, a year when 
it might very well have been 'difficult to keep the natives interested in copra' , only sixty-seven 
tons with a return of £67 1 was produced under the Native Plantations scheme for the whole 
Territory (PAR 1 932-33, p. 15). In the following year villagers of the South Eastern Division, 
the main producers. received only £ 1 76 .  Even Papuan grown coffee did better in 1 933-34 
with 55 ,552 pounds produced in villages of the Northern Division being sold for £ 1 ,54 1 ,  the 
Papuans' share being £762 (PAR 1 933-34, 29). The substitution of locally grown rice for 
imported rice was also promoted after 1920. Yet rice cultivation in the Mekeo under the 
guidance of the Catholic Mission remained 'desultory' when the effort required to produce 
ninety tons of paddy that was reduced to fifty-seven tons of milled rice brought only £389 in 
1 932-33 to a community probably expecting much more. Papuans were not starving. Once 
their minimum needs in trade goods were met and short of a "miraculous' transformation in 
the terms of trade they were not prepared to work very much harder for little further reward. 
Indeed, it might reasonably have seemed to many that only an actual miracle could now 
redress the inequities of their predicament vis-a-vis the whites. In the end it ls likely that the 
cash-in-hand return from the sale of copra to the white traders was greater than sale 
through the government's scheme. While the quantity of copra bought by the traders could 
not be measured, it was estimated in 1 938-39 - a year it ls true in which there had been a 
marked revival tn village production - to be between 2,500 and 3,000 tons. This was an 
amount which, if nearly correct, might have returned as much as £25,000 to the traders and 
their village suppliers, a sum certainly much higher than the proceeds of the Native 
Plantations scheme (PAR 1 938-39, 28, for the estimated tonnage). The traders could cheat, 
of course. In Mar. 1924 A.P. Lyons noted that Isadore Ede was paying only £4 a ton to the 
Laughlin Islanders for copra then fetching £ 1 8  in Samarat (A. P. Lyons, Journals (MSS), 22 
Mar. 1924). In June he thought the Mahonys too were not paying a fair price in the Calvados 
Chain (ibid, 6 June 1924). It ls possible that as prices had only recently risen from those of 
the depression of 1 92 1 -22 these traders were but seizing a temporary advantage where 
villagers had become accustomed to a low return. It is possible, even probable, that the 
quality of the sun-dried copra being offered was very low. If its exposure could be 
embarassing unequal trading was in any case hardly illegal. The Edes and the Mahonys, 
seldom scrutinised and without nearby competitors, were particularly well placed to drive the 
hardest of bargains. 
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thought its effects would be quite neutral and pointed to a large increase in 
the labour available in the year immediately following the introduction of the 
tax.30 In the meantime, in 1 9 1 8, there had been a further major confrontation 
with BNGD over the treatment of Papuan workers by employees of the 
company on ltikinumu. 
30 Indeed in Oct. 1920 A. P. Lyons, the then RM at Daru, was suggesting to villagers who 
possessed llttle land suitable for development as "Native Plantations', and who could not 
therefore find the means to pay the new tax, that in order to do so they seek work With 
Freshwater at Mad1r1 or With Cowling at Mlbu, or sell their copra and sago to the planters. 
A. P. Lyons, Journals (MSS), 14  Oct. 1920. 
CHAPTER 1 2  
Crisis at lt ikinumu 
ON 1 0  MAY 1 9 1 8  twenty eight labourers from BNGD's ltikinumu estate who 
had left their work and walked thirty miles to Port Moresby were prosecuted 
by the company for desertion. The Native Affairs Department provided a 
defence for the labourers on the grounds that they had had reasonable cause 
to refuse to work. Between the desertion and the hearing, Stanley Greenland, 
one of the three officers of the Department, made an inspection of the estate, 
the first in nearly two years. His report set out a long list of breaches of the 
labour code he found had occurred in the interim. These included failure to 
supply food from the plantation stores in the prescribed way, overworking 
labourers, and illicitly imposing Sunday work on rubber tappers.  Two 
plantation assistants, William Voysey and John Simpson-King, were 
interviewed and reported as saying that the manager, Richard Jensen, and 
another assistant, Percy Nunn, had continually beaten labourers. Voysey said 
he had remonstrated with Jensen whose response had been that 'I will not 
allow a bloody nigger to get the best of me'. 1  Jensen had barely escaped 
conviction on a charge of grievous bodily harm a few months earlier when he 
had thrown a lamp at a labourer causing the loss of an eye. What particularly 
disturbed Greenland now was the failure of the management to provide proper 
eating utensils as required under the NLO Regulations.  Such neglect 
suggested not only disregard for the law but contempt for the labourers on the 
part of the management. 
At the hearing the company's complaint was dismissed on 'reasonable 
cause' for desertion being shown. Native Affairs immediately made a counter 
claim for cancellation of the contracts of the twenty-eight. Jensen was obliged 
to give his consent to the terminations as the employer's agent. The Executive 
Council met and considering Greenland's report ordered that no labour was 
to be hired or transfered to Jensen or Nunn again. The company was called 
upon to show cause why the remaining 1 25 labourers on Itikinumu should 
not also have their contracts cancelled.2 
G.  A. Loudon protested to Murray that BNGD was being 'punished' for 
what had been the 'unauthorised' behaviour of an employee whose 
CRS Al 1 8 /  1 2377, Greenland's report of 7 Jan. 1 9 18.  
Ibid. . 
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misconduct should first have been reported to the company so that an 
attempt to remedy the situation could have been made before the matter 
reached a court. No notice had been given BNGD, as the employer, of Native 
Affairs' intention to apply for cancellation of the contracts of the twenty-eight, 
as required under the NLO, and Jensen, Loudon maintained, had no authority 
to consent. He quoted precedents where a notice of intention to cancel 
contracts had been given and suggested that the company had a claim on the 
government for the loss of labour it had suffered. 3 
Murray replied in the third person that if there was evidence that the 1 25 
labourers would in future be treated fairly then perhaps their contracts might 
not be cancelled. He added that the 'Lieutenant Governor does not intend to 
interfere [with the Native Affairs action] but the Company's bona fides will be 
revealed if Jensen and Nunn are retained in employ or if the 28 labourers 
whose contracts have already been cancelled are not paid their wages without 
further delay'. 4 
With the possibility that ltikinumu would be left entirely bereft of labour 
as well as of management, Loudon was forced to take control over the estate 
himself, where an outbreak of 'Pink' disease had occurred to complicate 
matters.5 He carried out his own enquiries into labourers' complaints and 
concluded that Jensen's principal 'error' had been to require workers to dig 
sweet potatoes for their evening meal after they had finished work at 2 pm 
instead of issuing the food from the plantation stores. Loudon found the 
desertions had been incited by Okari of Kokoda, a man who had been 
convicted of desertion previously. George Wiseman, the visiting expert from 
Malaya, accompanied the general manager to ltikinumu and observed that an 
offence similar to Jensen's in the FMS would have brought the manager a fine 
of $ 1 00, or between £ 1 1 and £12 ,  whereas BNGD stood to lose over £ 1 ,000.6 
The termination of the contracts of labourers essential to · the continued 
running of a distant estate because subordinate managers or assistants there 
had breached the labour code or assaulted labourers was a vexing problem for 
a general manager located in Port Moresby. And in asking for advanced notice 
that grounds existed for prosecutions which might be avoided if action was 
quickly taken, Loudon was not asking for consideration that the government 
did not extend to others. Indeed, in defence of the necessity to proceed with 
serious charges from time to time, Murray could show later that warnings 
3 
4 
5 
e 
NAPNG & CRS Serles G/ 1 28, Item 6, Loudon to Murray, 28 May 1918. 
NAPNO & CRS Serles G/ 1 28, Item 6, Murray to Loudon, 29 May 1 918. 
Pink disease: Cortlclum Salmonlcolor - a fungal disease of rubber. 
CRS Al,  Item 18/ 1 2377, Submlsslon by Loudon to Hunt, 22 July 1 9 18. 
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were much more frequent than prosecutions .7 In 1 920 when an inspector 
reported unfavourably on the labourers' quarters on Kemp Welch River 
Plantation Murray sent a telegram to Arthur Bloomfield in Melbourne 
forewarning him and promising that his officers would not take action if 
Bloomfield would arrange to 'clean things up' . Bloomfield and Murray were on 
good terms, but was Loudon asking for more than an opportunity to 'clean 
things up' in 1 9 1 8? 
At a second hearing in June no complaints made on behalf of the 1 25 
remaining labourers on Itikinumu were sustained and Native Affairs' 
application for the termination of their contracts was dropped. There is no 
evidence that Murray interfered to prevent the matter getting out of hand but 
the failure to find that these workers had also been neglected threw doubt 
upon the previous decision to cancel the contracts of the twenty-eight. And so 
the company's lawyer, R. D. Bertie, advanced in a claim for compensation.8 
In a letter to the Government Secretary he pointed out the inconsistency in 
the findings and contended that the Lieutenant Governor's remark about the 
company's bonafldes constituted a threat. Bertie also claimed that officials 
had since placed obstacles in the path of BNGD as it sought to re-engage the 
twenty-eight for work on another of its plantations - despite an assurance 
given by Murray that 'if the 28 discharged labourers want to work at Waigani -
every facility will be given them to "sign on"' .9 
In a letter to Murray, Loudon proposed that since his company like the 
government had its inspectors of plantations, these employees and officials 
might together share the responsibility for working out the difficulties that 
arose over labour from time to time. He did not, he said, object to the 
summary punishment of employees who failed to carry out their duties under 
the NLO, but suggested that as the government also found difficulty in finding 
suitable white staff, 'some sympathetic consideration' might be extended to 
private employers in such circumstances. 1 0  
Loudon was the complete businessman. His proposal was for a relationship 
between government and private employers based upon mutual interests and 
private understandings like that which obtained between businesses. No 
suggestion could have been made more calculated to receive a rebuff from this 
Lieutenant Governor, trained in the law, who could only regard such a 
relationship, were it to come about, as corrupt, and Loudon's proposal as an 
invitation to set the law aside. And the imputation that government officers 
See below pp. 277-8. For the warning to Bloomfield: NAPNG & CRS G 1 28, Item 8,  
Murray to Bloomfield, 1 8  May 1920. 
8 CRS A l  Item 1 8 /  1 2377, with Loudon's submission to Hunt, 22 July 1 9 1 8. 
Ibid. 
1 0  NAPNG & CRS Series Gl 28, Item 6, Loudon to Murray, 7 June 1 9 18 .  
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might be of doubtful integrity, or less than competent, was one - whatever the 
truth in it - Hubert Murray could hardly entertain as ground for co-operation. 
There is some evidence the BNGD did discipline its managers and 
assistants who were in breach of the NLO or who were known to have 
committed offences that risked prosecution under the Criminal Code - just as 
the company frequently sacked employees for other kinds of incompetence. 
Michael Burgess, an assistant who would make allegations in 1 92 1  about 
maltreatment of labour on ltikinumu, Jawarere and Baubaugutna, noted in 
his deposition that the manager at Baubauguina, Meredith, had dismissed an 
assistant for assaulting labourers. Meredith was himself subsequently 
dismissed for similar behaviour on the basis of a complaint Burgess had 
written to Loudon. 1 1  It is possible that these instances coming at the end of 
the 'development' period may prove little about the proper supervision of white 
employees in the previous decade and more about the extent to which the 
company was lately becoming careful. It is equally possible that Loudon could 
have done little better over the years than he claimed to have done in the 
supervision of his managers gtven the quality of white employees available. 
Bertram Bramell, writing in the 19 15-16 Annual Report, conceded that it was 
'possibly the inexperience of plantation managers and overseers with Papuans' 
that had 'a great deal to do with complaints and desertions'. 12 In a letter to 
the Papuan Courter in December 1 9 1 8, Prosper Charpentier, the Woodlark 
planter, wrote that only the larger companies had labour problems because 
they were forced to employ 'inexperienced and irresponsible young overseers 
and assistants' who competed with each other. 13 But even single plantation 
enterprises employing assistants could have difficulty. The letters of Percy 
Robinson of Ogamobu in the period 19 1 8- 1924 suggest that competent and 
sober white overseers were very difficult to obtain in Papua .. The record of 
convictions of Europeans working on plantations is examined further in 
Chapter 19 .  
Murray was later to ridicule the suggestion that BNGD should have a 
special immunity from accountability for the conduct of its employees.14 If 
Jensen and Nunn were held directly responsible for their failure to observe the 
requirements of the NLO on the estate in their charge, and could as a 
consequence have their right to control Papuan labour curtailed, the 
company, like any other employer, had to accept the further consequences 
brought about because ofits failure to adequately supervise its agents. Unless 
it was to be imputed that the company everywhere treated its labourers badly 
1 1  Ibid. See note 10, p .  1 8 1  below. 
13 PAR 1 916-1 7, 27. 
13 Papuan Courter, 6 Dec. 1 9 1 8. 
14 CRS Al 1 8 /  1 2377, Murray to Hunt. See also below p. 188. 
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and had attempted to 'economise' in their maintenance, then the law could 
take no other course. Conditions on other BNGD estates in 1 9 1 8  were not 
called into question and in September in a letter to Loudon, and almost 
certainly to make a point, Murray complimented the company on labour 
relations at Waigani.15 Loudon responded that he had always found labour 
contented on his own visits to the plantations in the 'east' . 16 Without 
attempting to defend the conduct of Bernesconi in 1 9 1 3 or Jensen and Nunn 
in 1 9 1 8  it is quite possible to conceive that at least some of the labour 
discontent and desertions in the Central Division originated in restlessness 
among Papuan recruits unhappy at having to work on a plantation away from 
the sea. On the Sogeri plateau where ltikinumu is situated, where nights 
could be cold and the work of rubber tapping exacting and boring, Papuans 
were also denied the excitement of ports and ships to which young men looked 
forward as a major attraction in indentured service. As a consequence 'control' 
might indeed have been more difficult. Archie MacAlpine, BNGD plantation 
inspector in 1 920, noted in a report submitted to Native Affairs, dealing with 
yet another crisis at ltikinumu, that the Sogeri district was unpopular with 
labourers. 17  The same may have been true to some extent of Baubauguina 
and Rorona, plantations which, while much closer to the sea, were not on the 
beach. Bernesconi had pleaded as much in mitigation of his conduct at 
Baubauguina in 1 9 1 4. J. T. O'Malley, RM in the Central Division in 1 9 1 2, 
suggested that Raymond Dubois might well be having difficulty in obtaining 
labour at Bomana because 'natives accustomed to the sea hate to work on a 
plantation inland'. 18 
Correspondence continued over the Jensen and Nunn affair for the 
remainder of 1 9 1 8 with Murray obtaining further ammunition from a letter 
sent to him by Jensen in July asking that the ban denying him the right to 
control Papuan employees be lifted. He had, Jensen wrote, been working 
labour in Papua for more than ten years without previous convictions and 
attributed his difficulties at ltikinumu to pressures from 'head office' in Port 
Moresby to 'economise' . 19 In a letter to Atlee Hunt, Murray made telling 
comparisons between the claims of Jensen and Loudon without conceding 
anything to either. Indeed that Jensen had not previously been convicted of 
assaults may have been chiefly due to want of witnesses as he was by this 
time suspected on good grounds of being a particularly violent man. His plea 
1 15  NAPNG & CRS Serles 01 28, Item 6, Murray t o  Loudon, 17  Sept. 1 9 18.  
1 6  Ibid. , Loudon to Murray, 1 8  Sept. 1 9 18. 
1 7  CRS Al 18/ 12377 MacAlpine's report on conditions at ltlkinumu, Sept. 1 920. 
18 CRS Al 1 7593, 1 3 / 7 1 .  
1 9  CRS A l  18/ 1 2377. A copy ls i n  Murray's report to Hunt. Jensen's letter was dated 
29 July but Murray does not appear to have replied until 9 Nov. 
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that he had been subject to pressure from Loudon might have had some 
substance but a hint that he had attempted to 'blacken the name of the 
company' having leaked out, Loudon wrote in October to the Government 
Secretary, Herbert Champion, listing items from his circulars directed to the 
managers of BNGD plantations since June 1 9 1 5  in which he had stipulated 
actions to be taken to ensure compliance with the food requirements under 
the NLO Regulations.20 Also writing to Atlee Hunt, Loudon set out the 
company's version of events from the beginning, adding intimately the 
suggestion that as 'the Minister and yourself are Chairman and Director of 
Papua Limited for the Commonwealth and Murray is the general manager; 
don't you think it is time you had a board meeting?'21 
To further embitter relations between the government and the largest 
company in Papua, hard on the heels of the crisis at Itikinumu came the 
destruction in January 1 9 1 9  of the Merrie England, the Lieutenant Governor's 
steam yacht used for his tours of inspection. BNGD was held liable as an 
employee, killed in the disaster, had caused an explosion while carrying out 
repairs. On the principle of respondeat superior the government proceeded to 
recover £ 1 1 ,000 from the company.22 
By 1 9 1 9  shareholder capital in BNGD was exhausted with over £500,000 
having been outlayed on its plantations and other enterprises. Barely 1 2,500 
of its holdings of 70,000 acres had in the end been developed. The company 
was forced to make the first of several debenture issues to meet the 
continuing drain on resources. Already known locally in jest as the 'bung 
company' after its initials and its unfortunately named 'Bung' twist tobacco, 
BNGD suffered from having at the outset undertaken to develop in Papua too 
many properties too widely distributed. The company's large experiments with 
sisal, tobacco and cotton - considered in a later chapter - proved expensive 
failures. As the largest private employer it is very likely that it suffered most, 
despite G. A. Loudon's drive and resourcefulness, from the difficulties 
increased by the war in obtaining competent subordinate staff. 
Murray and his officers would look back on the whole period until 1 922 as 
the pioneering or development phase in Papua, one where they had worked 
to educate an assertive and insensitive settler community, 'indifferent to 
native suffering', in its responsibilities towards the Papuans. It is surely 
predictable in retrospect that the white employees of companies developing 
plantation properties in those years, coming as most did quite inexperienced 
in tropical agriculture and bringing with them all the confident racial 
20 Ibid., Loudon to Champion, 1 Oct. 19 18. 
21 Ibid., Loudon to Hunt, 2 Oct. 1 9 1 8. 
22 This was the second vessel of the name. An earlier Merrie England was wrecked ln 
1 9 12.  
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assumptions of the imperial age, would indeed have been far more pre­
occupied with their employers' instructions and the problems of estate 
development than with the care of their 'savage' workers beyond the minimum 
requirements the law could enforce or the market in labour could demand. It 
was in the very nature of capitalist enterprise that this should be so. Only 
industrial unionism and a century of political struggle had secured even for 
'civilised' workers some measure of protection against the power of landed 
proprietors and factory owners and their agents 'indifferent to the suffering' 
of tenants and employees. If, as it was, the provisioning and organisation of 
Papuan labourers required much time and attention, the costs of labour had 
to be contained. In the eight years before full production of perennial tree 
crops commenced shareholder's capital represented in most cases the whole 
of 'income' and the pressures upon and from directors and general managers 
to conserve funds were considerable, the costs of plantation development in 
Papua generally, it appears, greatly exceeding the estimates.23 
Increasingly, as government succeeded government in Melbourne, it 
became Murray himself who embodied the continuity of Australian policy in 
Papua as he was compelled to explain the complexities of colonial 
administration to each new minister. His reputation had begun to bring credit 
to Australia in the management of its dependency. Yet if politicians publicly 
praised the Lieutenant Governor, the failure of Papua to prosper led some 
privately at least to doubt the practicality of his uncompromising line if it were 
to be applied in the government of another territory. 
For in the meantime, with the seizure by Australian forces in September 
1 9 1 4  of German New Guinea and the subsequent determination of the Hughes 
ministry that the Commonwealth should secure the occupied territory as a 
prize of war in any peace settlement, another possible arena for Australian 
enterprise in tropical agriculture was opening up - one which would soon 
overshadow Papua as an object of national interest. Its plantation sector by 
1 920 three times the size of Papua's,  its administration before the war 
underwritten by much larger subsidies from the former imperial power and 
undertaken by a government believed to have been far less ethically fastidious 
than Papua's, German New Guinea seemed to provide an opportunity for 
23 Expenditure on development of BNGD estates in the first nine months of 19 13  had 
amounted to £36,000 when the estimates had projected expenditure of £22,000. In the 
following year funds remitted to Port Moresby by the London office were averaging £5,000 
a month (or £60,000 a year). At the same time, while the proceeds of the company's trading 
and sale of its produce had been estimated at £ 1 6 ,940 for 19 13,  only £7,946 was realised. 
(BNGD Letterbooks, 1 4  May and 26 June 1 9 1 4, S. L. Thompson to Lewis Cowley). In 1 9 1 8  
with the plantations in production the sum of £ 14,000 had still t o  b e  remitted t o  Papua for 
the first half year when £5,537 had been all that had been estimated as needed for the whole 
year (ibid . ,  June 1 9 18). 
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Australia to reap a bountiful harvest where it had not sown. After 1 920 when 
the mandate to govern, and profit from, northeast New Guinea was indeed 
awarded to Australia by the League of Nations, Papua would always seem the 
lesser Territory. 
In August 1 9 19  Judge Murray was appointed chairman of a Royal 
Commission to consider the future of the former German colony, the other 
members being W. H. Lucas of Bums Philp and Atlee Hunt. Murray found 
himself in the minority, his recommendations about the constitution and 
development of the new acquisition rejected, he supposed, because of the 
humanitarian concern for native welfare uppermost in his administration of 
Papua, and he was quickly disabused of any idea that he might have held that 
he should head a combined administration.24 In the years ahead, if they 
travelled to and from Sydney or Soerabaya on a Bums Philp or KPM boat, 
Papuan planters met with the new settlers who had succeeded the 
expropriated Germans in the Mandated Territory, but no strong connection 
was established generally between planters in the two Australian island 
Territories. There developed some rivalry between their respective private 
settlers as between the two administrative services, 'Papuans' asserting their 
primacy as residents of the senior possession and in later years making a 
claim to a share in Murray's 'humane' approach among the 'gentle' Papuans, 
the New Guinea 'Territorians' displaying their greater collective power and 
hardheadedness in a 'wilder' country. The minimum wage for indentured 
labourers in the Mandated Territory remained 5s. a month, half the Papuan 
rate, and the administration - perhaps because it continued to be in the 
hands of former military officers, or perhaps as many thought, because of a 
pattern set in the German period - appeared less sensitive in its dealings with 
the native people than the Government of Papua. In 192 1 a few Papuan 
settlers and government officers were attracted to New Guinea by new 
opportunities and a few others would move there in the thirties drawn by the 
gold discoveries at Wau. 
24 The Royal Commission into Late German New Guinea and the implied rejection of 
Papuan practice in developing policies for the Mandated Territory are discussed in C. D. 
Rowley's The Australians Ln German New Gulnea (Melbourne 1 958). The struggle to secure 
German New Guinea for Australia is considered in Peter Spartalls's The dtplomatlc battles of 
Bllly Hughes (Sydney 1 983). J. H. P. Murray was in favour of a united administration in 1 9 1 9  
but twenty years later, he, together with most Papuan settlers, would b e  very opposed to 
amalgamation. 
CHAPTE R 1 3  
Bringing matters to a head 
AT A MEETING of the revived Planters' Association in February 1 9 1 9 ,  held 
while Judge Murray was in Australia, members considered the Native 
Labour Ordinance and ways in which it might be modified to better suit the 
needs of planters. An attempt was made to be constructive within the 
existing political and economic boundaries ,  and H. W. Champion, in 
telegramming the recommendations of the meeting on to Murray noted that 
they were 'couched in very courteous terms' . 1  Like the businessmen's 
group which had included Loudon, Sefton and Jewell that Murray had 
asked to make proposals for improvements for the 'welfare of the Territory' 
in May 1 9 1 6 ,  so with this meeting of planters in 1 9 1 9 - once they sat down 
to work out and agree upon practical action much the same people who 
wanted Murray's removal could betray a moderation or, at least a sense of 
political reality, hardly hinted at in the rhetoric of the public meetings and 
the Papuan Courier. They now agreed that very little amendment in the law 
could, in fact, be justified. The principal difficulties planters faced were in 
the administration of the ordinance . Large discretionary powers had been 
given to young and inexperienced officials who felt bound to carry out the 
letter rather than the spirit of the law. In cases of illegal recruiting 
involving a government officer, the responsibility, the planters suggested, 
lay with the government to recover for an innocent employer any losses he 
might have suffered. RMs should have the power only to recommend the 
cancellation of contracts where white employees were at fault; the decision 
in such matters, they proposed, should be reserved to the Executive 
Council. Or, if this was impractical, employers should have the right of 
appeal against the ruling of an RM. Women should be permitted to 'sign on' 
with their husbands, and though this was conceded to be to the employer's 
advantage, it was also, the planters thought, in the 'native' interest. Wages 
should only be payable from the commencement of work, and labourers 
should be allowed to agree, if destined for a rubber estate, to work by 
rotation on Sundays, as on any other day, with a compensatory payment 
NAPNG & CRS 0 1 28, Item 6, Champion to Murray, 1 0  Feb. 1 9 19 .  Also in CRS A l  
1 9 / 10372 .  
Bringing matters to a head 1 6 1  
offered in encouragement. Labourers should be allowed during the period 
of service advances of up to a sixth of the wages due. 
Here was nothing very new. Planters were appealing for leniency in the 
application of the law, to have some restraint placed on the summary 
jurisdiction of RMs and inspectors, and perhaps to be gtven opportunities 
from time to time 'to clean things up'. They wanted the indenture of women 
and unrestricted Sunday tapping on the rubber estates. These were 
proposals, the Association told Champion, 'from the practical point of 
vtew'2 but they suggest that, whatever planters might say, it was not the 
NLO that was the chief cause of their difficulties. Five hours of tapping on 
Sundays - provided the tappers were not Christians - had already been 
conceded and the government was soon to allow the payment of advances 
on wages just as the Association recommended. The indenture of women in 
agriculture was a lost cause. Planters, it seems, were clutcht.rig at straws. 
With the dearth of shipping by May 1 9 1 9 there was scarcely any rice left 
in the stores of either of the towns for the plantations dependent on 
imported food, and by August the Papuan Courier could declare that there 
was a 'famine' in Port Moresby. No overseas vessels at all called between 
the end of August and 1 3  October. Percy Robinson of Ogamobu recorded 
that 
The native situation is extremely serious on most Plantations and Industries 
where native food is not grown. It does not worry us but it is no joke for most of 
them with a large labour force depending on them for food and no food 
obtainable. Of course the stores are "out" of everything you want & altogether the 
arrival of the 'Suva' is considered with more interest as to what she is carrying 
than [is] the visit of Lord Jellicoe. 
Staying at Koitaki for a few days he noted that the Seftons could eat 
'real butter, bread, fresh beef and other things we haven't seen in Port for 
many weary weeks'.3 By Christmas the stores were emptied and the 
apparent inability of the government to do anything about the situation 
stood out in bold relief. In July when it had seemed possible that the 
Commonwealth Income Tax might be applied in Papua the question of the 
franchise was once more raised and the newspaper began a campaign 
under the slogan of 'no representation: no taxation'.4 Editorials and 
leaders appearing in the remainder of the year - some at least, it is likely, 
written by G. A. Loudon, possibly others by R. D. Bertie, the recently 
Ibid. The five hours of Sunday tapping had been permitted since 1 9 15 (Papua. 
Government Gazette, 4 Aug. 1 9 15, CRS Al 19 / 10372). 
3 Robinson Letters, 28 July, 1 1  Aug. 1 9 19.  
4 Papuan Court.er, editorials 1 1  Apr. and 22 Aug. 19 19.  The paper adopted the motto 
on 18 July. In his letter of 30 Jan. 1 920, Percy Robinson wrote to say that he had written 
a "leader' for the paper, his ·second' contribution. 
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arrived lawyer in Port, and at least one by Percy Robinson of Ogamobu -
were increasingly hostile to the government. 
The shipping shortage introduced another actor onto the Papuan stage 
in 1 9 1 9 .  Algernon Sydney Fitch, a master mariner who had spent eight 
years with the Hooghly Pilot Service at Calcutta and time since as a settler 
in Tasmania, now brought a tramp steamer, the Queenscllffe, to the 
Papuan coastal trade. Captain Fitch became a successful merchant in Port 
and his Steamships Trading Company by the late thirties would be second 
only to BNGD as an owner of plantations.5 In 1 9 1 9  he had quickly decided 
that the government of Papua was in the hands of a recluse unsympathetic 
to business .  6 
In the new year the Papuan Courier called for a mass public meeting to 
press for electoral representation and on 1 3  January 1 920 a new Citizens' 
Association was formed with Captain Fitch in the chair.7 In February with 
a continuing strike of marine engineers in Australia food remained very 
scarce in Port and the new Association used the recently established radio 
telegraph link with Melbourne to ask Murray, then on leave, to secure a 
relief steamer. A second public meeting held on 1 5  March demanded 
Murray's removal and the appointment of Staniforth Smith in his place as 
a man who could command the confidence of the white settlers. The 
occasion of the meeting was the publication of a report written by Judge 
Murray in response to an article in a Japanese newspaper critical of 
'British' rule in Papua. Rinzo Gond, a journalist, had suggested that Papua 
had fallen behind German New Guinea because of the failure of the 
administrations of British New Guinea and Papua to give sufficient 
encouragement to white settlement and their prohibition on the 
importation of coloured labour.8 In his report the Lieutenant Governor 
conceded that Europeans were less efficient in the tropics than they were 
in temperate countries and that Papua could indeed be developed more 
rapidly with cheap labour from Asia, 'but that from motives of patriotism 
and self-protection we preferred to do without such labour'.9 At the 
Steamships Trading Company Ltd was formed in 1 924 taking over the assets of 
Captain Fitch's original company, Steamships Pty Ltd. 
6 In a letter published in the Sydney Morning Herald of 1 4  Apr. 1 920 Captain Fitch 
accused Murray of according Customs concessions to the Catholic Mission at Yule Island. 
He claimed that the Lieutenant Governor was 'inaccessible to those outside the official 
circle'. 
Papuan Courter, 1 6  Jan. 1920. 
8 CPP 191 7-1 918-1919, Vol. 6, p .  1 623, Report by . . .  the Lieut. Governor of 
Papua . . .  on an article 'Three Power Rule In New Guinea', by Mr Rinzo Gond. The chairman 
at the meeting of 1 5  Mar. was W. C. Bruce. 
9 NAPNG & CRS G l 28,  Item 8, Murray to the Public Service Association, 1 7  Mar. 
1 920. 
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meeting the twist his remarks had taken about the capacities of the white 
settlers was easily exploited to attack the author - though Murray, probably 
correctly, was to suggest in a letter to the Minister that few attending could 
have read either his report or Gond's article. He attempted to persuade the 
Samarai Chamber of Commerce not to endorse the Port Moresby 
resolutions but failed. The agitation he attributed directly to the old 
antipathy of the former government officers, Bruce and Jewell, and to the 
'packing' of the meeting by BNGD. The officers of the company, he 
suggested in a letter sent to the Papuan Agent in Sydney, J. T. Bensted, 
were 'particularly bitter against the government now for they appear to be 
losing their case [over the destruction of the Merrie England] and will 
probably have to pay heavy damages'. He thought that 'in addition to 
employees they probably induced their customers to vote for the resolution 
especially those who were in their debt' . He asked Bensted to see that a 
correct report containing these charges appeared in the Australian press 
with the comment that 'the proper view to take is that the division is a 
triumph for the Government for our native policy naturally makes us many 
enemies and it is a matter of surprise that the majority was not very much 
larger•. IO 
There was some casuistry here and the mark of the lawyer. The whole 
settler community was experiencing the consequences of the decline in 
trade and shipping, and BNGD, if its employees might have been obliged to 
take part in the protest, had no need to apply direct pressure upon its 
customers to join them. Stung by Murray's quick resort to print, Loudon 
retorted that it had not been BNGD but the government that had attempted 
to 'pack' the meeting, that those who had opposed the resolutions had 
comprised only the officials present, and that they had failed to avert 
defeat. I I Murray was accused in the Papuan Courter of dragging in the 
'native labour bogey' to mask his unpopularity and Loudon telegrammed 
the Prime Minister, W. M. Hughes, to deny that Murray's difficulties with 
the settlers had anything to do with native labour. I2 
While the Lieutenant Governor sought and obtained expressions of 
confidence in his administration from missionaty and humanitarian groups 
in Australia, Bensted reported that BNGD had sent one of its employees 
'south' to stir up opposition.I3 This was Charles Jackson, the company's 
10 NAPNO & CRS 01 28, Item 8, Murray to Bensted for distribution, 1 6  Mar. 1920. 
The reserved judgement of the court in the Merrt.e Engl.and case was handed down on 24 
Mar. with the government being awarded £ 1 1 ,0 1 6  damages. An appeal in the High Court 
was dismissed in Aug. with damages reduced with the government's consent by £400. 
1 1  Papuan Courier, 3 0  Apr., 7 May 1920. 
1 2  NAPNO & CRS 0126,  Item 8. Bensted reports to Murray, 1 2  May 1920. 
13 Ibid. 
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labour inspector and the secretary of the Planters' Association. Murray 
wrote to the Minister, alerting him to a previous despatch that showed 
Jackson had once been employed as a patrol officer and permitted to resign 
under a cloud. 14  There is little doubt that Murray now felt that to 
distinguish between the Association and the company that employed 
Jackson was quite unnecessary. The man was clearly G. A. Loudon's agent. 
Reflecting later on what had been 'a rotten time'15, Murray wrote to Atlee 
Hunt that since the Papuan Courier had fomented much of the discontent 
and the handbills advertising the protest meeting had emanated from its 
press and offices, then Loudon and Bertie , BNGD's solicitor, who between 
them owned more than half of the shares in the newspaper, were directly 
responsible for all the agitation that led to the meeting and which followed 
it. 16  
Samuel Thompson, the London secretary of BNGD, visited Papua for the 
first time in May. While in Port Moresby he was received by Murray, their 
exchange, it seems, characterised more by correct pleasantries than 
frankness. Before leaving in June, he wrote to the Lieutenant Governor 
expressing anxiety about the decline in the numbers of Papuans willing to 
enter agreements and the evident unwillingness of the government to 
encourage 'signing on'. In reply Murray affirmed that there had been a 
dropping off in recruitment but could not agree that the responsibility was 
the government's, and in a telegram sent to Thompson in Sydney he invited 
the secretary's attention to an article by Charles Jackson in the Sydney 
Morning Herald attacking the administration over the ltikinumu affair. 
'Believing as he does the sincerity of the desire you expressed to him 
recently of avoiding all causes of difference with [the] Government', he 
pressed his point home, [the Lieutenant Governor] 'cannot think that [you] 
will allow these attacks to continue' . 1 7  
1 4  CRS A l  2 0 /  13556, Murray to Minister, 7 June 1 920. 
1 5  Francis West, Hubert Murray: The Australian Pro-Consul (Melbourne 1 968), 1 93,  
Murray to Gilbert Murray, 1 4  Dec. 1 920. 
1 6  NAPNG & CRS 069, Item 23 / 1 , Murray to Poynton, 17 June 1 92 1 .  This 
correspondence ls also in CRS Al  20/ 1 3556.  Three days before the meeting of 15  March 
the paper had also come out in support of the suggestion of an anonymous correspondent 
that W. C. Bruce be nominated as a candidate for the Senate in a seat with limited voting 
rights that the federal government was apparently considering for Papua. He possessed ·a 
charming personality' , was 'an educated man' and had 'an abiding faith in the Territory' . 
(Papuan Courter, 1 2  Mar. 1 920). In April, Arthur Bloomfield - a candidate more likely to 
be supported by Murray if Senate representation for the Territory was indeed being 
discussed in Melbourne - also offered himself as a candidate with the argument that as 
he was now again a resident of Melbourne his election could save money. 
1 7  NAPNG & CRS 01 28, Item 8,  Murray to Thompson, 1 6  June 1 920. Also in CRS A l  
20/ 13556. 
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Thompson replied that BNGD would comply, that the attacks would 
cease and that the general manager would sever his connections with the 
Papuan Courier. 18 Perhaps he had become alarmed at the degree to which 
Loudon had become engaged in a personal contest with Murray. Perhaps 
he saw how pointless it was to expect to discredit the Lieutenant Governor 
when, if a choice between profits and native welfare in Papua became a 
public issue in Australia, those cast as 'exploiters' could not hope to 
prevail. If the BNGD management in Port Moresby had worked to topple 
Murray, there is no doubt that outside the fellowship of officials the feeling 
against him was running high at the time and it was to his advantage to 
place responsibility for the agitation on those he could represent as having 
manipulated the community into protest out of a desire for gain. Bensted 
had kept Murray well informed of events in Australia and support had been 
rallied to the administration through sympathetic journalists, in particular 
H. S. Nicholas of the Sydney Dally Telegraph. In a telegram to Nicholas over 
Jackson's articles appearing in the Sydney Morning Herald, Murray could 
both cast blame and contain damage - 'it is true [there has been] more 
trouble with this company than all others but [I allege] no systematic ill­
treatment' . 19 Bensted reported that the confidence of the 'Federal Ministry' 
in the Papuan administration remained unshaken and that the Prime 
Minister had issued 'a press telegram' to say that no inquiry would be held 
to investigate the causes of the dispute with the 'British New Guinea 
Development Company'. 
What had Loudon, or indeed Bertie, Jewell and Captain Fitch hoped to 
gain? Did they expect that the settlers of Papua would be able to 'make free 
with the natives' with Murray gone? This was the impression that Murray 
always sought to give of their motives - though he did not impute to them 
malice towards the Papuans, only 'indifference to native suffering'. 
Certainly when considering the NLO in 1 9 1 9  the planters could propose 
few changes . Neither Loudon nor Bertie themselves managed labour 
directly nor does it seem that Loudon particularly wanted to protect brutal 
managers any more than he would indulge incompetent ones - though 
undoubtedly he found it inconvenient to deal with the consequences of 
their exposure and conviction. Jewell's record in managing labour at 
Lolorua was unblemished. Tom Sefton, if a hard man with his Papuan 
18 NAPNO & CRS 0 1 28, Item 8 and CRS Al 20/ 13556. Thompson to Murray, 25 
June 1920. The disposal of O. A. Loudon's shares was announced in the Papuan Courter 
of 18 June. 
19 NAPNO & CRS 0128, Item 8. Murray to Nicholas, 8 May 1920. Articles by Jackson 
appeared in the Sydney Morning Herald on 24, 26, 29, and 30 Apr. and 4 June 1920. 
Bensted had urged Murray to respond. H. S. Nicholas was also a lawyer and subsequently 
a judge. 
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workers, ran the most successful of the plantations without much trouble. 
Fitch was a newcomer. 
Or did the basis of opposition lie, just as Loudon and the others said, in 
their conviction that Murray did not have a sufficient commitment to the 
success of their enterprise in Papua, that it was not any threat settlers 
posed to the well-being of the Papuans at all but the Lieutenant Governor's 
indifference to the settler struggle that was in question? His obsession with 
the Papuan interest, and the costs of his native policy - borne they believed 
disproportionately by the white community - were merely proof of this 
indifference. Without elected representation planters could feel powerless to 
promote change and have no share in the responsibilities and frustrations 
of office. Where but upon Murray's lack of effort, or the Commonwealth's 
neglect, could they lay the blame for hard times? Above all, they wanted 
profits and these eluded them. Staniforth Smith, practical, bold and 
uncomplicated, could indeed seem a man more likely to speak up for them, 
and Murray a man just too cleverly bent on achieving a perverse personal 
apotheosis. 
But was Murray wrong? It seemed to him, as it seems obvious in 
retrospect, that his critics had mistakenly placed the blame for the 
disappointing outcomes of their great expectations in the wrong quarter -
in an apparent failure of this Lieutenant Governor's administration to work 
for them - when in fact they were all the while victims of circumstances 
over which he, like them, could have little influence. And was not an 
'indifference to native suffering' implicit in the planter demands? It would 
be the Papuans who would pay for any relaxation in either the law or its 
application or any reduction in the meagre conditions guaranteed them 
under the NLO. Clearly, white men settling on the land in Papua, 
unrestrained by government and beyond the scrutiny of humanitarians and 
the press, might indeed have gone farther in reducing the Papuans to 
'slavery' if they had had the power - as by telling contrast they had 
succeeded in doing with dispossessed Aborigines in the Northern Territory 
of Australia itself - and all the while protesting their concern for the welfare 
of both the native people and the country. 
A third though much smaller 'committee' meeting of the Citizens' 
Association held in September and chaired by Captain Fitch adhered to the 
March resolutions urging Murray's replacement. The chairman afterwards 
thought himself justified in sending a telegram to the King claiming that 
Murray's despotism was 'leading to [a] serious and dangerous uprising of 
[the] white people in Papua' . The 'honour of the Empire' demanded 
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intervention.2° Fitch had clearly 'over-stepped the mark', and his action 
was repudiated at a further public meeting. It had been a gesture - most 
could immediately see - that impugned the competence of the 
Commonwealth and one hardly calculated to advance the credibility in 
Australia of the five or six hundred 'citizens' of Papua clamouring for 
electoral representation. 
A lengthy review appeared in the local paper on 5 November. It was 
written by R. D. Bertie, one of the two solicitors practicing in Port.21 
Robert Dugald Bertie had arrived in Papua two years before. He became the 
planters' lawyer, joining their Association and, as noted earlier, buying 
shares in the 'new' newspaper. He quickly acquired a reputation as a 
procrastinator, irritatingly slow to answer letters or cariy out instructions -
Elizabeth Mahony once sat on his doorstep refusing to move until he 
attended promptly to her concern - but he was certainly a shrewd and 
articulate advocate for the 'opposition'. His review was a perceptive analysis 
of another review, the Review of Australian Administration in Papua from 
1 907 to 1 920, a small book of sixty pages written by the Lieutenant 
Governor, a copy of which the author had sent to the paper.22 In the 
hostile climate then at its worst Murray had been veiy anxious to have this 
document published 'with the concurrence of the Commonwealth 
Government', for it was essentially a careful defence of his own policies and 
administration disguised as a more general account of 'British' colonial 
practice as it had been applied by Australia in Papua. The time was 
overdue for Murray to explain himself at length, seriously, and without the 
detached irony with which he sprinkled his Annual Reports. These, 
'southern' readers could fmd masterpieces of official prose, free of 
grandiloquence, at times almost intimate, always fresh and interesting; 
their readers among the Papuan planters could think them exercises in 
self-promotion and evasion and fmd them infuriating. 
Murray's Review is indeed an impressive essay in justification, not only 
of the policies he had come to adopt and which he now could defend with 
complete confidence, but also of the whole enterprise of colonial 
�dministration in Papua as the work of reasonable and humane men, who, 
at a given point in time, were faced with circumstances of great inequalities 
in power and with cultures in collision. Certainly the Lieutenant Governor, 
if in many ways isolated and alone, was intellectually well equipped and 
possessed of an independent mind. Through an experience that for any 
20 Papuan Courter, 8 Oct. 1920. 
21 Ibid. , 5 Nov. 1920. 
22 J. H. P. Murray, Review of Austrollan Admlnlstro.tlon ln Papuafrom 1 907 to 1 920 
(Port Moresby, Government Printer 1920). 
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colonial administrator was already exceptionally long in one territory, 
through his correspondence and the reading that his solitary personal life 
had probably facilitated, he had acquired a very wide knowledge of colonial 
policy and practice, one such as no other Australian could possibly 
match.23 Simply, he now set down the basic choices open to governments 
of dependencies once the decision to annexe them was made - the options 
in pacification, white settlement, development and 'civilisiI)g' policy; the 
problems of land, labour and the raising of a revenue; and the reasons why 
the particular choices made in Papua were made. A government's duties 
towards Europeans encouraged to settle and invest in a territory are set 
down. These obligations were clearly not unlimited. A 'British' colonial 
administration's overriding duty, as it had come to be seen since the mid­
nineteenth century, was towards the survival, welfare and advancement of 
the native people. Moreover, 'the unpopularity of a Governor [with settlers] 
may be in direct proportion to his performance of his duty' in this 
respect.24 This suggestion appearing so naturally in the argument was, in 
the circumstances in which the Review was written, at its heart. Overall 
the Review placed Murray in a morally unassailable position. 
Bertie readily admitted that 
No one can read the paper without being impressed by its power and force, and 
our only regret is that it was not produced years ago. If such a document had 
been available, many misconceptions concerning the Government policy would 
perhaps have been avoided . . . We commend it . . . as the most able and 
interesting statement of native policy which it has been our privilege to read. 
Nonetheless he saw through Murray's disguise and recognised the 
Review as an 'apologia' that 'camouflaged' much that was contentious in 
the administration of Papua. 
With the large knowledge which we in the Territory possess of his subject matter 
we cannot sufficiently admire the delicate choice of words in a great many cases 
[where] in the present state of public opinion he is often treading on dangerous 
ground. 
To the heart of the matter Bertie was quickly drawn. If a 'Governor can . 
. only gain popularity by neglecting his duty towards the natives' then 
many popular colonial governors were being maligned for 'We cannot 
believe that they have all neglected their duties towards the natives'.25 
Murray's unpopularity, Bertie suggested, was not due to his native policy at 
23 Murray's wife Sybil had been unable to tolerate Papua. She died in London in 
1929. A second marriage ended 1n separation. 
24 Murray, Revlew of Australian Admlnfstratlon . . . , xi. 
25 Papuan Courier, 5 Nov. 1920, p.6 .  
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all but to his hostility towards those engaged in the development of the 
country. He concluded with a rhetorical protest that 
The Europeans in Papua may be a band of exploiters "wringing divtdends out of 
the blood and sweat of the natives" (Vide Commonwealth Hansard). We may be 
something lower than the Europeans discovered by the late lamented Sir Roger 
Casement in the Congo and Putamayo (Vide Southern papers of March and April 
last). Yet it is hardly possible that the wave of true feeling for the natives which 
has swept over all the English-speaking countries has passed us by. We think 
that we are capable of appreciating a sound native policy. 26 
Planters could feel besieged by the criticism directed at them by 
opportunist politicians, armchair humanitarians and, in their view, 
irresponsible journalists in Australia who knew little of their problems or 
'native' peoples but presumed to know all. In the aftermath of world war 
the intellectual and moral climate in the West was rapidly · changing, the 
late Victorian certainties under challenge. Perhaps Bertie's parting thrust 
conveys some of the bitterness settlers could muster at their neglect by the 
nation that had so recently and confidently called upon them to commit 
their fortunes to the Territory. And the claim that planters had a genuine 
concern for native welfare and an appreciation of what 'a sound native 
policy' might be, as they saw these things, cannot be entirely dismissed 
without imputing to them a degree of callousness that few actually 
possessed. If in much of their routine conversation white men found 
comfort in polarising racial differences - to be bothered with the subtleties 
of the situation could be threatening - and some of them were indeed 
prepared to bully and cheat Papuans, most had certainly learned the 
economic value of their employees. Above all, they saw themselves as 
deserving as settlers in Australia itself of the assistance of governments -
governments they supposed should represent their interests first and those 
of the Papuans second. Murray can hardly have been wrong in believing 
that the social costs Papuan communities would be forced to bear would be 
vastly increased if policies that fully met these settler expectations were 
adopted. 
To whom did the future of Papua belong? Both Murray and his 
opponents could have agreed that the Papuans might be dependent 
indefinitely. For Murray this implied that the country must be administered 
in trust for them. In this scheme white settlers had a limited if necessacy 
place. But for the settlers before 1 9 1 4  there was little doubt that they were 
pioneering a 'new' country and that the future was theirs - theirs, that is, 
28 Ibid. The Putamayo atrocities committed by the employees of rubber companies 
among the Indians of the upper Amazon were exposed by Sir Roger Casement in 19 12.  
See below p.  183.  
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failing a loss of will by the governing power. White minorities elsewhere in 
the British Empire had been conceded responsible government, they knew. 
If Murray was afraid that granting the settler community elected 
representation would open the door to future demands for a similar degree 
of self-determination - the outcome of which could only result in Papuan 
interests being permanently relegated to second place - settlers believed 
that without a franchise to elect representatives in either the Legislative 
Council or the Australian Parliament their interests would receive no 
hearing at all. Murray, it seemed to them, was by virtue of his position as a 
public official hamstrung, and by personal disposition indifferent to their 
struggle, and a poor advocate for the Territory's real interests. Yet while it 
was disappointment that gave to the the demands and denunciations of the 
opposition their bitter edge, it is possible that by 1 92 1 ,  when the agitation 
for the franchise reached a new peak, elected representation might well 
have been foregone as an aspiration and settlers 'bought off if the 
Commonwealth had then extended tariff concessions to its dependency and 
underwritten Papua's development. Rendered captive, settlers could have 
their teeth drawn.27 If, on the other hand, the prosperity all had thought 
assured in 1 9 1 4  had come to pass, with all that this would have entailed in 
an increased and more formidable white population, pressures for greater 
political power could have proved irresistible. 
In November 1 920 also came the blow that the government intended to 
levy an export duty on copra of 25s. a ton. This drew a strong protest from 
the Planters' Association, and Arthur Jewell, as vice-president, wrote to 
Murray to remind him how much the administration already depended for 
its revenue on an unprofitable planting industry. He claimed that in its 
effect even the 1 Os. 'head tax' paid on behalf of indentured labourers by the 
RMs out of wages deposited with them was a tax really met by employers 
as the expectations held by Papuans about the moneys to which they were 
entitled at the end of their contracts had not diminished. The recent 
increases in the salary scale of officials made as a result of a review of 
service conditions had compounded planters' difficulties as salaries for 
private employees were also forced to rise. The plantation sector could not 
bear the burden of the copra tax which would be 'a direct tax on Capital . . .  
not upon the profits of an industry' .28 
27 Certainly a decade later in times even more desperate, when a preference was 
finally obtained for the Territory's rubber and a small bounty offered the copra producers 
by the Papuan Government to save their industry, planters clearly accepted the price to 
be paid in polltlcal acquiescence. See below pp. 20 1-2. 
28 NAPNG & CRS 0126, Item 9. Jewell to Murray, 30 Nov. 1920. 
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The revenue had fallen considerably in the previous twelve months and 
the Lieutenant Governor felt no need to deny Jewell's contentions or to 
justify the administration's actions. While Murray would later defend an 
export tax as a contribution to territorial self-sufficiency, it is very probable 
from its timing that the copra levy was principally introduced to cover the 
deficit that would otherwise have resulted from the public service salary 
increases. It was a tax, he wrote to Jewell, that was simply a necessary 
measure and similar to one recently introduced in Late German New 
Guinea. It was not likely, he said, to be waived. 
Yet Murray well knew and privately acknowledged that he depended for 
about a third of the revenue on indirect taxes and fees levied on the 
'shareholders' .29 With the annual subsidy to the revenue from the 
Commonwealth of £30,000 in these years accounting for another third, and 
the heavy import duties levied on trade goods purchased by the Papuans 
for the remainder, the government was expected to maintain balanced 
budgets with any deficit met by borrowings from a small reserve or the 
pension fund, or by increased stringency in the following year. 
For the plantation companies, with their leases only partly developed 
and having waited eight years for the perennial tree crops to come into 
production, more money had to be found. The small 'profits' that BNGD 
alone could show on its large local trading account or derive from the 
modest proceeds in the war years of the 'catch' crops, tobacco and sisal, 
and declared to buoy up the confidence of shareholders, could not be 
distributed - they were still being greatly exceeded by outgoings on the 
plantation development account - and were appropriated annually to 
expenditure in the succeeding year. While small planters relied heavily on 
their trade stores to survive, the other larger planting enterprises engaged 
in little trading and remained overwhelmingly dependent on shareholder 
funds or the first returns on production to complete their development. In 
order to carry on as they reached the end of their issued capital, or, as in 
many cases, ordinary shareholders failed to respond to further calls on 
their shares, most of the companies were forced to take out bank loans or 
to issue debentures on the security of their properties. The repayment of 
these borrowings represented a first claim on earnings and had the effect of 
delaying even further the time when the industries would reach the 
dividend paying stage. Very large sums of money had been expended, and 
the savings of many investors, not all of them wealthy, had now been 
exhausted. Much depended on the maturing plantations proving profitable. 
29 West, Selected Letters of Hubert Murray (Melbourne 197 1 ), letter No. 52, Hubert to 
Gilbert Murray, 19 Jan. 19 13.  
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Capital entering the country during the 'development' years when 
plantations were being cleared and planted and before trees came into 
production could be expected to support a considerable trade deficit. This 
represented investment in expectation of profits. But the extent to which 
the value of imports continued to exceed the combined value of the exports 
and the annual Commonwealth subsidy to the revenue after 1 9 1 6 - 1 7  -
when production began on a large scale - represents one measure of the 
extent to which the new Papuan economy remained dependent upon 
private capital inflow to pay its way. Indeed as production and exports 
increased, the unfavourable balance of trade deteriorated further with low 
prices, the shipping shortage, and greatly increased costs bringing 
expectations down. The value of exports would exceed that of imports after 
1 905 only in 1 925-26 before the great depression forced the Territory to live 
within its means between 1 930-3 1 and 1 936-37. And the experience of the 
territorial economy as a whole corresponded closely with that of plantation 
enterprise. BNGD would pay a first dividend in 1 926 and not another 
before 1 936 - a year in which its capital was reduced by 60% partly in 
order to do so. The lesser companies would fare even less well. 
The total trade deficit for the early years of 'production' between 1 9 1 6-
1 7  and 1 924-25 inclusive amounted to £ 1 , 1 52 , 870. If the sum of the 
Commonwealth grants over the period, £360, 000, together with a large 
investment in the Laloki copper field, and perhaps £ 1 00,000 in funds 
directed to the Christian missions by their supporting societies, are 
subtracted, the remaining deficit must have been more than £500,000.30 
How was this met? Mostly still, it seems, from the capital of Australian and 
English shareholders - principally those interested in plantations - whose 
resources continued to be called upon and increasingly used merely to 
sustain their properties well into the period when a large return had once 
been confidently predicted. The BNGD Debenture Issue of 1 9 1 9  sought 
£ 1 00,000 from subscribers all of which was applied to meeting expenses in 
bringing already planted areas into production. Little or none was used in 
further development of the company's leases, the unused areas of which 
30 These calculations, drawn from the Papuan Annual Reports, assume that in the 
absence of dividends for planters there was also a complete absence of savings and that 
all income was ultimately spent on imports. Clearly the government maintained a reserve 
and trading enterprises must have remained at least barely profitable. It is unlikely that 
some of the proceeds from gold production were not also remitted. Any savings and 
remission of profits or proceeds overseas by some sections of the community could only 
have increased the burden of the trade deficit upon the primary producers. The figure for 
mission income is generalised from Murray's estimate that the missions received overseas 
contributions of £10,000 in 192 1 .  (CRS A l ,  Item 2 1 / 158 15) BNGD dividends are noted 
p. 2 1 2  (Note 14) below. 
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still amounted to nearly 60,000 acres. The sum of the cultivated areas on 
BNGD estates actually declined in the period 1 9 1  7 - 1 923 from nearly 
1 2,000 acres to under 10 ,000 acres as lands planted with tobacco, cotton 
and sisal were abandoned. In 1 923 the debenture holders agreed to 
increase their risk with a guarantee of a further $50,000 held as collateral 
security on bank loans negotiated to keep the company afloat. 
In these circumstances to those engaged in the development of 
agricultural industries government levies and charges could seem an 
insupportable burden and the size of the 'official class' a large 
extravagance. Until 1 9 1 6 - 1 7  the customs duties the government levied on 
most imported items whether for trade or issue to Papuans in indentured 
service were seen as adding materially to the heavy costs of plantation 
development. Beyond 1 9 1 6- 1  7 planters could only regard these 'truces' as 
placing a severe brake on the profitability of industries scarcely able to pay. 
The government had to raise a revenue, no doubt, and planters enjoyed the 
security and services it provided. They did not have their personal incomes 
taxed directly. Unless Australia was to bear the full cost of providing the 
Papuan administration, the burden of contributing to the costs of 
government, like the burden of developing and maintaining their 
properties, it seemed, had to be carried by the investors whether they were 
drawing profits or not. 
The customs duties were the principal item in the government's internal 
revenue, never amounting to less than half - the balance consisting mainly 
of rents, fines, and fees for services,  licences and utilities - and Murray 
could reasonably claim that through them the Papuans also made their 
contribution to the costs of administration of their country. Certainly white 
people in their capacity as private residents rather than as employers were 
not heavily 'truced' in this way. Much that Europeans imported for their 
own consumption, except for alcohol and tobacco, was not dutiable. 
Staniforth Smith calculated in 1 9 1 0  that the white population of under 900 
at the time contributed 28% of the customs receipts, or £7 ,032 in the year 
1 909- 1 0, and the Papuans 72% , or £ 1 7,868 in the same year. In terms of 
their personal consumption settlers thus contributed to the revenue no 
more than about £8 a head.31 
But as employers planters could feel excessively and prematurely truced. 
Much later, in the 1 933-34 Annual Report when considering the 
consequences for the revenue of a decline in the labour force, Murray 
estimated that 'a native labourer employed at 1 0 / - a month is worth 46s.  
[per annum] in customs duties alone so that a decrease of £28, 1 24 [in 
31 NLA Deposit 1 709, Staniforth Smith Papers, item 690. 
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wages paid since 1 927-28] means a loss to the customs of over 
£ 1 0,000' .32 The loss to revenue represented a contribution shared 
between Papuan workers and their employers as the calculation included 
not only the duty paid by time-expired labourers in the purchase of 
dutiable goods but also the duty paid by the employers on the tobacco, 
blankets, cotton cloth and rice issued to indentured labour under the NLO 
Regulations. Thus for employers failing to make profits the duties on these 
items could seem a large imposition and a clear target for attack on 
government policies. Even so, it should be recorded here that Papuans, 
whether receiving wages or producing copra on their own account for cash, 
were indirectly 'taxed' through the import du tie$ at the rate of 1 0% on most 
items they bought and at 200% on tobacco, the major purchase item.33 
32 PAR 1 933-34, 15.  The calculation was actually the Treasurer's in Circular No. 290, 
31 March 1932. NAPNG, G9 1 .  Outstation records, Series 485, Box 806 (Cape Nelson). Of 
course any reduction by the government in its own labour force would have represented a 
net saving to the revenue. 
33 The Custom Duty of 3s. a pound on tobacco was reduced to l s. 9d. a pound in 
Oct. 192 1 .  
PART IV 
Coming to terms 1921-1926 
We claim that a sympathetic Government would have assisted us 
in our bad times, or, at the very worst, left us alone. Instead of 
which they have added very materially to our burdens, and in doing 
so have created such a feeling of distrust that we are precluded 
from getting sufficient further capital to pull through. 
The Planters' Association of Papua, Condltfons tn Papua, 192 1 .  
In these quinine latitudes small town criticism grows rancorous . . . 
Papuan settlers should realise that, bad as it may be, Papua is 
about the best Territory in the Pacific today. Instead of howling for 
the moon, they should tum to and show Murray (who is a greater 
man than his generation realises) that they are willing to assist the 
Administration on practical lines . . .  Try a 'pull together' campaign. 
Leslie F. Gill, a planter of Vella Lavella, British Solomon Islands Protectorate, 
Papuan Courter, 26 Oct. 1923. 

CHAPTER 1 4  
The turn ing point 
G .  A. LOUDON was in England at the time of the September meeting in Port 
Moresby and the fiasco of Captain Fitch's telegram. At the annual general 
meeting of BNGD he attacked the government's 'ban' on the employment of 
Papuan women on plantations and allowed the chairman of the company, W. 
A. Horn, to suggest that the Merrie England at the time of its destruction had 
been a 'dilapidated' vessel whereas it had been barely two years old. Murray's 
attention was drawn to the published account of the meeting. He wrote 
challenging Loudon's facts. Women could work on plantations if they 
accompanied their husbands at the employer's risk. They could not, it was 
true, be indentured except for domestic service. With regard to the Merrie 
England, Loudon had obviously allowed a plain untruth to pass - presumably 
so that the government's claim on BNGD could seem to the shareholders all 
the more unfair . 1 
In his report delivered at the London meeting held in October at Winchester 
House, Old Broad Street, Loudon gave the planters' view of the benign 
transformation undergone by Papuans as a result of a period of plantation 
service. He also suggested that it was the company alone who ensured the 
strict observance by its managers of their responsibilities under the NLO and 
Regulations. In language reminiscent of Staniforth Smith - or even an earlier 
Murray - he assured the shareholders that 
The Papuan, in his native state is a wild, rather dirty, scraggy, cannibalistic 
gentleman, sometimes rather truculent and not easy to deal with. After one, two or 
three years' service on one of our plantations we return him to his village a new 
man, well nourished, with glossy skin, and good physique. We have the strictest 
regulations regarding the housing, care and attention of our natives, and any white 
employee disregarding such regulations is dealt with promptly. 2 
This was, no doubt, what his audience wished to hear. But Loudon was 
unquestionably sincere. Such a perspective was possible even if it is obvious 
that it understated the regulatory hand of government in Papua. And the 
ANUABL Deposit 95, M37, BNGD Annual General Meeting, Oct. 1920. Murray's 
comments on the report of the meeting are 1n NAPNG & CRS 069, Item 23/ 1 .  Atlee Hunt 
wrote to Horn to question the statements made. The chairman apologised for errors 1n his 
speech but defended what Loudon had said as 'candid crltlclsm of legislative enactments'. 
2 Ibid. 
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standard for comparison his description would have suggested to those 
present was that of Indian Tamils who, until recently, had been readily 
available in large numbers to undertake indentured service in Malaya and Fiji. 
Surely a similarly well regulated system of indenture offered the Papuans, and 
their womenfolk, a valuable opportunity to ascend the ladder of civilisation a 
rung or twol Or so it must have seemed. 
In transit in Sydney in January Loudon called on J. T. Bensted after the 
Papuan Government Agent had complained to BNGD's Sydney agent, F. C. 
Tracy, about London's speech in London. In an account of their conversation 
sent to Leonard Murray, Bensted reported that Loudon had claimed that 
government officers, unlike employees of private enterprise, were not being 
brought to account for ill-treatment of Papuans, and that he had evidence, 
'supported by photographs' , which could be produced to uphold the allegation. 
When on his return Murray wrote asking him to explain, Loudon disputed 
Bensted's account. All he had said was that both government and employers 
were bound to acquire some unsatisfactory employees and that the 
misdemeanours of officials were not made public. He reasserted his company's 
desire not to offend the administration. 3 
In Brisbane Loudon had given an interview for the Courier Mail, later 
reprinted in the Melbourne Age, in which he had again used facts loosely -
this time to explain the failure of the cotton industry in 19 16 .  The industry 
had collapsed, he said, because women and children had not been permitted 
to assist with the harvest as they were in other cotton producing countries. 
Women, he again claimed, were not allowed to work on plantations though 
they would benefit from doing so. 4 Whilst it is doubtful that Australian 
readers understood the implications of his remarks, Loudon was making here 
another appeal for the indenture of women in agriculture, for the consequent 
development of a 'plantation village' system and ultimately, we can be sure, 
for a radical restructuring of Papuan society to assist plantation agriculture. 
It was characteristic of the man that he would continue to press hard despite 
adversity even as he would certainly have taken advantage of successes to 
struggle for further concessions. It must indeed have been wearying for 
Murray to have had in these years so energetic, persistent and devious an 
opponent as George Archibald Loudon. For Loudon also the long contest with 
Murray was undoubtedly a deeply serious matter. Working away at another 
obstacle he had taken the opportunity of the Brisbane interview also to attack 
the Commonwealth's tariff indifference to the products of Papua. 
NAPNG & CRS 069, Item 23/ 1 ,  Bensted to Leonard Murray, 7 Jan. 192 1 ;  Loudon to 
Murray, 10 Jan. 192 1 .  
4 The Age (Melbourne), 29 Jan. 192 1 .  
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While G. A. Loudon was on his way home to Papua, though probably with 
his knowledge, the acting general manager of BNGD, Samuel Wills , lodged a 
formal complaint in February 1 92 1  'against . . . harsh and vindictive 
treatment recently meted out to the Company by the Department of Native 
Affairs and Control'.5 In many ways, this complaint, though it did not refer 
to events occurring before 1 920, marked the climax of the contest of principle 
and will that had developed since 1 9 1 4  between BNGD and the government 
and between Loudon and the Lieutenant Governor personally. Again, the 
immediate issues were allegations of ill-treatment of Papuans working on 
ltikinumu plantation. 
Following the desertion of more than fifty labourers from the estate, the 
acting CNA, Leslie Bell, after carrying out a preliminary investigation, 
instituted proceedings against BNGD for failing to provide sixty"'.'four labourers 
with 'good and sufficient food'. The hearing, in what the Papuan Courier 
referred to as the 'famous "bean" case', occupied fourteen full sitting days in 
the Port Moresby RM's Court spread over thirty-eight days from December 1 1  
until January 27, and though the charges were dismissed it was not before 
the company had incurred very considerable expenses.6 Wills suggested that 
this affair together with another recent case involving desertions from BNGD's 
plantation at Aroa were two more instances of ill-considered actions being 
brought in a discriminatory manner against his company by Native Affairs, 
and that BNGD had a large claim for costs. These were likely to exceed £700 
in transport, the salaries of European witnesses, the maintenance of the 
deserters and other Papuan witnesses , and in legal costs of which the 
company had been allowed £54. The indirect losses in suspended production 
caused by the absence of staff and labour from the estates could not be 
calculated. 
In the Aroa case, Wills claimed that contrasting treatment had been 
administered to Arthur Bloomfield's Galley Reach company and BNGD over 
desertions of labourers recruited at the same time and place, and who, after 
only a few hours on the estates, had run away complaining of a food shortage. 
Native Affairs , Wills alleged, had assisted the Galley Reach management to 
secure convictions against the deserters without it even being necessary for 
the manager to leave his plantation. Convictions were later obtained against 
the Aroa deserters also, but as the ltikinumu case intervened before the Aroa 
case could be heard, BNGD had been compelled under protest to maintain the 
Aroa labourers in town for the whole period of the Itikinumu hearing. 
NAPNG & CRS G69, Item 23 I l ,  S. A. Wills to acting Administrator, 1 Feb. 192 1 .  The 
full correspondence over the BNGD complaints against the administration is also in CRS Al 
21 /206 15 ·British N. G. Development Company Ltd. Complaints against Admin.', 192 1 .  
6 The 'famous bean case' was reported in the Papuan Courter, 2 1  Jan. 1 92 1 .  
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Wills' s charges were serious and could hardly go unanswered. In a report 
to the Acting Administrator, Bell set out the basis for the prlma jacle case 
against the company over the Itikinumu desertions. 7 BNGD had riot 
proceeded immediately against the deserters as was customruy, but had asked 
for time in which Archie MacAlpine, the company's plantation inspector, could 
make an investigation. Suspicious, Bell set aside the report MacAlpine then 
submitted as it gave him the impression that it had been especially written for 
him to read. An examination since made of the deserting labourers by the 
GMO, Dr Harse, had indicated they were unfit to work and it had been 
principally upon this evidence that the decision was made to press charges. 
Bell rejected the planters' argument advanced by Wills that where some 
labouring gangs on an estate were contented and well fed others on the same 
estate with a different overseer were similarly so, and that an expression of 
contentment on the part of labourers at a visit by one of the CNA's inspectors 
necessarily implied that all had been well before the visit. He denied that the 
Aroa and Galley Reach cases corresponded and called the suggestion that 
there had been a conspiracy to obtain the convictions against the Galley 
Reach deserters 'preposterous'. The Aroa deserters, unlike those from Galley 
Reach, had alleged that they had been beaten. Bell had acted, he said, on the 
principle that when 
batches of natives . . .  walk about 30 miles to Port Moresby . . . to co�plain of 
insufficient food, and the Government Medical Officer supports them in this 
evidence before the court, something must be radically wrong . . .  If these particular 
natives had been treated properly they would not have become discontented and left 
their work to complain . . .  with the risk of being sent to gaol for desertion. 8 
Bell went on to ridicule Wills's own knowledge of labour management. 
There was, he concluded, no foundation for the claim that Native Affairs held 
any 'animus' against BNGD - as the dismissal of the Department's case would 
seem to prove. Yet, if not animus, then prejudice was at least likely - so 
acrimonious had relations become between the government and the company. 
Bell gave no hint that the previous contests had added any weight to the 
decision to prosecute BNGD but he was to imply later that this was indeed the 
case, and among its officers the company's pyrrhic victory in the court did 
little to reduce the old suspicion that BNGD was being harassed. 
The Department's charges in the 'bean' case were dismissed because BNGD 
had been within the NLO Regulations in issuing haricot beans to plantation 
labourers in place of the customruy rice then unavailable on account of the 
shortage of shipping. Haricot beans needed to be repeatedly soaked before 
cooking with the water changed regularly to prevent fermentation. They were 
7 
8 
NAPNG & CRS 069, Item 23 / l , 8 Feb. 192 1 .  
Ibid. ,  1 Mar. 192 1 .  
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very unpopular as the plantation staple with the Papuans who, refusing to eat 
them, might well have become hungry, rebellious, and unfit for work. These 
circumstances must have been well known to Native Affairs officers, and 
Murray would attribute the general falling off in recruitment in late 1 920 at 
least partly to the unwillingness of labourers to eat the substitutes offered for 
rice.9 While Bell denied one of Wills's assertions that Port Moresby had been 
'flooded' with deserters from the nearer plantations, the diet of beans might 
indeed have prompted the desertions at Galley Reach and Aroa. 
The Executive Council met and considered that Wills's statement disclosed 
no justification of his company's complaint of vindictive treatment and that 
a claim for compensation couched in the terms the acting general manager 
had employed could not be entertained. It was at this point that Michael 
Burgess , a disaffected former employee of BNGD on Itikinumu, Jawarere and 
Baubauguina plantations, called on Bensted in Sydney alleging that charges 
made by him to an RM, Edwin Bastard, about the treatment of labour on the 
three plantations had not been acted upon. Murray attempted unsuccessfully 
to persuade Burgess to return to Port Moresby for an inquiry. When Loudon 
in a letter to Atlee Hunt accused the government of trying to bring Burgess 
back to further damage the company, Murray denied that he had done so .10 
In June 1 92 1  the incumbent Minister for Home and Territories,  Alexander 
Poynton, visited Papua and the new Mandated Territory of New Guinea. It was 
the first ministerial visit to Papua in ten years. G. A. Loudon sought a private 
interview - hardly a request, coming as it did from the most prominent 
businessman in the Territory, that could easily be refused. Yet it was, 
ostensibly because Poynton's stay in Port Moresby was to be for only three 
days. 
Loudon had attempted to prepare the ground for a meeting with a letter 
giving a resume of BNGD grievances. He referred to the old hostility directed 
towards the company. He could 'never find the reason for this antagonism. 
Sometimes I am told that it is a personal matter, but it existed a long time 
before I came into the country'. If anything he had done was considered to be 
the cause he offered to have his conduct 'made the subject of the closest 
inquiry'. Of BNGD, he continued 
The Company is directed by a body of gentlemen in London who have a very real 
feeling that the company is doing good work for . the Empire in assisting in the 
development of this out-lying part, 
but that there appeared to be in the Papuan service 
PAR 1919-20, 6 .  
1 0  NAPNG & CRS 069, Item 23/ l ,  Loudon t o  Hunt, 5 May 1 92 1 ;  Item 2 3 / 3  contains 
Murray's correspondence with Bensted over Burgess. Murray could, of course, readily deny 
Loudon's charge taken literally. 
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a feeling that anything can be done against us with impunity, and our complaints 
will be disregarded, that any report to our detriment will receive credence and that 
any attempt at assistance to us will not be conducive to promotion in the service . . .  
He added, 
I am prepared to do anything to satisfy the requirements of the government. I have 
long since gtven orders that so far as possible the Company's officers are to comply 
strictly with the directions of any official, however unreasonable . . .  for the sake of 
peace. 1 1 
Whether unable or unwilling to see Loudon privately, Poynton was clearly 
obliged to respond. He wrote asking the general manager to put the company's 
complaints in writing. Loudon replied with a long statement repeating much 
of what Wills had claimed about recent events but in even greater detail. He 
also ventured that the Lieutenant Governor had greatly misrepresented the 
nature and extent of the opposition to his administration in his published 
statements about the meeting in March of the year before, and referring to the 
Prime Minister's remark that the quarrel in Papua was no business of the 
Commonwealth, Loudon suggested that 'a public official was not allowed the 
luxury of personal feelings in his official capacity'. He continued, 
You can quite understand that it is a matter of difficulty to carry on business in 
difficult times with a feeling that any moment the company many be liable to a 
heavy and serious attack from errors [sic] of one of our staff and even in cases 
where no mistake at all is made. It may be that some of the government officials 
dislike our company or some of our staff but their personal disagreements have 
nothing to do with their duties as officers and we are entitled to ask for the same 
treatment as any other company. We contribute largely to the cost of the 
government. We have spent an enormous amount in attempting to develop the 
country and we are entitled to the assistance of the government . . .  12 
In the exchanges which followed, as in all those hitherto, Murray had the 
advantage of knowing exactly what Loudon had written to Poynton or Hunt, 
as by customary procedure copies of letters were forwarded to him and 
conversations reported. Poynton invited him to comment on Loudon' s letter 
and subsequent statement. 
With regard to the general manager's first resume, Murray admitted he 
could have no regard for Loudon personally but denied that he had ever 
allowed his personal feelings to influence him against BNGD. He had had no 
personal differences with Loudon's predecessor, Lewis Cowley, whom he had 
nominated to the Legislative Council. Of Loudon's reference to the good 
intentions of the company's directors, Murray commented, 
1 1  Ibid. , Loudon to Poynton, 25 June 1 92 1 .  
12 Ibid., Loudon to Poynton, 8 July 192 1 .  
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What is said of the directors may be quite true - I hardly know them. It is true that 
one of them is an ex-Governor; but I ought to add that another ex-Governor warned 
me against this Company, manifested great surprise that it was ever encouraged to 
come to Papua and expressed the most gloomy views of the treatment which natives 
were likely to receive at its hands. 1 3 
Here was implied some previous existence of BNGD, as if the company or 
its principals had an earlier record in another dependency of oppressing 
native workers. This was clearly unfounded. Perhaps Murray had been warned 
in general of the threat posed to government and native welfare in any colony 
by the presence of a dominant commercial interest. Certainly he had 
previously expressed fear of such a threat himself. In a subsequent letter to 
Poynton he would draw the Minister's attention to the Putamayo atrocities 
committed in Colombia and exposed in 1 9 12  by Roger Casement to show what 
the employees of British companies could perpetrate far from the eyes of their 
directors. 1 4  He went on now to suggest that the BNGD directors knew very 
little about conditions in Papua. Indeed, at the time when Murray entertained 
him in Port Moresby, the company's secretary, Samuel Thompson, had been 
'entirely ignorant of the facts of so outstanding a case as the starving and ill­
treatment of "boys" at Itikinumu in 1 9 1 8' .  He continued, 
I was struck by one thing in particular in my interview with Mr Thompson, and that 
was his insistence upon the wealth of his company and its importance in the world 
of affairs, and his apparent inability to understand the ordinary Australian view 
that the richest Company could have no more right to disobey the law than the 
poorest settler in the territory. I think that this sort of idea, that a rich company is 
in some way above the law, may have a good deal to do with the trouble this 
Company has given. 15 
Murray appended reports on the Itikinumu and Aroa cases, on proceedings 
taken against BNGD by the Treasury over customs clearances, and on a 
dispute over a claim by the company for exclusive rights over a water supply 
point for its coastal steamer, the Tambar. Leslie Bell's report of the December 
and January hearings was re-written for Poynton's eye. Bell thought that the 
absence of complaints from other employers of vindictive treatment by Native 
Affairs was in itself evidence of the absurdity of Wills's assertions. But he now 
allowed that 
There is no company in this Territory that has given this Department so much 
cause for anxiety in connection with the treatment of its native labourers . . .  
Officers . . .  have made very earnest efforts to bring the Company to a better 
understanding of its responsibilities . . .  by means of moral suasion, but we were 
13 Ibid. , Murray to Poynton, 25 June 1 92 1 .  
1 4  CRS A l  2 1 /206 1 5  'British N .  G. Development Company Ltd. Complaints against 
Admin. '  1 92 1 ,  Murray to Poynton, 1 7  Aug. 192 1 .  
1 5  Ibid. , Murray to Poynton, 25 June 1 92 1 .  
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most reluctantly forced to the conclusion long ago that such methods were quite 
ineffective . . .  Surely no reasonable man can honestly believe that we should appeal 
to the law, with all its attendant anxiety and extra labour that such entails, if we 
could carry out what we believe to be our duty by any other effective means . . .  The 
Company wish to govern, not to be governed. 16 
This suggests that BNGD was to be distinguished from other companies in 
Papua only by the degree of irresponsibility of its European employees and by 
their unwillingness to submit to control. But this company was the largest 
enterprise in the country and by far the largest employer of Papuans. And the 
detection ofbreaches of the labour code and the prosecution of offenders was, 
after all, the raison d'etre of Native Affairs. The confrontation between a 
government and such a company was indeed a major crisis for both, and both 
parties could believe the other prejudiced. It is at least possible that there was 
a determination on the part of Murray and his officers to bring BNGD in 
particular 'to a better understanding of its responsibilities' for fear of the 
threat any concessions to it could pose to the independence of the 
government. Such an enterprise had to be held at arm's length. 
In commenting on Loudon's larger statement of grievances, Murray drew 
Poynton's attention to the 'atmosphere' written into it that gave the impression 
that 'the Papuan Government is impossible and that its members spend most 
of their time in trying to entrap his company into technical breaches of the 
law' . 17  Murray repeated for emphasis that the origins of all the conflict with 
BNGD lay in the attitude of the company - and not in any malign intent on the 
part of his officers: 
This notion that the B.N. G.D. Co. Ltd. should be above the law is perhaps fostered 
by recollections of Chartered Companies in Africa and elsewhere, and is I think 
really at the bottom of all the difficulties we have had with this Company. 18 
Was Murray being fair? If there was 'atmosphere' in Loudon's submissions, 
there was exaggeration here also. Here was the trained advocate defending his 
administration and the conduct of his officers with an unanswerable strike at 
the competence of his principal opponents: they could do wrong 
unconsciously. And as with his evidence before the Royal Commission in 1 906 
when he thought he could see a foundation for Captain Barton's failure as an 
administrator in his hostility to Australian interests - so now he had identified 
an underlying cause for the government's difficulties with BNGD in the 
company's pretensions. Certainly the directors of the company were not as 
'entirely' ignorant of conditions in Papua or Australia as Murray suggested. 
The chairman, W. A. Horn, though now living in England, was born in New 
1 6  Ibid. , Bell to Murray, 22 July 1 92 1 .  
17 Ibid. , Murray to Poynton, 26 July 1 92 1 .  
18  Ibid. 
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South Wales and had spent much of his life in South Australia where he had 
been a prominent member of Parliament. His son, Major Kelham Hom, also 
a director, had visited Papua with Evelyn Metcalfe and would visit again. 
Samuel Thompson's letters as secretary of the company suggest a 
conscientious and not inhumane man, and betray no hint of a claim for BNGD 
to 'chartered company' status. Thompson was simultaneously secretary of the 
Kuala Selangor Rubber Company, also chaired by Hom, and the owners of 
Robinson River, and he and several directors knew Malaya well. The 
comparisons they could make between conditions there and in Papua were not 
uninformed. Perhaps Murray could not foretell the outcome of Poynton's visit 
if his opponents caught the Minister's ear and succeeded in establishing that 
their complaints had substance. He had to make sure that the groundwork 
for any further defence was solidly laid. He did not impute insincerity to 
BNGD, nor need insincerity be imputed to him. At bottom, Murray had come 
to believe, the problems between a colonial administration and private settlers 
were inherent in the colonial situation itself where the interests of the native 
people and those of the settlers were bound to be in opposition. 
If the visiting Minister would not meet Loudon alone, he could scarcely 
avoid meeting him as a member of a delegation from the Planters' Association 
and mining interests. 19 The others present were Arthur Jewell as spokesman, 
R. D. Bertie, Seymour Williams of Bloomfield's Moresby Trading and Agency 
Company, and P. R. Osborne of the Laloki Copper Mine. Jewell began with a 
request for consideration of a development loan for the Territory of £500,000, 
the expenditure from which would be determined by a committee in which the 
Lieutenant Governor would have only a casting vote. Poynton said he thought 
that this 'committee would abolish Government control altogether' , an unlikely 
concession. The remaining submissions were not new: the indenture of 
women, the admission of Asians for specified tasks, the reduction of 
government staff and salaries, jury rights, electoral representation, the 
abolition of the Native Affairs Department, the Sapphire Creek road. The 
encounter was amiable - if the Minister gave little hint of his attitude. Poynton 
had listened patiently. He responded to Jewell's thanks contrasting the 
welcome he had received in Papua with that he had received in Darwin. He 
was struck, he said, by the absence of signs in the places he had seen of the 
enormous waste of money that had occurred in the Northern Territory.20 This 
his hearers might well have found ominous. 
Poynton also met a deputation of the Citizens' Association comprising 
Captain Fitch, E .  C. Skelly, and J. R. Ross. Skelly, formerly the manager of a 
Samarai hotel, was now an employee of Fitch's company, and Ross a small 
1 9 Papuan Courter, 1 July 192 1 .  
2° CRS Al 2 1 / 1 582 1 ,  "Citizens ofPort Moresby No. 1 Deputation to Minister, 1921 ' , p.7. 
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planter at Kerema and possibly a trader connected with Fitch. This exchange 
was less pleasant than the meeting with the planters. Their principal 
'demand' , this deputation said, was the enfranchisement of the white 
community. But so heated did Fitch become in pressing his views about this 
and a wide range of other grievances that th� interview could only have 
confirmed any opinion Poynton may have had about the dangers of allowing 
such people a greater say in the Territory's affairs. Fitch was .reminded that 
he 'was making some very rash statements', and the deputation informed that 
there was no possibility that the Commonwealth would entertain a proposal 
to give settlers 'full control while the country was in state of transition' . 
Murray, the Minister told them, 'had done remarkably well' .21 
Poynton's visit marked a turning point. It did much to allow settlers a 
feeling that they had been given an opportunity at last to state their case 
before an arbitrator. He had conceded them nothing but his personal goodwill, 
yet a large crowd gathered at the Port Moresby wharf to cheer, sing 'For he's 
a jolly good fellow', and wave him goodbye.22 The Minister had demonstrated, 
without the least ambiguity, the Commonwealth's confidence in the 
Lieutenant Governor. It could take only a little reflection on the part of the 
planters and their allies to see that they could expect no change in the 
structure of the government or in the administration of current policies and 
that no agitation could succeed. And they would have to live with Judge 
Murray. 
Indeed that the government had won a 'victory' was widely perceived. 
Having lost control of the Papuan Courier in the previous year G. A. Loudon 
now had to contend with both editorial criticism and attacks from 
correspondents in the paper that for the first time placed the leading planters 
on the defensive. A letter of 1 July called them 'Advocates of Asiatics' and the 
new editor, C. E .  Wilkins, defended the independence of the local press 
against planter 'innuendoes'. 
Before the Minister left the Territory Loudon wrote to say that BNGD's 
plantation inspector, Archie MacAlpine, would also be travelling south aboard 
the Marslna. He suggested that perhaps Poynton could meet informally with 
MacAlpine to discuss matters.23 The resulting unscheduled interview at sea 
Alexander Poynton might have wished to avoid, but it was timely and proved 
him in the end a most astute conciliator. Affecting some perplexity at the 
21 Ibid. ,  p. 12 .  
22  Papuan Courter, 15 July 192 1 .  It  is  possible those giving the Minister a rowsing 
farewell were chiefly from "the Government crowd' though given the general success of his 
visit this ls not certain. 
23 CRS Al 2 1 /206 15, Loudon to Poynton, 8 July 192 1 .  
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conflicting claims of the government and the opposition, he urged the 
plantation inspector, 
that in the interest of all concerned I thought it would be much better to bury the 
past and work amicably together in the future. Mr MacAlpine assured me that this 
was the sincere Wish of his Company and that everything possible would be done 
by Mr Loudon and himself to create a better feeling in all matters between the 
Company and the government.24 
On 4 August the Minister wrote a quasi-personal letter to Loudon reporting 
that he and MacAlpine had been 'unanimous' about the need for the parties 
in Papua to work together. He assured the general manager 
that as far as you yourself are concerned, I have always formed the highest opinion 
of your integrity and ability and never for one moment did I think that you were 
personally antagonistic to the Government of Papua, but presume, like myself, you 
have people under you who are not at all times very discreet in the handling of 
important matters. 25 
This was a clever approach and it disarmed Loudon at a stroke. He was 
offered the opportunity to deflect onto unnamed subordinates any blame that 
might be his for the agitation and difficulties between his company and the 
government. He was permitted to believe that Murray himself might have been 
among Poynton's 'own' people who could be indiscreet. He responded in 
September with fulsome thanks . He felt 
that the result of your Visit to Papua is fully appreciated by all residents, especially 
myself and Directors of B .N.G.D. Co . Ltd. inasmuch as more harmonious relations 
have now been established. 
Loudon could not resist the implied offer of an intimacy in the Minister's 
letter, and added - it was entirely in character - an invitation that Poynton 
'write to me direct' if he considered 'at any time . . .  improvements can be 
made . . .  and I will endeavour to fall in with your suggestions'.26 Though he 
would remain general manager of BNGD for another five years and go on to 
be a large private planter, and would be the last of the old 'opposition' ever to 
be reconciled to Murray personally, the 'uncrowned king of Papua' had come 
finally to accept the constraints. He remained outspoken and a hard man in 
business but no longer the central figure in a cabal. In his later years he 
chose to remember Murray only in a favourable light and to forget the rancour 
that had once stood between them.27 
24 Ibid. ,  Poynton to Murray, 5 Aug. 192 1 .  
25 Ibid. , Poynton to Loudon, 4 Aug. 192 1 .  
26 Ibid. , Loudon to Poynton, 19 Sept. 192 1 .  
27 In 1 959 Loudon wrote some notes ('Agriculture - Papua, 1 9 13-1959' (7 pp. )) giving a 
brief history of the Papuan plantation industries . Murray ls mentioned only as the planters' 
ally. See also below pp. 296-7. 
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Long and carefully prepared submissions presented by a delegation of the 
Samarai Chamber of Commerce were also considered by Poynton on his 
return to Australia. They contained many proposals for additional expenditure 
by the Commonwealth which they suggested should 'look on Papua as a 
business enterprise' and 'bear the burden of its development till it reaches a 
self-supporting stage' - the whole predicated on the assumption that a much 
larger planter settlement in the country was necessary.28 The Chamber 
explicitly dissociated itself from those who had condemned the administration 
but many of its 'representations' were the same as those of the Port Moresby 
deputation of the planters. 
Copies of the submissions were passed to the Lieutenant Governor for 
comment. He preferred a development loan from the Commonwealth to an 
increased subsidy. He defended the 'iniquitous' copra tax as essential to the 
revenue. He could 'not imagine what advantage there would be' in reversing 
the roles of the Government Secretary and the Native Affairs Department. He 
did not object to electoral representation as long as the Papuans could be 
represented and the government retained a majority - the difficulties were 
practical as Papuans were not yet ready to participate in their government.29 
The demand for juries must be opposed where 'racial prejudice prevents the 
return of an impartial verdict' . And in the matter of an employer's 
responsibility for illegalities committed by his employees as employees,  he 
advised that 
It is believed that the employer is liable in every part of the world. The only person 
to whom the Government can look is the employer, and it is for the employer to see 
that the provisions of the Ordinance are complied with both by himself and by his 
servants . . .  A company can only act through its agents, and if only the agent is to 
be liable the company must always go free.30 
The publication of his Review in the previous year now gave Murray a 
convenient reference to which he could relate his response to grievances and 
queries. On one point the views of the Samarai delegation had his complete 
support - if the coastal provisions of the Commonwealth's NavigationAct were 
applied to Papua, as seemed likely, the effect would be disastrous. He noted 
that 
Questions of female labour, admission of Asiatics,  and all the hundred and one 
points which are raised by way of criticising the administration are not worth a 
moment of consideration in comparison with the question of overseas trade with the 
28 CRSAl 2 1 / 1592 1 'Planters of Papua: Deputations to Minister' 192 1 ,  Deputation from 
Samarai Chamber of Commerce, 28 June 1 92 1 .  
29 CRS A5 18 C9 18/2 contains comments by Atlee Hunt critical of the Lieutenant 
Governor's defence of the nominee system. 
3° CRS Al 2 1 I 1 492 1 .  Murray's notes on the record of the discussion between Poynton 
and the planting and mining deputation. 
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rest of the world. If our trade is confined to Sydney owned boats trading to Sydney 
the prospects of agricultural development are hopeless.3 1 
And indeed it would be over this fundamental issue that planters, all other 
settlers, and the administration were to unite in a struggle that would bind 
them together as a community as never before. 
The volume of the Territory's trade had increased 300% in the five years to 
1 920 and with the falling off in recruitment at the end of this period it seemed 
that a serious labour shortage would develop. But in 1921  the markets in 
both copra and rubber collapsed in an international slump. Planters 
previously hampered by the dearth of shipping from realising on the post-war 
boom were now forced to rapidly reduce their work force to maintenance 
levels. Production ceased on most plantations. 
The application of the Navigation Act to both Papua and the Mandated 
Territory of New Guinea coincided with Poynton's visit and appeared the 
crowning blow after a decade of toil. In the interests of both the Australian 
Seamen's Union and Australian interstate shipping companies the Act 
effectively denied the two island territories direct access to third countries by 
requiring overseas ships calling in turn at more than one port in Australia and 
its territories to conform to specified standards of accommodation for their 
crews - standards unlikely to be met in vessels employing Asian seamen. 
Since the volume of their exports was too small to attract direct shipping to 
Europe or America, the entire trade of Papua and New Guinea was now forced 
to pass through Australian ports and to proceed there aboard Australian flag 
shipping whatever the destination of the cargoes. Almost as soon as he had 
returned from his tour Poynton wrote personally to the Minister for Trade and 
Customs, Walter Massy-Greene, urging the exemption of the territories from 
the Act. He had, he said, 'received numerous deputations' while in the 
territories and 
upon one subject I found a complete consensus of bpinion, namely, the effect of the 
application to the territories of the . . .  Act, the view being quite general that unless 
some relief therefrom can be afforded the progress and development of the 
territories would be seriously retarded and the interests of planters and other 
settlers seriously prejudiced. 
He warned that 
Any factor in the trade between Papua and Australia which operates to the 
detriment of Papuan interests must, moreover, ineVitably react with equal force 
upon Australian interests.32 
31 Ibid. ,  item 16.  
32 Ibid. , Poynton to Massy-Greene, 3 Aug. 1 92 1 .  The Navigation Act was applied to the 
Territories from 1 July. 
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And so Poynton is likely also to have argued in the Cabinet Room, but 
evidently without success. In his 1 920-2 1 Annual Report, Murray noted 
ruefully, 
Agricultural development has, temporarily at least, come to an end. The low price 
of rubber and copra is responsible for this but even should prices rise it is 
improbable that there Will be any further development so long as the law confines 
our trade relations With Australia. 33 
The prospects were 'gloomy' and 'the price we may pay for Australia's policy 
may be the economic ruin of Papua' . This was a Lieutenant Governor, 
conspicuously 'going into bat' on their behalf, of whom planters could 
approve. He received their letters of support including one from G. A. 
Loudon.34 
The imposition of the Navigation Act served to shift the locus of 'blame' 
from Murray's administration to the Commonwealth and to the chief 
beneficiaries of the Act's provisions, the Sydney based island traders and ship­
owners, Burns, Philp and Company. In his letter to Massy-Greene, Poynton 
himself attacked the 'one line' that 'at present enjoys practically a monopoly 
of the Australian trade, and the service which it renders',  which was 'far from 
satisfactory'.35 That the presence of 'foreign' shipping, given the state of the 
markets, would have availed them little at the time seems not to have 
influenced the settler reaction. A new villain had been found. 
In October 1 92 1  the Planters Association published its response to 
Murray's Review , entitled Conditions in Papua, setting out the 'true position 
of affairs . . .  with particular reference to the Planting Industry, and with a 
view to securing more sympathetic treatment for the pioneers of Papua, and 
its industries' .36 It was written anonymously by R. D. Bertie. It is essentially 
an appeal to Australians to 'pay the premium on the insurance policy' taken 
out when Papua was first placed under British protection for reasons of 
Australian security. Murray's Review is repeatedly and deftly quoted in 
criticism of his own and Commonwealth policies while anything like a 
personal attack on the Lieutenant Governor is now avoided. Indeed it was the 
Commonwealth's 'starvation policy' , the failure to provide a sufficient subsidy 
through the development period that 'has condemned [Murray] to personal 
hardships and penurious parsimony in his official administration' and forced 
the Papuan Government to survive by taxing the capital of as yet unprofitable 
industries. For though 
33 PAR 1 920-21 , 1 .  
34 NAPNG & CRS G69, Item 1 2 10/7, Loudon to Murray, 10 Mar. 1 922. 
3 5  CRS Al  2 1 I 1592 1 ,  Poynton to Massy-Greene, 3 Aug. 192 1 .  
36 Planters' Association of Papua, Conditt.ons ln Papua (Sydney 1 92 1 ). The pamphlet 
contains 26 pages. See note 39 below. 
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It is an excellent ideal, to make the country self-supporting . . .  it must be realised 
that this can, in future, only be done out of profits made from the development of 
the country. The sooner this profitable stage is reached by the industries, the 
sooner the Territory Will support itself. 
Yet there seemed to be a 
fundamental sophistry, which infects like a canker the whole system of Papuan 
Administration by the Commonwealth . . .  [in] the apparent assumption that the 
possible accumulation of wealth by private individuals or corporations resulting 
from the work of development of the country is evil, and must be prevented at all 
costs.37 
What Bertie, together with Loudon, Sefton and Jewell - the executive of the 
Association - now proposed were: Firstly, that the annual subsidy to the 
revenue should be doubled to allow for the influence of inflation since 1 9 14 
and so maintained until industries could in fact contribute a larger share to 
the expenses of government out of profits. The 'savings' the Commonwealth 
had effectively made since 1 9 14 by not maintaining the real value of the 
subsidy, or £ 1 80,000 , should be set aside in a fund to assist industrial 
development. Secondly, the export duty on copra should be removed and the 
tax on imported tobacco reduced. Thirdly, either a bonus should be allowed 
Papuan rubber when the price fell below the costs of production, or a 
preferential duty applied in favour of Papuan rubber entering Australia. 
Fourthly, the restrictions recently imposed by the application of the Navigation 
Act should be removed. Finally, there should be non-official representation on 
the Executive Council and elected representation on the Legislative Council. 
The fulfilment of these requests was <vital to the success of Papua' . In the 
only allusion to Judge Murray that might have been provocative he was also 
absolved. Settlers it seems had misunderstood him. Bertie 
hoped that no one will take the complacent attitude so often adopted to camouflage 
the real conditions, that these conditions are only the aftermath of the war, and 
that, therefore, no one is to blame . . . The general stagnation of trade only makes 
our need the greater, and we have taken this means to publish the facts . . .  also 
to prove that the general opinion of those engaged . . .  in developing the country, of 
the attitude of the Administration towards them, is unfounded. 38 
This was an adroitly prepared document. If Murray's position was morally 
unassailable, the Commonwealth's was not. But did anyone read it?39 The 
37 Ibid. ,  15 ,  12 ,  6 .  
38 Ibid . ,  2 1 .  
39 There is no copy on CRS Al 2 1  / 1592 1 or on the file 'Planters' Association of Papua' 
Al 20 /9009. There is a copy with the Staniforth Smith Papers (NLA Deposit 1 709), item 
1 472 . 
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facts were that the Papuan settlers were far too few to be credible and that 
only in united action with a sympathetic administration could their distress -
in conjunction with the threat of a collapse of the local revenue - move an 
Australian ministry. 
9 .  Labour force and white staff, Giligili, Milne Bay, 3,500 acres under cultivation. A 
striking photograph taken to convey an image of efficient and effective "white' 
management of 'native' labour in the development of a large agricultural enterprise. 
!Commonwealth Parllamentary Papers , 1914-17, Vol. 21  
10. Sisal hemp plantation at Fairfax Harbour, around 1911. Here perhaps the object ls to 
expose the vigour and quality of the labour force shown against rows of well-tended sisal 
plants. IJ. H. P. Murray, Papua or British New Guinea, 19 1 2 )  
1 1 .  A Papuan rubber tapper (last-last or Gostago? ), l tlklnumu. Many labourers were very 
young, and homesick if undertaking their first period of indenture. 
(The late Mrs Winifred Loudon] 
1 2 .  Inside the rubber factory at IUklnumu. An image of the exotic produced no doubt to 
reassure the overseas investor or politician that Papuans could be trained to undertake 
quite technical tasks. (Territory of Papua Annual Report 1 933-34 J 
13 .  Sun drying sisal hemp, British New Guinea Development Company, Bomana. The 
scale of the sisal industry impressed visitors in the war years 19 1 4- 1 8 though by 1940 
few traces were left. [Territory of Papua Annual Report 1 9 1 8- 1 9 1  
1 4. Sisal hemp decorticating plant, Bomana. Another photograph with which to impress 
overseas people with both the scale and exotic setting of an enterprise in Papua. 
[Territory of Papua Annual Report 1 9 1 8- 1 9 1  
1 5 .  Gillgill Plantation, Milne Bay. Plantations could seem attractive places that 
demonstrated a considerable human achievement. They required constant maintenance. 
[Sir J. H. P. Murray, Papua of Today, 1925)  
16.  Guinea Airways Ford Tri-motor loading coffee at Eilogo, 1938. G. A. Loudon was 
probably the first planter in Papua or New Guinea to build an airstrip and fly out his 
produce to port. The plane pictured later crashed. [The late Mrs Winifred Loudon, Sydney) 
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THE SITUATION FOR all planters had indeed become desperate. In the twelve 
months commencing in October 1 92 1  the public companies ,  without 
exception, either underwent reconstruction with their capital written down, 
or offered their plantations for sale. Only the absence of purchasers of any 
kind served to keep most of them going in the unwilling hands of their long­
suffering shareholders. Trader-planters subsisted, even continuing to export, 
their losses concealed by poor or negligible accounting and covered by the 
profit on trade with even poorer Papuans. Angabunga River Plantations Ltd 
was wound up in October 1 92 1 ,  its properties passing to a new venture of 
Walter Gors, the onetime Bums Philp manager and planter who now returned 
to Papua to grow sisal and cotton. In November the collapse of Angabunga 
was followed by reconstruction of Papuan Products, the New Zealand based 
company that developed the lease alongside Mamai at Port Glasgow. Mullens 
Harbour Plantations found it difficult to find subscribers for an issue of 
debentures in May. Sogeri Para Rubber Ltd, the only company to have once 
paid a dividend and survived, put Koitaki up for sale in August. It could not 
be sold. The company went into liquidation and was re-formed as Koitaki 
Limited in 1 923.  Domara River Plantations Ltd was saved from collapse by 
obtaining £9,588 from an issue of £12 ,000 in five year debentures carrying 
the punishing interest rate of 15% a year. By 1 924 the company was straining 
under the incubus of the debt. 1 
With the largest planter, BNGD, the debentures that had kept the 
enterprise afloat since 1 9 1 9  and now due for redemption could only 
exacerbate the difficulties .  The choice for the directors was between 
reconstruction in the shareholders' interest or having the debenture holders 
appoint a receiver. Though the company's plantations had been 'planted 
according to first class practice' and were in excellent order, enquiries had 
shown that they would together fetch less than enough to pay the debenture 
debt, or £1 20 ,000 - perhaps a third of the cost of their development. There 
was no alternative for either share or debenture holder but to keep BNGD 
going. A reconstruction through the setting up of a 'new' company of the same 
Papuan Courter, 5 May 1 922 (Mullins Hbr. ); 4 Aug. 1 922 (Koitaki); 9 May 1924 
(Dornara). 
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name was approved by the Chancery Division of the High Court in London in 
June 1 922. The assets of the 'old' company were purchased with three 1 0s.  
shares for each of the old £1 shares with 7s . 6d. regarded as paid. The call of 
2s. 6d. now available provided the enterprise with the capital to continue. The 
transfer of titles to the new company required a legislative enactment in Papua 
and a facilitating ordinance was passed by the Legislative Council in May 
1 923. Staniforth Smith, Administrator in Murray's absence, wrote to the 
Minister pointing to the figures showing the company's fmancial plight. He 
commented that 'they presented a very good picture of the tribulations and 
difficulties that have been the lot of all plantation owners in the Territory'.2 
Of the Clarke and Whiting connection, the Fairfax Harbour and North 
Fairfax Harbour sisal plantation enterprises ,  floated by Arthur Bloomfield as 
public companies in 1 909 with Clarke and Whiting backing, were now offered 
to the government for £75 ,000 as soldier settlement blocks.3 When the offer 
was declined the properties were abandoned. The price Bloomfield had asked 
for them probably represented the loss sustained by the shareholders in their 
development. 
Arthur Bloomfield himself suffered major losses. His 'agency house' 
venture, the Moresby Trading and Agency Company, went into liquidation, at 
least one of the staff suspected of criminal negligence or embezzlement. The 
agency's business passed to G. A. Loudon and Company, a new subsidiary of 
BNGD. Bloomfield's Galley Reach Plantation was incorporated into Kanosia 
in a settlement with Clarke and Whiting marked by some bitterness and 
reproach. Two of his companies were given special assistance. 4 Late in 192 1 
with 65 ,OOO pounds of unsold rubber on his hands, Bloomfield requested a 
Commonwealth guarantee for a bank loan in return for a lien on the 
debentures of Kemp Welch River Rubber Estates and New Guinea Rubber 
NAPNG & CRS G69, Item 23/5, Staniforth Smith to Senator George Pearce, 14 May 
1923. 
CRS Al 2 1 / 1 606 1 ,  'Fairfax Harbour Plantation Ltd. Papua Settlement of Soldiers', 
1 92 1 .  The Commonwealth Repatriation Act did not apply to Papua but special arrangements 
and loans of up to £625 were provided to returned soldiers who had been Papuan 'residents'. 
Among the beneficiaries were G. Harden, Leo Gors, John MacDonald, Frank Mahony, 
Reginald Chancellor and M. M. Fitzgerald. The Papuan Government was responsible for the 
collection of repayments on the loans including interest, £2,500 having been advanced. None 
of this was recovered and the loss was borne by the local revenue. (CRS Al 20/9467, and 
G69, Item 2/8/50) 
4 CRS Al 25 / 16087, Loans to Kemp Welch & N. G. Rubber Estates Ltd. Papua. 192 1 -
1925. A .  S .  Bloomfield had gone t o  Canada i n  July 1920 in a n  attempt to establish a direct 
trade. The Toronto Globe of 4 Aug. announced that there appeared to be a 'Vast field for 
Dominion enterprise opening up in British New Guinea', while the Gutta Percha and Rubber 
Company of Canada privately advised their visitor that 'he could not have come at a worse 
time'. (CRS A l  2 1  /5488) 
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Estates . Judge Murray discreetly supported this application and the 
guarantee was obtained and with extensions continued until 1 925 .  Arthur 
Bloomfield had by then withdrawn from all his Papuan interests. In 1 926 he 
ventured again into tropical agriculture with the purchase of a plantation, 
Malhua, in Fiji. 
In Melbourne in March 1 922, and with support from R. S. Whiting and 
Bloomfield and an 'Association of Planters' lobby, Judge Murray tried to 
persuade the federal government to undertake to buy the whole of Papua's 
copra production at cost until prices rose above £ 1 8  a ton. He had earlier 
proposed that the Commonwealth compensate the Territory for the likely 
effects of the Navigation Act by imposing a preferential tariff on copra from 
elsewhere in the Empire of £1  a ton and on 'foreign' copra of £2 a ton.5 But 
locked into an intricate set of tariff provisions and having many interests to 
balance, Australian federal ministries and their advisers were unprepared, it 
seems, to contemplate changes unless the political price to be paid for 
inaction became too high. It was expected that partisan producers would cry 
for assistance as they began to be pressed, but experience suggested that 
such suppliants could always endure more than they admitted. Later in the 
year the Assistant Director of Navigation was sent to Port Moresby and Rabaul 
to investigate the effects of the Act on the two island territories. He attempted 
to weigh the interests of Australian manufactures, shipping and trade in the 
Pacific generally against those of the settlers to whom he spoke, whom, apart 
from those 'directly or indirectly dependent on Bums Philp' , he found 
everywhere 'in favour of the total exemption of their trade from the restrictions 
of the Act'. He recommended that vessels on Burns Philp's Singapore run be 
permitted to call at territory ports and upgraded to take white crews.6 The 
Commonwealth continued to wait. 
The Papuan Government was forced to reduce the copra export duty to 
1 5s. a ton. Bums Philp in tum was induced to lower freight rates for Papuan 
produce shipped to Sydney from 45s.  to 35s. a ton with through bills of lading 
to London at £4 1 0s.  a ton on consignments above twenty-five tons. The 
proceeds of copra f.o .b . at Port Moresby rose from £14  a ton on a c.i .f. London 
price of £2 7 in 1 922 to £ 16  a ton on a London price in 1 923 of £25 . Staniforth 
Smith estimated production costs at the time at £ 1 2  a ton on a fully bearing 
plantation yielding eight hundredweight an acre though few plantations could 
Papuan Courter, 10 Feb. 1922; the earlier proposal is in CRS A5 18 A.M. 8 1 2 / 1 / l ,  
Part 2 ,  Murray to Minister, 1 1  Feb. 1 920. See below p .  264 for reference to the Melbourne 
'Association of Planters'. 
CRS A5 1 8  Item A. M.8 1 2 / l / 1 , Tariff Board Memorandum, 1 2  Aug. 1924. 
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match this. 7 It seemed, nonetheless, that planters might just survive without 
assistance after all. 
But the sense of grievance over the Navigation Act would not abate. In 1 923 
in a move to open up a direct link with Europe and so escape the Act's 
restrictions , BNGD chartered a steamer to deliver petroleum supplies to Port 
Moresby and ship copra to London. The vessel, the Pruth, was wrecked at the 
very entrance to Basilisk Passage within sight of the town on Sunday 30 
December. 
Assisted by journalists in the Australian papers who found Burns Philp an 
easy target, opposition to the Act finally led to the appointment of a Royal 
Commission in August 1 924.8 In evidence the Port Moresby Chamber of 
Commerce tellingly charged that 'Rice, copra sacks, and other things which 
we must import from Asia are taken past our very doors to Sydney and 
transhipped back to Papua, involving extra handling and double freight' while 
Papua had 'to compete in the markets of the world with other countries 
employing coloured labour and whose produce is delivered to the markets 
direct by ships carrying coloured crews'.9 The Majority Report of the 
Commission accepted that damage had been done to the trade of the 
territories and recommended that the carrying of passengers and cargoes 
between Australia and territory ports no longer be deemed 'coastal' trade. The 
Commissioners pointed to the anomaly of having treated Papua as part of 
Australia under the Navigation Act while continuing to regard it as a foreign 
country under the Tarljf Act. One Commissioner, Senator G. E .  Yates, in a 
Minority Report, took the view that Papua had never been prosperous, that its 
industries would continue to be uncompetitive, that Australian interests 
required the maintenance of the NavigationAct and that the consequences for 
the territories should indeed be borne by the Commonwealth. 10  In August 
1 925,  the Majority Report having been accepted, the restrictions on Papua 
and New Guinea imposed by the Act were removed. 
In the meantime both planter representatives and the Lieutenant Governor 
sought to persuade the Commonwealth to concede tariff protection to Papuan 
produce. It was an issue raised with Poynton and one he had agreed to 
consider further. And for the copra producers, whatever the outcome of the 
struggle over the Navigation Act, there remained the burden of the Papuan 
export levy. Sir Robert McCheyne Anderson, an Australian elected to the 
NLA Deposit 1709, Staniforth Smith Papers, item 565, 'Valuation of Coconut 
Plantations' - an exhaustive analysis apparently prepared for the Expropriation Board 1n the 
Mandated Territory. 
8 CPP 1 925, pp. 1323-43, Second Report of the Royal Commission on the Navigation Act 
Ibid. ,  p. 1 1  (p. 1335). 
10 Ibid. , Yates's Minority Report ls on p. 15 (p. 1339). 
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board of BNGD in 1 922 as its 'local' representative, wrote in July 1 923 to 
Senator Pearce, Poynton's successor as Minister for Home and Territories ,  
urging abolition of the remaining duty of 1 5s .  a ton, and proposing a list of 
preferences. He was invited to make his submissions to a hearing of the Tariff 
Board in September attended by Judge Murray and a delegation of the Port 
Moresby Chamber of Commerce led by Arthur Jewell. 1 1  
The Tariff Board agreed that the copra levy was an excessive imposition 
upon an unprofitable industry and were prepared to recommend its 
replacement with a bounty of 15s .  a ton to be paid by the Commonwealth to 
the Papuan government. Murray objected that an export tax ultimately 
promised the only means whereby the administration could hope to become 
self-supporting whenever prosperous times finally came. An increase by way 
of a bounty in the Commonwealth's subsidy was 'a step in the wrong 
direction' . A precedent would be set and a principle conceded. Export duties 
were levied in most Pacific territories including the Mandated Territory, and 
Papua could not be expected to abandon a just claim on this form of 
revenue.12 To head off a collision he acted quickly to persuade planters to 
accept a revised arrangement whereby duty would be levied at the rate of 10% 
of the amount that the price quoted in London exceeded £25 .  He was able to 
present this to the Board as af alt accompli. 
In commending the Lieutenant Governor's scheme to the Port Moresby 
Chamber of Commerce, the Government Secretary, Herbert Champion, 
pointed out that the greater part of the export duty was in fact being met by 
English and Australian shareholders in the larger companies and that this, 
at least, was to be preferred by residents to any increase in import duties 
which he posed as the alternative revenue measure. 13  This was an argument 
used by Murray himself on several occasions though it would have found little 
support among small planters who had no shareholders onto whom to pass 
their losses. Larger planters could only be dismayed. Indeed, when a copy of 
Champion's letter was forwarded to Sir Robert Anderson he commented to the 
Minister that 'for cynical frankness it leaves nothing to be desired. In plain 
English the principle is laid down that the Government has to be maintained 
by outlanders who had foolishly found capital and consistently lost it' . 14  It 
was an attitude, Anderson thought, that would 'kill the goose that lays the 
golden egg' . Believing that the Chamber of Commerce had been led too easily 
1 1 CRS A5 l 8 Item A.M. 8 1 2  / 1 / 1 , Part 1 ,  Acting Chairman Tariff Board to Senator 
Pearce, 4 Sept. 1923. 
1 2 Ibid. , Murray to Minister, 17 July 1924, and Memorandum, 24 Feb. 1925. 
1 3 Ibid . ,  Government Secretary (Papua) to Chamber of Commerce Port Moresby, 29 Jan. 
1924. 
1 4  CRS A5 18 Item A. M. 812 / 1 / 1 ,  Part l ,  Sir Robert Anderson to Senator Pearce, 5 Dec. 
1924. 
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to accede to the government's scheme he suggested that the duty should not 
be levied unless the f.o.b. price at Port Moresby was above £ 1 8  a ton, the cost 
of production on at least some plantations.  In any case, he pointed out, the 
c .i.f. London prices quoted were usually for Straits Settlements copra that 
fetched an average of £ 1 a ton more than South Seas copra. Certainly for 
further investment in copra plantations the goose was already quite dead in 
Papua as elsewhere as the energies of company directors and planters for 
much of the following decade and more were heavily committed to protecting 
the existing investment from attrition. 
In April 1 925 the Commonwealth Analyst and Advisor to the Minister for 
Customs , Percy Wilkinson, visited both Papua and New Guinea to prepare a 
report for the Tariff Board and Cabinet on how encouragement might be given 
to expand the planting of economic crops for Australian consumption. On his 
return to Melbourne he met the Parliamentary Public Accounts Committee 
then considering the question of Papuan development. And in Sydney he held 
discussions with Sir Robert Anderson, G. A. Loudon, J .  R. Clay - a shipping 
agent at Samarai, and the Rev. C. F. Rich of the LMS, to get their views.15  
Both the Chambers of Commerce at Port Moresby and at Samarai had 
sought a bounty of 40s. a ton on Papuan copra while the government 
recommended an Australian duty on 'Foreign' copra. When the provisions of 
the Papua and New Guinea Bounties and Preference Acts were finally 
announced in April 1 926 both government and planters were disappointed as 
no assistance was offered either copra or rubber producers.  1 925-26 was 
colonial Papua's one year of prosperity due principally to the trebling of the 
price of rubber and a fourfold increase in the volume of copper exported from 
the Laloki mine. If copra exports increased only modestly in volume and value 
there seemed no pressing need to provide either for protection or 
encouragement. 
In 1 925 Judge Murray was knighted in the New Year Honours list. The 
stormiest years were well past and prosperity seemed, for a brief moment, to 
hand. As the rubber prices rose the value of exports exceeded imports for the 
first time since 1 906 when both had been by comparison negligible. Koitaki 
paid its second dividend in eighteen years and BNGD its first in sixteen years 
of operations in Papua - a modest 5% . By 1 927 the brief euphoria had 
subsided and the surplus of imports over exports resumed. Here was the true 
indicator of the Territory's chronic poverty. Only the continued injection into 
the plantation and mining companies of shareholders' funds, much of it 
proffered most unwillingly after 1 9 1 4, together with the annual 
26. 
1 5  CRS A l  26 I 86,  ·p, Wilkinson (Cwth Analyst) Visit to Papua and New Guinea'. 1 925-
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Commonwealth subsidy to the revenue, allowed the Papuan colonial economy 
to pay for the disparity between its earnings and its expenditure. 
The Customs Tarlff (Papua and New Guinea Prejerence) Act of 1 926 waived 
tariffs on coffee, whole coconuts, prepared coconuts, kapok seeds, ginger and 
tropical fruits entering Australia from the two territories. It was a measure 
taken at a moment when Australia itself and the world economy appeared to 
have 'turned the comer' after the post-war depression and when some gesture 
of generosity towards the dependencies could be afforded. Briefly buoyant, 
copra and rubber - as noted above - received no benefit. 16 Though Papuan 
products were still subject to the primage duty of 2 .5% , the umbrella provided 
by the preference over both 'Foreign' and 'Empire' imports was enough in the 
following years to allow the development of a desiccated coconut i.Qdustry, 
with factories at Ahioma in Milne Bay and at Hisiu, and to renew interest in 
growing coffee. 17 
A Papua and New Guinea Bounties Act passed in the same session of the 
Federal Parliament made up to £25 ,000 available for claim annually in the ten 
years until 3 1  December 1936 to encourage the production within the 
territories of commodities currently imported into the Commonwealth from 
elsewhere. The schedule included sisal hemp and kapok fibre, bamboo and 
rattans, cocoa, vanilla, and various spices, and all in a 'raw' state that would 
reserve for Australian workers the further manufacture of the materials. The 
Act came too late for sisal hemp and the industry spluttered to a halt despite 
the bounty now offered of £6 a ton. A revival in 1 930 was shortlived. 18 Of the 
remainder of the products listed, only a little cocoa was exported and this 
came from a few trees planted years before. The other items seemed more 
appropriate to smallholder development and it was a measure of the prevailing 
pessimism that £8, 783 was all that was paid out in bounties from the possible 
£250,000 in the ten years spanned by the Act. Nearly all of the claims were 
accounted for in subsidies to cocoa production in the Mandated Territory.19 
Arthur Jewell was appointed a Member of the Legislative Council in 1 924. 
In view of his long association with the opposition to Murray's administration, 
the honour attached to the appointment - and Murray's offer implicit in it to 
forget the past - placed Jewell in the Lieutenant Governor's debt. Their 
relations remained formal, an arrangement that suited both men, though the 
new MLC came to be on first-name terms with Leonard Murray. While elected 
1 6  CRS A5 1 8, Item A M  8 1 2 /  1 / 1 ,  Part 2; and A l  26/86. 
17  See below p. 208 (desiccated coconut) and p. 240 (coffee). 
18 See below p. 233. 
19 CRS A5 1 8  Item A M  8 1 2/ 1 / 1 ,  Part 2,  Memorandum: Halligan to Minister, 3 May 
1937. A Memorandum of 1 2  April 1 932 records that £20 had been paid out in 1 927- 1 929 
as a bounty on cocoa in Papua, and £40 on sisal hemp. 
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representation was never achieved, Jewell's appointment in many ways 
effectively enfranchised the leading planters, and thereafter, while they might 
remain privately critical of government policies and publicly oppose particular 
decisions, these settlers could not again believe that their interests went 
entirely unconsidered, at least by the Papuan Government. 
Jewell was a good choice. His responsibilities as general manager of Pacific 
and Papua Produce, with its plantations at Lolorua in the Central Division 
and the Conflict Islands in the Eastern Division - together with Millicent 
Jewell's interest in Sagarai plantation which she bought in 1 93 1  from the 
liquidators of Mullens Harbour Plantations - took the MLC frequently to 
Samarai. He possessed a courtly manner that impressed others in 
negotiations, and proved an alert and skilful defender with Sir Hubert Murray 
of the common Papuan interest in the seventeen years from 1 924 until the 
cessation of civil government in 1 942 .20 
The value of the Territory's exports rose from £ 1 79,452 in 1 922-23 with a 
trading deficit of £ 1 35 ,96621 , to £685 ,896 in the annus mlrabills of 1 925-26 
with a surplus of £2 1 5 ,  1 22 when 8,6 1 9  tons of copra realised £204, 1 25 ,  and 
642 tons of rubber £ 194,849 .22 A further £20 1 ,732 was obtained for 1 1 ,466 
tons of copper ore. In the following year incteased production of copra and 
rubber brought lower returns and with the sudden collapse of the copper 
industry, the Papuan economy was again trading at a loss. By 1 928-29 
exports were valued at less than half of those of the peak year. From 1 930-3 1 
onwards until 1 937-38 the trade of the Territory showed a small surplus. But 
the Commonwealth subsidy was reduced after 1 930, and with no further 
investment, the money economy had to live within its means. Commercial 
agriculture was far from flourishing. If rubber exports rose slightly the returns 
were less than a third of those of 1 926 and copra production steadily declined 
both in volume and value. In 1938-39 gold production was valued at 
£ 1 50,000, more than twice the returns from copra, and exceeding those from 
rubber by over £30,000. Renewed interest in investment in rubber planting 
from 1 936, a revival in oil exploration and the rapid increase in military 
expenditure just prior to the outbreak of the Pacific War in 1 94 1  allowed the 
country once more to afford a large deficit. The defence of the investments in 
rubber and coconut plantations that overwhelmingly preoccupied planters in 
the years after 1 926 , together with an account of the failed attempts to 
20 In 1 925 Jewell became also 'unofficial member' of the Executive Council elected by 
the Legislative Council under an amendment of the Papua Act. His company, Paclflc and 
Papua Produce Ltd, became Anglo-Papuan Plantations Ltd in 1935. Jewell remained one of 
three directors of the 'new' company. 
2 1 PAR 1 922-23, 9.  
22 PAR 1 925-26, 74 
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establish other commercial agricultural industries over the whole period 1 900-
1 942, form the subject of the next Part. 
The BNGD Company shed the Samarai branch of its trading operations in 
1 926. The purchasers were Burns, Philp and Company. While G .  A. Loudon 
withdrew as general manager in that year, G. A. Loudon and Co. the BNGD 
retail store and plantation agency subsidiary, continued to do business under 
this name for another two years until its functions were resumed by the 
original trading arm of BNGD and residual wholesale and import agency, the 
BNG Trading Company.23 The parent company appointed George William 
Guttridge, an Englishman with Indian experience, to succeed Loudon - though 
as attorney rather than general manager. Guttridge played golf, was a fine 
chess player and 'a great entertainer' in Port, and Murray appointed him to 
the Legislative Council in 1 93 1 .  He is believed never to have visited any of his 
company's estates24 and were it not for the good fortune that Tom Nevitt had 
succeeded Archie MacAlpine in 1 927 as BNGD's plantation inspector the 
company might have collapsed.25 Nevitt, a Queenslander with a laconic wit 
and a character much liked in the settler community, had come to Papua as 
an assistant on Clarke and Whiting's Rorona estate in 1 9 13 .  When Guttridge 
returned to England in 1 933 Nevitt became general manager of BNGD, a 
position held until his retirement in 1 95 1 . He became an MLC in 1935 . The 
old antipathy between the 'bung' company and the government was well 
buried, the rules in Papua were established and infrequently challenged, and 
the relationship between the officials, the planters , and very probably too most 
Papuan coastal communities, had become almost domestic. 
Though now subdued, settlers privately could still persist in believing that 
even were trading conditions for the Territory's products to improve markedly 
the Papuan planters must continue to be competitively disadvantaged as a 
consequence of Murray's 'native policy' . Certainly they had cause to be 
grateful to the Lieutenant Governor for all he had done for them since 1 922 
and they were quite unwilling any longer to openly criticise his administration. 
But they were also well aware that the minimum wage for native labour in 
Papua remained double that prevailing in the Mandated Territory to the north. 
Here, surely, we may think, they might have found good grounds for protest 
in the worst of times. Yet there was little direct demand in the depression 
years for the lowering of wages. Rather it is clear that planters consistently 
preferred to argue for Australian tariff concessions to remedy their losses or 
to compensate for greater costs - however these latter might be attributed -
23 The BNG Trading Company too was sold to Burns Philp in 1 933 , BNGD's interests 
thereafter being solely in plantation enterprise. See below p. 2 1 1 .  
24 Interview: B. E. Fairfax-Ross, 1 1  June 1 973. 
25 Archie MacAlpine died in 1 927, Tom Nevitt in 1964. 
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whether to the higher wages paid to native workers or to the higher price of 
supervision, transport and supplies in Papua. Perhaps by the early twenties 
settlers knew that Murray would never agree to a reduction in wage rates just 
as he could not be moved in other matters and that Australian ministries 
would support his government. It was in desperation and almost apologetically 
that the chairman of BNGD, General F. C. Stanley, wrote to the Lieutenant 
Governor in October 1 933 to appeal for further assistance to copra growers 
with the plea that labour costs were after all the most serious impediment to 
profitability in Papua. 
We do not wish to suggest that the natives employed on coconut plantations in 
Papua should be accorded less favourable treatment than has been customary, but 
the fact remains that the terms of employment required by your Government result 
in the operating costs being on a higher scale than in other tropical countries 
producing similar products, and it is consequently impossible to reduce costs in 
Papua as much as elsewhere.26 
And Samuel Thompson, the BNGD secretary in London since 1 9 10,  clearly 
expressed a settled view long taken by officers of his company - and we might 
presume shared by many others - when he wrote to Tom Nevitt in 1 938 that 
Labour in Papua is better treated than in other tropical countries and therefore 
more expensive, and they should reimburse Papuan planters for the extra cost by 
means of a preferential tariff . . .  27 
It seems that employers accepted that a minimum cash wage of 1 0s .  a 
month had indeed become 'customary' and that it could not be tampered with 
without an effect on the labour supply that was unpredictable. Certainly 
Papuan labourers who made comparisons between their own apparent poverty 
and the wealth of the white men among them could only remain perfectly 
unaware of any relative advantage they were supposed to have over plantation 
workers in other parts of the world. 
26 ANUABL, BNGD Letterbooks, Stanley to Murray, 18 Oct. 1933. 
2 7  Ibid. ,  Thompson to Nevitt, 18 Nov. 1 938. 
PART V 
The fortunes of the industries 
It is some years now since the Australian Government asked for 
increased rubber production in Papua and promised help in some 
form or other but nothing whatever has been done. It is very 
disappointing, particularly in view of the fact that we and others did 
a good deal of planting on the faith of such promises . . .  Australian 
promises go for nothing. 
Samuel Thompson (Secretary of the British New Guinea Development Company, 
London), to Tom Nevitt (General Manager of BNGD in Port Moresby), 18 Nov. 
1938. 
That there was over-expansion of investment in raw materials 
production during, and immediately after, the war is clear. Raw­
material productive capacity proved to be far in excess of the 
demand from European and American industry in the 1 920s.  The 
terms of trade for primary producers worsened. By 1 92 1 , their 
terms were only 70 per cent of 1 9 1 3  and, although they recovered 
between 1 922 and 1 929 to 84 per cent of 1 9 1 3, they fell again after 
1 930 to a level below even that of 1 92 1 . 
Michael Barratt-Brown, After Imperfaltsm, 1970. 

CHAPTE R 1 6  
Defending the stake :  copra and rubber 
1 921 - 1 942 
IN 1 92 1  RUBBER tapping in Papua became uneconomic, and copra prices 
also began to fall rapidly as in an international recession the extent of over­
capacity in tropical plantation production throughout the world became 
apparent. The pattern of pre-war trade in the tropical commodities had 
resumed with some increase in volume as the economies of the European 
belligerents re-adjusted to the peace. Britain and France had been greatly 
weakened by the war but retained their advantage as possessors of immense 
overseas investments including those in tropical export produce. Germany too 
was soon importing rubber at the pre-war level, and the growth of the motor 
car industry in all the major industrial states promised an expanding market 
at least for rubber. But the extent of the planting explosion before 1 9 1 4, 
predicated as it had been upon very optimistic expectations of future levels of 
consumption , was bound even without the interruption of the war to lead to 
the lowering of prices. The pressure to secure tropical commodities at the 
lowest possible cost in combination with their domination over populations in 
the colonies to whom they were politically unaccountable had allowed the 
metropolitan powers to impose terms of trade on their dependencies that -
while seeming to represent an improvement in the conditions of life of the 
subject peoples - had encouraged immense expansion in plantation industries 
based upon very cheap labour. In the South Seas an abundance of land and 
subsistence food might secure a degree of protection for the Island peoples but 
in many other countries dependence upon plantation industries would provide 
a formidable barrier to further betterment in the lives of colonised 
communities. With the margins of profit reduced to the minimum, both 
investors in 'over-extended' industries and low paid workers who laboured on 
tropical estates had now to contend with the cycle of inflationruy boom 
followed by deflationary bust seemingly inherent in the operation of market 
economies. Only expanding consumption in the metropolitan countries 
ultimately promised profitability for plantation enterprise - and, perhaps, the 
filtering down to plantation workers in the colonies of some small measure of 
increased purchasing power. A world economy in recession represented 
disaster, and the investors and distant planters in coconut plantations, in 
particular, could feel trapped. They had been led on by the guarantees of 
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William Lever and others in the almost universal optimism of the pre-war 
generation, and since by the hope that prosperity would follow the peace. The 
hopes of 1 9 1 8  now dashed, the optimism of 1 9 1 4  seemed quite muve and 
certainly irreclaimable in 192 1 .  
Copra 
An average coconut palm bears around forty nuts a year and about 5 ,OOO 
nuts are needed to produce a ton of copra, the kernels losing about 45% of 
their weight in drying. On coasts with volcanic soils in New Guinea palms may 
produce up to eighty nuts and it might take only around 4,000 to make a ton, 
while on some atolls 7 ,OOO nuts might be required. Thus an acre of about 
fifty-six mature palms will produce on average about four hundredweight of 
copra a year or about a ton every five acres but 1 00 acres might produce as 
much as fifty tons in favoured areas or as little as twelve tons on poor soils. 
Fifty thousand acres, the area of Papua's plantations in the 1 930s, produced 
scarcely 1 0,000 tons . Some of the larger, better situated and better managed 
properties - like the government's Baibara plantation on Orangerie Bay - came 
close to producing two tons of copra from five acres. Smaller plantations must 
have done much less well considering that village groves and plantations set 
up under the government's Native Plantations scheme accounted for some 
part of the copra exported. 
Throughout the period to 1 942 prices quoted for copra in Papua and New 
Guinea were the c.i.f. landed prices obtaining in London. Freight from 
plantation to port - in the case of Papua freight to Port Moresby or Samarai -
and freight to Sydney or Europe together with handling charges and an 
allowance for further shrinkage of copra aboard ship (with resulting weight 
loss) meant that the return to the grower was between half and three fifths of 
the quoted price. The cost of production was variously estimated as between 
£ 10  and £ 1 8  a ton with freight to London seldom less than £5 a ton. 
Palms begin to bear commercial quantities of nuts after eight years and 
those planted in Papua between 1 907 and 1 9 1 4  began to come into bearing 
during the war years. The extent of the commercial coconut plantations 
increased from 1 ,000 acres in the former year to 34,000 acres in 1 9 1 5- 16 .  
Tonnage and value of copra exported rose from 1 ,  1 00 tons valued at £ 1 9,000 
in 1 9 1 5- 1 6  to over 2,000 tons valued at £40,000 in 19 1 6- 1 7, outstripping gold 
for the first time as Papua's chief export. Tonnage doubled again and values 
tripled by 1 9 1 9-20 with copra valued at £ 1 24,000 accounting for half the 
value of all exports in that year. These results were achieved in the face of the 
diversion and loss of ships in the war and their dearth in the years 
immediately following. 
Between 192 1 and 1 925,  when the burden of the Navigation Act was lifted 
from Papua and New Guinea, copra producers in the territories could still 
believe that their difficulties were almost wholly due to its effect. And the 
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coincidence of finding the market briefly favourable in 1 925 could seem to 
confirm their view. But to confirm other predictions - those made by the 
representatives of Bums Philp before the recent Royal Commission - the 
exemption of the territories from the Act brought no rush of new shipping to 
Papua. 1 In the late twenties direct freighting of copra to San Francisco 
commenced through the agency of Houlder Brothers, a London based 
company with offices in Sydney and Port Moresby which had traded in 
Papuan timber since 1 9 1 4. It now became convenient for American ships 
discharging cargo at Australian ports to call occasionally at Port Moresby and 
Samarai and fill otherwise empty holds with copra on the return voyage. In 
the thirties the vessels of the Dutch KPM Line on the Sydney to Batavia run 
resumed calling but mainly to set down or take on passengers, and Bums 
Philp's hold on the overseas trade of Papua remained largely unchallenged. 
And if the recovery of 1 925 had provided an opportunity to pay modest 
dividends , it did not lead to any further investment in coconut cultivation. The 
life of the white coconut grower became one of constant struggle to make ends 
meet, one providing the barest of 'civilised' livings and carried on for much of 
the period until 1 942 only in the hope that 'we might tum the comer'. 
Of the world production of copra in 1 926 of 897 ,OOO tons, about 250,000 
tons was 'South Seas' copra, including 24,000 tons from Fiji , 50,000 tons 
from the Mandated Territory of New Guinea, and 1 2  ,OOO tons (or 1 .3%) from 
Papua. There was some reluctance on the part of crushers in Europe to pay 
as much for South Seas copra as for Ceylon (43,500 tons),  Java (206 ,000 
tons) or Straits Settlements ( 146,000 tons) copra, the reason being the very 
great variability in the quality of the South Seas production in the absence of 
a standard system of grading.2 
The Samoan Government in 1 92 7 was the first to introduce an ordinance 
to control the quality of copra produced in the villages where the worst copra 
presented for sale had tainted the reputation of the best produced on the 
plantations. Fijian planters sought a similar ordinance the following year 
when after continental crushers had amalgamated to form a Margarine Union 
it appeared that South Seas copra might face complete exclusion from the 
European market. 
PAR 1 926-27, 3-4. The Parliamentary Joint Committee of Public Accounts visited 
Papua in Oct. 1926. It was proving difficult to obtain tenders for the subsidised Papuan Mail 
Contract - and therefore the •trunk' service to Papuan ports - from any shipping line other 
than Burns Philp. Burns Philp itself could affect some reluctance. See K. Buckley and K. 
Klugman, The Australian Presence in the Pac!flc: Bums Phllp, 1 91 4-1 946 (Sydney 1983), 1 99-
202. 
CRS A5 18, 08 1 2 / 1 / 1 , 'Territories Commerce - General Copra Industry, 1 9 19-1932, 
Assistance by Empire Marketing Board', Memorandum to Prime Minister, 1 8  Apr. 1 929. 
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After an Imperial Conference held in London in 1 926 an Empire Marketing 
Board had been formed to collect and disseminate information and to 
facilitate, if possible, the rationalisation and integration of commodity 
production within the British Empire. The Board agreed to contribute to the 
costs of establishing in conjunction with the Fijian Government a coconut 
research station in Fiji. Papua and New Guinea planters made representations 
to the Board for similar assistance in the Australian territories,  an approach 
the United Kingdom Government was, understandably, unwilling to 
entertain.3 The Australian Government in turn was also concerned that there 
should be no direct contact between the planters in Papua and New Guinea 
and London that by-passed the co-ordinating body for research in Australia, 
the C.S.l.R. Subsequent requests made by the planters through the C.S.l.R. 
to secure the services of scientific advisers were gracefully declined by the 
Board.4 
With mounting apprehension as prices began to slide again some 
producers in Papua looked to alternative uses for coconuts. As noted 
previously, the Commonwealth Customs Tar![f (Papua and New Guinea 
Preference) Act of 1926 had the effect of establishing one new industry. Among 
tropical products from the territories to be admitted into Australia duty free 
the Act listed 'prepared coconuts'. In 1 927, W. H. Wright, the manager of 
Levers' only Papuan plantation, Giligili , began producing desiccated coconut. 
In 1 929 a group of Samarai merchants and planters led by the Burns Philp 
manager, George Aumuller, and the Bunting brothers invested in a 
desiccating factory at Ahioma, midway along the northern shore of Milne Bay, 
with a view to buying in nuts from the numerous Papuan groves around the 
bay as well as from the commercial plantations . 'Giligili' Wright undertook the 
management, and a desiccator was installed designed and built by the 
Samarai engineer, Norman Izod, who had earlier patented a widely admired 
copra drier. In the same year a second desiccating factory was established by 
a group of Central Division planters under the name Coconut Products 
Limited (though no connection with W. R. Carpenter Ltd's Rabaul subsidiary 
of the same name) on Hisiu beach. This was also equipped with an lzod 
Desiccator. Together with the production of several factories established 
around the same time in New Guinea desiccated coconut exported from the 
territories was given protected entry into Australia initially through an 
Ibid. ,  Memorandum, Halligan to Prime Minister, 3 May 1 929. 
Ibid. , Empire Marketing Board to Prime Minister (of Australia), 21 Jan. 1932. The 
C.S.I .R. (Council for Scientific and Industrial Research) became the Commonwealth Scientific 
and Industrial Research Organisation (C.S. I .R.0. ) in 1949. 
Defending the stake: copra and rubber 1921-1942 209 
�mbargo on all 'foreign' imports and subsequently through the tariff.5 By 
1 934, when the Papuan exports had reached 1 ,200 tons valued at £50,000 or 
an amount equivalent to the value of the copra exported in that year, the 
market became saturated and production had to be restricted. In 1 938 the 
two territories were exporting to Australia nearly seven million pounds weight 
of desiccated coconut or a pound for every man, woman and child in the 
Commonwealth. 
The c.i.f. London price for copra fell to £ 15 a ton in 1 929-30 and to as low 
as £1 1 the following year. Only the remission to the producers of the greater 
part of the benefit of the exchange gain in converting the Pound Sterling to the 
Australian Pound made by the shippers to the producers in the interest of 
maintaining a service through what was hoped would be a temporary slump 
eased the situation in any way.6 The Commonwealth had come belatedly to 
the rescue of the rubber industry with the imposition of a duty on rubber 
imported into Australia except that from Papua, but whereas rubber trees 
could rest if necessary without deterioration and with only little maintenance, 
coconuts continued to fall from the palms in season and out, and copra 
production fell only gradually. In the year of peak production, 1 928-29, 
1 2,500 tons brought in over £2 1 4,000. In 1 933-34, 8,000 tons were worth 
only £43,000. The larger companies made copra at a loss carried by the 
meagre return on their rubber. Smaller planters subsisted on credit and the 
declining trade in matches and ramls with the even more impecunious 
Papuans. In 1 934, with small plantations closing down and the larger estates 
obviously about to follow, the Papuan Government, to avert the calamity that 
only hope of relief had delayed for so long, voted £8,000 out of its insurance 
fund to be used as a subsidy. Assistance was provided for each ton exported 
at a rate that varied according to the distance of the plantation from the port 
of shipment. The recent stabilisation of rubber prices and a renewed interest 
in gold on Misima were all that staved off disaster for the revenue as copra 
reached a low £8 a ton. The Treasurer's report noted that 
Coconut planters have so long contended With adversity that one must fear, if prices 
do not reach a profitable level and remain there, the industry Will just fade out With 
the participants gMng up the unequal struggle. It is this industry we have always 
looked to absorb the bulk of our native labour.7 
Copra producers everywhere sought relief from colonial governments and 
drew attention to the anomaly of planters floundering while the Unilever 
'Combine' formed by the merger of the Margarine Union with Lever Brothers 
PAR 1 93 1 -32, 3, 3 1 .  For desiccated coconut exports see below, p. 3 13 .  Vavasseurs 
and Company Ltd of London acquired over half the shares in the Ahioma venture in 1 935. 
6 Ibid. , 4. 
PAR 1 934-35, 6.  
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in 1 929 continued throughout the depression to pay ample dividends. In the 
largest 'South Seas' producer, the Mandated Territory, the failure of the 
industry threatened the livelihood of the greater part of the European 
community in one way or another. Plantation salaries and wages for European 
employees were reduced and an ordinance passed granting a moratorium on 
mortgage payments due to the Custodian of Expropriated [German] Property. 
The Rabaul Times thundered that 
These huge mergers of the super-capitalistic combines are bleeding the world's 
producers to death and any government in any country is not only entitled but 
should consider it its immediate bounden duty to step in and protect those who are 
unable to protect themselves against the exploitation of huge concerns whose huge 
capital and immense profits make them an economic power in the land. 8 
Indeed the activities of the 'combines' gave 'the greatest fillip to present-day 
Communism'. The New Guinea Planters and Traders Association urged an 
approach to the United Kingdom Government to enquire into Unilever's 
affairs. A similar proposal was made by the Advisory Council of British 
Solomon Islands Protectorate meeting in October 1 933. 9 This one 
international company now bought more than 70% of the world's copra and 
was undoubtedly able to manipulate the . market in edible oils to ensure that 
the lowest possible prices were paid - even if its own plantations produced at 
a loss. Responding to inquiries Unilever's agents blamed the situation for the 
coconut planters on the very low prices prevailing for butter. 
The Empire Marketing Board, its members perhaps having realised the 
hopelessness ofreconciling the interests of producers and manufacturers, had 
ceased to exist in September 1 933.  There now remained no institutional 
mechanism either within the British Empire, or outside it, similar to the 
Rubber Growers Associations of Malaya and Ceylon , by which copra 
producers could work together towards an international agreement to 
maintain prices by restricting output. In Papua the export duty was reduced 
to a nominal 2s .6d a ton. In Fiji a Report on the Copra Industry suggested 
measures by which a bounty on copra might be funded, all wharfage charges 
and the export tax remitted, and Fiji copra compulsory graded and separately 
marketed. The Legislative Council meeting in Suva in March 1 934 
distinguished between the plight of the white planters and the relatively less 
serious position faced by the Fijian growers who could withdraw from the 
market and enjoy the continuing security offered by communal society and 
8 Rabual Times, 2 Feb. 1934. 
CRS A5 18 CB 1 2 I 1 I 1 ,  'Territories Commerce. General Copra Industry. Activities of Uni 
Lever Company', 1934- 1937. 
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the subsistence economy. 1° Conditions in Papua were comparable. Pacific 
Islanders generally enjoyed few advantages in marketing copra as 
smallholders except the capacity to survive a market collapse. 
Planters throughout the southwestern Pacific railed at what they believed 
were excessive freight charges and the low f.o.b . prices offered by Burns Philp 
to whom many had become heavily in debt. In the Mandated Territory both 
'Beeps' and W. R. Carpenter Ltd had obtained 'charging agreements' from 
planters as security for credit which, as the depression in the industry became 
prolonged, made foreclosures difficult to avoid. In Papua in 1933 , BNGD, 
having sold its Samarai trading business ,  G. A. Loudon & Co, to Bums Philp 
in 1 926, now also relinquished its British New Guinea Trading Company 
subsidiary in Port Moresby for £29 ,896 Stg. Burns Philp retained the trading 
company's name for its wholesale business and provided office space at their 
main building for BNGD - an arrangement that often led to confusion as to the 
relationship between the plantation company and the merchants. 
In Papua there were few 'charging agreements'. Burns Philp had avoided 
taking a direct interest in plantations in the Territory since the failure of the 
Hall Sound Company in 1 900. But by 1 935 with properties becoming available 
at prices well below the cost of their development, the 'Octopus of the Pacific' , 
having continued to prosper mightily, could now both afford and risk 
ownership. As a centre for its plantation operations, in February 1 936 the 
company bought Robinson River, the large and very productive coconut 
plantation of 3 ,400 acres near Abau developed and managed for the Horn 
family by BNGD. The price was £68,000 Stg, calculated as no more than the 
cost of development - or £20 an acre - but a high figure in view of the current 
state of the market. 1 1  In the same year the new Burns Philp subsidiary 
Robinson River Plantations Ltd bought Hagita, the old Milne Bay Rubber 
Company's coconut plantation adjacent to Giligili at the head of Milne Bay, 
and Dedele - the oldest plantation in Papua and once associated with Bums 
Philp as the private venture of the company's first manager at Port Moresby, 
Walter Gors. In 1939 Thomas McCrann's Baia plantation and the 
neighbouring Domara River Plantations rubber estate at Kauru were added 
to the Robinson River holdings. 
The collapse of copra had brought down all the old single estate companies 
that had depended primarily on coconuts. New owners, chief among them 
Burns Philp and Steamships Trading Company, would proceed with 
production when prices eventually rose again after the war of 1941 -45 
unencumbered by any heavy development debt. Captain Fitch's company, now 
1 0  Ibid. ,  The file contains the record of the meeting of the Fijian Legislative Council, 23 
Mar. 1934. The comment is made in the Governor's speech. 
1 1  Buckley and Klugman, The Australian Presence ln the Pac!fl.c, 27 1 .  
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Burns Philps' principal trading rival in Papua, began its acquisitions with 
Mamai, the plantation in the Elai Valley of the '.New Zealand owned Papuan 
Rubber and Copra Company, in a liquidation sale in 1934. The property had 
absorbed over £75 ,000 in shareholders' funds and had paid no dividend. 
Steamships acquired if for £875 . 12 Steamships went on to buy the two 
coconut plantations on the Vailala River. Maira, developed by Lewis Lett and 
since 1928 the property of J. F. Puxley, was purchased in 1 935 ; and Vaiviri, 
Donald MacDonald's place downstream, was bought from his widow in 1937. 
Captain Fitch also bought the New Guinea Rubber Estates property on the 
Kemp Welch in 1 935.  
Other estates to change hands were Sagarai, obtained by Millicent Jewell 
in 1 93 1  from Mullens Harbour Plantations, and Veimauri, bought in 1 936 by 
its manager Trevor Ward from the heirs of R. S. Whiting. Ward continued to 
manage for Clarke and Whiting at Rorona until 1 94 1 ;  Mrs Vera Ward 
managed Veimauri in conjunction with Veiya, a small adjacent property the 
Wards had owned since about 1 9 1 2. 
The successors of Clarke and Whiting offered Rorona for sale in 1940 but 
it could not be sold. Kanosia and Rorona remained their property until after 
the war when Steamships undertook the management. Only the recovery in 
rubber prices in 1 934 saved BNGD.13 A second reconstruction of its assets 
in 1 935 enabled the 'bung' company to pay its second dividend in twenty-five 
years. Its capital was now written down 60% from £478,53 1 to £ 1 9 1 ,4 12 ,  
perhaps half the development costs of  its rubber and coconut plantations 
alone. With a loan of £75 ,000 Stg from Burns Philp to pay off its maturing 
debentures, new shares were issued in 1937 with two valued at 2s. being 
offered for each of the old 1 0s .  ( 1 923) shares. 14 
1 2  Neal Nicklason, 'History of Steamships Trading Company Limited' in Second Walgani 
Seminar, The History of Melanesia (Canberra and Port Moresby 1 969), 242. 
1 3 Earlier, in 1 930, the companyseemed close to collapse when the Papuan Government, 
concerned that BNGD might not be able to honour its existing commitments to its labour, 
refused to accept the company's guarantees. The refusal in itself left the largest planter and 
employer open to the suggestion that the company might go into receivership. The 
application of a duty of fourpence a pound on 'foreign' rubber entering Australia in that year 
may have come just in time to save BNGD then. 
1 4 ANUABL Deposits 95, M37. BNGD Notice to Shareholders, 8 Nov. 1 935 . Directors' 
Report, 5 June 1 937. BNGD distributed no dividend before 1926 (5%) and then not another 
until 1 936 (3% ). Subsequently, with the company's capital heavily reduced and international 
rubber prices maintained at profitable levels, dividends were declared in 1937 (3% interim 
and 5% final), 1938 (2% and 3%), 1939 (2% and 5%), 1940 (2.5% and 5%), 1 941 (7.5%). 
(BNGD Annual Reports 1 9 1 1 - 1941 (ANUBL deposit 95)). BNGD over the years had written-off 
large losses sustained in the failure of the tobacco, sisal hemp and cotton industries and in 
the abandonment of areas planted with these cultures. 
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Yet, while company owned properties changed hands, most independent 
planters managed to survive with the assistance of the Papuan government's 
small copra bounty payable since 1934. The market rallied in 1936-37 when 
the c.i.f. price quoted in London rose again above £ 1 7  a ton. Papuan village 
producers, long inactive, also began again to contribute significantly to 
exports. But the recovery was brief, with prices falling steeply to £9 in 1939-
40. With 6,000 tons unsold on hand in August 1 940, Loudon, Jewell, Nevitt 
and Fitch requested the Administrator to radio their proposals to Canberra for 
temporary assistance to 'save the total loss of the assets' of the industry. In 
January Leonard Murray attended a conference in Australia to consider the 
problems facing all the 'South Seas' producers. 15 The conference 
recommended the establishment of a combined Copra Marketing Board with 
a local board in each territory, but in June under the National Security 
Regulations the Commonwealth undertook to buy existing copra stocks in 
Papua and New Guinea for a maximum of £4. 1 Os a ton and cover the freight 
from plantation to port.16 It was bare relief at the last possible moment as 
many plantations had by then paid off their labour and ceased production. 
Some were re-opened late in 1943 as the Japanese forces withdrew from 
Papua. Most did not resume production until 1945 .  
Rubber 
It was not until 19 1 5 - 1 6  that the first plantings of the rubber boom years 
began to yield their latex. In 1 9 14- 15  exports were valued at only £ 1 ,500. In 
the following year they were valued at £1 4,800 and in 1 9 1 6- 1 7  eighty-five tons 
were sold for £26 ,000. Thereafter, while tonnages increased, the price declined 
and by 1 920-2 1 220 tons realized scarcely more than had the eighty-five tons 
of 1 9 1 6- 1 7. When the price fell to 7d a pound in 1 922 tapping ceased on most 
estates, exports falling to fifty-seven tons in 1922-23 but rising to 304 tons in 
1 923-24 when the price again exceeded a shilling a pound. 
In the meantime the planted area under rubber in Malaya had increased 
to over 2.25 million acres. It had become obvious that Papuan rubber, like the 
other plantation products of the Territory, could not be produced at as low a 
cost as in Southeast Asia. If prices rose above a shilling a pound then a 
modest profit could be shown but the margin was narrower than for any of the 
'Eastern' producers. Planters blamed the poor roads, the absence of railways, 
the fees and duties imposed by the Papuan government, or the 
Commonwealth's parsimony, for the uncompetitiveness of their industry. They 
also attributed it to the scarcity, inefficiency and higher costs of Papuan 
labour. There were grounds for other explanations. As mentioned in Chapters 
15 Papuan Courter, 2 May 1 94 1 ;  and CRS 069 Item 26 /20. 
16 Papuan Courter, 20 June 194 1 .  
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1 1  and 1 2, in 1 9 1 8  the manager of Glenealy estate in Perak (FMS), George 
Wiseman, was invited by several of the Papuan rubber producers to visit their 
properties and suggest improvements. Wiseman noted that the labour force 
on Papuan estates was actually smaller by a third than that required on an 
equivalent acreage on Malayan plantations.  He thought this state of affairs 
might indeed be due to higher labour costs in Papua. Or so he told the 
Planters' Association. For he confided to Judge Murray, with whom he 
happened to travel to Australia as a fellow passenger at the end of his tour, 
that he believed the European managers and overseers employed in Papua 
inferior to the managerial class in Malaya and that this was the chief 
impediment to efficiency and profitability.17  
In 1 922 ,  a Ceylon planter, C.  F. Hutchinson, also visited Papua furnishing 
the Lieutenant Governor with a confidential report in which he too questioned 
the capacities of the 'digger' type of Australian employed on the estates, their 
number and their cost.18 He suggested that many could be replaced by 
employing assistants drawn from the Ceylon burghers or the Singhalese who 
could quite competently do much of the work currently carried out by white 
men in Papua but at greatly less expense. These overseers, clerks and artisans 
of the 'intermediate race' would then work under a greatly reduced staff of 
professional managers assisted by a department of qualified agricultural 
officers. He went on to recommend, as the planters had also frequently 
sought, the settlement of the families of labourers on the plantations and the 
employment of women - a situation that, if allowed, would make the labour 
force more dependent and more permanent. It was a suggestion deeply 
opposed, as we have seen, to Murray's policy of maintaining a balance 
between the need to provide just sufficient labour to meet the requirements 
of employers and the need to preserve the basis of Papuan society in the 
village by ensuring that time-expired labourers returned to their homes. 
Hutchinson came much closer to laying bare the causes of Papuan 
disadvantage. But there were others as well. 
From the beginning the very wide distribution of the estates and the 
consequent failure to consolidate holdings - together with the continuing 
small volume of the Papuan rubber export - had contributed to the higher 
costs of transport both within and from the country. Before 1 9 14 the Dutch 
KPM boats had called regularly at Samarai and Port Moresby on the Sydney­
Batavia-Singapore run and approval had been given to build a light railway 
from Port Moresby through the then flourishing sisal hemp, tobacco and 
cotton plantations of the lower Laloki valley to Sapphire Creek at the foot of 
1 7  CRS A l  1 9 /9923, ·a. Wiseman Report o n  Plantations, Papua', 1 9 1 8- 1 9. The fil e  also 
contains Murray's comments on Wiseman's reports submitted to him by Atlee Hunt. 
18 CRS A5 1 8  Item H l  1 2 /  1 'Papua Agriculture and Labour Reports', 1 922. 
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the Astrolabe Range where the ore of the Laloki copper mine and the rubber 
of the Sogeri plateau could be gathered in . The steel rails purchased in 
England by the successful tenderer, Elders, were already aboard ship when 
war was declared. They were diverted to Brisbane for more pressing use. After 
the war, with the continued shortage of shipping of any kind and the 
confinement of direct trade to Australian ships and ports imposed under the 
Navigation Act in 192 1 ,  there were only the Burns Philp vessels, no more 
tobacco, sisal or cotton plantations along the Laloki - they had proved 
unprofitable - and the copper mine had closed down.19 Until 1 942 the rubber 
of the Sogeri district had to be carried down a zigzag track from Hombrom 
Bluff on the back of mules to be met by trucks at Sapphire Creek. 
The post-war slump of 1 92 1 -22 was not confmed to Papua. In the 
immediate aftermath of the war prices for rubber had risen. American motor 
vehicle production had reached 2 .25 million in 1 920 and speculative boom 
conditions had again developed. Rubber acreage in Malaya increased by 
125 ,000 acres in 19 19  alone. Efforts to control inflation through credit 
restriction that resulted from a conference of the allies in Brussels led to a 
rapid collapse into depression. Car production fell by half a million in 192 1  
and a stockpile amounting to 1 1 0,000 tons of unsold rubber quickly 
accumulated. A committee under the chairmanship of Sir James Stevenson 
was set up to recommend some form of restriction of production that would 
force prices to rise. The Stevenson Committee proposed that an export tax be 
imposed in all the producing colonies and that output be limited to a 
percentage of productive capacity, to be decided annually, on the basis of 500 
pounds an acre for plantation rubber and 400 pounds an acre for smallholder 
rubber. The scheme was duly applied throughout the British rubber 
producing areas, 72% of the whole, and voluntarily accepted by British 
interests that controlled a third of production in the Netherlands Indies - the 
Dutch producers refusing to be party to the restrictions taking the view that 
competition should be allowed to run its course to eliminate the inefficient 
producer. The Americans took a similar view and saw the Stevenson scheme 
as a British 'imperial venture' which, at the expense principally of the United 
States, was designed to deprive automobile producers and consumers of 
cheaper rubber.20 
1 9 The mine was closed in 1 9 19 ,  re-opened in 1 92 1 ,  dosed in 1 922,  re-opened in 1924, 
and finally closed down in 1926. To later requests for a motor road beyond Sapphire Creek 
Murray could respond that the whole product of the Sogeri district amounted to 'no more 
than two lorryloads a day' . In CRS A5 18,  Item R9 18/3 "Planters' Association of Papua, 1936-
1950', Bulletin No.5, 8 Jan. 1 937. A light rail line was built from the mine to the coast at 
Bootless Bay. 
20 John Drabble, Rubber in Malaya 1 876-1 922 (Kuala Lumpur 1973), 1 98. 
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By April 1926 the Colonial Office permitted 1 00% production but warned 
that the percentage would be reduced again if the price of rubber on the 
London exchange fell below l s. 9d. a pound. In that year, planter Papua's one 
year of prosperity before 1942, the price reached 4s.7d. a pound. The 642 tons 
exported in 1 925-26 realized over £ 1 94, OOO, only a little short of the £204, 097 
earned on the 8,4 1 9  tons of copra produced.21 
As noted in Chapter 1 5 ,  the visit to both Papua and the Mandated Territory 
of New Guinea in 1 926 by the Commonwealth Analyst, Percy Wilkinson, was 
followed by the passage through the Federal Parliament of a Papua and New 
Guinea Bounties Act whereby £250,000 was set aside over ten years to 
encourage in the territories production of tropical commodities that Australia 
currently imported from the Netherlands Indies and elsewhere. Rubber, briefly 
buoyant, was not included in the schedule attached to the Act. 
Arthur Jewell MLC, representing the planters and temperamentally a 
cautious man, immediately proposed that rubber be added to the list, and 
that a bounty become payable if the price fell below a shilling a pound. 
Wilkinson thought it unlikely that the price would fall below 1 s. 9d. a pound 
and that, in any case, the industry would do well to establish its own 
stabilisation fund out of any return above this amount.22 By 1928, under 
pressure from rubber manufacturers in the United Kingdom, the British 
Government announced its intention not to impose further restrictions on 
production as from November of that year. Prices fell suddenly to 8d. a pound 
and Sir Hubert Murray pressed to have Jewell's proposal reconsidered.23 An 
immediate threat, it seemed, was posed to the continued existence of the 
rubber plantations, the livelihood of their thirty-six European managers and 
assistants and to the emp�oyment of 2 ,000 Papuan labourers. The effect on 
the Papuan revenue in reduced import duties, fees and receipts was likely to 
be very severe and the ramifications of collapse among the commercial 
community incalculable. The Stevenson scheme had had the effect of shifting 
American support to the Dutch producers and smallholder production in the 
Indies had rapidly expanded. It was now expected that Malayan planters 
would export at the maximum rate to reduce costs and no one could tell the 
depths to which the market might fall. 
The Commonwealth Analyst now concurred that the Papuan planters had 
a fair claim to support but Australia was becoming rapidly absorbed in its own 
economic crisis.24 Rubber production in Papua dropped from 8 1 1 tons in 
2 1  PAR 1 925-26, 74. 
22 CRS A5 1 8, Item P8 1 2 / l /5, 'Commerce Papua - Rubber Industry', Part l, Percy 
Wilkinson to Secretary, Home and Territories, 1 4  July 1 926 and 5 Oct. 1926. 
2 3  Ibid. , Murray to Minister, 20 Apr. 1 928. 
2 4  Ibid. , Memoranda of 12  and 23 May 1928. 
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1 928 to 470 tons in 1 929 as tapping was reduced. Over the next twelve 
months the price did not rise above 1 Od. a pound landed in London which 
yielded the Papuan grower less than the cost of production. Hard times had 
shown that rubber might just be produced at cost at this figure f.o.b. at Port 
Moresby. 
In February 1 930 Arthur Jewell went to Canberra in an attempt in person 
to persuade the government to include rubber within the scope of the Bounties 
Act out of the fund of which almost nothing at all had so far been paid to 
Papua. In July the price fell to 6d. a pound and Jewell wrote to the Minister 
for Industry, J .  A. Beasley, suggesting that if the bounty proposal was 
unacceptable then the government might consider placing an import duty of 
a penny a pound on all rubber entering Australia other than that from its 
territories .  This would represent almost £ 1 0,000 for every 1 ,000 tons 
imported. He pointed out that despite the decline in raw rubber prices 
manufacturers of rubber goods had not passed any saving on to Australian 
consumers. 
Here was an idea far better calculated to gain a receptive hearing from a 
Federal Government itself desperate for revenue than could an appeal for a 
bounty. The Comptroller General conceded in a memorandum that the 
increased burden on the Commonwealth that would result if the Papuan local 
revenue failed might not be inconsiderable.25 When rubber fell to 4d. a 
pound in November the House of Representatives passed a Tariff Resolution 
imposing an import duty of 4d. a pound on crude rubber other than that 
produced in territories of the Commonwealth. Considering how desperate the 
situation had become and the sheer weight of correspondence that had been 
required to wring this preference from Canberra, the fulsomeness of Jewell's 
gratitude was excessive: 'We were indeed fortunate in having a Mother 
Country in Australia to whom we could appeal for help', he telegrammed.26 
The Comptroller General was rather irritated by this reaction. He wrote to the 
Prime Minister, James Scullin, acknowledging that the tariff had given 
incidental assistance to a Papuan industry, but he thought it should be made 
quite clear that it had been primarily imposed as a revenue measure. Scullin's 
secretary noted that true as this may have been, such a view might best be 
withheld from the Lieutenant Governor.27 Meanwhile the Legislative Council 
in Port Moresby carried a further vote of thanks. 
215 Ibid. , Memoranda, Comptroller General to Secretary, Prime Minister's Department, 
3 Oct. and 6 Nov. 1930. 
26 Ibid. , Jewell to McLaren, 20 Nov. 1 930. 
2 7  Ibid . ,  Memoranda, Comptroller General to Secretary, Prime Minister's Department, 
16 July 1 93 1  and reply, 3 Aug. 1 93 1 .  
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Elsewhere prices dropped still further and below the 4d. a pound now 
regarded as the cost of production in Malaya. In Papua it was soon realized 
that even with the 4d. preference the Territory's rubber still laboured under 
the disadvantage of a higher primage duty - a flat rate duty of 2 .5% ad 
valorem imposed on all goods imported into Australia including those from 
Papua and New Guinea. The duty was levied on Malayan rubber before the 
tariff - on rubber entering the country at 3d. a pound in 1 93 1  - whilst Papuan 
rubber had primage levied on rubber valued at 7d. a pound making the 
Malayan product still cheaper, it seemed, for Australian manufacturers to buy 
tariff and all. Within a year the Tariff Board was of the opinion that the duty 
on an essential material like rubber was neither 'scientific nor rational' .28 
Arthur Jewell, vigilant as ever, pointed out to Murray in a letter forwarded to 
the Prime Minister that the London price had fallen to 2 l/2d. a pound and that 
the alternative to continuing the preference was the immediate collapse of the 
Papuan industry. Australian manufacturers and consumers, he argued, were 
paying less than the cost of production even with the 4d. duty.29 The 
Lieutenant Governor had eventually heard of the view of the Comptroller 
General that the tariff was no more than a revenue measure, and dismayed, 
he sought assurances that were not forthcoming, that the preference would 
be adopted as a permanent feature of Australian territorial policy.30 
With the fall of the Scullin ministry in November 193 1  manufacturers 
renewed their pressure for abolition of the tariff and it seemed that the 
planters and the Papuan Government had to go through the whole gamut of 
explanatory correspondence again to acquaint the new Prime Minister, Joseph 
Lyons, of Papua's predicament. Internationally, attempts made again in 1 932 
to regulate production failed as 'native producers' in the Netherlands Indies 
could not be effectively controlled. On Mincing Lane, the London hub of the 
rubber trade, brokers were accepting l .875d. a pound.31 
The Commonwealth tariff system traded off one interest group and industry 
against another where governments had to bear the electoral consequences 
of altering the balances. There was no constituency in Papua; there was only 
the cost that would accrue to the Commonwealth of failure to keep the 
territorial economy afloat. With the Papuan rubber industry regarded by the 
manufacturers as more of a nuisance than an asset, the balance was heavily 
weighted in their favour. It appeared that the new government would succumb 
28 Papuan Courter, 22 Jan. 193 1 ;  The Tariff Board Minute has not been sighted but a 
Minute Paper of 23 Jan. 1933 in CRS A5 18,  Item P8 1 2 / l /5 summarising events for the 
Prime Minister confirms this. 
29 CRS A5 18,  Item P8 1 2 /  1 /5,  Jewell to Leonard Murray, 1 Oct. 193 1 .  
30 Ibid. , Murray to Prime Minister (J. A. Lyons), 5 Nov. 1 93 1 .  
3 1  Papuan Courier, 24 Mar. 1932.  
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to pressure as trade unionists added their voice to those of the manufacturers. 
The Darling Harbour Branch of the Australian Labour Party, in protesting 
against the withdrawal of a subsidy to the shale oil industry that promised a 
domestic synthetic rubber industry, demanded the ending of the natural 
rubber 'subsidy' to 'New Guinea farmers'.32 
Only the rubber preference had saved Papuan commerce, and indeed the 
Papuan Government, from the worst effects of the great depression as the 
annual subsidy to the revenue made by the Commonwealth was reduced from 
£50,000 in 1 928-29 to £34,000 in 1932-33 . While the Papuan industry had 
been able to survive with the preference , the manufacturers had also derived 
the benefit of a savings in exchange, since in purchasing Papuan rubber they 
were not required to remit funds to London. Nonetheless, as the entire Papuan 
rubber production represented only about 8% of Australian rubber 
consumption, their desire to have the duty lifted was an overriding 
consideration. To press its case the leading importer, the Dunlop Perdriau 
Rubber Company, declined to buy any Papuan rubber as from 3 1  March 
1 932, ostensibly on account of the disadvantage in primage duty.33 The 
Executive Council in Port Moresby now asked for exemption from the primage 
for Papuan produce - though the Treasurer, E. C. Harris, was able to tender 
figures that demonstrated that when the exchange factor was considered 
Papuan rubber was indeed still cheaper than 'Eastern' rubber.34 Murray 
wrote 
I do not think that one can contest the argument of the Papuan rubber growers that 
the collapse of their industry would ruin many persons in the territory and would 
cause a loss to Australia far greater than anything that cheaper sales of rubber in 
Australia could possibly replace. The primage amounts to something like a 
halfpenny a pound and this on 800 tons . . .  doubtless amounts to a very large sum 
but I suggest that it would be worthwhile to gtve up this sum if thereby the 
objections of the merchants could be removed. 35 
On agreement that the excess primage be debited to the sellers' account the 
manufacturers agreed to extend their purchases of Papuan rubber for another 
year until 3 1 March 1 933. In January 1 933 Jewell and Harris went 'south' to 
be joined by Major Walker of Clarke and Whiting, and F. C. Tracy, BNGD's 
Sydney agent, to attend a conference with the Chairman of Dunlop, W. A. 
Watt, and the Minister for Customs, Colonel T. W. White.36 At the conference 
32 CRS A5 l 8, It�m PB 12 / 1 / 5 ,  Darling Harbour Branch of the ALP to the Prime Minister, 
4 May 1932. 
33  Ibid. ,  Jewell to Minister, 30 Nov. 1932, and a radio-telegram from Murray to the Prime 
Minister, 13 Dec. 1932.  
34 Ibid. ,  Memorandum E. C. Harris to Leonard Murray, 14 Dec. 1932. 
35 Ibid. , Murray to Prime Minister, 16 Dec. 1 932. 
36 Ibid. ,  Harris and Jewell to McLaren, 13 Feb. 1933 . 
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Watt complained about the expen�e of Customs supervision on the factmy 
floor where a drawback of duty could be claimed on Eastern rubber that was 
to be re-exported but not upon Papuan rubber. It was difficult to maintain a 
distinction between batches of rubber at the manufacturing stage merely on 
account of their place of origin. This the growers could acknowledge. But the 
main problem, as Watt saw it, was, and would continue to be, the cost of 
rubber production in Papua. If the Papuan industry was not competitive, did 
it deserve to survive? He privately told Tracy that Dunlop would be prepared 
to buy all the Papuan production at an agreed price - he suggested I Od. a 
pound - if the tariff were lifted from Eastern rubber. It was an offer that might 
have been very acceptable years earlier though it would, no doubt, have been 
tied to an agreement restricting extensions to rubber acreage in Papua. But 
the Federal Government's declared interest in the revenue remained and a 
private agreement was not now possible. 
The outcome of the meeting was a decision by the Commonwealth to 
impose a tariff of 4d. a pound and therefore equal primage on all rubber 
entering Australia but remitting the proceeds of the duty on the Papuan 
rubber component to the Papuan Government for disbursement to planters 
in the form of a Papuan rubber export bounty.37 Jewell and Harris returned 
to Port triumphant; the manufacturers remained outraged. A year earlier W. 
A. Watt had drawn his shareholders' attention to the iniquity of tariff and 
primage duties that amounted to upwards of 200% of the landed cost of an 
essential material and which cost their company alone £ 1 80,000 in the year 
1 93 1 -32.38 He felt no need also to acknowledge what everyone knew - that 
the Australian manufacturers were themselves very heavily protected from 
imports of cheap manufactured rubber articles. 
The triumph of Papua soured a little when it was found that Papuan 
rubber, like Eastern rubber, might now remain in bond for long periods and 
that bounty payments could only be made on receipt by the Papuan 
Government of the re-imbursement of duty after clearance. 
Then in October 1 933 it was announced in the Federal Budget speech, 
without warning, that the tariff on crude rubber was to be reduced to 2d. a 
pound. The Prime Minister hoped that the reduction would be passed on to 
the public in cheaper motor car tyres . Apparently the Federal Treasurer had 
had his attention drawn to the Annual Report of BNGD that indicated the 
average cost of production had dropped from 5 1/2d. to 4112d. a pound. A closer 
examination would have revealed these to be a pared down figures, produced 
for the jaded British shareholders, that included nothing beyond plantation 
37 Ibid. ,  Jewell to Minister, 27 Feb. 1 933.  
38 Ibid. ,  Dunlop Perdriau Rubber Company, Annual General Meeting, 30 Sept. 1 932. 
Chairman's address. 
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cost - not local or overseas freight, the interest due on loans or the 
amortisation of debt, or the 25% exchange payable on remission of proceeds 
to London.39 
By the beginning of 1 934 it seemed likely that the manufacturers would 
soon succeed in forcing the abolition of the tariff and that the question of 
assistance to the growers in Papua would be 'thrown into bold relief as 
[further support] would have to be by subsidy from the Australian Treasury'. 
Sir Hubert Murray was invited in April to furnish confidential proposals for 
such a contingency.40 
The Commonwealth also intended to set up a commission of enquiry into 
the industrial conditions prevailing in Papua. Murray thought this 
unnecessary.41 Within Papua there was peace between government and 
commercial agriculture. The old complaints against the provisions of the 
Native Labour Ordinance and their administration had died away over the 
years. There was agreement that limitations of geography, timing and scale 
had all disadvantaged Papuan industry and that the conditions offered 
Papuan workers could not be modified. Murray now recommended that a 
permanent bounty of 2d. a pound be applied to all Papuan and New Guinea 
rubber - a proposal he submitted in conjunction with General Griffiths, 
Administrator of the Mandated Territory. In return Australia was to be offered 
exemption from duties on rubber manufactures imported into the territories -
a quite nominal gesture in view of the insignificance of such trade.42 The 
tariff stayed in place. 
In March 1934 the manager of Ogamobu Plantation for BNGD, William 
Jefferson, returned from Malaya after careful assessment of rubber production 
costs there. He was able to confirm that in production per acre, in the number 
of trees tapped per day by the average labourer, and in labour unit costs, the 
Papuan estates compared quite favourably with those he had visited.43 The 
advantages possessed by 'Eastern' estates , he found, were firstly in transport 
39 Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates 1 933, (Representatives), 4 Oct. 1 933, p. 3235, 
for Lyons's announcement; CRS A5 1 8  Item P8 1 2 /  1 /5, Part 2,  has the protest by F. C. Tracy 
to Secretary, Prime Minister's Department, 1 1  Nov. 1 933. 
4° CRS A5 18, Item P8 1 2 / 1 /5 ,  Part 2, Prime Minister to Murray (Confidential) 6 Apr. 
1 934. 
41 Ibid. ,  Prime Minister to Murray, No. 25 /3 / 489 . 20 Apr. 1 934. 
42 Ibid . ,  Murray to Prime Minister, No. 25 / 3 / 490. 20 Apr. 1 934. The Mandated Territory 
produced no rubber. 
43 Ibid. ,  Part 2, Murray to Prime Minister, 6 June 1 934. Jefferson's report was prepared 
for the planters but Murray was given permission to use it as he saw fit. He defended the 
need to protect the Papuan as an independent peasant proprietor but in every other respect 
agreed with Jefferson's analysis. ·w. H. Jefferson: Some Notes on a Visit to Malaya -
February /March 1 934' was appended. Later in the year Jefferson returned to Malaya to take 
up a position there. 
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where a large industry had provided the revenue out of which excellent roads 
and railways had been built and where the volume of production had made 
for cheap shipping. Secondly, though the salaries of white staff were much 
higher than in Papua, the number of white managers in proportion to the 
acreage was comparatively very small. Tanah Merah, near Port Dickson, for 
example, a single estate of 1 1 ,  1 72 acres and an area greater in extent than all 
the Papuan rubber estates together, was under the control of one manager 
and two assistants. Thirdly, Indians and Chinese were available to carry out 
many of the technical and clerical functions performed by whites in Papua. 
Finally the growth of great agency houses that managed large numbers of 
properties in Malaya on behalf of British companies allowed for a high degree 
of rationalisation in staffing, transport, storage and marketing. It appeared 
that only the amalgamation of estates in Papua - impractical on the grounds 
that proprietorship was shared between Englc;md and Australia, and the 
plantations too small and too widely distributed - might have promised 
reduced costs. A. S. Bloomfield set up the Moresby Trading and Agency 
Company in 1 9 1 6  to act as managing agents for the Clarke and Whiting 
interests, the Kemp Welch estates and his own Galley Reach property. The 
company was a casualty of the post-war collapse and an absconding 
accountant. G. A. Loudon and Company and the BNG Trading Co. , 
subsidiaries of BNGD, succeeded as agents for Clarke and Whiting in 1 922 
and managed the BNGD estates until 1 933 . But neither of these companies 
could achieve great economies of scale when the scale of the whole was so 
small. 
The year 1 934 marked a turning point in the fortunes of Papuan rubber. 
It was to be a last minute reprieve for the colonial economy, for the year also 
brought the collapse of the copra industry that was not to recover before the 
Pacific war. There had been renewed efforts to regulate international rubber 
production, and in addition this time, to limit the expansion of planted areas. 
An International Rubber Agreement between Great Britain, the Netherlands, 
France, the Government of India, and Siam was signed on 7 May. Australia 
was not party to the agreement and Papua too insignificant a producer to be 
considered. Nonetheless, the maintenance of this agreement was to provide 
the security of price so long hoped for that allowed, as another war drew near, 
a second expansion of the Papuan rubber industry on the scale of 1 908- 1 2 .  
In February 1 936 the London price rose above 6d. a pound for the first time 
in five years. 
It did not take long for the International Rubber Regulation Committee set 
up to administer the Agreement to have its oversight in respect of the 
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Australian dependency drawn to its attention by Dutch interests. 44 The 
Committee approached the Australian High Commissioner in London to 
complain that under the umbrella of restriction the Papuan growers were free 
to extend their plantings , and to urge the abandonment of any bounty that 
might encourage expansion. With Papua still supplying under 10% of 
Australian rubber requirements the Commonwealth began for the first time 
to look on the Territory - at least with regard to its rubber industry - as an 
integral part of Australia. Murray and Jewell were invited to respond to the 
Committee's objections.45 Papuan production was less than an eighth of 1 % 
of world output, a minuscule amount by comparison with the output of the 
chief producing countries, but with the collapse of copra, the decline in gold 
exports, and the failure of most other cultures, it was doubtful if a rubber 
industry was as important to the economy of any other country as it was to 
that of the Territory. 'It is hardly realized' , Murray wrote, 'that Papua has been 
within a very short distance of bankruptcy' .46 
Such was the recovery that Koitaki was to pay a dividend of 7.5% in 1935 , 
the first since 1926 , and in July 1 936 BNGD paid out its second dividend in 
twenty-five years of operations in Papua, a tentative 3% . Since the 
International Rubber Agreement was to last initially only until 1 938, the 
Planters' Association, newly refurbished,  continued to press for a guaranteed 
bounty of 2d. a pound that would be fixed for upwards of thirty years. The 
urgency for such a provision had diminished rapidly, and the Commonwealth 
toyed with a proposal for a stabilisation fund to be raised out of the tariff re­
imbursement. Rebate of the duty in the form of a bounty ceased finally on 1 
October 1 936 with the total assistance given to the rubber planters of Papua 
since 1 930 amounting to £ 145 , 743 . The only advantage now retained by 
Papuan rubber was exemption from the primage. This had been conceded. 
Australian consumption in 1 936-37 was 1 9,000 tons. The area under 
cultivation in Papua was 1 1 ,836 acres and production amounted to l ,  1 12 
tons. By comparison, Sarawak exported 44,000 tons from 228 ,000 acres; 
British North Borneo, 2 1 ,000 tons from 126,000 acres; Malaya, 600,000 tons 
from 3.25 million acres; and the Netherlands Indies 500,000 tons also from 
3 .25 million acres.47 
44 Ibid. ,  High Commission (London) to Prime Minister, 15 July 1 936. The IRA 
Committee's letter ls appended. 
4� Ibid. , Murray to Minister, 5 Oct. 1 936.  Memoranda by Murray and Jewell are 
appended. 
46 Ibid. , Murray to Prime Minister, 8 Jan. 1935. 
47 Ibid. ,  Memorandum: Prime Minister's Department, 2 Aug. 1938. These estimates 
compiled in 1 938 compare with Colin Barlow's figures for Peninsula Malaya for 1 937 in The 
Natural Rubber Industry (Kuala Lumpur 1 978), 444. Barlow gives the planted area in Malaya 
in that year as 1 .3 million hectares ( 1 .27 million hectares of mature trees) and production 
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In 1937 two clerical officers, J. Fletcher from the Commonwealth 
Department of Trade and Customs, and 0. Wolfensburger from the Tariff 
Board, were sent to Papua to assess the current costs of rubber production. 
They closely examined the estate accounts of BNGD, Clarke and Whiting and 
Koitaki concluding that the average plantation cost without provision for 
either depreciation or amortisation was 5 .23d. a pound, and that with 
provision for these - according to a formula of the International Rubber 
Regulation Committee of what was a 'fair and equitable price level reasonably 
remunerative to efficient producers' - the cost was 6 .  7d. a pound f.o.b. Port 
Moresby.48 These were calculated at current cost but still did not include the 
interest on mortgage or debenture loans under which most of the companies 
laboured and which if added would have taken the figure close to the 8d. a 
pound that planters now claimed as the minimum price they needed to obtain 
to cover their real costs - a figure double that for Malayan rubber c.i .f. 
London. 
From 1936 onwards , nonetheless, the idea that Papuan rubber production 
should be expanded as a contingency against war became part of every 
recommendation for protection and occurs in much other correspondence 
besides. Colonel White, as Minister for Customs, spoke to the National Club 
in Canberra declaring that 'if we do not develop these territories fully we may 
lose them. They will be taken from our weak fingers by energetic hands'. This 
was rhetoric reminiscent of that which had accompanied each previous new 
start in New Guinea, but now the urgency seemed more pressing t.Qan ever 
before. All his adult life, and like many other Australians,  Sir Hubert Murray 
had seen Ja pan as the real threat to Australia's survival as a European 
society in the Pacific , and in a personal letter to Sir George Pearce, Minister 
for Territories,  he gave his private view of the vital importance the Papuan 
industry might acquire in the event of a Japanese blockade of the East.49 He 
was now asked what the limits of suitable and available rubber lands were. 
It had become clear in 1937 that the International Rubber Agreement 
would continue beyond 1 938 and in Port Moresby applications for more than 
40,000 acres of new lands for rubber cultivation were received. The expansion 
between 1936 and 1 942 was considerable, the areas under rubber cultivation 
almost doubling though the benefit was not to accrue until after 1 945 . 
as 506,000 tonnes - figures that roughly correspond to the estimates given in imperial 
measures here. However, the average production per hectare of Malayan estate rubber in 
1 937 appears to have been 4 1 8  kg per hectare while in Papua it was 236 kg, the Papuan 
level being well below even the 368 kg per hectare produced on Malayan smallholdings. 
48 Ibid. , Minute Paper (Trade and Customs Department), 28 June 1 937, prepared by O. 
Wolfensburger. The Appendices are detailed and clearly show that the higher costs of Papuan 
production were due to higher transport and supervision costs. 
49 CRS A5 1 8, Item P8 1 2 / l /5, Part 2, Murray to Sir George Pearce, 6 Oct. 1 936. 
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In 1 934 Tom Nevitt had taken out a lease at Sogeri of the area between the 
junction of the Kokoda track and Koitaki on behalf of a syndicate of 'old' 
BNGD managers comprising himself, Bill Voysey of Gadaisu, Jim Matley of 
Waigani, Doug Ross of Obu, Gordon Marshall of Ogamobu, Tom Miller of Paili, 
Fred Godson of Itikinumu, Arthur Pollard of Aroa, and Cecil Day of 
Otomata.50 The plantation was a little confusingly named 'Sogeri'. Since 
BNGD had never been in a position to provide any retirement scheme for these 
men they had agreed to develop this property jointly and as an enterprise 
quite distinct from the larger company to provide for their security. Samuel 
Thompson, now a BNGD director and secreta.Jy of the company since 1 9 1 0, 
with his two daughters also held an interest in the venture. Coming into full 
production later at the time of the Korean War, Sogeri amply repaid their 
foresight.5 1 
Also in the Sogeri district, Percy McDonald, once a miner on Misima, and 
a building contractor in Port in the thirties, had examined land a few miles 
along the Kokoda track from the Hombrom Bluff tumoff with a view to 
planting rubber. By 1 937 his plantation, Ilolo, was being cleared and a 
nursery prepared. 
'Gal' Loudon, once 'the uncrowned king of Papua' , had taken large risks 
and paid dearly for them in the years after 1 926. In 1 922, as previously noted, 
he had established G. A. Loudon & Company as a subsidiary of BNGD to 
operate as an agency for the parent company and other plantation interests, 
and to take over the BNGD retail trading business .  He remained general 
manager of both companies until 1 926 when he thought the moment 
propitious for becoming a full-time planter in his own interest. He was later 
sued by G. A. Loudon & Co. for retaining the agency for Clarke and Whiting 
contrary to an undertaking made at the time of his resignation.52 An action 
was also taken against him to recover money he had borrowed from BNGD as 
a loan to buy his and T. D. Ryan's one third shares in Ogamobu plantation in 
1 924. His personal affairs were at their nadir and he survived on his interests 
in several Papuan companies, the plantations at Mogubo and Ou Ou Creek, 
Mrs Loudon's tradestore and credit from Bums Philp.53 In 1929 Mogubo was 
sold to the Bunting brothers and Ogamobu to BNGD. By that year Loudon 
had begun the development of a coffee and rubber estate at Eilogo, on the 
southern boundaries of Itikinumu. The rubber did not come into full 
50 Interview: B. E. Fairfax Ross, 1 1  June 1 972. 
3 1  Ibid. Rubber reached £1 a pound during the Korean War. 
32 Papuan Courter, 2, 8 July 1927. 
3 3  His dependence on the shipping merchant was such for a time that the company 
could restrict him to one bottle of whisky a week. (Interview: B. Fairfax-Ross interview, 1 1  
June 1972 . )  
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production until after 1 945 when Loudon established another rubber estate, 
Mororo, and a cattle property, Catalina, adjacent to Eilogo.54 
Captain A. S. Fitch, the Steamships Trading Company chairman, and 
Brian Molloy, a new solicitor in Port, prospected for suitable rubber growing 
country in the Kasiabadina district between the Vanapa River and Galley 
Reach in 1 935 . In February and April 1 937 two companies, Mariboi Rubber 
Estates , with a nominal capital of £50,000, and Rubberlands Limited, with 
capital of £20,000, were incorporated to develop leases in the area. 
Steamships were the managing agents for the companies and the nursery 
stock was raised from the seeds of improved budgrafted rubber obtained from 
Koitaki. These inland estates were unpopular with Papuan and New Guinea 
Highland workers in the years ahead though proving to be highly profitable 
investments. To the west of Galley Reach along the Aroa River, between 
Lolorua and Aroa plantation, another lease for planting rubber was taken out 
by Mrs Vera Ward and Mrs Winifred Loudon. On this estate, Aroana, an 
attempt was made unsuccessfully to interplant with cocoa.55 Vegetables for 
the Port Moresby market were also grown for a time as catch crops. 
In 1 936, Herbert Kienzle took out a lease to grow rubber at Amada near 
Kokoda. In April 1 938, Kienzle's father, A. T. Kingsley, manager of the 
Commonwealth Hemp Company at Tavai in 1 930 and since a miner in New 
Guinea, registered Mamba Rubber Estates, a private company to develop the 
property.56 On the same day together with E. J .  Frame, manager of Burns 
Philp in Port, Kingsley registered a syndicate to take over alluvial gold 
concessions downstream on the Yodda previously held by the mining engtneer 
Ward Williams. The supplies for the development of both enterprises were 
flown into Kokoda after the New Guinea goldfields pattern. In July, intending 
another Northern Division development, Sangara Rubber Plantations Limited, 
was registered by R. D. Bertie, the Port lawyer, and may have represented an 
attempt by the syndicators of the failed Sangara Sugar Estates to develop their 
lease with rubber instead. Rubber trees became a common sight in the 
villages of this division as Orokaiva labourers returning along the Kokoda 
54 Other plantations in which G. A. Loudon held an interest for a time included Bala, 
Domara, Hisiu and Dedele. The historians of Burns Philp record that in September 1927 a 
loan of £5,000 was made to Loudon and two others to 'buy' a plantation. It is possible that 
this loan was obtained by Loudon to repay the money borrowed from BNGD in 1 924 to buy 
ogamobu. See Buckley and Klugman, The Australian Presence tn the Pac!flc, 200, note 12 .  
See below, pp. 240- 1 ,  for a brief account of coffee at  Eilogo. 
55 G. A. Loudon, 'Notes', p. 4. 
56 Papuan Courter, 6 Apr. 1 938. Herbert Kienzle arrived in Papua in 1927 as assistant 
manager at Kanosia. He was employed by Ward Williams for a time, and joined by his brother 
Wallace and his father at Kokoda in 1936. 
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track over the Owen Stanley Ranges at the expiry of their contracts planted 
1 1 ,000 trees of their own.57 
Finally, with rubber prices rising rapidly in 1 940, Captain Fitch invested 
further in another new company, Kerema Rubber Plantations, which under 
Steamships management developed Epo Estate at Kerema in the Gulf 
Division. One of two other directors was R .  W. Robson, editor of the Pacific 
Islands Monthly , of Sydney. The shares in this venture were not all sold until 
after 1 945 , and like all the plantations where development had begun in the 
late pre-war boom, tapping did not commence until the late forties. 
57 Clendyn Searle counted them in 1 938 and made a submission to H. W. Champion 
for tapping rights proposing to pay royalties to the local owners. The scheme was not allowed. 
Searle, with experience in Fiji and Malaya, had come to Papua to manage the AWA radio 
communication facility. He began a plantation at Kokoda, Saga, later incorporated into 
Mamba Estates. He planted cocoa at Awala near Sangara after 1 945. (Interview, Clendyn 
Searle, 2 1  May 1 975). Much earlier in 1 920-2 1 J. G. Fowler, then ARM at Kokoda, had 
counted 7, 1 69 rubber trees planted by villagers in his district (PAR 1920-21 , 50). 
CHAPTE R 1 7  
Trial and travai l  with other cultures 
1 900-1 942 
WHILE COPRA AND rubber became the major industries of colonial Papua, 
efforts were made to establish plantations of most of the other principal 
tropical commodities. These included tobacco, sisal hemp, cotton, tea, sugar, 
coffee and cocoa. Each for a time received enthusiastic attention and could 
seem to promise an answer to the Territory's chronic poverty. All had failed by 
1 942. An account of the trial of these other cultures and the travails that 
planters encountered as climate, soils, diseases , distance,  labour and markets 
were tested now follows. If in general these abandoned industries 
demonstrated that in no branch of tropical agriculture could Papua find a 
margin of competitive advantage, the history of each is distinct - failure or 
collapse due to a different combination of factors . The planters of Papua 
blamed their predicament on those closest - the antagonism of the Papuan 
Government until 1 922 and the Commonwealth's unwillingness to provide the 
degree of protection and support necessary for profitability. They wanted 
preferential treatment like that enjoyed by other 'Australian' producers in 
Australian markets. This, federal ministries were loathe to provide for the 
Papuan industries, unless, as was the case in 1 930, a government in 
Canberra was faced with immanent collapse of the Territory's revenue and 
forced to accord a preference to Papuan rubber. 
Successive governments in Melbourne and Canberra never resolved, indeed 
never after 1 906 and before 1 942 did they again consider, the fundamental 
issue of Papua's future - whether, like the Northern Territory of Australia, it 
was an integral part of the Commonwealth though currently a dependency of 
the Federal Government, whether it was an external dependency destined for 
eventual incorporation into the Commonwealth, or whether it would remain 
indefinitely no more than a convenient strategic barrier, self-sustaining if 
possible, but otherwise maintained at the very lowest cost. From the outset 
the revenues of Papua, unlike those of the Northern Territory, were to be 
raised substantially from the country's own resources. Indeed Papua could 
seem a 'foreign' country when it drew an income from customs duties on 
imports into the Territory - including those from Australia itself - and when 
its products imported into the Commonwealth were subject to Australian 
tariffs, conceded no more than the imperial preference. There could be little 
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political or commercial support in Australia for any of the agrtcultural 
industries of Papua if they might compete with Australian domestic 
production or with cheaper tropical commodities obtainable elsewhere. 
William Little MLC, advocating the development of a Papuan sugar industry 
in 19 1 7, attributed continuing Australian indifference towards the 
development of Papua ultimately to the lack of elected representation for its 
settlers - 'there are no votes in Papua for Australian politicians'. 1 
With the Customs Tariff and Bounties Acts of 1 926 it did seem for a time 
that the Commonwealth might adopt a more generous policy of protection and 
encouragement of commercial agriculture in Papua and the Mandated 
Territory. But, as discussed in the last chapter, neither of the established 
industries, copra or rubber, was included on the schedule of either Act and 
both measures largely failed to stimulate production of the other commodities 
listed. The proffer of assistance had come too late. By the late twenties and 
throughout the next decade the international economy offered few 
opportunities for the development of new plantation industries in any part of 
the world. 
Tobacco 
The British New Guinea Development Company was the only enterprise to 
plant nicotiana tabacum on a large scale and experiment with manufacture of 
tobacco products for local consumption. Tobacco from the beginning had been 
a major item in trade with the Papuans and comprised between 5% and 1 0% 
of the value of all imports annually. Local production, the management 
thought, would be highly profitable and provide an income as a 'catch crop' 
in the years while the perennial tree plantations were immature. Five tons 
were harvested from the first areas planted at Katea on the Laloki in 1 9 1 1 and 
a sample of leaf sent off to London. The company had some cigars made up. 
S. L. Thompson reported their 'appearance . . .  certainly good and the flavour 
fair'. 2 The Papuan Times in February 1 9 12 noted that a first lot of these 
BNGD cigars had already been received by the editor. William Bruce, who 
knew something at least about their smoking quality, thought the 'Colorado 
Madura' style specimens just 'a little green', but nonetheless ventured in his 
fulsome manner that 'of the cultivated products of Papua we place tobacco 
next to copra and rubber in importance and think the day is not far distant 
when the brands Flor de Kanosia, La Sogeri, or Regalia del Cowley will be 
Papuan Courter, 3 Aug. 1 9 1 7. Melbourne was the seat of the Australian Federal 
Goverrunent until 1 927 when Canberra became capital of.the Commonwealth. The Northern 
Territory was part of South Australia from 1863 until 1 9 1 1  when it passed to the 
Commonwealth. 
ANUABL Deposit 95, BNGD Letterbooks, S. L. Thompson to LeWiS Cowley, 1 9  Jan. 
1 9 12 .  
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indented by merchants and smoked by conniseurs [sic] in all civilised parts 
of the world' .3 
In 1 9 1 3  the company sent out two Dutch 'twisters', Arie Otte and Willem 
Akkerman, to instruct Papuans in the making of tobacco twist and finer 
cigars. Subsequently, in 19 16 ,  a 'technical expert' , Thomas Calligan, was 
hired in the United States to come and oversee the enterprise. Calligan, a 
heavy drinker, proved 'hopeless'. He was once pulled out of a ditch by 
someone he described as 'a long string of a miner' and later identified as the 
Lieutenant Govemor.4 Bad luck in the choice of staff seemed to plague the 
'bung' company for years . 
The area under tobacco on Katea reached 232 acres in 1 9 1 7 .5 Production 
had increased to 3 1 ,  1 95 pounds in the last quarter of 1 9 1 6 alone and a large 
part of the twist tobacco in the stores and issued by employers under the 
ration provisions of the NLO was by then being produced by BNGD's factory. 
About a hundred men of Wanigela, Marshall Lagoon, with 'fine neat hands' , 
were employed in making the 'Bung' and 'Lakatoi' brands of twist and the 
'Namo', '1-dau' and the cheaper 'Papuan Beauties' brands of cigarettes, 'grown 
and manufactured in Papua by Papuans' .6 A duty on imports provided 
protection of ls .9d. a pound on the twist and some small protection also on 
cigars and cigarettes. But an enduring problem had been the moulding of the 
tobacco in store and in the 1 9 1  7- 1 8  season almost the entire crop was wiped 
out by disease. There had been increasing difficulty in wartime in obtaining 
the licorice required for twist manufacture and the industry was abruptly 
abandoned.7 G. A. Loudon much later recalled that BNGD had to write off 
£1 50,000 with the failure of the tobacco industry.8 This is possibly an 
exaggeration but certainly the company had invested heavily in its tobacco 
operations . 
In 193 1  Tom Sefton planted tobacco experimentally at Koitaki and sent leaf 
off to London to test the market; 2 ,085 pounds were exported and sold for 
£2 16 .  Badly cured it had been badly received.9 But to encourage further tests 
Papuan Times, 14 Feb. 1 9 1 2 .  In the same ediUon Bruce anonymously drew attention 
to a deterioration he believed had taken place in the quality of the Armed Constabulary since 
the abolition of the office of Commandant - his own old position. One of his children had died 
of dysentery in the week before this was published. 
4 Interview: Mrs W. Loudon, June 1 973. 
ANUABL Deposit 95, M37, BNGD Annual Report, 1 9 1 7, p. 18.  
G. A. Loudon, 'Agriculture - Papua 1 9 13- 1 959', Notes prepared for an address or 
article, 1 Apr. 1959, p. 3 (cited below as Loudon, 'Notes' ). 
7 BNGD Letterbooks, Vol. 1 ,  30 Dec. 1 9 15 ,  S. L. Thompson (Secretary of the company 
in London) to G. A. Loudon (general manager in Port Moresby). Thompson suspected the 
'Tobacco Trust' of withholding a supply of licorice. 
8 Loudon, 'Notes', 4. 
PAR 1 932-33, 37, 1 2 .  
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the government made a grant of£ 1 00 to the company. A plantation assistant, 
Sholto Morton, was sent to Mareeba in North Queensland to study tobacco 
cultivation, and cultivation began in earnest with the Warne and Hickory 
Pryor varieties. 10 In 1 933 L. A. Jenkinson, an expert from the Tobacco 
Experimental Station at Mareeba, was invited to visit Koitaki and oversee the 
harvesting and curing. His report gave mixed grounds for optimism - the first 
tobacco harvested and cured being satisfactory, the second harvest less so on 
account of the 'excessive rain, and hot and steamy conditions . . .  making the 
curing more difficult' . As well, 'this leaf also shows signs of leaf spots'. Of this 
crop 458 pounds were exported but the return was only £ 1 1 .  None was 
exported thereafter. 1 1  
Beatrice Grimshaw's brother, Ramsay, planted or acquired a trial plot of 
tobacco on a block on the Laloki that Beatrice bought in 1 933 from Errol 
Flynn - the future actor and briefly a Papuan planter. The Grimshaws left 
Papua in the following year, the tobacco being probably that harvested 'at the 
15  Mile' in late 1934 by a trader, Percy Hinds, who turned it into 'Koiari 
Twist'. Compared with the old 'Bung' tobacco which 'would ruin any pipe' , the 
new tobacco was, if anything, 'too light' for 'the native trade' but apparently 
quite suitable for cigarettes - for which no market existed.12 The CMO, Dr 
Walter Strong, had bought the property from the Grimshaws. He continued 
to experiment with tobacco culture. 
Sisal Hemp 
Sisal, agave sisalana, a spiky yucca native to Mexico and major source of rope 
fibre, may have been among plants sent to British New Guinea for 
experimental planting from Rockhampton through the agency of Ferdinand 
von Muller, the Victorian Government Botanist from whom Sir William 
MacGregor sought advice. Well suited to stony dry soils it was successfully 
propagated by A. C. English at Kapakapa near Rigo and subsequently by John 
Exton at Boera. By 1 907 English had planted sisal in his own interest next to 
the Rigo Government Station, but none of the processed product, sisal hemp, 
was exported before 1 9 1 0  when £340 was realised.13 The poor soils and lower 
rainfall of the coastal districts surrounding Port Moresby between Lealea in 
the west and Hula to the southeast seemed to provide perfect conditions for 
the cultivation of the sisal plant. 
In the plantation boom beginning in 1 907 sisal was one of the first cultures 
to be tried with a view to an early return on investment. With A. S. Bloomfield 
1 0  Ibid. ,  13 
1 1  Ibid. 
12 Papuan Courter, 4 Jan. 1935, p. 4. Another of Grtmshaw's brothers, Osborne, was an 
officer of the Papuan service, 1 9 1 5-34. 
1 3  PAR 1 91 1-12,  152. For sisal exports see below, p. 3 1 2.  
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as promoter and subsequently secretary of the companies, Sir Rupert Clarke 
and R. S. Whiting floated Fairfax Harbour Plantations Ltd and North Fairfax 
Harbour Plantations Ltd in 1 909 to produce the fibre between the western end 
of the harbour and the sea. The contractor for these properties in 1 9 10 was 
Arthur Jewell who bought suckers from Exton's fifty acre block at Boera. 
Clarke and Whiting later proceeded to plant more than 1 ,000 acres of sisal on 
their Rorona property at Galley Reach alongside the coconuts. 
At the '7 Mile' on the Laloki road, Papuan Plantations Limited had planted 
250 acres of the suckers on a lease of over 1 ,  1 00 acres by 1 9 1 4. Further along 
the track at Bomana the company had another 2 1 0  acres planted on a lease 
of 5 ,500 acres next to a much larger plantation of the BNGD Company. By 
1 9 1 4  BNGD were cultivating nearly l ,000 acres of sisal on their lease at 
Bomana of 1 0,228 acres. In that year the larger company took over the 
smaller company's holdings on the strength, the BNGD chairman said, of the 
government's firm undertaking to build a railway along the Laloki to the 
Astrolabe copper mining field. Papuan Plantations Limited had paid a dividend 
it could not afford in 1 9 13 ,  the first paid by any of the plantation companies, 
and liquidation soon followed. Both companies on the Laloki had installed 
scutching machinery and light rail tracks , and the immense fields of sisal and 
the acres of racks hung with drying fibre were a striking feature along the 
road to Sapphire Creek in 1 920.14  BNGD produced 1 0 1  tons of sisal hemp 
in the year ending 3 1  January 1 9 1 7, the Territory producing 343 tons in 
1 9 1 7- 1 8.15 This was the best year and earnings were £ 1 7,682, exceeded only 
by returns on copra (£68,225 ), rubber (£37,020), gold (£28,594), and pearls 
(£1 9 ,250). The shortage of shipping during the war enabled Australian buyers 
to pay only £28 a ton for sisal hemp then fetching £37 in London and £43 in 
New York. 16 In August 1 9 1 7  the London price reached £68.  
When prices began to fall in 1 9 1 9 ,  the Territory's output rapidly declined, 
to 1 45 tons valued at £4,630 in 1 92 1 -22, and to nothing in the following 
year. 1 7  Production of sisal hemp ceased. As mentioned in Chapter 1 5 , 18 
capital in the Fairfax Harbour companies was exhausted and they were placed 
in the hands of A. S. Bloomfield, their promoter in 1 909 and now their 
liquidator. There were no buyers - Clarke and Whiting with other shareholders 
14 Papuan Courter, 2 1  Jan. 192 1 ,  pp. 6-7. This comment is in a reprint of an article that 
had appeared in the World's Work magazine written by Thomas McMahon, a 'sisal expert' 
who visited Papua in 1920. In the paper of June 10 McMahon criticised Commonwealth 
parsimony in Papua. 
1 15  PAR 1 91 8-19,  63 , and the BNGD Co. Directors' Report to 31 Jan. 19 1 7  (ANUABL, 
Deposit 95, M37). 
16 BNGD Letterbooks, Vol. 2, Secretary to General manager, 1 6  Jan. 1 9 1 6.  
17 PAR 1 921-22, and PAR 1 922-23. 
18 See above p. 194. 
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losing the whole of their investment in these plantations. BNGD did not 
immediately relinquish its leases but the company did not again produce sisal 
hemp. 
Elsewhere sisal had been planted on the Tavai Creek at Gaire in 1909 by 
the former RM , Herny Griffin, for a company he had floated and which 
included among its directors Arthur Jewell and Archie MacAlpine. The 
property, planted with stock from Kapakapa, had 500 acres bearing in 19 16 .  
I t  wa� offered for sale in 1913  and appears to have passed into the hands of 
Clarke and Whiting. By 1 9 1 8  Tavai was being managed by Tom Nevitt, then 
one of the Clarke and Whiting staff. Also left abandoned as prices fell in 1920-
2 1  it was opened up again in 1 922 by Anglo-Papuan Investments Ltd, a new 
undertaking of Walter Henry Gors, the onetime Burns Philp manager and 
early planter, who returned to join his brothers and sister in Papua after an 
absence of twenty years. He acknowledged that he was taking a 'gamble' but 
that it was 'worth a try' . 1 9 Alongside the sisal at Tavai cotton was also grown. 
But by 1 926 Walter Gors had failed to make the place pay and this time he 
left the country not to return. When he came he had felt 'ten years younger', 
he wrote to the Lieutenant Governor begging permission to withdraw from the 
Legislative Council to which Murray had re-appointed him in 1 922, but so 
much disappointment had attended the sisal project that he was leaving 
'feeling ten years older'. 20 
In 1930 with the arrival of a representative of a newly formed 
Commonwealth Hemp Company, A. T. Kingsley, together with 'plant and gear' , 
Tavai was again opened up, 200 acres of the old plantation being in still 
'splendid condition' .2 1 But even with the promise of a Commonwealth bounty 
of £6 a ton the Papuan industry could not compete with countries paying their 
labour 6d. a day in full. £40 was paid out from the bounty fund in 1 93 1  but 
none thereafter. Forced to sell at or below cost, the company ceased 
production and sisal disappeared from the hills near Gaire. Kingsley with his 
sons, Herbert and Wallace Kienzle, became a rubber planter on the Yodda in 
the late thirties. In 1936 the Commonwealth Hemp Company became agents 
for the British Australian Pulp and Paper Company that intended to make 
paper in Australia from the kurukuru grass of Papua. 22 
Cotton 
Like sisal, 'Sea Island' and upland cotton had been cultivated by A. C. English 
at Rigo in the years before 1 906 , though none had been exported.  Robert 
1 9 Papuan Courter, 4 Aug. 1922, p. 4. Anglo-Papuan Investments was registered in 
Papua as the Kiana Planting and Trading Co Ltd. 
2° CRS A5 1 8, P800 / 1 /5, W. H. Gors to Murray, 2 July 1923. 
2 1  Papuan Courter, 4 Apr. 1930. 
2 2  See below p. 242 .  
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Hunter had also tried cotton at Obu in 1 898. John Clunn sent samples from 
a test crop at Ramaga on Milne Bay to Brisbane for appraisal in 1 904. They 
were reported to be of 'good commercial value'.23 With the plantation boom 
commencing in 1 907 -08 the production of cotton was bound to be attempted 
and Alec Clunas and Morton Clark were the first to do so, on the Giriwu River 
near Buna in the Northern Division . Partners in a store supplying the miners 
on the Yodda and Gira goldfields, they leased 940 acres on which to plant 
rubber and coconuts in 1 908. Cotton was to be a 'catch' crop . By 1 9 1 2  Clark 
was dead and the lease terminated. 
· 
In 1 9 1 4- 1 5 ,  to test both the suitability of its lands and the market, the 
BNGD Company began the cultivation of cotton on 1 02 acres of Baubauguina 
estate, with smaller plots on Otomata, Paili, Obu, Aroa, and Gadaisu. The first 
266 bales (forty tons) produced realized £2,639 in London. It was apparently 
of a high quality but unprofitable at the price obtained on account of the cost 
of Papuan labour. 24 Cotton was not again planted on any of the estates in 
1 9 1 7. 
In 1 9 1 9  the president of the Commonwealth Board of Trade wrote to the 
Lieutenant Governor enquiring about cotton growing in Papua. In reply 
Murray acknowledged that the main difficulty was a sufficient supply of 
labour at the picking stage. He asked the general manager of BNGD to supply 
a report of the company's experience which was forwarded on to the Board. 
G. A. Loudon began by saying that 
The industry was abandoned by the company on account of labour difficulties . . .  
when our crops were due for harvesting, we only had a certain number of 
indentured labourers available. Cotton is a rush crop, and harvesting has to be 
carried out promptly and a large number of casual labourers are required . . .  when 
we called on local natives from surrounding villages to assist in picking (for which 
we were willing to pay a half-penny per lb. )  they refused.25 
In addition he noted that Papuan pickers averaged only nineteen pounds 
of boll cotton a day which compared badly with the 1 30 pounds a day picked 
by Egyptian casual labour, with which, after all, they were competing. Only 
a large area, an abundant labour force and a level of production that would 
allow the employment of the latest machinery, he thought, would have made 
the industry payable. In his letter accompanying Loudon's report Murray saw 
no reason to dispute the general manager's reasoning. 
Yet with the collapse in 1921 -22 of the market for Papuan rubber, copra, 
and sisal hemp, there was a renewed interest in cotton production. A Papuan 
Cotton and Produce Association began planting cotton at Haga on Milne Bay 
23 BNGAR 1 904-05 , 29. 
24 BNGD Letterbooks, Vol. 2, 13 Jan. 1 9 1 6, Secretary to general manager. 
25 NAPNG Series Al 28, Item 7, 7 July 1 9 19,  Loudon to President of the Board of Trade. 
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in 1 92 1 .  Anglo-Papuan Investments Ltd, the company that re-commenced the 
production of sisal hemp at Tavai in 1 922, planted cotton as well, both there 
and on the old Angabunga Company lands it also leased in the Mekeo district. 
In November 1 923 Walter Gors thought the Gaire pickers, while they 'broke 
no records' had 'shaped very well' With the best worker gathering ninety-four 
pounds in a day.26 BNGD too resumed cotton cultivation on a large scale on 
its properties at Katea, Gadaisu and Baubauguina in 1 923 and Clarke and 
Whiting began interplanting a crop under the coconuts at Rorona. At Huiva 
in the Gulf Division Robert Shaw-Moody had planted sixty-five acres of cotton 
by October 1 924 and in March 1925 brought a shipment of twenty-seven tons 
to Port Moresby. 27 
G. A. Loudon and Company, formed in 1 922 to take over the agency and 
commercial business of BNGD, established one of two cotton ginneries in Port. 
Shaw-Moody put his first four tons through Loudon's Asa Lee gin in July 
1 924. The second ginnery was set up by Messrs Clayton and Bell. Kurt Hacke, 
a mechanical engineer who had worked for Walter Gors at Tavai, became 
manager of their machinery in 1925 . A Papuan Cotton Syndicate became 
Patakalana Cotton Estates Ltd in September 1 923, taking over a timber lease 
on the Kemp Welch River from Timbers (Papua) Ltd, a company in liquidation. 
Patakalana continued the sale of timber and began planting cotton. By 192 7, 
like all the producers this company was in trouble. The Territory's production 
had reached 103 tons valued at £4,866 in 1 925-26, by far the best year, but 
prices rapidly fell thereafter. To these prices alone, and not to a shortage of 
cotton pickers at harvest time or to the low productivity of Papuan workers, 
was now attributed the decline in the industry. In 1 928-29, one ton was 
produced.28 By 1932 there was none and the industry vanished a second time. 
Liquidation and sale of the assets of a failed enterprise to a new venture 
that in its tum also collapsed made up a pattern repeated in colonial Papua 
before 1 942 as speculators probed the possibilities . Despite the lessons that 
some learnt, others still could be readily deluded, it seems. A Wataluma 
Cotton Syndicate was registered in 1 92 7 with the intention of developing an 
industry on Goodenough Island. In 1 932, in the midst of the depression, the 
syndicate was still seeking money in the market believing that a cotton 
industry could yet be established in Papua. 
26 Papuan Courier, 23 Nov. 1923, p. 5. 
27 Papuan Courter, 27 Mar. 1 925. 
28 PAR 1 928-29, 2 1 .  For cotton exports see below, p. 3 12 .  The physical suitability of 
Papua for cotton cultivation was again affirmed in Sept. 1925 when a visiting Britlsh cotton 
expert, G. Evans, and the Commonwealth Cotton Entomologist, E. Ballard, after inspecting 
several parts of the country, recommended the 'dry' belt around Port Moresby and the 
D'Entrecasteaux for Sea Island cotton development (PAR 1 925-26, 9 ). 
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Tea 
Tea was grown successfully from seed at Warirata in 1896-97 and was among 
the numerous 'economic' plants that grew in the government's nursery and 
garden begun in 1 907 on Hombrom Bluff, the opposite spur of the Astrolabe 
Range overlooking the Laloki Gorge . In the 1 9 1 2- 1 3  Annual Report, Charles 
Speedie, in charge of the station, recorded that he had 1 4,000 tea seedlings 
available.29 BNGD had considered tea culture and seeds were supplied to the 
company together with rubber seeds by the agents Cumberbatch & Co. of 
Malaya in 1 9 1 0. An experimental plot of 150 bushes was planted on 
Itikinumu estate where, like those at the Bluff, they did well in a climate and 
at an altitude considered ideal. The secretary in London noted that 'there 
should be a splendid market for tea in Australia if it could be found to 
thrive' .30 The establishment of a tea industry was one among many 
recommendations for agricultural development in Papua made in a report 
prepared in July 1 9 1  7 for the Department of Trade and Customs by the 
Commonwealth Analyst, Percy Wilkinson. He noted that Australia imported 
tea valued at nearly £2 million and that Papua possessed 'large upland jungle 
districts . . .  where the climatic and soil conditions . . .  approach closely those 
of the tea districts of Java and Ceylon' .  It seemed folly to continue to import 
so much with 'our own vast tropical possession lying almost unexploited 
within a few hours sail of the mainland'. 31  
Yet neither BNGD nor any other company proceeded beyond experiment 
with tea cultivation. In every country where it was produced tea was picked 
principally by women living on or near the estates. In no part of Papua was 
the population surrounding plantations dense enough to provide a very large 
reservoir of temporary labour and it was likely that if an industry was 
developed in Papua pressure would have mounted for the government to 
reverse its policy on the indenture of women in agriculture. This, the 
administration had already shown it would strongly resist. In 1 924 the idea 
that tea might be cultivated was revived by the Commonwealth Analyst but 
with the world price already very low it was obvious that no bounty or 
preference could be usefully given in encouragement. It was not included in 
the schedule of either the Bounty or Preference Acts of 1926. In 1 935 
prompted by a suggestion from Sir Hubert Murray a preference of 2d. a pound 
29 PAR 1 912-13,  3 1 .  
30 BNGD Letterbooks, Vol. 1 ,  1 May 1 9 14,  S. L. Thompson to Lewis Cowley (general 
manager in 1 9 1 4  ). 
31 CRS Al 20/ 2 1 573, Papuan Development - Report by W. P. Wilkinson, 1 920. The 
passage is in the Appendix drawn from Trade & Customs file 17 /5585. 
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was finally offered, but while tea grew in Papua, tea planting was a risk no 
one was prepared to take. 32 
Sugar 
Among all the tropical commodities that had expanded in world trade since 
the seventeenth centucy cane sugar was the first to be 'over-produced' and its 
planters the first to suffer the downward pressure on price and income in a 
near perfect international market that producers of all the commodities would 
eventually experience. By the late nineteenth centucy the industcy was also 
in competition with an immense and subsidised domestic European beet 
sugar industcy. Nonetheless, the sugar colonies of the West Indies and the 
Mascarenes remained the classic plantation economies where unbridled 
European power, unanswerable to an enslaved or indentured population of 
workers that could be moved about almost at will, had first succeeded in 
creating the conditions whereby a commodity desired in Europe was produced 
in unprecedented abundance at the very lowest possible cost and at a great 
distance from the markets. The development of the Australian and Fijian 
industries, though subject to much greater scrutiny in a more humane 
generation, began with much the same pattern. But Australian sugar was 
being produced largely for a growing domestic market that possessed an 
enfranchised working class wanting employment at 'civilised' rates of pay and 
restless at competing with cheaper 'coloured' labour. With the federation of 
the Australian colonies the Queensland industry had to respond to political 
pressure and replace indentured South Sea Island labour with white labour, 
the producers compensated for the increased costs with tariff protection. 
No one could be in any doubt that sugar could be grown in Papua. It was 
a natural home of saccharum o.fftcinarum and strains collected in New Guinea 
were important in the development of sugar industries elsewhere. The Badilla 
(or 'Badila') variety that became the most successful of those grown 
commercially in Queensland had been obtained in New Guinea in 1 895 .33 
The problem for anyone contemplating establishing sugar plantations in the 
Territory was that Australia together with Fiji had begun the development of 
sugar industries in the 1 870s that by the time British New Guinea was 
32 The preference was announced in the Papuan Courter, 6 Dec. 1 935. A tea industry 
would be developed in New Guinea after the Pacific War. 
33 Papua continued to be of interest as a possible source of new sugar varieties. The 
Chief of the Sugar Research Branch of the United States Department of Agriculture, Dr E. 
W. Brandes, visited Papua in 1927 looking for disease resistant stock. He was accompanied 
by the Chief Sugar Expert of the Dutch East Indies, Dr J. Jesweit, and the Chief 
Entomologist of the Hawallan Planters' Association, C. Pemberton. The expedition camped 
at Everill Junction on the Fly and was flown in by sea-plane. Large quantities of plant 
material were collected (PAR 1 927-28, 4 1 ). See also the National Geographic Magazine 
(Washington), Sept. 1929 . 
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annexed already met the requirements of the Australasian colonies and to 
spare. No Australian government answerable to its domestic sugar producers 
and to white industrial unions and at the same time administering Papua 
could readily permit the development of a Papuan sugar industry that might 
threaten the Australian. The entrenched and established Queensland sugar 
interests could only view a Papuan sugar industry as a threat to their current 
markets and to their future expansion. 
In May 1 9 1 6 , on hearing a report that the Australian Prime Minister, W. 
M. Hughes , had said that increased sugar production was desirable in the 
Empire, Samuel Thompson, secretary of BNGD in London, telegrammed the 
general manager in Port Moresby asking him to secure leases of up to 1 0,000 
acres adjacent to the company's Paili estate for a sugar venture. It was 
'important' ,  he added.34 The company had hoped in any case to obtain more 
land at Cloudy Bay near Paili in exchange for other areas of its leases that 
were unproductive - perhaps to consolidate its holdings. The government was 
unwilling to allow such exchanges. And, almost certainly, Hughes's remark 
was made in the interest of Australian growers alone and when this had 
become clear BNGD did not proceed further. In the following year William 
Little MLC, noting that Australia was actually a net importer of sugar 
products, proposed in lengthy letters to the Papuan Times that a sugar 
industry be developed after the war by returned soldiers enabling Papua to 
become for Australia what Hawaii and the Caribbean islands were for the 
United States.35 In 1 92 1  the Samarai Branch of the Returned Soldiers' 
League submitted a similar proposal for the development of an industry at 
Buna to the visiting Minister, Alexander Poynton.36 
No attempt was made to test whether a Papuan sugar industry could be 
developed before 1 929 when Sangara Sugar Estates Ltd was promoted by 
Arthur Bunting, the Samarai merchant and planter, and Tom Nevitt, then 
BNGD's plantation inspector, to grow cane commercially in the Northern 
Division between Buna and Kokoda. Several residents of Cairns in North 
Queensland, including Tom Nevitt's brother Bert, an accountant, were 
members of the syndicate backing the venture. In August, W. F. S. Howe, 
manager of the Mulgrave Central Mill at Cairns, was persuaded by the Nevitts 
to visit Papua to examine and comment on the suitability of the area for sugar 
development. His report was rumoured in the Papuan Courier to be 'glowing' , 
the Buna lands thought to resemble Babinda near Innisfail.37 Badilla 
34 BNGD Letterbooks, Vol. 2, 1 8  May 19 1 6, Secretary to general manager. 
35 Papuan Courter, 3 and 3 1  Aug. 1 9 1 7. 
36 CRS A l  2 1 / 15922 RS&SILA Samarai Sub-Branch to Minister. The members 
understood that the Buna Bay district would be opened up to soldier settlers. 
37 Papuan Courter, 30 Aug. 1929. The visit was first reported on 16 Aug. 
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cuttings were brought in from Cairns and by July 1 930 a nursery and trial 
plots had been set out and tramlines reported as completed. The Sangara 
experiment was begun with limited capital, Bunting and Nevitt hoping, no 
doubt, that a successful demonstration would attract the remaining 
investment necessary for a much larger scale development. In the 1928-29 
Papuan Annual Report, Sir Hubert Murray gave the idea of a sugar industry 
for Papua his support and to allay the apprehension of a threat to their 
interests among Australian growers he assured them that Papuan sugar 
would never enter the Commonwealth. Instead it would 'be sold in the 
markets of the world'.38 This could hardly have comforted Queensland 
growers with a sugar surplus to sell in international trade. In the end they 
had no need to fear. For by 1 932 , Staniforth Smith's successor as Director of 
Agriculture, A. P. Lyons ,  had to report that while the Sangara sugar 
experiment had been technically successful and a flourishing crop grown, the 
international financial slump made further development unlikely for a time. 
Seventy-six tons of 'plant Badilla' cane an acre were produced on one plot of 
twenty-five acres and forty-two tons of 'first ratoon Badilla and "P.O.J." mixed' 
on another.39 In an experimental nursery the company also planted forty 
indigenous varieties collected in the Buna and Tuft districts.  None at all was 
exported. The company had offered 450,000 £1  shares for subscription, a 
huge sum gtven the state of the share market, but expecting a slow response 
the promoters assured subscribers that the deposits made to reserve their 
shares would be held in a trust account until sufficient were sold. The 
suggestion was that this might take several years . Five other enterprises were 
mooted or floated in the years 1 93 1 -35 to plant sugar in the Northern 
Division. One, Papuan Rural Products Limited, intending to grow sugar on 
Collingwood Bay, proposed having a nominal capital of £4 million. All of these 
ventures failed either to proceed or produce, the loss on the Sangara 
experiment being £30,000.40 
Coffee 
Coffee from the company's mixed plantation at Warirata had been the first 
tropical culture tested commercially by Burns Philp in 1897 and the first 
choice for plantation cultivation on the pioneer Sogeri plateau properties of 
David Ballantine, also in 1 897, and of Garrioch and Greene in 1 902 . In 1905-
06 the value of the beans exported reached £9 1 5 .4 1  Thereafter production 
rapidly declined with none being exported in 1 9 1 0- 1 1 .  Without privileged 
entry to the Australian market there seemed no likelihood of a revival. 
38 PAR 1 928-29, 4. 
39 PAR 1 93 1 -32, 7. 
40 Loudon, 'Notes', 6. 
41 PAR 1 908-09, 1 52.  For coffee exports see below, p. 3 13. 
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Staniforth Smith in June 1 9 1 5  and Judge Murray in December 1 9 1  7 each 
wrote to argue that since coffee could not be produced in Queensland with 
white labour the Commonwealth might exempt any coffee produced in the 
Territory from the tariff.42 No response came before 1 926,  when to encourage 
new industries at last, coffee from the Commonwealth's territories was to be 
permitted entry into Australia free of duty under the new Customs Tar!ff 
(Papua and New Guinea Preference) Act. Coffee imported from elsewhere 
remained subject to duty of 3d. a pound. With this assistance significant 
exports from Papua resumed in 1 928-29 when four tons valued at £3 1 3  were 
shipped south. By 1934-35 exports had increased to seventy-nine tons and 
sold for £7 ,083. The greater part of the production came from Eilogo estate on 
the Sogeri plateau.43 
By 1929 the former general manager of BNGD, G. A. Loudon, had begun 
producing coffee at Eilogo when with the depression his fortunes were at their 
lowest. Planting rubber as a long term investment he interplanted with both 
robusta and Blue Mountain coffee to spread his risks. These flourished and 
he was gradually able to regain the personal pre-eminence among the planters 
of Papua that for four or five years he seemed to lose. His 'A-LOGO' coffee at 
first found a ready Australian market through the agency of F. C. Tracy, a 
shareholder in Eilogo and Sydney agent for BNGD since 1 9 1 5 .  The early 
shipments were sold to the Mutual Store in Melbourne with Bushells in 
Sydney later taking the bulk. 44 But in 1935 coffee from the Netherlands East 
Indies was being sold in Sydney below the cost of production and Loudon was 
able to show that the Australian primage (the flat duty of 2.5% on all imports) 
together with the costs of freight by mule and truck between Eilogo and Port 
Moresby and by sea between Papua and Sydney amounted to a sum hardly 
less than 'the Dutchman is prepared to accept C.l.F. Sydney'.45 The crisis 
was barely survived. 
Always an entrepreneur and enjoying being ahead of others in everything 
he did, Loudon had an 'aerodrome' cleared near Eilogo in 1 938 and flew out 
his produce to Port, probably the first planter in either Papua or New Guinea 
to use aircraft in this way.46 Just prior to the outbreak of the war in Europe 
42 CRS A5 18 Item A.M.81 2 /  1 /  1 .  Murray to Minister of Trade and Customs, 21 Dec. 
19 17.  
4 3  A third of production came from Papuan owned plantations set up under a scheme 
whereby the government provided the capital out of the Native Taxation Fund to establish 
small plantations in the Northern Division with a total area in 1935 of 242 acres. The 
proceeds of sales as elsewhere under the Native Plantations scheme were divided between the 
Fund and the growers. See note 29 , p. 1 50. 
44 Loudon, 'Notes', 4. 
4 5  NAPNG Series G 69, Item 25 / 2 1 ,  G. A. Loudon to H. L. Murray, 17 Apr. 1935 . 
46 Loudon is also believed to have brought the first motor-vehicle to Papua in 1 9 1 4. 
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in 1939 overproduction in Brazil and Java had again caused the market to slump 
with prices falling to 3d. a pound. Loudon appealed for additional Australian 
protection without result and production at Eilogo was finally shut down, the trees 
grubbed out. 'At this time the Blue Mountain type was commencing to flower', 
Loudon later wrote, 'and the destroying was a heartbreakingjob'.47 Coffee became 
the major indusby of the New Guinea highlands in the decades after 1 945 but 
Papua scarcely shared in this development. 
Cocoa 
Elias Solomon planted cocoa at Loani on the China Strait in the early twenties on 
a small scale. In 1928-29 he exported 784 pounds valued at £17  and drew £20 
from the bounty fund, but none was exported thereafter.48 A further attempt to 
grow cocoa commercially was made on Aroana, a rubber estate between Lolorua 
and Aroa opened up towards the end of the 1 930s by Mrs Vera Ward and Mrs 
Loudon, but Aroana proved seasonally too chy for success with this culture.49 
Apart from Solomon no one exported cocoa from Papua until well after 1945 when 
production began in the former Northern Division. 
Miscellaneous ventures 
'Peanut Charlie' Gillingham's attempt in 1899 to establish peanuts on Gebaro 
Island in the Western Division has been mentioned.50 Elias Solomon 
experimented with vanilla beans at Loani but these failed, it was concluded, 
because bees were absent. BNGD tried planting castor oil seeds at Katea in 1918  
after the failure of tobacco, but the new crop was attacked by caterpillars.51  
The Angabunga River Plantations Company in the Mekeo grew bananas during 
the war years 1 9 14-1 9 18 in the hope of finding an Australian market. In 19 15-16, 
1 ,200 bunches valued at £120 were exported.52 The company went into 
liquidation in 192 1 , its properties passing to Walter Gors's Anglo-Papuan 
Investments. The new owners planted cotton. When cotton failed, a new 
Angabunga Plantations enterprise again tried bananas. An Australian preference 
was sought and denied, and this company too was wound up in 1938. 
47 Loudon, 'Notes', 5. 
48 Ibid . ,  4; PAR 1 928-29, 2 1 ;  CRS A5 1 8, Item A M  8 1 2 /  1 / 1 , Part 2 ,  Prime Minister's 
Minute regarding payments under the Bounties Act, 1926- 193 1 ,  1 2  Apr. 1932 . In 1929 
Solomon's interest in Loani passed to his creditors, the Bank of New South Wales. The 
property was bought by the Samarai ship-owner J. R. Clay and then by W. P. Gill - possibly 
a former BNGD manager. Solomon retired to nearby Kwato. 
49 Loudon, 'Notes', 4. 
50 See above p. 38. Judge Murray believed that Gillingham was later 'eaten' in the 
Solomon Islands (CRS Al 20/2 1573, Murray to Minister, 29 Sept. 1 920). 
6 1  Loudon, 'Notes', 7. 
52 CRS A l  20/548 1 .  'Angabunga Plantations Ltd. Reduction of Lease' , F. S. Bryce to Sir 
Joseph Cook, 2 1  Nov. 19 19; PAR 1 915-16, 23. 
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Some industries did not require the development of plantations initially 
but, if successful, might have done so later. There had been a preliminary 
investigation in 1 922 into setting up an industry to make a fuel alcohol, 
Natalite , from sago palms in the Delta Division. And then there was interest 
in kurukuru (lalang or kunal) grass.53 In June 1 936 a report in the Papuan 
Courier noted that a consortium of New South Wales graziers led by P. R. 
Higgins, chairman of Standard Portland Cement, had lodged an application 
to register a British Australian Pulp and Paper Company Ltd with a nominal 
capital of £3 million. It was intended to enter into an arrangement with British 
firms to use the long fibrous grass from Papua and New Guinea to produce 
pulp at a factory in Papua, and manufacture paper at a mill to be built at Port 
Stephens, north of Sydney, or in Tasmania. The promoters expected that the 
new company would produce 60,000 tons of bleached paper annually. Forty­
five thousand acres of grassland on Collingwood Bay - possibly the old 
Mombiri lands - were obtained from the Papuan Government. In August the 
projected output was reduced to between 15 ,000 and 20,000 tons and the 
capital required now estimated at £ 1 million. An engineer from Bertrams Ltd 
of Edinburgh was brought out to design the machinery. Not strictly a 
plantation venture, this was to be the 'first big industrial enterprise in Papua' . 
Neither of these projects proceeded. Five directors of the Commonwealth Hemp 
Company, agents for British Australian Pulp and Paper, were arrested in 
Martin Place, Sydney, in 1 940 for attempting to defraud shareholders.54 
In 1 936 there seemed no industry where Papua could find an advantage; 
the country had proved a profound disappointment. In the Papuan Courier an 
anonymous writer about to leave after twenty-one years poured out the 
sentiments of many of 'the legion of the damned' . 
It was not the hardships or the discomforts or the sense of loneliness that makes 
me so joyful at the prospect of being able to leave it all behind. All these have been 
and still could be cheerfully borne, if there were any sense of achievement . . .  But 
there is no such feeling and my spirit is oppressed with a sense of futility; a 
conviction that all the striving and stress of all these years is just a generation of 
endeavour wasted. 
'Adsum' in his regular column, 'Papuanalysis' ,  wrote a few months later that 
'not a word of [that] article was untrue' and asked 
How many are there here today, we wonder, - or are buried here - who feel or have 
felt exactly the same . . .  What a waste of youth, energy, faith, hopes and money, 
have gone into plantations of Coconuts, Hemp, Rubber, Coffee etc. Why is it that 
hopes have never been realized?55 
53 Papuan Courter, 5 June 1936. Further details were published on 2 1  Aug. and 25 Sept. 
54 Ibid. , 6 Sept. 1 9 40. 
55 Ibid. ,  22 Nov. 1 935, 19 June 1936. 
1 7. Interior: Beatrice Grimshaw's house at Mtgagt, Rouna Falls. It ls a representative 
scene. Cane furniture, 'squatter's' chair, bookshelves, and, usually, male 'house boys' . 
[ Beatrice Grimshaw, Isles of Adventure, 1930) 
18. Servants: Three of the 
Bruces' children and nurse­
maids. These white children are 
very well cared for. But so also it 
seems are the two young Papuan 
women who tend them. One has 
a gold bracelet.  Possibly taken 1n 
Sydney or Brisbane, where 
sometimes Papuan Residents on 
brief visits were accompanied by 
their servants. 
[The late Mrs Ellen Bruce, 
Brisbane I 
1 9 . Adapting to the country: New house at Paili,  Marshall Lagoon, c. 1 9 1 0. This splendid 
manager's house of native materials with its surrounding verandah and detached kitchen 
is typical of many of the first houses erected on plantations. 
[E. Nixonwestwood: New Guinea-Tonga Album, National Library of Australia) 
20. An opposition voice: The Papuan Tlmes press, c. 1 9 1 2 . The paper began publication 
in 1 9 1 1 and William Bruce remained the editor un tll 1 9 1  7.  It was succeeded by the 
Papuan Courter in 1 9 1 8. (The late Mrs Ellen Bruce, Brisbane) 
2 1 .  On the steps at Koltaki, c. 19 15. From left, Winifred Penny, Tom Nevitt, woman and 
boy unknown, Ruth Pratt, Tom Sefton. Probably photographed after a ride through the 
plantation. Miss Penny the school teacher subsequently married G. A. Loudon of BNGD 
and Miss Pratt Tom Sefton. !Mr Colin Sefton, Sydney) 
22.  Vice-regal party at Koltaki, 1 929 . Centre left: the Governor General's aide-de-camp; 
centre: Tom Sefton (with topee ); centre right: Sir Hubert Murray (in white), Lady 
Stonehaven, the Governor General Lord Stonehaven (hidden by coat) and Leonard 
Murray. !Mr Colin Sefton) 
2 3 .  A rougher society: The Sapphire Creek Gymkhana Committee, 18 May 1 9 13.  The 
group includes Tom Nevitt (third from left at rear), James Matley (with pipe), Campbell 
Cowley (centre rear ), A. 0. Wallace (with spectacles ), Richard Jensen (far right), Tom 
Sefton (centre), and Guy de Moleyns, (centre right). The others unidentified are Messrs 
Thomas, Harmont, Rydal, Fry and Simmonds. [ Mr Colin Sefton) 
24.  A settler establishment: At the racecourse, c. 1 938. From left, Gerald Smith, E. J .  
Frame, hidden unknown, R. A. Goodyear, E .  T .  Ward (?),  E. A. James, Arthur Jewell (?) ,  
P. J .  MacDonald, Tom Sefton, -Tom Nevitt, J .  B. McKenna, Fred Godson. [Mr Colin Sefton) 
PART VI 
Planter Papua 
People indulge in a lot of shoddy moral indignation about the 
'settler mentality' . Let them face in practice the decisions involved, 
and then talk. 
James McAuley, 'My New Guinea·, Quadrant, Vol. 5, No 3, 1961. 
The colonial plantation was always an enclave of racial 
discrimination; in New Guinea the tensions between the white 
manager and the coloured labour force, the first with his family in 
the house, the second housed in the dreary barracks of the labour 
lines, have been expressed for too long in the (long illegal) use or 
threat of violence as the basic labour incentive. Generations of this 
kind of experience have inevitably coloured the views of the white 
man held by villagers. 
Charles Rowley, The New Guinea Villager, F. W. Cheshire, 1965. 

CHAPTER 1 8  . 
The planters' world 
WHAT EXPECTATIONS did inexperienced settlers coming to Papua hold about 
the kind of life they would live? If they came, as most did, after 1 909, they 
might have devoured Staniforth Smith's Handbook of the Territory of Papua 
in the first or subsequent editions and found it full of reassuring detail. Some 
would have read one of Beatrice Grimshaw's articles or The New New Guinea. 
Many middle class settlers must have been familiar with the South Seas 
stories of Robert Louis Stevenson or Louis Becke. All had some idea of 
plantation life as it had been recently seen in Queensland or as it could still 
be found in Fiji. Plantation societies had existed in the Americas for three 
centuries and in parts of the East for nearly as long - plantations could seem 
a permanent part of the periphery of the world Europeans had created. To 
some the actuality they faced in Papua would always fall short of the 
expectations that these images aroused and planters could think that they 
had chosen the wrong country or arrived too late. Nonetheless, the nature of 
the common plantation enterprise - the experience of clearing the land, the 
management of alien labour, the conscious adjustment to a new climate and 
country - created a sense of identity and shared destiny among planters 
which, like the group loyalties among settlers elsewhere, could be given at first 
an exaggerated significance,  but acquire in time great sentimental power. 
Beatrice Grimshaw in her autobiographical account of her South Seas 
wanderings as a journalist and author of popular romances,  Isles of 
Adventure, wrote that 
If I were asked what I have most enjoyed in my life, I think I should say the clearing 
of that forest. No one who has not done clearing can imagtne the delights of it. You 
have obtained from the Government so many acres of forest, paying nothing but a 
few shillings for your ninety-nine year lease; you know that you will have no rent 
to pay for ten years, and after that only a few pence an acre. The place is yours to 
dispose of for a century . . . 
Your team of 'boys' . . .  has been collected and signed on; they are your servants 
for three years, provided you treat them well, and their wages will be no more than 
ten shillings a month each man. Just before daylight . . .  you will wake . . .  and go 
out on the verandah for roll call. The sun is rising now, and your native labourers 
dressed in cotton loin cloths, or in the native next-to-nothing of dried leaves, stand 
in line . . .  all but one boy who has been told to go ahead with the cooking. After 
roll-call comes medical parade; cuts and sores are dressed, medicines, if necessary, 
are gtven out. Then you go to breakfast . . .  One by one the big trees fall to the 
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accompaniment of wild screams and singing, and by the middle of the day your 
boys . . .  have transformed a good slice of the landscape. 
Power? Authority? You can revel in both to the top of your bent . . .  You have 
been down to the sea, taken your whaleboat across to Samarai. You return, after 
a day of absence, walk up the long dark forest track and see, ahead of you, a break 
of light that was not there yesterday. For the first time in centuries, the sun has 
touched the earth of those dusk acres. For the first time, since those hills beyond 
were made, man may look upon them from the valley below. And you have done it 
. . .  Power!1  
Beatrice had recollected these emotions in tranquillity years afterwards but 
similar thoughts occurred to Percy Robinson clearing land at Ogamobu in 
December 1 9 1 9 .  Writing to his wife in the heat of the moment he found that 
Achievements on a large scale have their compensations for the hard work and self 
denial that go into their making - if they are successful. I have just been watching 
the impenetrable jungle that I used to struggle into, and get lost in, less than four 
months ago, rising to the high heavens in flame and smoke. It is good to see, and 
good to contemplate good work well done. And the scale is large enough for anyone. 
Imagine an area equal to a line from the Hackney Hotel to the Parliament House 
corner then down King William Street to City Bridge along Queen's Drive to Hackney 
Bridge and back along Hackney Road to the corner you started from - that is the 
size of the block you have to imagine thickly strewn with great trees, branches, and 
dry scrub six feet or more deep & closely packed - some fire eh!2 
Robinson's deep satisfaction was almost certainly shared by his 'boys' as 
they feasted, danced and rested for three days after completion of the work. 
He wrote 
I killed 'Scotty Currie' [a Berkshire pig] for the feast . . .  They decorated themselves 
and their houses with variegated leaves and flowers & created really a most effective 
scene of festivity. I bought up seven dozen discarded flags . . .  and presented them 
to the boys & you would have laughed to see the use they made of them . . . The 
whole affair was . . .  a good stunt.3 
In his letter of 20 March 1 920 he described his 'regular routine' . It varied 
little from Beatrice Grimshaw's. 
A bell rings a 5.30 and we have coffee and a pipe while the boys eat breakfast 
(which consists of sweet potatoes cooked over night and left in the boss boys' 
charge) then at 6 there is a violent uproar of conch shells and the gangs "fall in". We 
have 150 now so it is quite a gathering. Then the various tasks are allotted, food for 
lunch served out, sores and sickness treated and we depart for work. At eight, 
having seen the various gangs well started on their respective jobs we come in to 
breakfast and a smoke. Then back on the job till noon when everyone knocks off for 
Beatrice Grimshaw, Isles of Adventure (London 1930), 2 10. 
Percy Robinson, Robinson Letters, 12 Dec. 19 19.  In the possession of the family of 
the late Mrs Penelope Hope of Canberra. They are cited below as the Robinson Letters. Her 
parents' letters are extensively used in Mrs Hope's Long ago ls far away (Canberra 1979). 
3 Ibid. 
The planters' world 247 
lunch till one P.M. Then back again till 5.30 which makes the even twelve hours 
round. Then I bath and shave, get into my pyjamas and eat some food and after a 
pipe on the verandah turn in With a book until the nine o'clock gun by which time 
I am good and ready for sleep. 4 
If for the planter - his routines dictated by meaningful work - such a life 
was deeply fulftlling, to some close observers his world could appear drab and 
conventional despite the exotic setting, the settler trapped by his own narrow 
perspective as much as by physical isolation. Tough and frequently profane, 
with the sardonic outlook of Australians and eschewing any pretence to 
intellectual or cultural interests beyond a taste for farce, drink and sport, the 
typical settler disclosed little of a sense of wonder or appreciation of any 
beauty in his surroundings. In 1 9 1 7, the anthropologist BronislawMalinowski 
wrote 'How shall I describe Samarai . . . The contradiction between the 
picturesque landscape, the poetic quality of the island set on the ocean, and 
the wretchedness of life here'. Periodically depressed by Trobriander culture 
on Kiriwina he sought company in the little town. But the white residents 
'filled [him] with dislike . . . I shudder at the thought of how life looks from 
their point of view' . He found them 'ordinary people who are incapable of 
finding a glimmer of poetry in certain things that fill me with exaltation' - even 
as he guiltily flirted with one or two of the prettier women among them. 
Unpleasant jokes made about his Austrian citizenship by Australian officials 
he found 'Loathsome, and the effect . . . depressing. These fellows have such 
fabulous opportunities - the sea, ships, the jungle, power over the natives -
and don't do a thing't5 
Evelyn Cheesman, an entomologist collecting in Papua and the New 
Hebrides, recalled much later that in her experience 'it was the planters that 
lived the most lonely lives'. Unlike even the missionaries who were joined in 
communities with frequent contact between their members, planters were 
often isolated and alone, chained to their plantations for many months at a 
time, their only company their Papuan 'boys', with whom no real dialogue was 
either wise or easy, or a dog. Or, 
There might be a wife, or young children before they were old enough to send to 
school. Sometimes it was a man without responsibilities, and on the whole these 
were the happiest . . .  it was no life for an ordinary woman unused to privations. 
(This point of View should be remembered when men are despised for taking a 
native wife. )6 
4 Ibid. , 20 Mar. 1 920. 
Bronislaw Malinowski, A diary in the strict sense of the term (London 1 967), 1 1 2,  12 
Nov. 19 1 7; p. 1 67, 27 Dec . 1 9 17; p. 2 1 ,  5 Oct. 1 9 1 4. 
6 Evelyn Cheesman, Who stand alone (London 1 965 ), 8. 
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No ordinary woman herself and possessing the freedom and the means to 
visit remote places and leave them again as she finished her work after a 
month or two, Evelyn Cheesman could attest to the 'stark greyness of these 
lonely lives' that 'can scarcely be imagined except by those who have 
experienced it' even as she enjoyed the spare amenities of a planter's house 
after weeks in the bush. The people she remembered most vividly were clearly 
not the planters of popular imagination among people down 'south' in 
Australia or at 'home' in England, sipping gin on a verandah in some South 
Seas tropical idyll, but 
Little cells of humanity tucked away in the vast untamed wilds . . .  Their own 
known world out of reach below the horizon, and their present life colourless . . .  
H undreds of men and women endured this, in the days before radio and air 
communications . . .  Mail was left at anchorages and small ports, thence to make 
hazardo.us journeys to its destination - precious packages in waterproof covering. 7 
Isolated planters expected passing coastal boats and patrols to visit and 
accept hospitality and the failure of a white skipper to pause, without 
explanation, was deeply felt. In a letter of 1 92 1  Percy Robinson noted that the 
Freshwaters at Madiri had been 'a bit cold at first' when he called. They had 
thought that he had 'gone South for good' but were most upset because 
Percy's brother-in-law, Arthur Williams, recruiting on the Fly, had sailed past 
three times, and with his new wife aboard, without stopping by.8 Evelyn 
Cheesman recalled the greeting and 'querulous and impatient' voice of a lone 
planter's wife trapped by the choices she had made and desperate for white 
company: 'Yours is the first civilised voice I have heard for thirteen months 
since the last ship anchored here, except my Hubby's - and he only talks 
about the copra markett'9 
Other women could summon up the strength to manage entirely alone. Two 
Americans, John and Margaret Vandercook, travelling the Pacific on tramps 
and coastal steamers, called into Papuan ports in 1 93 1 .  In Dark Islands , John 
Vandercook recounted a visit they made to Ogamobu where they stayed with 
Bill Jefferson and his wife for several weeks. 10 During their stay the 
Jeffersons were also visited by a woman, a 'Mrs Evans', who, together with her 
eleven year old daughter, unexpectedly tied up her schooner at the jetty. 'Mrs 
Evans' ,  as Vandercook understood it, had decided to 'open up' a rubber 
plantation on the Fly River and had come to Jefferson for practical advice 
Ibid. , 9, 1 1 .  
8 Robinson Letters, Apr. 1 92 1 .  Arthur Williams later became an electrician in 'Port'. 
Cheesman, Who stand alone, 13 .  
1 0  John W .  Vandercook, Dark Islands (London 1 938), 234-9 . William Jefferson was 
manager of Ogamobu for BNGD after the collapse of a partnership ( 1 924-29) of Percy 
Robinson, G. A. Loudon and Thomas Ryan. He obtained a position on a Malayan estate in 
1 934. 
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about cultivation. The woman described can only have been Mrs Janet 
Cowling, the widow by this time of John Cowling of Mibu. In 1 93 1  Janet 
Cowling took out a lease over the old Papuan Industries plantation at Madiri 
from the Unevangelised Fields Mission, and might indeed have gone to learn 
a few details about rubber from Jefferson just as Percy Robinson, a decade 
before, had gone from Ogamobu to Madiri to learn from James Freshwater. A 
farmer's daughter from Yorkshire, Janet Wallis had gone out to Papua to be 
housekeeper for a 'rich planter' . John Cowling was apparently well read but 
hardly wealthy. They were married in Port Moresby in 1920. Visiting Mibu 
only eight months after her arrival and while Cowling was away recruiting on 
the Fly, A. P. Lyons, then RM at Daru, 'hadn't the slightest doubt' that Mrs 
Cowling was 'supervising [her workers] much more thoroughly & capably than 
her spouse' . 1 1  After Cowling's death in 1 929 she remained on their 
plantation, where, as Vandercook gathered from the Jeffersons , 'barefoot, 
ponderous, with a heavy rifle always in her hands, she marshalled her Fly 
River boys . . .  digging drainage ditches , setting out new groves' in that 
unpromising place. 
Accepting the minimum of hospitality and sleeping aboard her boat 'Mrs 
Evans' departed Ogamobu as soon as she could, a striking but quite credible 
figure and representative of a group of pioneer women of great strength and 
courage. Elizabeth Mahony, 'Queen of Sudest', was another and so also had 
been Joan Mickle McCrann of Baia near Demara. Controlling her labourers 
'exceedingly well' and adopting 'exactly the same methods she knew a man 
would have done' ,  Mrs McCrann seldom saw visitors. 12  In 1 9 1 0  she tended 
Mrs Lett dying in childbirth on nearby Kauru. She died herself in 1 9 1 2 , 
'fevered and alone' ,  aged fifty-four having spent five years developing the 
property she shared with the publican of the 'lower pub' in Port, Thomas 
McCrann. Mrs Elizabeth Whitten of Samarai and Mrs Vera Ward ofVeimauri 
were planters in their own right alongside their husbands, and Mrs Millicent 
Jewell, wife of Arthur Jewell and a 'handsome woman' in the recollection of 
several old planters , continued to directly manage their Papuan interests after 
her husband's death in 1 943 . There were other such women. 
The war of 1 9 1 4- 1 8  took its tithe of young men from among the planters 
and their families as from among the officials. Harry and Margaret Catt of the 
government plantation at Baibara lost their only son in August 1 9 1 6  at 
Pozieres. Staniforth Smith made sure he visited the boy's grave before leaving 
1 1  A .  P .  Lyons RM, Western Division, Journals (MSS), 9 Oct. 1 920. Perhaps Mrs Cowling 
had been soon driven to assert herself for Lyons also noted that 'John Cowling's good nature 
& indulgence of the natives is (sfcJ well recognised by those who know him best'. 
12 Papuan Courter, 3 1  Jan. 1 9 1 2. 
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Europe in 1 9 1 9  after active service. 13  A son of James Osborne of Hagita, 
Milne Bay, was killed in July 1 9 1 8. Harry 'Hardy' Gofton, a plantation 
assistant in the Eastern Division and briefly the 'Port' butcher in 1 9 1 4, had 
been killed in March. His pretty wife left alone in Samarai was one of those 
who attracted Malinowski's eye in 1 9 1 7. She visited Harry's grave in 1 922,  
remarried and started a hotel at Bulolo in the Mandated Territory. Charles 
Evenett, only son of 'Brassy' Evenett of East Cape, had joined the 9th 
Battalion. Badly wounded he died at Cairns in December 1 9 1 9  on his way 
home to Papua. Campbell Cowley of Mogubo also returned from France in 
1 9 1 9  and died within a year possibly as a result of war injuries. Judge Murray 
counted 1 20 Papuan white residents who had gone off to war, some forty-five 
from among the officials ;  the remainder must have included many assistants 
from the estates. 1 4  William Bruce noted in 1 9 1 5  that the Papuan Times had 
been received and read by at least five 'Papuans' with the AIF at Gallipoli. 15 
And settlers shared vengeful feelings towards those 'who started the war' . 
Two Germans returning to work in Papua on the Marsina in January 1 920 
were not permitted to remain ashore by a hostile group of residents . 16 One, 
Carl Ettling, had managed Dedele for Mrs Elizabeth Whitten for a time until 
1 9 1 5  when he was interned in Australia. 
As time went by the white community became increasingly integrated by 
marriage. Few women remained either single or widows for long and many 
were recognised as having very strong characters . Archie MacAlpine's brother 
Alex was an RM and his sisters married C. R. Baldwin, the 'Port' merchant, 
and J. G. Fowler, a plantation manager who became an ARM. Of the planter 
triumvirate of G. A. Loudon of BNGD and Eilogo, Tom Sefton of Koitaki, and 
Arthur Jewell of Lolorua, Loudon married the second school mistress at Port 
Moresby, Winifred Penny, Sefton married Ruth Pratt, daughter of Surveyor A. 
E. Pratt, and Jewell married Millicent Francis, a BNGD employee. W. H. 
Wright of Giligili and Ahioma married Doris, daughter of Surveyor Septimus 
Tooth of Samarai . Daisy English, wife of A. C. English of Rigo, was a sister of 
E. C. Skelly, a Samarai publican, and a sister-in-law of Bertram Bramell, 
Commissioner of Native Affairs. Of the daughters of Mrs Ashton of Huiva in 
the Gulf Division, and 'Port' baker in 1 9 1 4, Vera married Ernest Trevor Ward, 
Whiting's manager at Veimauri, and Violet, a former miner and a planter at 
Mei in the Gulf Division, Charles Priddle. Widowed in 1 925 ,  Vi Priddle in 1 941  
1 3  NLA Deposit 1 709 , Staniforth Smith Papers. A letter dated 30 Apr. 1 9 1 8  from Harry 
Catt to Staniforth Smith asks for a photograph of the younger Harry's grave. 
1 4  Francis West, Selected Letters of Hubert Murray (Melbourne 1 97 1 ), letter No.  65 , 1 4  
Dec. 1 9 15;  letter N o  67, 6 Aug. 1 9 1 6 ,  increased the estimate to 1 40. 
1 5  Papuan Times, 15  Sept. 1 9 15.  One of the five named was W. M.  Middleton 
subsequently a partner for a time of Hobart Spiller of Menapi (Baniara). See above p. 9 1 .  
1 6  Papuan Courter, 9 and 1 6  Jan. 1 920. 
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married Tom Nevitt, by then BNGD general manager. Vera and Violet's brother 
married A. H. Bunting's daughter Meg. Kathleen, wife of Arthur Gors, was 
widowed in 1 928 and married the BNGD manager at Aroa, Arthur Pollard, in 
1 930. In the same year Arthur Drummond, previously a brash young 
assistant on ogamobu, married the widow of Robert Shaw-Moody of Huiva 
and became a planter in his own right. Celia, widow of Donald MacDonald of 
Vaiviri, might have been briefly engaged to Captain Fitch in 1 93 7. There were 
many other unions and interconnections among the white 'Papuans' . 1 7 
An increase in the risks to health and especially to the health of children 
was a heavy price paid by Europeans who committed themselves to isolated 
lives throughout the tropics. Malaria was endemic in coastal Papua and New 
Guinea and few settlers escaped entirely from bouts of fever. At least five white 
children died in a 'dysentery epidemic' that swept Port in 1 9 12 ,  including two 
of William and Ellen Bruce's babies, a child of Lewis Cowley, the second 
general manager of BNGD, and a child of Albert and Daisy English of Rigo. 
Lewis Lett's first wife had died in childbirth in the isolation of an estate, and 
his only son, a child of his second marriage, young Richard Lett, died in 193 1  
aged 1 1  years. Among other settlers the miners in particular, mostly single 
men or by the nature of their work living apart from wives in Cooktown or 
Sydney, careless about their food, insect bites and shelter, were particularly 
vulnerable - as were many of the Papuans who worked for them and shared 
their camps. Many died intestate in Papua. Assistants on the estates, often 
like the miners heavy drinkers and single, were likewise plentiful among the 
casualties of empire. 
In 1 929 Alice Keelan, wife of an ARM badly shell-shocked in the war and 
given charge of Gobaregere,  the government plantation on the Kemp Welch, 
published In the Land of Dohorl a revealing and often bitter account of five 
years lived in Papua from 1 920. While confident about the moral and rational 
superiority of 'white' civilisation, she reserved her harshest judgements for the 
many malicious and ungenerous white people she encountered. She was just 
as confident that Papuans generally were unreliable, lazy, mendacious, 
superstitious, incompetent and dirty, while she remembered particularly fine 
qualities in many individuals. She accepted her husband's code that 
responsible Europeans must maintain their dignity, honour their pledges and 
deal justly with the native people. That some did not was deplorable and for 
1 7  Names associated with Papua were given to some white children. Frank ·snowy' 
Clarke of Domara and later of Robinson River called his son Domara; Bill Voysey, a BNGD 
manager, gave the name Doa to a daughter born on the plantation of the name; Harry 
Gofton's son was named Moresby; and Ted Clay, a recruiter in the western divisions, called 
his daughter Varoe after his boat, itself named after a place on the Kikori by its one-time 
owner, Percy Robinson. These instances were well known. There may have been others. 
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a 'white man to go native' , actually live like one, she agreed with Jack Keelan 
'seems like a degradation of the whole white race and pierces one's very 
soul' . 18 
The expression of such attitudes may have been common enough among 
both officials and middle-class settlers throughout the British colonial world 
but they were attitudes worked through and given assent in the fire of 
countless circumstances where to act other than according to the simple 
principle of maintaining white 'prestige' could only be seen as betrayal. 
Keeping social distance between the races was an imperative that came easily 
to an already very class conscious and sexually inhibited white community 
whose own children were protected from adult realities well into adolescence. 
Camaraderie, loyalty, undemonstrative affection and trust there could be 
between white 'Papuans' and Papuan 'natives' but seldom - it is tempting to 
say never - as equals, never without an overriding awareness, on both sides 
it seems, of an unbridgeable difference in cosmic predicament. 
There had been disturbing signs of change as some Papuans in the towns, 
who had become familiar with Europeans at home and at play and had had 
opportunities to assess that the taubadas and sinabadas were neither morally 
impeccable nor omniscient, could feel that they might show some defiance, 
steal, or make a sexual advance and perhaps escape unpunished. Anxiety 
among residents of Port Moresby about a decline in respect for Europeans 
reached a peak in 1 926 when a White Women's Protection Ordinance was 
passed and the death penalty made mandatory in cases of rape or attempted 
rape of a white woman or child. 19 The discriminatory provisions of the 
measure seemed quite justified and necessary to a community increasingly 
self-absorbed, suburban, and some will say hypocritical in its prevailing 
outlook. The loosening of restraints among Europeans in the post-war world 
had not made them generally less racially prejudiced; indeed changes in 
sexual mores and dress since 1 9 14 had probably heightened their awareness 
of being vulnerable in alien eyes. 
On outstations and plantations white women and children continued to live 
as before - apparently exposed to great danger and far from the aid of other 
Europeans - but very few convictions on· charges of being 'within the curtilage 
of a house without good cause', or of actual or intended assault of a white 
woman or child, appear to relate to incidents that took place outside Port 
Moresby or Samarai. An attempted rape occurred at Kerema in the Gulf 
Division in December 1 925 . 20 It was one of two cases reported by the 
18 Alice Jeannetta Keelan, In the Land of Dohort. (Sydney 1 929), 225 . 
1 9  The events leading to the passage of this ordinance are recounted in Amirah Inglis's 
Not a whlte woman safe (Canberra 1974). 
2° CRS A5 18,  Item 0840/ 1 /5 ,  Murray to Minister, 28 Dec. 1925. 
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Lieutenant Governor to the Minister at the height of the Port Moresby 
agitation over the safety of white women. Another took place at Bwagaoia on 
Misima in 1 930.21 If there were very few assaults of any kind upon isolated 
white women, incidents of common assault on plantations between men, 
including Violence involving white men, were, as we shall see in the following 
chapter, hardly infrequent. 
The failings and Virtues of Papuan employees were as often the subject of 
conversation among settlers as their own health or the weather. In April 1 92 1 ,  
Percy Robinson of Ogamobu described his cook, Hepea, as 
a treasure that I have just signed on at 15 /- a month & is equal and better than the 
Pt Moresby house boys at £2. He can make splendid bread and cooks very well . .  
. He has good manners . . .  [and] goes for a swim each afternoon. 
A week later Hepea was 'a wonder' who had presented him 'with a pidgeon 
[sic]  pie . . . We thank each other most courteously on all necessary occasions 
and he always addresses me as "Sir" or "Taubada" . '  
Hepea's predecessor, Aumockel, had been 'quite tolerable' requiring only 
a whisper to know what to do. Vagt, one of the crew of Robinson's vessel was 
'an expert cook, natural born mechanic, experienced seaman & can sew and 
mend like a tailor'. Two years later Vagi was found to know how to milk cows 
and Robinson was unstinting in his praise - 'I have yet to find anything he 
doesn't know about'. 22 Such detail may suggest that relations were at the 
least amiable much of the time at Ogamobu and that Robinson was indeed a 
sensitive employer. Was he extraordinary or were 'his' Papuans exceptional? 
Or was it that, despite a level of conflict and misunderstanding that was 
inevttable, co-operative relations prevailed much of the time in most work 
places? Nowhere in his frank and confidential letters did Robinson admit to 
thrashing Papuans. He frequently deplored as quite unnecessary the use by 
his brother-in-law and other Europeans of Violence as a means of controlling 
labour even as he was quite prepared to physically threaten several of his 
white employees himself. 
In Alice Keelan's Land of Dohorl, both Jack Keelan on several occasions, 
and Alice at least once, hit out in anger at Papuans who were deliberately 
defying them and she wrote 'there were many times when my hands ached to 
gtve Toia [her "house boy" at Gobaregere] the shaking he so richly 
deserves'.23 She was not unique. Indeed two white women in 1 9 12 ,  and 
another in 1 9 1 9, were convtcted and fmed for assaulting their domestic 
2 1  NAPNG, Series 485, Box 806, Station Records, Baniara and Cape Nelson, Circular No. 
263, 12 Dec. 1 930. 
22 Robinson Letters, 29 Apr. 1 92 1 ,  8 May 1 92 1 ,  28 Dec. 1 9 18,  1 1  Sept. 1 920. 
2 3  Keelan, In the Land of Dohorl, 133. 
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servants in Port Moresby.24 Alice could see the dangers in legally permitting 
employers the right to corporally punish their 'boys' but could believe that 
some might be so placed as to need to use corporal punishment. 
Yet she came increasingly to see how Papuans might view their situation 
and was often taxed by questions Toia asked. He had heard about the war in 
Europe and wanted to know why white people were not gaoled, as Papuans 
were, for fighting. 'For a moment I was non-plussed. The white race had 
evidently been arraigned before a native parliament at some time or other, and 
the inconsistencies of the white man's theory and practice severely 
commented on' .25 Later Toia asked how the white man found New Guinea 
and how he had thought about making guns, having clearly identified the two 
essentials, ships and firearms - rather than the moral and intellectual 
superiority Europeans supposed to be their advantage - that in Papuan eyes 
had made the white man supreme . Mrs Keelan learned 'that the native 
evidently thinks his own thoughts, even while he seeks information on them 
from a white person whom he trusts. And I was forced to admire the wisdom 
that seeks "the other fellow's" point of view while yielding no enlightenment on 
his own. Would that we understood the Papuan as thoroughly as he 
understands ust' She 'was conscious of a feeling of genuine regret when the 
day of [Toia's] departure arrived. As natives go, he was a wonderful boy, and 
surprisingly honest and loyal' .26 
When, after repeated attacks of shell-shock, Jack Keelan was finally 
invalided out of the service, he and his wife decided to settle as planters on a 
small-holding at Sogeri hoping that when the road then under way to the 
tableland was complete they could live comfortably off their property and his 
pension. After enduring many hardships and frustrations, and the lofty 
hostility of Tom Sefton of Koitaki whose identity is only barely disguised in 
Alice's book, the Keelans gave up their lease when work on the road was 
abruptly abandoned in 1 926.  Those bruised by their Papuan experience could 
imagine that the country was 'cursed' in some way, that they had been enticed 
into compromising themselves with a painted harlot. No one who had lived in 
Papua, it seems, could leave unaffected by it. In In the Land of Dohorl the pain 
is palpable.  
Alice Keelan's book was one of many dealing with Papua or having a 
Papuan background. Scarcely a year went by after 1 9 1 0  without the 
publication of a work of anthropology, missionary annals, travel or fiction 
about the Territory. These were widely read and with its tree houses and 
houses built over the sea, its du.bus and ravls , cannibals and sorcery, Papua 
24 Papuan Tlmes, 28 Feb. and 6 Mar. 1 9 1 2. Papuan Courter, 1 8  Dec. 19 1 9. 
25 Keelan, In the Land of Dohorl, 72 . 
26 Ibid. ,  1 64-5. 
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became a country imagined familiar by schoolboys, armchair travellers, 
philatelists and scholars in many places. Bronislaw Malinowski's studies of 
Trobriand Islands culture based on two years spent in Papua between 19 15  
and 1 9 18 placed the country at the centre of anthropological attention. His 
books commencing with Argonauts of the Western Paciflc began appearing in 
1 922; his last major Trobriand work, Coral Gardens and their Magic, was 
published in 1 935.27 Settler Papua too inspired a small industry, in fiction. 
Living in Papua for much of the period between 1907 and 1 934, Beatrice 
Grimshaw wrote over twenty novels and numerous stories, many with a 
Papuan setting. Generally peopled by larger than life characters and with 
implausible plots her novels served to develop and feed a market in South 
Seas romances for adults. In her first and best 'Papuan' tale, When the Red 
Gods Call ( 1 9 1 1 ), the daughter of the 'Governor' of Papua marries a planter, 
Hugh Lynch, a man educated at Harrow and Sandhurst, but who she 
subsequently learns has been previously married to a Papuan girl. The girl is 
dead, but hurt and indignant, Stephanie Hammond leaves Lynch and goes 
back to England. Hugh, repenting his earlier youthful folly, has never 
compromised himself in any other way with the 'native' and years later 
Stephanie returns to Papua and her husband realising that she is bound to 
him by the bonds of marriage. Conventional morality is vindicated and a 
delicate question of racial relationships resolved. 28 Papuan settlers, no 
doubt, were among those who read Beatrice Grimshaw's books but they can 
hardly have regarded them as lifelike. 
Rather better drawn images of their world were realised in several novels 
written by Gilbert Munro Turnbull, an architectural draftsman employed in 
the Department of Public Works ( 1 9 1 4- 1 934) . In Munro Turnbull's novel , 
Paradise Plumes ( 1 934) ,  Stephen Blake, an incorruptible RM returning to 
Papua aboard the 'Moratau', falls in love with a young woman on her way to 
marry a planter, Harry Merton, a man Blake knows to be a scoundrel. Merton 
has previously lived with a Papuan girl - a fact that in any man of honour 
would have prevented him contemplating ever marrying a white woman. Again 
the husband conceals his past, his subsequent crude and bullying behaviour 
consistent with that of a weak man who has betrayed his caste. The drama is 
resolved when Merton is killed by Loana, his Papuan mistress, with Blake 
neatly shielding Lesley Merton from the facts of her husband's shame. To 
balance the figure of Harry Merton, Munro Turnbull provides old Tod Lorimer, 
a rough but worthy pioneer and planter, the widower of a Papuan woman, 
who has honourably accepted the consequences of his union. His daughter 
27 Bronislaw Malinowski, Argonauts qf the Western Paciflc (London 1922); idem, Coral 
Gardens and their Magic (London 1 935 ). 
28 Beatrice Grimshaw, When the Red Gods Call (London 1 9 1 1 ). 
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Moira is placed in an unenviable position. Although educated by the nuns at 
Yule Island - as indeed were many children of mixed race in Papua - she 
cannot finally escape her Papuan heritage and her 'lapses' into chewing betel 
nut 'bewilder' and 'frighten' her father. Turnbull allows Lesley Merton to find 
Moira's treatment by white men hypocritical but when she taxes Blake about 
the girl the RM has to shrug his shoulders. Lesley does not understand. 
Paradise Plumes says much about the outlook of a generation for whom an 
alternative scheme of things was literally unthinkable.29 
Planters themselves, while they could be the subject of romantic fiction or 
writers of occasional letters of complaint, were mostly 'doers' rather than 
observers . Lewis Lett and his second wife Mollie were both writers and 
planters for a time but wrote no planter reminiscences. Indeed few settlers left 
records of any kind at all. The books , therefore, of Beatrice Grimshaw, Alice 
Keelan, Munro Turnbull and others, and the material in the Papuan Times 
and the Papuan Courier provide information that must be relied upon heavily 
in reconstructing the settler world in Papua. But in the extraordinary letters 
of Percy Robinson of Ogamobu there is another order of material available -
abundance of detail, immediacy, strain, fatigue, elation, humour, emotion. 
Comprising almost a weekly diary at times, they singularly allow an intimate 
acquaintance with one planter. It is beyond the limits of this study to exploit 
all of their richness though their value must be apparent. Robinson was a 
sensitive, aggressive and highly strung man, his wife and correspondent an 
interested and informed reader. Irene Robinson had been to Kikori on a visit 
with Percy in 1 9 1 6  and part of the value of the letters lies in this - that 
Robinson could assume her understanding of much that he subsequently 
wrote about. And for Percy Robinson, Ogamobu was from the outset to be his 
'greatest and last adventure', one in which he had invested everything.30 
A dissatisfied public servant on his way to look at farming land being 
offered for settlement on the Daly River in the Northern Territory, Robinson 
was attracted to Papua at a chance meeting with H. C. Cardew, the ARM from 
Kikori , when calling at Thursday Island in 19 14.  He decided to interrupt his 
voyage to see the Papuan Gulf, and like Theodore Bevan before him, was 
captivated by the meretricious charms of what he saw, 'the whole trip' being 
'like the most brilliant of my anticipations . . . calm smooth water, perfect 
weather and an intensely fascinating tropical jungle within a stone's throw of 
the boat practically all the way. It realized my wildest imaginings & seemed 
almost too good to be true'. 31 At the Kikori station, he found the view from 
29 G. Munro Turnbull, Paradise Plumes (Sydney 1 934). 
30 Robinson Letters, 1 Jan. 1920. See Penelope Hope's Long ago ls far away (Canberra 
1 979). 
31 Ibid. ,  15 Apr. 1 9 14 .  
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Cardew's house 'enough to bring tears to your eyes' .  If Robinson was 
interested in taking up land on the Kikori rather than on the Daly, the ARM 
suggested, he would be prepared to be a silent - and preferably unidentified -
partner in the enterprise .32 
· 
At Daru Robinson decided to accompany Percy Beach, a recruiter, on a 
short trip to Parama Island where he 'couldn't think of anything better to do 
with myself but stand around & look as much like the dominant white race 
as possible' .33 But this experience was also inspirational. At home in Broken 
Hill and Adelaide he laid before several investors proposals to develop a 
coconut plantation at the Kikori River which he thought could be partly 
financed out of the proceeds of recruiting labour in the western Divisions. He 
returned to Papua placing his two brothers-in-law, Arthur and Claud 
Williams, in charge of a lease he had taken out on the river at Ogamobu above 
the Kikori government station. 
In May 1 9 18 ,  having persuaded several Melbourne investors to join him in 
a company, Kikori Plantations, to take over the lease, Percy Robinson went to 
Papua to directly manage Ogamobu. By August he had been again to Port, 
had argued with Arthur Bloomfield over a recruiting agreement, and had been 
asked to join the Papua Club by G. A. Loudon. He was elected to the council 
of the recently revived Planters' Association. While yet again in Port on 1 1  
November Percy noted in his letter that the Club's rooms had become his 
temporary office. Three days later he was to bring news of the armistice in 
Europe to Kikori. 
At the time of his arrival at Ogamobu most of the lease still remained to be 
cleared and planted with rubber, coconuts having proved unsatisfactory on 
the first blocks planted by Arthur Williams in that extremely wet place. In his 
letters to Irene Robinson, Percy tried to convey the atmosphere and excitement 
of the estate at the clearing stage: 
My first day in charge here was celebrated by quite a chapter of accidents. I hardly 
arrived on the clearing to inspect the work before one of the scrub cutters presented 
for my inspection a horribly gashed foot that he had cut with his axe. I fixed him up 
& sent him off just in time to receive another with a cracked head - don't know how 
he did it. Then as a final catastrophe, a tree fell on Dimabi and killed him instantly. 
As you have probably never heard a hundred savages doing their death wail you can 
have no idea of the uproar. I knocked them off and started for the house with the 
body & then all the women joined the chorus . . .  We buried him this morning and 
the incident is apparently forgotten already.34 
32 Ibid. ,  Easter Sunday 1 9 1 4. Shortly afterwards Cardew joined the Australian military 
administration in German New Guinea. He was not an investor in Ogamobu . 
33 Ibid. 
34 Ibid . ,  18 Oct. 1 9 1 8. 
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He could not resist condemning Arthur Williams's frequently violent 
treatment of labourers when it seemed that careful thought could almost 
invariably prevent trouble. He continued, 
You remember Dimabi? He was boat boy on the launch. Arthur beat him up & got 
fined five pounds. So I took him from the launch & put him to work at Ogamobu to 
keep him out of Arthur's way. This continual trouble with the Authorities has got 
to be stopped somehow . . .  it is only a matter of time before Woodward, the new 
magistrate, will be a 'cow' also unless I can devise some means to check [Arthur's] 
unruly conduct. He was full of good resolutions after Woodward arrived but . . .  was 
[soon] again talking about 'black swine' & 'belting their blocks off & generally 
performing in his old pleasant manner. 35 
By December he could write of a clever scheme he had conceived to keep 
up the morale of the labour force: 
After the end of next week we will have a block of 100 acres right in the middle still 
to do. This may strike you as a queer way to attack the job but it is still part of the 
'kidding' process. It is partly this scheme that has kept the labour from losing heart 
in the face of the magnitude of the task . . . [for] in the isolated patch is now 
collected all the wallabies, cassowaries etc. that may have been about and so just 
at the time when the labour is heartily sick of the whole thing they will bog in like 
seven devils to get at the game . . .  Three hundred acres of virgin jungle looked a 
fearful task. I confess that when I scrambled through to the back line the first day 
my heart failed me - it seemed such a cheek for us human insects to undertake to 
remove all that millions of tons off the face of the earth . . . you can imagtne what 
it feels like to struggle into it for a mile & then sit down & realise that you have 
undertaken to remove it all. The way I started was to work out a week's task on my 
programme. Then I divided it into strips from west to east of such width that if the 
boys did their work they came out at the home end on Saturday morning. They were 
getting nearer home every day & if they failed to reach there on Saturday morning 
they worked Saturday afternoon. So it became a sort of game & kept their minds off 
the rest of the job. 36 
Recruiting labour in the west for plantations in the Central Division was 
to pay the day to day development costs at Ogamobu and it was essential to 
have competent and experienced crew on the company's vessel, the Varoe. 
Percy was quite candid in admitting his complete dependence on good men 
among the Papuans , and he resorted to careful stratagems to retain them. 
Sometimes these came unstuck. 
It was rather amusing to notice the effect of his [lgua's] dismissal on the crew. They 
are picked boys and know their value too well. Consequently they were inclined to 
hold out as a great favour the prospect of their signing on again. But since I sacked 
Igua it has thrown a scare into them and each one has come to me in great anxiety 
to know if I will sign them on again. Rather a change from their previous attitude. 
I was awfully relieved when Heagi came to me on the same errand tho'! I was afraid 
35 Ibid. 
36 Ibid. , 4 Oct. 1 9 19.  
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he might leave me and I do not know how I could manage without him . . .  he is 
quite the best on the coast . . .  They are a fine crew . . . I can see that they approve 
of me too, as a boss although I don't think they respect me very much - it is more 
a sort of pity for a harmless individual that gtves as little trouble as possible. 37 
In December 1 9 1 8  he thought Heagi and the crew were 'get[ting] on with 
me and each other in a most satisfactory way . . .  I am most awfully relieved 
as I simply couldn't carry on if it was really necessary for discipline to behave 
in the blackguardly manner that Arthur claims is the only way' to deal with 
Papuans. A month later, however, Heagi walked out after demanding £ !  more 
a month in wages.  Refusing at first, Percy was fmally forced to go into 
Hanuabada and beg his skipper to return. By 1 920 Percy Robinson's earnings 
from recruiting with the Varoe had reached £6,000 and had substantially paid 
for the costs of development at Ogamobu in the preceding two years.38 
With the agricultural labourers the same care needed to be taken in the 
selection of boss-boys and in weeding out those elements among the labourers 
that spread disaffection or shirked on the job.  Labour contentment, it seems, 
was not only a result of careful management and consideration shown by an 
employer. Labourers could bring with them, or learn from other workers, 
attitudes that could threaten good relations on the plantation. Percy was 
pleased if his judgement was confirmed: 
Bydalu - the warder in the Kikori Hospital who humbugged along Evoi's wife - well 
. . . I put him on for a month on trial much against Arthur's advice . . .  and he 
turned out an absolute prize winner . . .  So I shot out Evuga & the rest of his crew 
of loafers and am now well satisfied with the staff at Ogamobu. Nearly all the old 
guard have been paid off and I have 60 brand new boys (signed on for 3 years) who 
have no bad traditions to overcome. I finished up the 1 00 acres on the other side 
of the Tewo creek. 
In November he reported that 
there is orderly discipline & plenty of hard work going on. At the same time there 
is much more contentment. We have twenty-four women on the place and 
numerous children and babies. They have gardens of their own and are allowed to 
entertain their relations at weekends. The mile or so of sago swamp has proved a 
great success . . . and the 'sago boys' go out every day . . .  I have cut out rice 
altogether. 
He now found that Woodward, 'the new RM . . .  is a real good sort' who 
'shows every intention of avoiding friction with us' and Greenland 'who is 
acting CNA put me wise to a lot I didn't know before' - presumably about 
compliance with the NLO Regulations. 39 
37 Ibid. , 2 Nov. 1 9 18.  
3 8  Ibid. , 28 Dec. 19 18.  
3 9  Ibid. , 2 Nov. 1 9 18. 
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Percy Robinson was welcomed by G. A. Loudon, Arthur Jewell and Tom 
Sefton into the inner circle of the commercial community. Ogamobu was a 
business-like operation, Percy tough and determined. His recruiting venture 
had quickly outstripped its rivals in the 'west'. He appeared a rising man. His 
membership of the Papua Club and the Planters' Association pleased him and 
his enthusiastic descriptions of membership mores provide one of only two 
contemporary glimpses that survive. 
The Papua Club 
The Papua Club was founded in 1 9 1 3  by Tom Sefton, G. A. Loudon - then 
BNGD's new Commercial Manager, Arthur Jewell and others as an exclusive 
retreat for selected members of the commercial and planting community, the 
'silvertails' , who could then avoid the 'riff raff who gathered in the pubs - and 
at the same time balance the exclusivism of the officials .  Sefton had come to 
Papua as an accountant with the Bank of New South Wales in 1 9 1 1 but was 
soon working as the assistant to his uncle, F. A. Lord, manager at Koitaki. He 
succeeded Lord in 19 13 .  If 'Gal' Loudon was a rough and bold player in 
various contests with the government, Tom Sefton was careful to mind his 
own business and mind it well, while Arthur Jewell , once Captain Barton's 
private secretary and since an opponent of Judge Murray, would become the 
planters' chief negotiator. Already in 1 9 1 4, Loudon, Sefton and Jewell were 
considered leaders of 'Port' society, Sefton and Jewell acquiring houses on Ela 
Beach in which they stayed on their frequent visits to town. Much later, when 
a planter at Eilogo, Loudon also maintained a town house. An American 
doctor sent to Papua in 1920 by the Rockefeller Foundation to treat 
hookworm, S. M. Lambert, found friendship in the Club and some indifference 
at Government House. He thought 
Loudon, Bertie, Sefton, Jewel [sic ] ,  Tom Nesbitt [s ic ]  and a dozen more . . .  the 
ablest colonials in the South Pacific . . .  I couldn't have moved a finger without the 
help of these men and their friends. These were the forward-looking ones who 
wanted native labour restored to health, to revitalize races for whom , at that time, 
there seemed no future but extinction.40 
Lambert betrayed here a perfect summing up of a view of their role vis-a-vis 
the Papuans held by many planters - that it was they and not the officials who 
did most to 'improve' and even preserve the 'native' as they sent their 'boys' 
back to their villages free of skin diseases -with a caddy of tobacco, a 
hurricane lamp, and a bolt of red cloth under their arm. To their critics it 
could as easily seem that despite the friendly relationships the more lordly 
among the settlers might undoubtedly have with individual servants and 
employees, they appeared to regard the Papuans collectively as little more 
40 S. M. Lambert, A Doctor ln Paradise (Melbourne 1 942 ), 19 .  
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than particularly troublesome beasts of burden. Within the confines of the 
Papua Club and among likeminded men With common interests the country"s 
problems could seem capable of simple remedies if only the members could 
have their way. 
Membership became a reward that admitted the more successful men in 
the white community to an elite group. Staniforth Smith was the first of the 
officials offered the accolade. Dr Strong, Herbert Champion and Judge Gore 
would later join him. The Club became a registered company With nominal 
capital of £5 ,000 in 1 927, but it is doubtful whether there were ever more 
than forty members at a time before 1 942, and it acquired permanent 
premises of its own only in 1 940. 
Percy Robinson, the new member in 1 9 1 8, recorded some of the 
atmosphere of both the Club and the 'Port' community. The rougher society 
all settlers shared to some extent before 1 9 1 4  had given way to one of sharp 
class distinctions. In Port Percy found that 
the men here rather go in for attire - much more so than I expected considering that 
the society is almost entirely masculine. There seems a very sharp line between the 
beachcombers and such and the crowd that frequent the Club. I think they are 
careful about attire to emphasise the difference . . .  you see half the men (in town) 
going about with bare toes sticking out of their shoes & nothing on but ragged 
pants & a filthy singlet & the other half looking as if they had just come out of 
Collins St. Melbourne. There is nothing much in between. 
Club members were 'a particularly nice crowd of men and I have some very 
good friends among them'. His wife 'would fall for Louden [sic] . . .' and 'there 
is an entire absence of any effort to assert superiority'. Yet conformity to a 
standard of dress and a code of behaviour was clearly expected With 'Gal' 
Loudo11-, Tom Sefton, Arthur Jewell, and Ernest Trevor Ward, R. S. Whiting's 
rather elegant manager at Veimauri, setting the accept-able pattern. Percy 
continued in detail, 
In dull or cool weather and in the evening they wear trousers of either gabardine or 
mohair of a karki [sic ]  color, socks to match and brown shoes, a shirt of a color to 
go With the rest & tie likewise. Shirts are always plain & never With anything in the 
shape of stripes or spots or patterns of any sort. If really cold they have a coat to go 
With the pants. Unlined patch pockets (pleated) & cut in a severe military style . .  
. in the hot weather, duck pants, white shirt of heavy twill with two breast pockets 
. . .  gauntlet cuffs are anathema. Loudon has his made With Wide sleeves only to 
above the elbow [Le.  short sleeves] but that is his speciality & no one likes to copy 
him although they approve of the idea. Black &ilk tie as narrow as possible. 
Anything 1n the nature of 'handkerchief ties would cause the wearer to be tarred 
and feathered.4 1 
41 Robinson Letters, 2 Mar. 1 9 19 .  
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Percy Robinson visited Sefton at Koitaki, enjoyed dining at Loudon's and 
at Surveyor Pratt' s and imbibed the opinions of his fellow Club members 
about particular officials . Stanley Greenland, the CNA Inspector whose advice 
he had earlier thought worth taking, now it seemed was 'a dud', a 'narrow 
official . . .  the sort that drives me frantic. I expect I have to "out" him'. A. E. 
Pratt, Tom Sefton's father-in-law, on the other hand, was a useful friend who 
would survey Ogamobu and include a block across the Tewu Creek that Percy 
had illegally cleared before the Land Board had granted him its lease. 
Smarting from a £ 1 0  fme for over-carrying on the Varoe 'in spite of my 
ingenious efforts to dodge it' , he now thought, 
Govt officials here are simply poisonous - they are all alike, it is the system & not 
so much the individuals. No one seems to be able to escape for the simple reason 
that the Governor does not care a hang about the spirit of the law - if they can 
'catch' you on any technical breach they rub it in.42 
But it was not only in his relations with the government that he had to 
watch his step. Most of the leading planters had taken large risks with their 
fortunes and lived on the edge where ruin was an ever-present possibility. 
There was frequent litigation to recover debts even from friends. Some of the 
fragility of his own situation Robinson revealed as he realised that 
Just at present I am strong here & am treated by everyone with distinguished 
consideration as a successful man and one of the 'Heads' but it would take about 
three months of hard luck & a few whispers of financial embarrassment to throw 
me down among the suppliants . . .  No, it is not a condition for a weak or nervous 
man.43 
By 1 924 he knew G. A. Loudon to be 'as clever as Satan' even as he entered 
into partnership with the general manager of BNGD to buy out the 'southern' 
shareholders in Ogamobu. The partnership would indeed prove a fatal mistake 
for Robinson. In the collapse of 1 929 while Loudon managed to survive the 
loss of many of his business interests including his share in Ogamobu, for 
Percy Robinson the Papuan adventure had come to an end. 
The Planters ' Association 
Unlike the Club which was to have a continuous life, the Planters' Association 
of Papua was a body that was formed and re-formed several times after 
periods of inactivity. As with the Citizens' Association in 1 9 1 5  and 1 9 19-2 1  
joint action by planters as a group was only possible in such a small and 
dispersed community for short periods. The first Association began in 1 9 1 1  
with an executive comprising Lewis Cowley, general manager of BNGD 1 9 1 1 -
1 4, Arthur Bloomfield, Raymond Dubois and Archibald MacAlpine. 
42 Ibid. , 9 Mar. 1 9 19.  
43 Ibid. , 22 May 19 19 .  
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Representing the larger plantation companies rather than the individual 
planter, this was the group worried at the time that the limits of available 
Papuan labour had already been reached, and pressing for three year 
contracts and the admission of Asians. 
Following several years without meeting the Association was re-formed late 
in 1 9 1  7 when new grievances had brought interests together. With the 
purposes of commercial agrtculture and Murray's government now seeming 
to be in irreconcilable disagreement, the difficulties planters were experiencing 
appeared remediable only if the Judge was replaced as Lieutenant Governor. 
Names put forward in 1 92 1  in case Murray should retire at sixty were those 
of Staniforth Smith and Major General Charles Rosenthal, a prominent 
Australian conservative. 44 With a membership by that time of thirty seven, 
the Association represented itself as a responsible 'opposition' which in the 
absence of electoral representation had taken upon itself to speak on behalf 
of the whole 'unofficial' community. Several well prepared Bulletins were 
printed and circulated. But most smaller planters chose not to join. 
Essentially the Planters' Association had been revived to give the leading 
members of the planting establishment, Loudon, Sefton and Jewell, with the 
lawyer R. D. Bertie's help, a base respectably large enough to allow them to 
apply pressure on the local and Commonwealth governments. As recorded in 
Chapter 1 4, when the Minister for External Territories, Alexander Poynton, 
visited Papua in June 1 92 1  the Association led by Jewell, Seymour Williams -
A. S. Bloomfield's agent at the time - and Bertie and G. A. Loudon confronted 
him with a formidable list of proposals for Commonwealth expenditure and 
changes in policy. 45 
In the economic crises that followed in 192 1 -22 and again in the late 
twenties, Judge Murray's efforts to have Papua exempted from the provisions 
of the Navigation Act and other measures taken on behalf of the distressed 
planters changed their view of his administration. With the Lieutenant 
Governor actively engaged in defending the Territory's industries and 
interests, a Planters' Association operating as an opposition to the government 
had little to do. After years of suspended activity when the Chambers of 
Commerce in Port Moresby and Samarai provided representation for the 
interests of the combined commercial and planting communities, a new 
Planters' Association of Papua was established in 1 935 on a broader basis of 
membership than the previous bodies and when economic issues alone now 
44 Papuan Courter, 18  Feb. 192 1 .  Rosenthal is believed by some to have been a model 
for 'Kangaroo' in D. H. Lawrence's novel of the name. 
411 See above p. 1 85. Three Bulletins published by the Association are in CRS Al 
20/9009. Membership rules were changed in 1 920 to admit plantation assistants as 
'Associate Members' (Papuan Courier, 19 Nov. 1920). 
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assured it of support. The president was G. A. Loudon. Tom Sefton was vice­
president and the secretary-treasurer was Richard 'Dickie' Walshe of Domara. 
The Council of the Planters' Association of Papua included Loudon, Sefton, 
Walshe, Tom Nevitt MLC, and Captain Fitch.46 
Another group had been formed in Melbourne in 1 9 14 to lobby the 
Commonwealth Government on behalf of Australian investors in Papuan 
plantations . This was an 'Association of Planters' led by A. S. Bloomfield which 
included among its members F. W. Kitchen the soap manufacturer and a 
principal of the Commonwealth Copra Company (Giligili) ,  and H. Y. Russell 
of Sydney, director and secretary of the Sogeri Para Rubber Company 
(Koitaki). In 1 9 1 9  this body found itself in conflict with the Planters' 
Association in Port Moresby over recommendations each were making about 
Sunday tapping on rubber estates . Judge Murray consulted with the 
Melbourne group in 1 922 to obtain support in opposing the Navigation Act.47 
The planters of the Sogeri, Galley Reach and Hisiu districts of the Central 
Division, founders and core of both the Papua Club and the Planters' 
Association, lived within a few hours of Port Moresby and, as we have seen, 
could maintain to a degree much greater than was possible for more distant 
settlers a frequent intercourse both with each other and with other members 
of the unofficial community in 'Port'. The chief among them in partnerships 
with merchants, agents and publicans of the town put money into risky 
ventures, into mining and timber milling and into buying smaller plantations 
that came up for sale. And few as their numbers would remain they could 
come together for those distinguishing pastimes - horse-racing and 
gymkhanas , cricket and golf, fancy-dress dances and amateur theatricals -
that middle-class Anglo-Saxons seemed to take wherever they settled. There 
was perhaps a conscious reproduction of African and Indian colonial 
behaviour in some of these pursuits but more certainly there was emulation 
of the style of life of the landed classes in Australia or England. Horsemanship 
at least remained a necessary accomplishment for managers and assistants 
on large estates, and horse or mule and saddle continued to be the means of 
access to the Sogeri plateau. William Bruce of Doa, Manu Manu and the 
Papuan Times, and skilled in many sports , was the first to keep racehorses in 
town but most of the nearby planters kept one or two, and from around 1 9 1 0  
race meetings were held intermittently throughout the remaining period under 
46 Membership in 1936, it seems, comprised almost every planter. A list of the members 
circulated on a ballot paper for three delegates from each of five 'districts' contains seventy 
eight names out of (perhaps) a hundred remaining planters. CRS A5 1 8, item R9 1 8/3, 
'Planters' Association of Papua', 1 936-50. 
47 CRS Al 19/  10372 contains correspondence between the Melbourne group and the 
Minister. CRS G69 contains disagreement over Sunday tapping. 
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revtew. In the twenties there also grew an enthusiasm in Port for sailing canoe 
races where town businessmen, senior public servants and planters from the 
surrounding districts put up prizes, laid odds and sponsored Papuan crews 
of vanagls or lagatols in contests on Fairfax Harbour or around the coast to 
the canoe anchorage at Koki and return. The whole white community joined 
with Papuans at vantage points along the hills and on Paga Point to View 
these spectacles. 
In the Eastern and South Eastern Divisions of Papua, where there were 
fewer large planters or company estates , where the tropical environment was 
more distinctive, standards of dress and behaViour might have been more 
relaxed than in Port Moresby. Several 'east-enders' were members of the 
Planters' Association and visiting members of the Papua Club. But Samarai 
had only a few government officers and little of the hostility between 
'commercials' and 'officials' that characterised the capital during the war 
years. While there were cliques - Alice Keelan found there were three in the 
town in 1 920 between which newcomers had to choose - the Samarai 
Chamber of Commerce provtded a sufficient local forum for all those with an 
interest to advance or defend and well represented the collective voice of the 
white residents.48 Their number in Samarai could rise to two hundred at 
Christmas and New Year - with two hotels providing an egalitarian place to 
meet, stay and entertain that drew traders, miners, pearlers and planters from 
a vast area. The grander planters of the Central Division might have found the 
place cloying and confmed. 
AL THOUGH their new country became relatively safe and predictable, settlers 
in the years before 1 9 14 had expected more - indeed that Papua would one 
day resemble Java, Malaya or Ceylon. No such expectation could be sustained 
by 1 930. Henry Dexter, a marine engineer who had worked his passage out 
to Port Moresby on the BNGD supply ship Bentlnck in 1 9 1 0, and then served 
as an assistant on Otomata and Kemp Welch River plantations, left the 
Territory in 1 9 18 to take up a position on a rubber estate in Negri Sembilan 
in the FMS. He returned to Papua after eight years and remained a trader at 
Milne Bay until 1 937.  Dexter was well placed to make comparisons between 
two quite different planter communities. 
At Otomata he had worked under Bill Jefferson who knew Malaya and had 
tried to prepare Dexter for what he would see , but 'Only those who have spent 
years in a primitive country like Papua can fully realise the contrast' . In 1 9 1 8  
48 Keelan, In the land of Dohort, 49. 
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everyone in Malaya seemed prosperous. While difficult times were to come, 
there were 
comfortable hotels, cars, trains in which one could travel in comfort, instead of the 
long journeys - per boot - that had been the usual method of travel in Papua . . .  
every district had its little club, with its billiard table, tennis courts, reading room, 
etc . . .  How different the lot of the Papua planter! Not his the blocks of ice, the daily 
paper, mails and cold storage goods delivered each morning; nor when his day's 
work was done could he get into his car, and spend his evening with others of his 
kind.49 
The Papuan rubber planter might personally recruit his own labour, 
personally supervise his rubber nursery or bud-graft his rubber stumps, build 
his house, and personally oversee the clearing of the land, all tasks let out to 
Chinese contractors in Malaya. There, cleaning and weeding and rubber 
tapping itself were contracted out, a tapper being replaced by the contractor 
if trees were wounded on two successive occasions. 'It was greatly to the credit 
of the Papuan planters' ,  Dexter thought, 'that tapping is as good as it is' .50 
A recent historian has described 'the world of Papua's expatriate settlers' 
before 1 942 as 'a dusty, lower middle-class , Australian version of the British 
Raj'.5 1 Settlers would not have presumed even so much. In the thirties 
British India seemed very far away and vastly more glamorous than prosaic 
Papua. Samarai might resemble other South Seas port towns but Port 
Moresby from the beginning had the unmistakable stamp of a northern 
Australian frontier settlement - timber framed and iron roofed houses with 
verandahs, raised above the ground on 'stumps', with corrugated iron tanks 
to collect the run-off of rain water from the roofs. The town, except in the brief 
wet season from December to March, invariably disappointed visitors who had 
expected something more tropical. As a place to live Lewis Lett thought Port 
Moresby by 1 939 had become a town as 'dully and regrettably respectable as 
any other. For with the coming of women and the flood of commercialism . . .  the 
pioneer element has disappeared' . Sir Hubert Murray could write in the 1 938-
39 Annual Report of 'our life's dull-round proceeding as usual' as the news of 
a fresh European war arrived and he 'found it difficult even to feign an 
interest in the local activities which had hitherto absorbed so much of my 
life' .52 If for government officials the heroic age of pacification had been 
succeeded by an age of bureaucratic routine, so for planters the exciting 
49 Henry Dexter, 'Reminiscences of a Gin-soaked Trader' . Unpublished manuscript (ANU 
Pacific Manuscripts Bureau, PMB 624), p. 1 1 0- 12 .  Dexter was an acting ARM at Abau 1n 
1 9 15 .  
5 0  Ibid. , 1 1 4. 
5 1 Edward P. Wolfers, Race relations and colonial rule In Papua New Guinea (Sydney 
1 975), 45 . 
52 PAR 1 938-39, 1 .  
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stages of development, the clearing of the bush and the laying down of the 
plantations ,  had been followed by years of waiting and of bondage to the 
needs of trees, labourers, and markets. 
Yet both officials and planters, once so opposed, now shared a veiy strong 
sense of ownership of the countiy. Frequently, if mainly perhaps to 
distinguish themselves from the white community in New Guinea, they had 
lightheartedly called themselves 'Papuans'. Less frequently and more formally 
they had described themselves as 'Anglo-Papuans' - pioneers of a distinct 
community they expected to continue and carry on their work. In their view 
they had laid the foundations of the countiy just as it had been white people 
like themselves who had named and brought 'Papua' into being. The other 
Papuans were Papuan 'natives' the best of whom might be more able than 
whites of an 'inferior class' perhaps but who generally were still destined for 
a veiy long apprenticeship in civilisation. In the thirties with most of the world 
still apparently safe within the ambit of unchallengeable European power it 
was quite easy for 'ordinaiy' white people to hold such a view. M. K. Gandhi 
seemed to the average white man a joke, the Indian nationalists pushy and 
ungrateful, and only the Japanese, the Germans, and the Bolsheviks real 
enemies of the modem world order. 53 
53 Atlee Hunt had written privately to Murray in Oct. 1 9 1 6  at the time when as a result 
of C. F. Andrews's report on the indenture oflndians overseas the Government oflndla ended 
the system. Hunt had been told that Andrews was 'quite a crank on the subject of Indian 
labour' who had 'seriously lowered his own status with the whites by an extraordinary action 
he commltted in Natal' where he had 'literally kissed' the feet of an Indian leader named 
'Gandi' [sic). This is in CRS Al 20/ 1 1 706. 
C HAPTER 1 9  
Transgression and retribution 
Vulnerability and responsibility 
The individual settler was vulnerable and his safety finally depended on the 
perception among the Papuans that, if the provocation was sufficient, the 
reach of the gavamani was very considerable, and that punishment was both 
certain and irresistible. The capacity of the new authorities in the forceful 
suppression of warfare and unflagging pursuit of 'wrong-doers' had been 
demonstrated quite overwhelmingly and within living memory by MacGregor, 
LeHunte, and Christopher Robinson. But there was a gap between open 
opposition to the government, its laws and its officers , and the small thefts 
and evasions that could occur on plantations,  
the loafing, the scheming, the waste and destructiveness o f  the native on his job -
things which only prohibitive expenditure on white supervisors could hope to cope 
with and then not too successfully - the thousand and one insolences and 
irritabilities . . . that confront the grower at every turn against which he has no 
practical remedy at all save a very risky and illegal one. 1 
Minor acts of 'disobedience' and 'disrespect' directed towards the isolated and 
fallible employer - his power obviously limited - were hardly uncommon as 
Papuans were prompted to assert their dignity as men. Such an isolated 
European might be outnumbered a hundred to one, and the constant concern 
to maintain their individual authority and a general 'respect for the white 
man' was kept alive in the minds of most settlers as much by these smaller 
acts of defiance met with frequently, as by the much less frequent reports of 
actual attacks . They were signs, settlers could think, of a savagery still barely 
repressed in a people so recently subjugated. It might now seem more 
remarkable that Papuans threatened the settler so seldom and accepted the 
solitary white man at his own valuation as much as they did. 
Yet, for the European both his fears and his overcoming of them might 
have provided zest in a life in other respects dull.2 He was also strongly 
prompted not to lose his standing with other whites by failing to 'control' his 
Papuan Courter, 1 4  Aug. 1936. Letter written by Richard Walshe. 
Percy Robinson certainly regarded arrows shot at the Varoe as she passed a village 
in the Kikori delta in 1 9 19 as an experience to write home about while at the same time 
something to be dismissed as just another minor hazard of settler life in such a place. 
(Robinson Letters, July 1 92 1 )  
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labour. The trick, many found, was to forestall a display of truculent 
behaviour from assertive labourers with a show of bravado, personal power 
and self-confidence that left Papuans impressed. The penal sanctions of the 
labour code were a blunt weapon and for an employer to be forced to rely on 
them too heavily could be considered by his peers an admission of defeat. 
A planter's capacity to command respect depended partly on mystery - the 
novel and unpredictable quality that much of the behaviour of Europeans 
possessed at least for 'raw recruits' from the bush, and which kept them 
intimidated, intrigued and frequently, it can be assumed, just amused. 
Europeans themselves were very aware of their effect generally, often planning 
to surprise, impress, and even occasionally delight their employees with exotic 
wonders - and being disappointed if Papuans failed to respond as expected. 
As early as 1 9 1  7 on a visit to Gadaisu G. A. Loudon was giving a 
'cinematograph' show for the labour force.3 J. F. Horn, the visiting director 
of Robinson River, was present at Giligili in Milne Bay in January 1 933 to 
observe a fireworks display provided by the manager, Don Irvine, to entertain 
the 'boys'.4 Percy Robinson could kill a pig or issue flags at Ogamobu as a 
reward to the men completing the task of clearing the bush. Others might kill 
a bullock or take workers hunting or fishing. But planter authority also 
depended on demonstrable skills - the daily life of the plantation presenting 
many opportunities for displays of specialised knowledge in the construction 
and repair of buildings, boats, wharves and machinery. Plantation 
development overall and the processes of production to the export stage had 
requirements set by the remote world outside the purposes of which Papuans 
could only guess and which gave the planter the initiative as employer, 
instructor and technical specialist. 
Labourers were also dependent on the degree of responsibility and care 
taken by the employer - the more so the more isolated the plantation. Planters 
were expected by their workers - as well as required as employers under the 
NLO - to attend and treat personally any seriously ill and injured labourers, 
a task carried out immediately after roll call each morning on most 
plantations. There was a cost in negligence as cases referred to the GMOs for 
treatment - except where a venereal disease was the cause - were a charge 
against the employer. Though ultimately constrained by the law and prudence 
to provide adequately for his employees , every planter could seem to hold 
arbitrary power as the supplier of food, tobacco, shelter, wages and the 
Papuan Courter, 1 4  Dec. 19 1 7. 
J. F. Horn, [Diary of) A visit to Robinson River Plantation (Manuscript in the 
possession of the Horn family, Sydney). The Papuan Courter of 22 Nov. 1 939 reported the 
large Christmas feast provided by Bob Bunting the younger for his Teste (Wari) Island 
plantation workers. Such events had been indeed routine on plantations for many years. 
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passage home. When, after 1 920, RMs were empowered to advance up to a 
sixth of the wages deposited with them and due to Papuan labourers, the 
money could only be spent in the plantation trade store the planter 
controlled.5 Generally he needed to show some interest in workers' problems, 
acting as a local 'court' , punishing mis-demeanours with tobacco fines and a 
'dressing down', and settling by force of personality or as some will judge, by 
intimidation, disputes arising between the workers . Generally also the 
employer had too much to lose if plantation routines were disrupted, and 
strong reasons to maintain a satisfactory working atmosphere. But fights on 
plantations were not unusual, sometimes involving a confrontation between 
worker and European manager or assistant, more often between workers , 
especially where 'batches' of labourers from different divisions were employed 
for different types of work - where Goaribaris or Orokaivas might be employed 
for heavy work and Aromas, Rigas or Iasi-lasis for cleaning and tapping - but 
they could also occur between labourers from rival 'tribes' from the same 
division, and sometimes on larger estates between work gangs pitted against 
each other by their overseers. If the necessary discipline of plantation life 
could be irksome, the work boring, the absence of women frustrating, intrigue 
was diverting and probably inevitable. There was undoubtedly also fear of 
other Papuans. Gosiago labourers clearing land in 1 9 1 1  on Giligili and fearful 
when they heard the sound of axes felling trees on the neighbouring property, 
Hagita, rushed to James Osborne with the 'breathless information' that 'the 
Orokivas [sic]  are coming'.6 
Control and breakdown 
The universal practice of singling out experienced labourers as 'boss-boys' to 
act as intermediaries between the planter and the labouring gangs not only 
provided a convenient structure of command like that in an army company or 
a public school but placed social distance between the management and 
workers that was essential in the confined society they shared. On larger 
estates , a manager might never in practice directly communicate with an 
ordinary labourer at all. On the medium sized plantations the boss-boy 
system was indispensable if a planter was ever to be able to leave his property 
for brief periods, essential in the training and supervision of new recruits, 
essential if he fell ill . In the eastern Divisions boss-boys overseeing casual 
local labour were entirely responsible for smaller properties for months at a 
As mentioned above on p. 49, the prices charged for common trade store goods by 
plantation stores were regularly monitored by both Native Affairs inspectors and visiting RMs. 
As was also noted on p. 49, advances of up to a third of wages due were permitted after 
1 935. 
NAPNG Series 09 1 ,  Patrol Reports, Eastern Division. C. B. Higginson, 4 Sept. 1 9 1 1 .  
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time. The understanding that every planter attempted to develop with these 
employees could be very close and a 'good' boss-boy was much sought after. 
But the mood on a plantation could change and if an employer's grip was 
lost in a lapse of judgement, or a particular group of labourers could not be 
bluffed, impressed or intimidated and openly refused to work, the enterprise 
was faced with a major crisis. For an indentured labourer to refuse a lawful 
order or desert his work - or to incite others under contract to do so - were 
offences under the NLO and the planter was entitled to seek assistance from 
the nearest RM to punish offenders. As well as the time lost in work and 
attendance at a local court hearing the planter could face the risk that the 
accused might bring a counter claim of unjust treatment or abuse against 
him, which,  if proved, could result in fines and costs being imposed that were 
severe. If labourers were gaoled their services were lost. Often the employer 
would prefer to have the contracts of 'loafers', 'troublemakers' and 'deserters' 
cancelled, accepting the losses involved in wages for which he was still liable 
and the costs of having new labourers recruited. He could hope for more 
tractable replacements or an opportunity to mend his own approach. Other 
planters seemed to enjoy teaching a 'surly' or 'lazy batch' of workers a lesson, 
believing that to begin with an unsparing regime or to bring back deserters to 
a harsh routine 'taught the boys who was boss' . These were no more than 
essential techniques in good management. Subsequently the hard master 
could allow himself to be generous knowing that he could 'crack the whip' 
whenever he chose. He might even acquire a reputation as a 'good' taubad.a. 
If in many lesser circumstances it was just not worth the employers' while 
to bring actions against their employees and a dressing down or the 
withholding of tobacco rations were the most common punishments, physical 
assault remained temptingly available as an immediate remedy in dealing with 
disobedience. The white men came from societies in which the corporal 
punishment of children and young males was still socially and legally 
sanctioned, and plantations invariably invited comparison with boarding 
schools and the conditions of life on board ship or in the army. And Papuans 
of any age, physically smaller generally than Europeans and culturally 
backward or immature in the view of most white people, could indeed be 
regarded just as they were routinely described, as 'boys' . While beatings and 
bashings were behaviour more likely to be resorted to by the less competent 
or secure among the Europeans, violence was a recourse that all employers 
believed it necessary to hold in reserve , one that they believed Papuans 
understood, and one the threat of which was far more significant in the 
plantation setting than the records of assault cases brought against employers 
can possibly show. White men acknowledged that in these 'quinine latitudes', 
their tempers - like their lives - might be shortened. They commonly spoke of 
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being 'nervy' or 'liverish' .7  A planter suffering from frequent bouts of malaria 
or the consequences of heavy drinking might have been as frequently short­
tempered in his management of Papuan labour. It would often be left to a 
boss-boy to interpret the taubada's mood to other workers. The employee 
might even feel an indulgent or protective concern for such a white man. 
Certainly many settlers had good reason over the years to be grateful for the 
loyalty of Papuan servants, boss-boys and crews in such circumstances . 
Papuans were also testing the constraints. They saw that the Europeans 
were divided by role, personality and attitude , that aid could be sought from 
government officers against employers , and that the new law in Papua 
provided a broadly predictable - if precisely unpredictable and inexplicable -
degree of protection. In October 1 9 1 9 Percy Robinson of Ogamobu noted that 
If [ the labourers] take it into their heads to sulk, you can't do a thing. I know that 
was Arthur's trouble - he treated the labour like dogs and they simply wouldn't 
work for him . You may 'belt their blocks off and punish them but if they don't want 
to work you can't make them. They have nothing to learn from the 1 .W.W. , I can 
assure you . Simpson treats them like children. He pulls their legs and kids them 
on. He rarely punishes a boy . . .  We had a government inspection on Saturday and 
there was not a complaint. Incidentally we exercise a little diplomacy with the Govt 
officials to the same end. Of course, quarrelling with the officials and brutally 111-
treating the natives at the same time may be personally gratifying but it is poor 
policy from shareholders' point of view.8 
The argument that shareholders ultimately paid for the abuse of labourers 
was one pressed by the government on many occasions. 
Robinson's letters contain quite detailed accounts of several white 
plantation assistants at Ogamobu and their dealings with Papuan workers. 
William Arthur Simpson, employed there between 1 9 1 9  and 1 92 1 , was typical. 
The high opinion held of him in the passage above where he is compared with 
Arthur Williams, Percy's brother-in-law, did not last. The assistant worked 
well in sober periods but began to be 'rude and offensive' about the house 
having forgotten how 'half starved' he had been when Percy took him on. 
Simpson had earlier been 'shaken to the soul with fear as he had had a close 
look at his next step - the beachcomber - and this job came just in time to 
save him . . .  His memory lasted about three months' .9 Simpson's drinking 
and indulgence with Papuan women in the end proved too much for Percy's 
puritan taste. One morning he thrashed the assistant so severely the man was 
In the Papuan Times of 4 Oct. 19 1 1  under the headline 'Are we Mad?' a writer 
suggested that residents suffered from 'furore tropicalis' and that 'It cannot be denied that 
the white inhabitants of Papua are hot of temper and rancourous of dlsposltlon taken all 
round'. 
8 Robinson Letters, 4 Oct. 1 9 19 .  
Ibid. , Christmas Day 19 19 .  
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taken to hospital. Drinking whisky with Baidam, the boss-boy, in the 
manager's absence, Simpson had touched 'the lowest level for a white man in 
this country - to sit drinking with a native. Besides carrying a penalty of six 
months imprisonment't By this time Percy Robinson was 'fed up absolutely 
with cheap white labour . . . I don't think any men of that class are worth 
employing at any price' . Simpson had been a pharmacist in Marrickville, New 
South Wales, before going to Papua - perhaps with a drinking problem - in 
1 9 1 8. In the thirties 'Simmo' managed Whittens' Bubuleta plantation on Milne 
Bay and he died at Samarai in 1 939, aged sixty four.10 
Three separate instances of conflict on plantations might be considered. 
The first comes from the reminiscences of Henry Dexter, acting for a time as 
a manager for BNGD at Otomata. Writing much later, Dexter recorded with 
revealing candour a potentially explosive confrontation with labourers in 
1 9 1 3. He had been able to arrange the transfer to Otomata of 150 Goaribari 
labourers he had previously recruited for Baubauguina expecting that they 
would work well for him. On one occasion these 'old friends' refused an order. 
Dexter knew that the RM was absent from the government station at Abau, 
and that to communicate with the general manager in Port would be an 
admission of weakness. 'Rightly or wrongly' , he issued a gun to his servant, 
loaded his Winchester, and confronted the 'strikers' . They had acted as 
beaters for Dexter on Saturday afternoons and well knew the power of the 
rifle. The strike collapsed. Dexter's conduct was completely illegal and the 
consequences could have been far more serious . It is quite possible that such 
a scene was more representative than we have evidence for - even if, as a 
recollection of himself as a newcomer perhaps out of his depth, Dexter's 
account is unique. 1 1  
Yet another picture appears in a 1 929 case which just might suggest that 
physical punishment was more routine on at least some plantations than 
there is other evidence for. In October three labourers from the Gulf Division 
employed on Kanosia estate were committed for trial on a charge of causing 
grievous bodily harm to a boss-boy, Mohi-miri, who had reported their refusal 
to work to the manager, J. B. 'Joe' McKenna. In their defence, they testified 
that they had taken revenge on Mohi-miri because McKenna had caned them. 
Caning was punishment quite inadmissible under the law in Papua, but it is 
at least possible that the manager had taken such a 'very risky and illegal' 
step , might have done so on other occasions, and was not alone among 
planters who did so. While the workers in this case were convicted of an 
admitted assault, no charge was laid against the manager. 12 
1 0  Papuan Courier, 1 7  Mar. 1 939. 
1 1  Dexter, 'Reminiscences', 49-50. 
12 Papuan Courter, 18 Oct. 1929. 
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The third perspective comes from a Papuan source. Ausa Songoro of 
Mabadauan in the Western Division worked for Tom Sefton of Koitaki as a 
boss-boy before 1 942 and as a recruiter after 1 945 . He remembered Sefton as 
a 'strong' or hard man, and violent to a degree. Labourers were indeed 
frightened of his anger. Ausa could remember being called on one occasion to 
hold Sefton's mount while a Kiwai worker was horse-whipped to tears. Thirty 
years later the former boss-boy could still feel the indignation he had then felt 
at the humiliation of a countryman. This incident was clearly the most 
memorable of many. Yet though he had worked at Koitaki for more than a 
decade Ausa could not recall a single instance where a labourer brought an 
action against Sefton for assault. Papuans, it is possible, were prepared to 
accept their employer's right to use force to punish them if they had 'done 
wrong'. 'Mister' Sefton valued good workers and rewarded them. He was harsh 
with those who were lazy or rough with the rubber trees. He ensured that 
Koitaki labourers were well fed and when they were sick he visited them each 
afternoon. He kept two 'shooting boys' constantly out in the bush after game 
to provide variety and interest in the plantation diet. These things also seemed 
important to Ausa.13 
Like most others in the development years Tom Sefton had been fined for 
breaches of the NLO and in 1 9 1  7 was warned of the consequences of illegally 
confining a labourer . 1 4  All this would be forgotten, his firm handling of his 
labour probably regarded as falling within permissible bounds by the 1 920s 
and 1930s as Koitaki became the showplace plantation to which vice-regal 
and other official visitors were invariably taken to be entertained by the 
manager. Indeed Sefton came to epitomise the more successful :Papuan 
planter. In 1935 he had a cricket ground with a concrete pitch made at 
Koitaki where 'all hands, European and Papuan, practice together . . .  on 
Saturday and Sunday and play matches against neighbouring plantations' . 
J. T. O'Malley, CNA by this time , hoped other planters would follow Sefton's 
lead. 15 
Both the law and government policy without ambiguity prohibited all 
assaults whether by European or Papuan, employer, labourer or villager. If 
such assaults could no more be prevented in Papua than in most societies -
and perhaps less than in some, Murray and his officers appear to have policed 
the law with an efficiency and degree of equity where two 'races' interacted 
that might have been exceptional. And if Papuans were more likely to be 
13 Interview: Ausa Songoro, Hohola, May 1 975 . 
1 4  CRS A l  18/427 1 . In 1928 he was arraigned on 1 8 counts of ·removing natives further 
than 15 miles' without an RM's leave, fined a nominal 2s.6d in each case and 3s.6d costs. 
There had been a ·misunderstanding" (Papuan Courter, 17 Feb. 1 928). 
1 5 PAR 1 936-37, 1 2 .  
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convicted on the testimony of Europeans than the contrary, and routinely 
given prison sentences that may seem more severe, certainly gross or 
persistent offenders among white men could expect prosecution. In 1924 
Charles Jackson, once a Patrol Officer and then the BNGD company labour 
inspector and secretary of the Planters' Association during the period of 
greatest hostility towards Murray's government, published his Native Labour 
Law and Practice in Papua.16 By the time of publication an admirer of the 
Lieutenant Governor he advised that 
the newcomer is astonished to find that many natives are only too ready to take the 
fullest advantage of their privilege to 'make court' on every opportunity offering, and 
that convictions and fines against the employer are inevitable if the assault, 
whatever its nature, is proved . . .  It is frequently very galling to find one's only 
legitimate remedy is the 'ponderous machinery of the law' (often enough a difficult, 
tedious and expensive remedy) for all the many petty delinquencies of native 
employees, when a 'cuffing' or even a 'sound thrashing' at times seems so much 
more suited to the . . .  offence. 17 
If a Papuan knew that 'a sympathetic . . .  or apparently sympathetic . . .  
official' would preside 'to hear patiently and solemnly anything and everything 
he has to say', then employers had to be careful. In practice,  Jackson advised, 
it was 'Time alone' that 'serves to establish the mean of a reasonable "give and 
take" tolerance and mutual understanding between employers of labour and 
officials' . 1 8  This might suggest that settlers might not find all officials 
unsympathetic. Andprimafacie, we might suspect that this was so. But there 
is much evidence that Murray and his senior officers kept a close watch over 
the decisions of the RMs' courts and that local court records, like all patrol 
reports, were closely scrutinised in Port Moresby. If imprisonment of 
Europeans was certainly rare, fines were frequent. Settlers could believe 
themselves excessively supervised, constrained and punished even as the 
government moderated penalties to meet the circumstances of offenders 
whether they were white or black. Offences under the NLO heard before the 
local RM carried the penalty of imprisonment only for Papuans. The Criminal 
Code on the other hand applied equally. Criminal cases, however, had to be 
referred to the Central Court. It seems that unless a settler's offence was 
sufficiently serious to clearly warrant his committal to appear before the 
higher court on a criminal charge, RMs routinely used their discretion to sting 
rather than risk confming the European. To send a planter to gaol might so 
disrupt the work of his plantation as to make such a punishment counter-
16 Charles F. Jackson, Native Labour law and pra.ctlce ln Papua (Sydney 1924). 
17 Ibid. ,  37. 
18 Ibid. ,  38.  
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productive. A sharp fine had frequently to suffice to curb the white man where 
a Papuan could only be gaoled. 
Inspection and prosecution 
In Chapter 9 it was noted that the position of Commissioner for Native Affairs 
and Control (CNA) was created in 1 908 and held conjointly until 1 9 1 0  with 
that of Government Secretary by Alexander Campbell. As Government 
Secretary Campbell was head of the administration through the Resident 
Magistrates of the eight (in some years nine) Divisions into which Papua was 
divided. As CNA his responsibilities were to supervise the indentured labour 
system. 
The roles were essentially incompatible, and from 1 9 1 0  they were 
separated. Bertram Bramell became CNA. He had been an officer in the 
British New Guinea and Papuan services since 1897. Thereafter with a small 
staff of Native Affairs Inspectors the full time of the Commissioner could be 
given to policing the Native Labour Ordinance independently of the regular 
magistracy responsible to the Government Secretary. Bramell was regarded 
by planters as far too credulous in admitting 'native' evidence and 'a bit of a 
crank' . He bore the brunt of their antagonism during the most trying period 
of conflict between the administration and the settlers. In 1 920 in an account 
that demonstrates what was probably a typical planter response to a surprise 
visit by the Commissioner - though in this instance he did not appear - Percy 
Robinson wrote that he had been 'scared out of seven years' growth' when he 
saw the Government Yacht Elevala heading unexpected towards his wharf for 
I was sure it was that white whiskered old Devil Brammell [s ic] . . . coming to 
inspect the labor and plantation. His rare visits are invariably followed by complete 
disorganisation of your labor and the Lord knows what expense for all sorts of 
faddish alternatives of the houses, latrines etc. So I was much relieved to see only 
the Governor . . . Our labor is contented, well fed,  well housed and the general 
conditions . . .  are absolutely O.K. but it only needs old Brammell to put in an 
appearance and the labor will be upset and full of complaints and our working 
programme jiggered up for the next six months. 19 
Percy Robinson, like most planters, had little to hide most of the time. 
Ultimately this was because he and they knew that Papuans could not be 
compelled to 'make paper' and enter a contract of indentured service if they 
believed they would be cheated or mistreated. While villagers were 
undoubtedly tempted by the display of goods recruiters customarily spread 
before them as an inducement to allow the young men to leave home, 
Papuans were finally under no compulsion to take up a particular offer of 
work. They could pick and choose. The reputation acquired by a plantation, 
1 9  Robinson Letters, 29 Feb. 1920. 
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its location and points of interest, together with stories told by returned 
labourers about their treatment by plantation staff became significant factors 
in whether a recruiter's 'presents' were accepted - and ultimately in whether 
an enterprise could secure labour of a desired kind. It was also inevitable that 
there would be some planters, more commonly those employed as managers 
and overseers , hard pressed, irresponsible, or just temperamentally 
unsuitable and not awake to the dangers of alienating workers , who believed 
that they could 'get away' with abusing or neglecting them for a period without 
serious consequences. Upon such men fear of the inspectors must have acted 
as a restraint. 
But for the more scrupulous planters too inspections remained an irritant. 
All planters 'knew' or supposed that in every other plantation colony the 
employers were subject to far less supervision. It was to take many years 
before even good men would cease to be indignant at the disruption of their 
routines by the visits of 'impractical' CNA officers prying into their businesses 
and questioning the labour force. While acquittals were frequent in cases 
brought by the Native Affairs Department officers against planters , usually for 
want of conclusive evidence - a fact which seemed to confirm the prevailing 
View among the latter that many charges were ill-founded or frivolous - there 
was some effort indeed needed to evade the law in Papua for any length of 
time. 
In 1 9 1 8  Arthur Bloomfield had shown Atlee Hunt the reports on the 
Kanosia and Galley Reach estates prepared by George Wiseman, the visiting 
Malayan planter. Well primed With the planters' View of things Wiseman had 
suggested that in Papua 'the Labour Ordinance is interpreted too literally by 
Government labour officers' .20 Hunt forwarded copies on to Murray for 
comment. To show that forbearance rather than an over-eagerness to 
prosecute was by far the more frequent response of his officers, the Lieutenant 
Governor reViewed the twelve most recent plantation inspection reports of the 
Native Affairs inspectors , Leslie Bell and Stanley Greenland, which had 
exposed sixteen clear breaches of the Ordinance and three cases of assault. 
Action was taken in only one case of assault - that against an overseer at 
Mamai on six charges of assaulting his workers, and in the case of two 
breaches of the NLO - against Fairfax Harbour for alloWing the latrine to 
become 'a serious menace to health' and against Itikinumu for failure to 
proVide adequate accommodation for sick labourers. With these cases action 
could not be avoided. In fifty other cases in the year ending 30 June 1 9 1 8, 
where a total of 320 labourers had laid complaints, action had not in the end 
been taken by the Department. Here surely was evidence of restraint, hardly 
2° CRS Al 1 9 /9923. 'G. Wiseman, Report on Plantation, Papua'. Murray's comments. 
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of 'too literal' an interpreting of the law. Murray could argue persuasively that 
while 
I do not of course claim that the Department makes no mistakes . . . I do claim that 
the figures I have given prove that the Department exercised a very free discretion 
in distinguishing between the complaints which are genuine and those which are 
not. 
He concluded, 
I think the opposition of the ordinary settler to the Government, in such countries 
as Papua, is really quite independent of evidence, and arises from the very nature 
of things . . .  he is naturally inclined to view with impatience any desire on the part 
of the Government to protect and assist the native . . . as a piece of sickly and 
unpractical sentimentality . . .  [He] is not a fair critic of the Government's native 
policy.21  
A planter, understandably, preferred to deal in labour matters with the 
Resident Magistrate in his own Division. This was a neighbour with whom he 
could build a rapport. They might mix socially. Their wives might become 
friends. If an RM was also a qualified Native Labour Inspector whose reports 
were forwarded on to the CNA by the Government Secretary, plantation 
inspections occupied only a small part of his time. On several occasions 
planters would suggest that the functions of the CNA and the RMs be reversed 
- that the CNA be responsible only for 'uncivilised' natives and unemployed 
villagers and the RMs responsible for all aspects of the indentured labour 
system.22 In a letter to Atlee Hunt in July 1 9 18 ,  G.  A. Loudon described 
Bertram Bramell as 'more or less a joke with the natives themselves' and went 
on to point out the excellent relations that existed between Milne Bay planters 
and the RM at Samarai, Charles Higginson.23 The editorial in the Papuan 
Courter of 6 September 1 9 1 8  - certainly appearing with Loudon' s knowledge -
identified the Department of Native Affairs as the particular agency of 
harassment of the employers, the source of innumerable 'vexatious pin­
pricks' ,  a quite unnecessary body that went to such 'ridiculous lengths to 
protect the native' that settlement was being discouraged. 
Murray could only have seen the Department's unpopularity with planters 
as a measure of its success, and one reason for the frequent transfers of RMs 
may indeed have been to prevent them developing too close a relationship with 
settlers in any one Division. In a letter reporting the departure from Kikori of 
Louis Brown, an RM he liked, and his replacement by the shell-shocked young 
Jack Keelan - 'mad as a hatter, but, thank heaven a type I can manage' -
2 1  Ibid. , 8. 
2 2  In the Papuan Ttmes of 4 Apr. 19 1 5, and in 'representations' of the Samara! Chamber 
of Commerce to Poynton, 1 92 1  in CRS A l  2 1 / 1 592 1 .  See above also p. 1 88. 
23 CRS Al 18/ 1 2377, Loudon to Hunt, 22 July 1 9 18. 
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Percy Robinson thought 'the Govt. sickening the way they treat their officials. 
The Browns toiled day and night to make the station habitable' . He added, 
'you have no idea to what extent the efficient management of our job depends 
on the tactful handling of Government officials. They can just about double 
our costs of development by a wave of the hand' .24 
In 1922 , following the climactic events of the preceding two years, Leslie 
Bell, previously Chief Inspector, succeeded Bramell and faced a then much 
tamed settler community. Bell had been sent to Malaya in 1 9 1 2  to bring back 
a report on the labour system and conditions there. A former senior RM, J. T. 
O'Malley, yet another officer with an intense personal loyalty to Murray and 
in complete sympathy with his determination to maintain the law without fear 
or favour, succeeded Bell in 1926.25 
By 1924 C. F. Jackson could explain to the newcomer, with no hint of the 
ridicule that William Bruce would have brought to bear a decade earlier, that 
The guiding principle behind the administrative policy is the necessity to render 
impossible . . .  where Europeans of mixed temperaments and antecedents are 
working and living under health conditions that tend to exaggerate 'nerves' and 
'liver', the adoption of a general spirit of domineering and careless brutality in 
relations with the native population.26 
Most employer infringements of the NLO - neglecting or failing to provide 
good and sufficient food, adequate housing or medical treatment - were 
classed as minor and cases could be heard by the RMs at a Court of Petty 
Sessions constituted on an inspection visit to a plantation or at the nearest 
government station. It was on .the high incidence of charges over these 
offences - together with actions brought against managers for failure to 
maintain proper records - that the perception of some in the years before 1922 
that the government was engaged in a frenzy of unnecessary prosecutions was 
based. In cases brought by the Native Affairs Department on behalf of Papuan 
workers, the CNA's inspectors themselves would act as prosecutors before an 
RM, the Department also providing a solicitor in the defence of labourers 
charged by employers where its officers believed a defence could be made. 
While convictions recorded against planters were frequent - hardly an overseer 
or manager was not at some time convicted of an offence - so also were 
dismissals and acquittals. 
Cases of common assault, like breaches of the NLO,  could be tried 
summarily by an RM. The Resident Magistrates generally would only convict 
24 Robinson Letters, May 1920. In Penelope Hope, Long ago ts far away (Canberra 
1 979), 175 .  
25 Bell became an optician in Sydney. In the early 1 930s he advertised in the Papuan 
Courter. 
26 Jackson, Native Labour Law and Practice tn Papua, 39. 
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a European if a complaint was repeated, where witnesses were clearly agreed 
or where some injury appeared to have resulted. The slaps and hair pullings, 
the type of humiliating treatment employed to coerce labourers by some 
assistants and overseers, generally went unpunished. Most managers and 
owner-planters using boss-boys as intermediaries could avoid such methods 
altogether. As noted above, more serious cases considered to warrant criminal 
prosecution were referred to the Central Court, either in Port Moresby or 
Samarai or on circuit, and heard before the CJO - Murray himself throughout 
almost the whole period of this study, or from 1 9 10 until 1 928 before the 
DCJO, Charles Herbert, and subsequently Justice Ralph Gore. 
The number of Europeans convicted of serious criminal acts involving 
Papuans was actually small. In June 1 92 1 ,  with the visit of Alexander 
Poynton, Murray had a list prepared of all cases of Europeans charged under 
the Criminal Code heard before the Central Court in the eleven years since 
1 9 1 0.27 There had been forty-two. Offences ranged from stealing and forgery 
to murder. The majority of those tried appear not to have been planters or 
plantation employees though these were well represented. Of the cases where 
planters, assistants or overseers were convicted of offences against Papuans 
the trial in October 1 9 1 1 of the Osborne brothers of Rossel Island for arson, 
the Bernesconi affair of 1 9 14 previously considered, 28 and the case of A. M. 
Sinclair of 'The Palms', Hisiu, arraigned on a charge of murder, stood out. 
The Osborne trial was the outcome of the first visit by a government patrol 
in three years to Rossel or Yela Island at the extreme east of the Territocy in 
July 1 9 1 1 .  The visitors were unexpected. It became apparent that the brothers 
Frank and Eric Osborne, for much of the time the only white men on the 
island and planters and traders there since 1 903 , had taken advantage of 
their position to intimidate the islanders and engage in a wide range of illegal 
activities. They had felled timber and operated beche-de-mer boats without 
licence, had placed buildings on native land, and supplied islanders with shot­
guns. The more serious of their offences were the burning down of the houses 
of men who had refused to work for them and a possible case of incitement to 
murder. The lesser cases were tried summarily by the RM and the criminal 
charges referred to Port Moresby. At a sitting of the Central Court on 27 
October Frank Osborne threw himself upon the mercy of the Lieutenant 
Governor denying the incitement charge but admitting arson and wilful 
27 NAPNG & CRS G 1 79,  Item 7 /2, 'Return Shewing Europeans Charged with Criminal 
Offences in the Territory of Papua since the lst January, 1 9 10',  1 92 1 .  The Queensland 
Criminal Code of 1 899 had been adopted as a whole in British New Guinea in 1 902 . 
28 See above pp. 1 27-8. 
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destruction of property. Both brothers were convicted of the offences against 
property, fined and made to enter a £50 bond to keep the peace.29 
A. M. Sinclair was tried in January 1 920 for the murder in 1 9 1 9  of Kaima, 
an employee blown up while Sinclair was using dynamite to stun fish. He was 
found guilty of manslaughter and given a suspended sentence.3° Charges of 
the manslaughter of a plantation labourer were made against Charles Adolphe 
Smith, an assistant on Jawarere, in 1 9 1 5 ,  and against the manager of 
Robinson River in 1920, Helge Holm. Smith was found guilty and imprisoned 
for three months. Holm had kicked a labourer who had taken more than his 
share of a catch of fish. The man subsequently died, probably of a ruptured 
spleen. Because there had been no post mortem the exact cause of death could 
not be determined and the case against the manager was dismissed. He had 
been previously convicted on several occasions since 1 9 14 of assault on 
labourers. 
Over the whole period 1 9 1 0-2 1 seven out of nine Europeans charged with 
inflicting bodily harm and four out of five charged with unlawful wounding 
were convicted. Two at least were plantations overseers, one a recruiter. 
Richard Jensen, whose treatment and neglect of his workers led to the crisis 
at Itikinumu in 1 9 1 8, as previously noted, had barely escaped conviction the 
year before for causing the loss of an eye when he threw a lamp 'in mistake' 
at a labourer. 
Of other criminal offences little need be said here. These were not unique 
to planters nor particularly associated with plantation life. And not all victims 
in cases of serious assault recorded on the 1921  list were Papuans. There 
were violent crimes committed by Europeans against other Europeans. August 
Frese, the contractor who cleared Jawarere in 1 9 10, serving subsequently as 
manager on several estates, was charged with the murder and convicted of the 
manslaughter of 'Handsome Harry' Baker in 1 9 1 5 .  They had quarrelled over 
a Papuan woman. 31 Convictions for sexual crimes committed by Europeans 
29 See Margriet Roe, 'The History of South East Papua to 1930' (ANU, PhD thesis, 1 962 ), 
475-6. 
30 NAPNG & CRS 0 1 79,  Item 7/2.  p. 2; Papuan Courter, 1 6  Jan. 1 920. 
3 1  NAPNG & CRS G 1 79,  Item 7 /2 .  Capital offences committed by Europeans against 
each other were indeed very few. Towards the end of our period in Sept. 1939, Margaret 
Sinclair, Widow of A. M. Sinclair of Hisiu, was arrested on suspicion of the wilful murder of 
Ernest Jones found dead in her bed with his throat cut. Both had been drinking heavily the 
night before and Mrs Sinclair could admit to remembering nothing. She said that Jones must 
have committed suicide. Dr Jenkins thought the wound one inflicted With great force and 
incompatible With such a view. At a committal hearing Richard Humphries RM nonetheless 
accepted R. D. Bertie's defence that there was no prl.mafacte case against Mrs Sinclair who 
was quickly discharged. That the crime was an act of Papuan vengeance remained a 
possibility, certainly. But though it is unlikely in the circumstances that Mrs Sinclair could 
have been convicted on the 'wilful' charge it is also possible that in Papua the prospect of 
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were few if sexual relationships between white men and Papuan women were 
relatively common. Reginald Chancellor, a plantation assistant in 1 9 12 and 
a soldier settler at Aroma in 1 92 1 ,  was convicted of the abduction of a Papuan 
girl in February 1922 and sentenced to six months imprisonment with hard 
labour.32 Perhaps as many as one in ten planters fathered Papuan children. 
Such outcomes could scarcely be concealed for long nor their consequences 
evaded if a man was to continue to live and work in the Territory. But where 
conception could be prevented there was much deception practised among 
wayward settlers anxious to preserve an unblemished reputation among their 
peers. Public knowledge that a European had sexual intercourse with 'native' 
women inevitably imposed limits upon his reception in polite company. At the 
same time acknowledged and sustained inter-racial marriages, whether 
formalised or not, were in time accepted, the settler admitted at least to 
masculine society. Homosexual acts on the other hand were a great scandal 
and for a white man exposure invariably led to early departure from the 
country. 
Between 1 9 1 8 and 1932 ten managers and assistants were debarred from 
having charge of labour.33 A banning order made by the Executive Council 
as a result of a conviction before either an RM or the Central Court was 
usually for twelve months in the first instance and perpetual on a second 
conviction. The most prominent cases were at the beginning and end of this 
period. The first was that of G. E. Harris, the assistant on Mamai found guilty 
in 1 9 1 7  of six charges of assault and as a result permanently banned.34 The 
second was the case of Richard Jensen and Percy Nunn convicted of breaches 
of the NLO on ltikinumu in 1 9 18.35 The last was the case of Edward Ditton, 
a stockman on Giligtli in Milne Bay fmed for assault in 1 930. In 1 932 Ditton 
served two months imprisonment on another assault charge and was 
committed for trial in the Central Court for the attempted murder of a villager. 
Though acquitted he was never to be allowed to have charge of labour again. 
Ditton smashed the windows of the RM's office in Douglas Street in protest. 
He was imprisoned for a further three months during which he refused to eat. 
trying a white woman for murder even of a lesser degree was too daunting for a case to be 
allowed to proceed. Papuan Courier, 22 Sept. 1939. 
32 Chancellor's lease on the Upagau River was issued in 1 920. His trial and conviction 
were reported in the Papuan Courier, 23 Dec. 1 92 1 and 20 Feb. 1922. His lease was for sale 
in 1 924 (Papuan Courier, 6 May 1924). 
33 NAPNG 09 1 Series 485, Box 806, Station Records, Abau, Jackets 1 8, 19, 1 9 13- 1 936. 
The circulars recording debarrments were routinely sent to all offices. 
34 CRS Al 18/4271 ,  'Papua: Reports re Native Affairs', 1 9 1 6 - 1 918.  B. W. Bramell to 
Lieutenant Governor, 10 Feb. 1 9 18, reports Harris's case. 
35 See above pp. 152-3. 
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He was deported in October 1933 .36 Among the others debarred at least for 
a year were Harry Garstang - a former manager of a government plantation, 
and W. J. Connolly - a former Patrol Officer and Government Land Buyer. 
Recruiters could lose their licence as a result of a summary conviction by 
an RM, and between 1 9 1  7 and 1 92 1 ,  fourteen, including the planters A. G. S. 
Frese, Arturo Pilotti, Charles Owen-Turner and Hobart Spiller, had their right 
to recruit suspended.37 A Recruiter's Licence was issued annually, subject 
to a guarantee being secured or a surety of £50 being lodged. As with the 
planters, a second conviction for any serious offence could result in a recruiter 
being permanently denied the right to employ Papuans and refused a licence. 
In the 1 923-24 Annual Report after noting that there had been no serious 
breaches of the law in the previous twelve months, Leslie Bell, then CNA, 
wrote that 
The conditions under which native labourers are working at present are as good, I 
think, as we can expect under an indenture system. The natives seem to have no 
serious grievances if we may judge by the large numbers in all parts of the Territory 
who regularly seek further service With Europeans when their contracts expire. 38 
And in 1926 Bell's successor, J. T. O'Malley, found that generally 'amicable 
relations' had been maintained between employers and labourers in the 
preceding twelve months. These he attributed to the 'steady improvement year 
by year in the conditions under which the natives work' and to employers 
having absorbed the lesson taught by the Department 'in and out of season 
that to reduce costs at the expense of labour was really a policy of extra 
cost' .39 The improvement in the working atmosphere on plantations was 
above all the consequence, he believed, of the selection of 'a better class' of 
plantation assistant on the company owned estates. Papuans in the North 
Eastern Division were now approaching recruiters for work and planters in the 
Rigo district were almost daily turning applicants away. 
Of 1 38 inspections carried out during 1 925 - 1 926 fifty were made by the 
Commissioner himself or one of his three Native Affairs Department inspectors 
and the remainder by the twenty RMs in their capacity as Inspectors of Native 
Labour. Employers now seemed less perturbed by these visitors and on many 
estates labourers were being encouraged to raise any grtevance directly with 
the manager over the head of subordinate supervisors, a procedure, O'Malley 
36 CRS A5 18,  X840/ l /5,  J:;>rohibitlons Employment of Native Labour, 1932-34. This 
contains the report of the Ditton case. 
37 NAPNG 09 1 Series 485 , Box 806 , Station Records, Baniara and Cape Nelson, 19 1 4-
1 934. From 1926 private planters were permitted to recruit labourers locally without a 
licence. Other businesses had been so free since 1 9 18.  
38 PAR 1 923-24, 52.  
39 PAR 1 925-26, 82.  
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thought, that 'places the responsibility for contentment and efficiency on the 
right shoulders'.40 He went on in the same report to describe unsatisfactory 
types of overseer that could still occasionally be found: the one who has 
nothing to learn and believes that sympathetic treatment of labour will be 
construed as weakness, the man with the 'live mouth' who nags his workers, 
and the man who has no interest in the labourers and believes he must make 
every small saving while extracting the maximum of labour. There was 'always 
the inevitable bias of the white man against the coloured man, which can only 
be rightly interpreted as race prejudice . . . Opposed to this is the native 
conviction that the European does not scruple, when opportunity offers, to 
take advantage of him'.41 Since 'our pioneering stage of development', the 
Commissioner believed, employers had learnt that the 'watchful eye' of the 
Department could not be evaded. 
Ten convictions for common assault were recorded against Europeans 
during the period from July 1 925 to June 1 926 and eight charges dismissed. 
There were twenty-four convictions for assault by Papuans upon Europeans 
with three cases dismissed. Not all of these cases must have been connected 
with events that took place on plantations. Some 600 cases were heard 
against labourers in breach of the NLO with 1 1 6 being dismissed. Fourteen 
Europeans were convicted of breaches. The inspections over twelve months 
had covered 1 3 ,669 'units' of labour. There had been 6,7 1 6  new engagements 
and 6,3 1 7  labourers paid off. Total wages amounted to £68,082 with £572 
being withheld for worker infringements of the Ordinance.42 
In proportion to the numbers of white men and brown men, 'of mixed 
temperament and antecedents' both, who faced each other on plantations at 
roll call each morning, the number of convictions for 1 926, despite O'Malley's 
reassurances, may still seem excessive. About 1 50 Europeans were managing 
owners, employed managers or staff employed on plantations. Perhaps 
another fifty were traders and recruiters who did some 'planting'. And 
plantations employed more than half the Papuans in service. While an exact 
record of the numbers of Papuans engaging and completing contracts was 
readily maintained, the actual number currently under indenture could only 
be estimated. Allowing for those labourers with the three year contracts 
preferred by planters, and who would not appear in the records as entering 
or ending a period of employment, the total labour force under indenture at 
any one time in 1 926 must have been between 9,000 and 10,000, the 
majority, or about 6,000, as agricultural labourers.43 If a corresponding two 
40 Ibid. , 84. 
41 Ibid. 
42 Ibid. , 85, 88. 
43 See discussion 1n Appendix A, pp. 3 1 6-8, and Table 8,  p. 3 1 5  below. 
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thirds of infringements of the NLO were committed by plantation workers 
these would account for about 320 of the convictions recorded. Thus perhaps 
7% of indentured labourers on plantations might have been charged with 
such infringements in 1 926 and under 6% convicted. If planters or their 
employees were indeed those among Europeans most likely to commit 
assaults upon Papuans or offend against the NLO - then perhaps as many as 
one planter in twenty was convicted of assault and one in fourteen of a breach 
of the NLO. Fewer than one in 300 indentured labourers all told were 
convicted of assaulting a European, perhaps one in 250 plantation labourers 
among them. 
By 1 930-3 1 Sir Hubert Murray could record in the Annual Report that the 
Central Court heard few civil cases adding - perhaps a little forgetfully - that 
'the trial of Europeans on [criminal] indictment is practically unknown. The 
law abiding nature of the white population of Papua has been a noticeable 
feature ever since the days of Sir William MacGregor'. 44 In May 1 936 , George 
Roberts, another stockman employed at Giligili, was charged with murder for 
the rather brutal killing of a plantation labourer. While Roberts was prepared 
to admit to striking Kelemesina with his open hand a post mortem revealed 
that the man had a ruptured spleen and other internal injuries. Judge Gore 
convicted the stockman of manslaughter and sentenced him to eighteen 
months imprisonment.45 This was the nearest a European came to 
conviction for a capital offence committed against a Papuan before 1 942 . 
Attack and restraint 
By 1 930 a cumulative list of Papuans convicted of serious offences in the 
Central Court and debarred from entering further contracts of service - or to 
be permitted to sign on only under conditions - contained thirty-nine 
names. 46 About half of these men had been convicted either of indecent 
assault involving a European woman or child or of being on premises with 
intent to 'annoy' a European woman or child, all but two of the instances 
being in Port Moresby, one in Samarai, and one on Misima. A Native 
Offenders ' Exclusion Ordinance was passed in that year to deny access to the 
towns to Papuans so convicted. Papuans from the Gulf and Delta Division in 
particular were regarded as untrustworthy near European women and an 
order was made that no men from these divisions were to be signed on to work 
44 PAR 1 930-3 1 , 7. 
45 Papuan Courter, 15  May 1936. 
46 NAPNG Series 485, Box 806,  Station Records, Baniara and Cape Nelson, Appendix 
to DNA Circular No. 254, 22 July 1 930. The 1 930 list did not, it appears, include Papuans 
currently serving prison sentences and who may have been subsequently debarred on 
release. 
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as domestic servants outside their own divisions.47 Of the remainder, most 
of whom might have been plantation labourers, at least one and possibly 
several others were debarred because of sodomy, perhaps several as 'notorious 
troublemakers' who had been convicted of fighting or of incitement, and the 
others for serious assault on a European. Eighteen names were added to the 
list in 1 933 as a result of convictions for the group rape of a Papuan woman 
of Hisiu. Yet, considering the size of the indentured labour force - and 
remembering that many thousands of other Papuans had at some time been 
'signed on' - the list of debarred labourers , like that of Europeans convicted 
of criminal offences against Papuans, was brief. 
Whether provoked or not Papuans as men and as Melanesians could be 
violent. Robert Bunting was attacked in August 19 1 3  at Giligili� Milne Bay, by 
Orokaiva labourers armed with knives after he had struck one who had 
threatened him. The labourers when questioned by Alexander MacAlpine ARM 
said that they would surely have killed Bunting had he been a Papuan but 
desisted because he was 'another kind'.48 Much later in 1 934, Bunting was 
attacked by Fergusson Island labourers at Ahioma, Milne Bay, where he had 
taken over the management of the desiccated coconut plant. Nine of his 
attackers were given sentences of ten years' imprisonment.49 Bunting died 
a few months later, possibly from the effects of the assault, aged fifty-two. In 
1 926 Andrew Doyle a small planter or market gardener on the Laloki was 
murdered, probably by a Papuan employee. The motive apparently had been 
no more than robbery.50 William Bellingham, managing at Hisiu in August 
1 92 7, received severe head injuries when he attempted to stop two labourers 
beating a third, Lalaita. Lalaita had previously complained to Bellingham that 
he had not been receiving sufficient food and that rations were being withheld 
and stored by the 'cook-boy' . The cook had been confronted and Lalaita's 
claims confirmed. At the preliminary hearing the two labourers said that they 
wanted to punish Lalaita for informing on the cook, who, they alleged, had 
been assaulted by the manager. In 1936, Laidley Cay, an assistant on 
Itikinumu, was very badly beaten by labourers after he had punched one for 
refusing to put out a cigarette. Eight months later Cay was again attacked by 
workers who were charged with attempted murder. Four of the assailants were 
sentenced to seven years and two to six years imprisonment. These were 
47 Ibid. , Circular No. 246 , 1 4  Feb. 1930. 
48 NAPNG & CRS 09 1 Government Secretary, Patrol Reports Eastern Division, 15 Aug. 
1 9 13. 
49 Papuan Courter, 4 May 1934. 
5 0  Nohoro of Orokolo was discharged when, after a trial in which he was convicted of 
Doyle's murder and after the warrant for his execution had been signed, the Crown's 
evidence was discredited. Murray believed him to be very probably guilty but allowed that the 
strong circumstantial evidence of itself could not convict the man. See PAR 1926-27, 1 .  
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among the more significant incidents that reached the newspaper.51 But 
Station Patrol Reports and Journals record numerous acts of violence carried 
out by Papuans, most of these taking place far from plantations. And it may 
be, setting aside the greater publicity given to assaults on plantations and 
especially where Europeans appeared the sufferers, that by comparison with 
life in many villages, plantations were in fact relatively quiet and peaceful 
places.52 
Papuan communities in the vicinity of plantations were neither free of 
conflict nor entirely subdued by fear of the gavamani and from time to time 
could probe the limits of its power. Harry Ballot, a 'Russian' managing 
Jawarere for BNGD, was murdered there in 1 9 1 5  by Papuans from nearby 
villages for killing a pig. It was an incident William Bruce in the Papuan Times 
used to 'show' that Papuans held the government in contempt.53 In the same 
year at Abau in the East Central Division villagers at Oio killed three members 
of the Armed Constabulary sent to arrest a man wanted for the murder of 
Mageri people. The dozen Europeans on plantations throughout the area 
offered to assist L .  P. B .  Armit RM in a patrol to catch the killers. J .  R. Clay, 
a coastal mariner staying at Robinson River at the time and found wounded, 
may have been attacked by the Oio.54 
The same district was disturbed again eighteen years later. In June 1 933, 
Frank Clarke, former manager of Demara and now at Robinson River, wrote 
a note to the RM at Abau requesting a police patrol. He had been warned 'by 
the elders not to let my boys go into the bush'. In January 1 934 the RM 
reported that several murders had been committed by Waramabo in a raid on 
Wanigela. It seemed that the Waramabo thought that if they killed someone 
they could be sent to gaol 'to see what it was like'.55 In May C. R. Corke, 
managing at Dedele, reported that some of his copra splitters had been 
frightened by 'bush natives' , armed and decorated with feathers.56 In August 
raids were made on Dedele, where an attempt had been made to kill two 
51 Papuan Courter, 5 Nov. 1926 (Doyle); 1 2  Aug. 1927 (Bellingham); 7, 14  Aug. 1936, 2 
Apr. 1937 (Cay). Bill Bellingham, like W. A. Simpson (see above pp. 272-3), had been an an 
assistant on Ogamobu in 1920 who failed to satisfy Percy Robinson's requirements. He 
became relieving manager on the BNGD estates in the twenties and thirties. He left Papua 
"for good' in Jan. 1938 but returned in Feb. 1940 and became manager of Epo, the new 
Kerema Rubber Pty Ltd estate in the Gulf Division. 
52 For testimony to the muted atmosphere on a plantation as remembered by a Papuan 
born on Koitaki, see John Kadiba, "Growing up in Mailu', in Ulli Beier, Black Wrtttngfrom 
New Guinea (Brisbane 1973 ). 
53 Papuan Times, 10 Mar. 1 9 1 5 .  
54 NAPNG & CRS G9 1 ,  Station Journal, East Central Division, Apr. 19 15. 
55 NAPNG Series 485, Box 809. Statton Records Abau, 1 9 1 3- 1 936.  Grist ARM to 
government Secretary, 25 Jan. 1 934. 
56 Ibid. , Corke to ARM Abau, 8 May 1934. 
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Goaribaris, and on Robinson River, where the house of an absent assistant 
was ransacked. In October there were killings and rumours of killings by 
'Keveri' men from the villages behind Domara, the range of the unrest 
stretching over the mountains into the North Eastern Division. In December 
Richard Walshe of Domara reported that his Aroma tappers worked 'in fear 
and trembling of being knocked on the head by "bushmen"' who were 'hanging 
around the outskirts of our plantation'.57 One worker from Aroma had been 
killed there in 1 93 1 .  Walshe had been forced to place a 'stalwart gang of 
Goaribaris' on guard while rubber was being tapped. In July 1 935,  Awara of 
Ganai, a labourer on BNGD's Baubauguina estate nearby, was murdered. The 
Lieutenant Governor directed that the RM at Abau see that the people of the 
district understood that murderers of plantation labourers would in future be 
punished with death.58 The disturbance ceased. 
Small societies previously hostile to each other could readily be dominated 
by comparatively few intruders supported by the organisation and technology 
of the larger world outside. Clearly the Europeans were powerful men 
possessed of desirable objects and formidable weapons. But Papuans would 
continue to entertain a level of violence as an expression of personal and 
group power among themselves and could direct violence against white men 
too if these strangers were perceived as vulnerable or provocative enough. The 
restraint that many Papuans and Europeans exercised in the interests of 
satisfying complementary needs enabled economic relationships and a kind 
of society between them to develop and endure. Plantations were the major 
arena in which these interactions took place, an arena which quite quickly 
acquired characteristics that were 'customary' and predictable. By the thirties 
the European settlers in Papua had tested and acknowledged the limits of 
their circumstances. And clearly, many Papuans too, if they hoped for a more 
perfect dispensation, had come to accept the only one that was provided, knew 
what to expect, and - for a period in their lives at least - took the terms offered 
them for their labour on plantations. 
57 Ibid. , Walshe to ARM Abau, 1 7 Dec. 1934. 
58 Ibid. , Government Secretary Minute Paper to ARM Abau, 23 Oct. 1 935 . 
PART VI I 
Settl ing accounts 
A(t] the possession of British New Guinea, this place was a 
picturesque backwater of no political or economic consequence .  A 
new order appeared in 1 906 when Australia took over the 
Possession and made it into the Territory of Papua . . .  for the next 
thirty years the same names were appearing in all the movements 
in the Territory . . .  The two ages of the country might be called the 
savage and the pioneering . . .  [The] question is are we passing 
rapidly into a third age? . . .  [T]he men who pioneered the country 
are retiring from the scene one by one and new men are taking their 
places. The Commonwealth is, for good or evil, taking a more direct 
interest in the place. 
Papuan Courter, Editorial, 27 Oct. 1939. 
Well, such is life. You are quite right; our civilisation is a hollow 
fraud - all the fun of life is lost by it; all it gains is that a larger 
number of persons can continue to be contemporaneously unhappy 
on the surface of the globe . . . 
Robert Louis Stevenson, Letter to Mrs Charles Fairchild, Sydney, 1890. 

CHAPTER 20 
Concl usions and reconci l iations 
THE WHITE PIONEER episode in Papua was brief and much of the evidence 
that there was once a small community of 'Anglo-Papuans' who believed that 
they had a permanent future in the country will soon have disappeared 
completely. Hardly a structure will be left standing or an original planter's 
name remembered and many of the older plantations have completed their 
cycle. While international companies control some of the larger estates and 
these may retain overseas staff, most plantations in an independent Papua 
New Guinea - if they survive - will acquire a history increasingly associated 
with Papua New Guinean ownership and management and with the economic 
experience of the new nation state. Their white history will recede in memory 
and in proportion. And among living Australians too the 'Papuan planter' 
experience will be soon extinguished. Planters were never many. In its colonial 
period Papua did not attract substantial European settlement or become the 
economic asset to the Commonwealth that Australians in 1884, 1 888 or 1906 
imagined it would become. These outcomes could not have been known in 
advance, of course , however inevitable they seem now in retrospect. 
Of the period from 1 884 until 1 942 we might reach some general 
conclusions. Firstly, that despite the bold words of the Royal Commissioners 
and others in 1905-06 , and once its strategic needs were met, Australia 
attempted neither to create a genuine mercantile empire in Papua (or later in 
the Mandated Territory of New Guinea) with protected industries that 
complemented her own, nor to develop a thoroughgoing plantation economy 
based on imported labour with which she could challenge other producers of 
tropical commodities in international trade. The Australian market-place 
remained too small ever to absorb more than a small part of the copra 
produced in its surrounding island region, a region where the Papuan growers 
were in competition with many other Australian and British producers. And 
most other tropical commodities imported into the Commonwealth would 
continue to be obtained more cheaply from nearby Southeast Asia. 
Secondly, that as a field for plantation agriculture Papua proved in any 
case an ungenerous country, less fertile than its verdure suggested, with no 
advantage in its resources or in the cost and efficiency of its labour force over 
'competitors' elsewhere in the tropical world. This,  the white settlers 
discovered to their cost and sorrow. Nothing except much larger discoveries 
of gold or of oil might have compensated for this and changed Papua's 
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fortunes as a colonial economy. Comparatively few white men made a living 
out of the country. 
Thirdly, that while the administration of Sir Hubert Murray was indeed one 
determined to defend Papuans, so too, it is clear, were successive ministries 
in Melbourne and Canberra. Their concern for Papua primarily strategic and 
prepared to take few risks they made virtue of a policy of protection. As it 
became manifest that the country was poor in resources and prospects, this 
was also the cheapest policy. 
If the plantation cycle elsewhere consisted of four phases - a 'pioneer' 
phase in which the individual planter predominated, a 'capitalist' phase in 
which companies eclipsed or superseded the private planter, a 'consolidation' 
phase in which great agency houses provided integrated management services 
or plantations came under the direct control of the manufacturers 
downstream, and a 'repatriation' phase as ownership and some degree of 
control of plantation industries were claimed and acquired by the successor 
states, then in Papua the third phase had been passed by. 1 With the other 
South Seas producers on the margins of the plantation world, its small 
industries uncompetitive, the Papuan economy could not proceed to the 
consolidation of plantation interests, infrastructure or property management 
that characterised the plantation economies of Southeast Asia after 1 920. If 
these developments signified 'maturity' in those economies then Papua's 
economy remained 'immature' even as the last phase approached. Nor, 
without imported labour, could the Territory have taken the Fijian path 
whereby Indian tenant farmers replaced white planters as the foundation of 
an integrated commodity export industry. 
Papua had not stood the commercial test. Its copra industry stagnated and 
its rubber never became competitive. Attempts to develop other im;lustries 
failed. It became apparent that the Territory could not be another Java or 
Malaya or Ceylon because Java, Malaya and Ceylon already existed. The 
reality was that Australians had neither the numbers, nor the wealth, nor 
indeed sufficient good reason to invest more heavily in their dependency - in 
either its industries or its administration; only the strategic arguments for the 
annexation of British New Guinea were in the end, for them, unquestionably 
vindicated. Papua's industries contributed towards the Territory's upkeep but 
otherwise they were without importance. 
And as demonstration models of industry among the Papuans, plantations 
can hardly be said to have succeeded.  Throughout the period covered by this 
study smallholder development remained slight - rewarded with meagre 
This model of the course of plantation development ls discussed in G. C. Goldthorpe, 
'Plantation Agriculture in Papua New Guinea' , Institute of National l!ffalrs Occasional Paper 
No. 1 9  (Port Moresby 1985), 52. 
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returns and tainted by the pressure applied upon unwilling villagers by 
government officers carrying out a policy of 'encouragement'. Despite ancient 
traditions of exchange between Papuan communities the intrusion of 
European commerce led to no growth of a class of 'native' traders, small 
businessmen or skilled managers; perhaps the advantage Europeans 
possessed in the new trading was such that Papuans were excluded from the 
beginning; perhaps Papuans were content that the new economic functions 
carried out by Europeans should remain in the hands of these strangers 
outside the circle of customary obligation. Smallholder cash-cropping would 
expand in the fifties as commodity prices rose and a much more resolute 
programme of agricultural extension was begun but it is doubtful that the 
presence of commercial plantations was essential in stimulating this 
development. 
Modem Papua New Guineans might have reason to be glad of the 'failure' 
of colonial Papua as they might be relieved by the determination of the 
Australian and Papuan governments not to admit an alien labour force into 
the country when it was within their power to do so. European intervention 
may have been relatively less destructive of Papuan societies than of small 
societies in other parts of the world precisely in proportion to the failure of the 
development the intruders had hoped for. Certainly a much larger white 
community, if it had become established - and like those elsewhere - might 
have stubbornly resisted the eventual transfer of power to Papua New 
Guineans. Papuans might believe that they gained little from their experience 
of European colonisation but they were also spared much. 
Of planters and settlers 
To colonise an apparent Eden, to settle and cultivate 'new' lands, are 
profoundly formative experiences. To create and to defend a permanent stake 
in a country that may be passed on to others of the settler group may 
constitute an almost biological imperative. To expect to be justified by time in 
the possession of territory might seem something well worth the sacrifice and 
effort of a lifetime. And so it seemed for a time to the white pioneers in Papua. 
The tenacity of their commitment to the country they claimed is striking. Like 
their contemporaries in Kenya or Rhodesia, they had come confidently, 
believing themselves the first fully aware and adult people to tread that earth, 
the first to really see it for what it was, and to truly possess it. They believed 
that they had come to stay and they had high hopes . And most of those who 
put down roots in the boom years remained to take what came. They were 
greatly disappointed. 
For by 1 935 the Territory's 'failure' was all too clear. Papua, its settlers now 
recognised, would never be a 'white man's country'. And those who had 
foolishly settled there, it seemed, would never find prosperity. Richard Walshe, 
managing at Domara, and admitting to pessimism, wrote to the Papuan 
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Courier in June to question the assumption made in the leader of 1 7 May that 
prosperity might 'return' .  'Has "prosperity" been here then?',  he asked. 'Has 
somebody seen it at last?' The only prosperity Papua had known, he was 
certain, was the 'mirage' created by 'capital and yet more private capital 
FLOWING IN'.2 In June, 'Adsum' reflected that 
At some distant date a "History of Papua" will be written . . .  The first thirty years 
will no doubt be styled the Early or Pioneer Period. The next thirty years might be 
styled The Grasscu tters Period. What will the thirty year period commencing now 
be styled? Let us hope it will be a period of true development. If not why not let the 
Germans, Japs, or the real natives have it? There is any amount of room in 
Australia, and no need to come to Papua to - well, deteriorate. 3 
Why indeed did settlers now stay? Was it the residual allure of the 
islands?4 Was it because of the natural attachment over time to a climate and 
landscape, to friends and properties ,  to a shared way of life? Or was it 
because of a 'sense of their singularity' among aliens, a deep unadmitted 
pleasure in being lords over lesser men? Certainly an unwillingness to admit 
failure and leave Papua, and a strong desire to return after an absence, were 
repeatedly shown by a whole generation of both settlers and officials between 
the wars. It is true that if government officers could retire on their pensions 
to Australia few private settlers could afford to do so, and for many in the 
depression years to leave Papua was to face hardly less poverty in Australia. 
And of those who did leave before 1 942 - like Elizabeth Mahony, Walter Gors, 
Percy Robinson and the Keelans - most had known bitterness and defeat. Men 
like G. A. Loudon were of a kind that might have succeeded anywhere. 
Perhaps only a stubborn refusal to be beaten can ultimately explain the 
determination of Loudon and others to carry on. Yet it is also clear that 
Papua, despite worsening times and greatly dampened hopes, had become for 
many settlers an adopted homeland, a familiar place, and a focus of personal 
and group identity. In an emotional and most telling conclusion to his 
response to suggestions in 1 939 that there should be an amalgamation of 
Papua with the Mandated Territory, Sir Hubert Murray probably spoke as he 
claimed to speak for the great majority of the Papuan white community when 
he declared, in opposing the idea, that 'in spite of all sorts of woeful 
Papuan Courter, 1 4  June 1935. 
Papuan Courter, 3 July 1936. 
Dexter, 'Reminiscences', 287. For Henry Dexter it was the 'Call of the islands'. Years 
before he had been advised 'You take my tip and get out of this country as soon as you can 
or every time you go away you'll be hearing the Call and be always coming back. It's damned 
unsettling, I can tell you'( p. 297). 
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prognostications we have made a success of ·our territory . . . and we have 
come to love Papua not only as our home, but as our own creation' .5 
In May 1 935 , a poem by 'R.H.' - probably Richard Humphries RM - was 
published in the paper. In 'This Land' the writer defined a refationship with 
the country shared by many of his contemporaries among the white Papuans -
whether officials or private settlers it did not now matter. R.H.'s poem 
presents a profound contrast in mood and substance to J. G. Fowler's strident 
settler verse of 19 1 1 . 
Whatever call I felt to leave this land 
In days gone by, a prey to thoughts that seemed 
To promise more than what I had in hand 
Of calm and ease and pleasures real or dreamed; 
Whatever call I felt I must obey 
To find relief from longing's plaintiff cry, 
It is to this wild land that now today 
My spirit clings, my calmer soul gtves way. 
I feel and know that here I have fought 
And sinned and suffered, laughed at passion's heat, 
Drunk all the draughts of pleasure life has brought, 
And bitter cups of misery and defeat, 
Here in this land whose discords suit my ear, 
Whose features once were sullen in my eyes, 
This very land, which has to me grown dear, 
Now holds me close in mild but sweet surprise. 
Whatever call I feel to wander now 
To distant lands With Wider ways that hold 
For other men a heavy laden bough 
Of care, success, or crop of gleaming gold; 
This land, mother of all I know unkind, 
Whose wayward steps I never could explain, 
This very land the only place I find 
Where I can live at peace With heart and mind. 6 
But with the pioneer planters who had shared the old optimism of the 
development years or had cleared with their 'boys' half a square mile of virgin 
scrub, a particular relationship between some white men and women and the 
land of Papua was already passing away. From 1 930 onwards no year went 
by, it seemed, without the deaths of several of the central figures of the pre-
Sir Hubert Murray, Notes on the Suggested Combination of the Admlntsbuttons of 
Papua and New Gulnea (Port Moresby 1 939 ), 1 7. 
11 Papuan Courter, 17 May 1 935. Richard Humphries remained in Papua after 1 945 
becoming Director of Labour in the post-war administration of Papua and New Guinea. He 
was killed in the eruption of Mt Lamington in 1 95 1 .  J. G. Fowler's 'Wake up Papua' is above, 
p. 125. 
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1 9 1 4  generation of settlers whose presence had given continuity and structure 
to the community. Among these 'old friends', Leo Gors of 'Iki-ikina' at Hisiu, 
and Horace Harbord, a miner in the 1 880s rush and first manager of 
Angabunga, died in 193 1 .  Bob Bunting of Sanaroa and Ahioma died in August 
1 934, Allan B. Sinclair of Orokolo in May 1 936, Elias Solomon once of Loani 
in August 1936 , Robert Hunter - the rough sandalwood getter who had 
planted Daugo for Sir William MacGregor - in September 1936 , and Charlie 
Talbot of 'Taupota' , Punipuni, in January 1 937. Robert Whitten, the surviving 
brother of the Whitten Bros partnership, died on 1 6  April 1 93 7. Allan 
MacGregor Sinclair of Hisiu died in December 1 93 7, Mrs Anna 'Granny' Clunn 
of Ramaga in December 1 938. Arthur Bunting - the eldest of the Bunting 
brothers and with the Whittens and Mahonys a major planter of small 
properties in the Eastern Division, Jim Matley of Waigani - a BNGD manager 
since 1 9 1 0, Mrs Daisy English of Rigo, 'Gus' Nelsson MLC of Doini and 
Woodlark, and Don Irvine of Giligili, all died in 1939. 'Scotty' Currie of Oiapu 
died in 1 940, Fred Kruger of Gamododo and Fred 'Brassy' Evenett of Moununa 
in 1941 . Brassy had blown himself up in a boat accident. News had been 
received of other deaths - in 1934 of Staniforth Smith in retirement in Western 
Australia, and in 1 936 of Walter Gors, British New Guinea's first planter, dead 
in Sydney at seventy-one. Others tempted by the plantation dream came to 
buy or manage the smaller properties but the newcomers seemed to dilute 
rather than strengthen the old community. 
Reconciliations 
By 1940 the circle was closing. Hubert Murray was in his seventy-ninth year 
and had been Lieutenant Governor for thirty-two years having acted in the 
position for two years preceding his appointment. He had also been Chief 
Judicial Officer in Papua since 1 904. Now frail if still unbending, the 'Old 
Man' had become the object of some pride even among those who had once 
sought to bring him down. The social committee of Steamships Trading 
Company arranged a ball in September 1 938. Unexpectedly Murray accepted 
an invitation to attend. Captain Fitch, so long alienated from the Lieutenant 
Governor by the telegram of 1 920, told his general manager E. V. Crisp that 
Murray's presence there had made the moment the proudest of his life. The 
two had seldom met, and then only officially, in the nineteen years Fitch had 
been in the country. On 28 January 1 940, 'Gal' Loudon's elder daughter was 
married to an American geologist in Port and Murray was invited to propose 
a toast at the reception. It was another moment of reconciliation. His 'bitterest 
enemy for many years' with whom Murray in 1 9 1 8  could not contemplate 
further contact, and the Governor that Loudon, alone among the business 
community, could not bring himself to congratulate on his thirty years of 
service only a few months before, could at last see no purpose in continuing 
to keep their distance. 'I took it as an expression of a wish to bury the 
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hatchet, and readily accepted', Murray wrote. 7 A month later while on routine 
judicial circuit in the Eastern Division he died of pernicious anaemia at 
Samarai. 
Some that had become reconciled to his methods and long prepared to 
accept the constraints he had consistently maintained were once again able 
to see the possibility of another 'fresh start' in Papua with a future policy 
favouring development through government assisted private enterprise. Once 
more the Papuans were 'too protected'. Once more, the visiting popular writer 
Frank Clune could write, might Australia 'look to Papua for many tropical 
products imported from foreign countries - rubber, tea, coffee, cocoa, quinine, 
kapok, copra, could all be more extensively cultivated.  Rice could be grown in 
the swamplands for native food, and industrial uses could be found in paper­
making from the quick-growing grasses and nipa palms of the mighty river 
valleys and the muddy deltas . . . Our northern frontier, the Land of the 
Fuzzy-tops, should become an asset instead of a liability'.8 
When asked his recommendations for a successor for Sir Hubert Murray, 
Tom Nevitt, BNGD general manager since 1 934, now declined to confide in H. 
W. Champion or Leonard Murray who were obvious candidates.  In May 1 940, 
F. C. Tracy, agent for BNGD in Sydney since 1 9 1 5 ,  submitted proposals on a 
successor for consideration by the Prime Minister, R. G. Menzies. Tracy 
thought that 'however excellent the qualities of the late Sir Hubert Murray, he 
was not a financial genius, neither had he any liking or regard for agriculture 
or commerce and this is clearly shown in the present condition of finance, 
agriculture and public works in the Territory'. 9 Considering the public 
support planters had given Murray since 1 922,  and the debt they owed him 
for assistance in the two depressions - as much as he could give within the 
limits of his resources - this was unjust. Tracy saw the opportunity presented 
by Murray's death to make him once more the scapegoat for the disappointing 
progress of Papua with a view, no doubt, that by avoiding any mention of the 
Commonwealth's failure to provide adequate support for its dependency, a 
change could be prompted in its policy. But in July, after a meeting of 
planters, Captain Fitch, as chairman, wrote favourably of Murray's efforts on 
behalf of the growers .10 The appointment of Leonard Murray to succeed his 
Francis West, Selected Letters ofHubert Murmy (Melbourne 1 97 1 ), letter No. 166, 29 
Jan. 1 940. As recently as 1 938 a long letter from Loudon was published in the Pac!flc Islands 
Monthly. It attacked, among other things, a failure of the Papuan Government to provide 
adequate technical training for Papuans (Pac!flc Islands Monthly, Jan. 1938, p. 65). 
8 Frank Clune, Prowling through Papua (Sydney 1942), 236-7. 
NAPNG & CRS 069 1 /3 1  fl - 10,  'Correspondence in which Criticism is levelled against 
the late Sir Hubert Murray's attitude to Agriculture and Commerce', Nevitt to Champion, n.d. 
1 /3 1-8; Tracy to Menzies, 5 May 1940. 
· 
1 0  NAPNG & CRS 069 4/39 / 20, Fitch to Minister, 3 1 July 1 940. 
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uncle, if only as an 'Administrator', while it surprised no one, was a 
disappointment to those, like G. A Loudon, who wanted a change in direction. 
The younger Murray was not personally unpopular with planters - they had 
lived together with him for a generation - but he promised only continuity. 
One change might have pleased some, at least in principle. In 1941 it was 
decided that no harm would now follow for Papuan workers if the old 
Department of Native Affairs and Control - the late Lieutenant Governor's 
independent 'watch dog' set up to stand guard over employed labour - was 
amalgamated with the Government Secretary's Department as part of the 
general administration. 1 1  
With the outbreak of the war in the Pacific in December 1 941  white women 
and children in Papua and New Guinea were evacuated to Australia to be 
followed in January and February by all of the men who could not be placed 
in the armed forces. The sudden departure of the greater part of the European 
community left the plantations without direction and their indentured 
labourers stranded and perplexed. No one had known what to advise their 
employees to do. On a few estates workers continued to maintain the routines 
of production until the plantation food stores were exhausted, waiting for a 
return to normalcy, unable to comprehend so abrupt a discontinuity. Others 
perhaps long expecting an apocalyptic outcome to European intrusion might 
not have been disappointed by the war. Many small plantations already 
reduced to a maintenance state by the depression in the copra market were 
just abandoned as labourers tried to make their way home. The Australian 
army's need for carriers would soon exceed by far the annual labour supply 
Papua had hitherto afforded and for the first time Papuan communities would 
be subjected to a very large demand for involuntary labour. Many plantation 
workers were drafted directly into serving the military forces without being 
able to return to their villages and without regard to the period of their 
indenture served prior to the war. 
A Pacific Territories Association was formed in Sydney in May 1 942 by 
planters and other settlers, mostly those in private business and from both 
Papua and New Guinea, to represent their interests in exile. The president 
from July was E. A. James, a customs agent in Port Moresby and proprietor 
of the Papuan Courier since 1924. The treasurer was Gerald Smith, G. A. 
Loudon's Port agent. The looting of the stores and residences of Port Moresby 
by the Australian troops following the confusion of the evacuation, together 
with the destruction of other property, was at first the major concern of the 
'Papuan' members. As the war progressed and time elapsed the assumption 
that they would resume the same life in the Territory as before began to be 
1 1  Papuan Courier, 1 4  Feb. 194 1 .  
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threatened by the patriotic and humanitarian rhetoric in the press and the 
Federal Parliament about giving the native people who had assisted the allies 
a new deal when the conflict ended. The situation seemed to be growing 
dangerously out of hand and by not being in Papua and in possession of their 
properties the settlers could feel their grip loosening. 
The Pacifi.c Islands Monthly , published in Sydney since 1 930 and during 
the depression years a comforting buttress of the planter establishment 
throughout the southwestern Pacific, now became the settler's only source of 
information, and the editor, R. W. Robson, enjoyed the opportunity to strut a 
little. He became intemperate in his advocacy of settler interests at one point 
proposing that the Pacific Territories Association appeal over the head of the 
Australian Government to Britain and the United States for immediate 
independence for 'New Guinea', a motion overwhelmingly rejected by the 
Association. In July 1943 the Australian New Guinea Production Control 
Board was set up to allow production to resume in areas no longer threatened 
by the enemy and many of the Papuan planters were permitted to return to 
their properties without their families. Confronted with badly damaged or 
neglected plantations and the work at hand, their anxiety about the future 
lessened. If the Labor Party seemed determined to pursue a post-war policy 
that placed the Papuans above the settlers, practical men could see that the 
plantations could not easily be done away with nor the property rights of 
Australian citizens disregarded. By November 1944 the Commonwealth had 
committed itself to compensation payments for war damage. 
But following on as it did from the deaths in the late thirties of so many of 
their peers, in a profound sense the intervention of the war had provided a 
final release for the remaining pioneers from a kind of bondage to Papua - a 
deep transformation in their psychological commitment to the country and a 
way of life they had been unwilling to acknowledge as leading to nothing. 
Forced to make many prolonged adjustments of their lives and minds to 
conditions in Australia most would never again regard Papua as a permanent 
home. For many Sydney would now remain their fixed point of reference and 
their plantations 'in the islands' essentially businesses - businesses conducted 
in surroundings that were familiar and still dear to them, but businesses they 
all knew that sooner or later they could relinquish. In the post-war prosperity 
most planters could afford to go 'South' for a brief holiday or for long delayed 
dental treatment, and nearly all would retire to Sydney or Brisbane forming 
a small and dwindling circle of old 'Papuans' in friendly rivalry with their 
contemporaries from New Guinea. If some of those who returned in 1 945 
chose to recollect the period between the wars as a 'golden age' , for others 
there was a strong impulse to forget a past that had comprised for most 
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Papuan planters as for the former Government Secretary Herbert Champion -
if for different reasons - more of 'a long nightmare' . 1 2  
After 1 945 the rubber estates begun in the late thirties were developed and 
would come into full production though little use was made of the new profits 
to replant the older blocks as undertaken in every other producing country. 
Perhaps the pre-war base of unimproved rubber stock in Papua was too small 
to bother about. Certainly planters proceeded cautiously in the new 
circumstances despite a supported price for the whole of Papua's rubber in 
the Australian market and the establishment of a stabilisation fund for copra. 
As long as favourable conditions lasted plantations would be extended and 
managed at least partly with a view to exacting the highest price for them - or 
to justifying a claim for the greatest compensation - if and when the time 
eventually came to go. By the mid-sixties 'the writing was on the wall' and 
their proprietors, awaiting the outcome, were content to work them out as 
they stood. The new planters who in the fifties had taken up blocks in the old 
Northern Division to grow cocoa, like those who developed coffee estates in the 
highlands of New Guinea, re-lived the old certainties but the foundations of 
the world had shifted. 
Post-war production of rubber in Papua greatly exceeded the pre-war 
output. The area under hevea brasiliensls grew to 35,000 acres and exports 
reached 6,000 tons in 1 970. Copra, nearly a third the product of Papuan 
smallholdings, amounted to 16 ,5 1 9  tons in 1 964-65 - the plantation share 
scarcely more than that of the best years before 1 942 . 13  In the early sixties 
some of the new generation of planters could ignore the signs and still hope 
for a 'partnership' with Papuans and New Guineans or a continuing 
constitutional relationship between Australia and the territories - combined 
since 1 949 - that might preserve the economic role and privileges of the 
'expatriates'. But by 1 965 the pace of decolonisation elsewhere and Australia's 
paramount interests dictated a rapid progress towards disengagement. Their 
numbers never large enough to allow them to make demands that might 
modify the Commonwealth's policy, their dependency on Australian markets 
now too great and Australia itself far too close for any seizure of power to be 
remotely contemplated, settlers would accept the inevitable outcome. In the 
end if some thought that they could afford the risks of carrying on, many were 
1 2  Ian Stuart, "Herbert William Champion', in Austro.llan Dictionary of Btogmphy, Vol.  
7 (Melbourne 1 979). Captain A. S. Fitch was one for whom the wartime exile was decisive. 
In 1943 he was permitted to return to Papua to re-commence copra and rubber production 
on the Steamships estates. With a new share issue the company's stores re-opened in Nov. 
1945 and Fitch was able to retire to Sydney in Nov. 1 946 . He died in 1 972. 
1 3 PAR 1 965-66. 
Conclusions and reconcillatlons 301 
given no such option, made the best arrangements they could for the disposal 
of their assets, and went quietly. 
In 1 942 both 'Gal' Loudon and Tom Sefton had turned sixty, and Arthur 
Jewell was sixty-three. Jewell died a year later in wartime exile. Millicent 
Jewell , always the stronger partner, carried on after 1945 managing their 
interests until her own death. Loudon joined the ANGAU administration as 
Assistant Quartermaster General with the rank of major. He had been one of 
only a few unsentimental Papuan residents in 1939 in favour - on conditions -
of amalgamation with New Guinea, in favour of the larger arena that such a 
change would create as he was in favour of the development policies that gave 
greater security to the Papuan industries after the war . 1 4  He was ever 
consistent. His Eilogo, Mororo and Catalina estates did well in the years 
following the outbreak of the Korean War and his son, Ian Loudon (born 
1 92 1  ) , with Colin Sefton of Koitaki (born 1920), seemed for a time likely to 
carry on leadership of the Papuan planters into the next generation. 15 Ian 
Loudon, an RAAF pilot during the war, was drowned in a few inches of water 
when his car left the road on the low Laloki bridge at Sogeri in November 1957 
after a day of business in town. It was a significant tragedy, one that among 
the older planters could only nourish the deep sense of the futility of it all. 
Lisle Johnston, an assistant on Itikinumu before the war and manager on 
Sogeri afterwards, remembered that 'something seemed to go out of the place' 
with the younger Loudon's death and that it tainted every enjoyment of the 
better times of the sixties. G. A. Loudon died in Sydney in 1 964. He had seen 
the most prosperous period experienced by the Papuan plantation industries 
in the last decade of his life at a time when it was becoming clear even to the 
most refractory of more recent settlers that the future belonged to the 
Papuans. His wife, Winifred 'Peg' Loudon, nee Penny, Port Moresby's second 
school mistress in 1 9 1 3, spent fifty years in the Territory. Looking back in 
1 973 she reflected that planter Papua, the Papua of settler hopes, had been 
'a washout' . 
Postscript 1 988 
On the Sogeri plateau, in January 1 988, there remained exposed patches of 
the red volcanic soil and the distinctive fenugreek smell of molasses grass. 
Koitaki Estate was largely cleared of the hevea braslllensls that had covered 
1 4 On 1 7  Feb. 1 939 it was proposed in the Papuan Courter that G. A. Loudon be the 
representative of 'unofficial' Papua at the amalgamation discussions. The proposal was not 
followed but Loudon would undoubtedly have proved difficult in the defence of 'Papuan' 
interests. In the paper of 8 Aug. 1940 he dismissed as 'a joke' the suggestion that the then 
Administrator of the Mandated Territory might preside over the combined territories - 'We 
ourselves in Papua can produce at least half a dozen more outstanding men', he thought. 
1 15 Colin Sefton became vice-president of the Planters' Association of Papua in the sixties. 
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the land in its tens of thousands for upwards of eighty years . Along the road 
a flowering pink cassiajavanica stood out near a thin line of rubber trees that 
survived as a wind break. Round about cattle grazed in open country. On 
nearby Sogeri Plantation too the rubber had been grubbed out, the departing 
manager of thirty years confronted and reproached by expectant villagers in 
1 976 for having enriched himself on their lands while they had stayed poor. 
Beyond Koitaki the trees on Itikinumu still stood but tapping had ceased and 
this also was to become a cattle property supplying the expanding needs of 
the capital for fresh meat. The collecting bowls hung from the trees with the 
latex in them coagulated and dirty. Over a rise to the south lay Eilogo. This 
property remained in the hands of the Loudon family until 1978 when with 
its trees exhausted it was sold to the government of Papua New Guinea. Ilolo, 
Percy McDonald's estate on the Kokoda track planted with bud-grafted rubber 
in the late thirties and since, was still in production and being expanded with 
even better cloned stock. It was owned by a Koiari co-operative. The greater 
part of rubber production now came from the belt of lower country seventy 
kilometres to the west surrounding the old Kanosia, Lolorua and Veimauri 
estates and in the Mariboi-Rubberlands area. New levels of rural wages were 
placing the industry in difficulty though with further planting or replanting 
using high-yielding material and with technical advances in tapping and 
processing it seemed that it might survive. There was a promising 
development in smallholder production of rubber in the Western Province and 
around Otomata at Cape Rodney. Copra production was almost at a standstill 
with elderly coconut stands, little new planting, and overwhelming 
competition from palm oil. 
The British New Guinea Development Company became a subsidiary of 
Eastern Plantation Holdings, a part of the Jessell Group, a British 
conglomerate, in 1970. In 1984 it was acquired together with Kanosia and 
Veimauri by the Belgian plantation multinational S. A. Sipef N. V. of Antwerp. 
Sipef also held an equal share with the Papua New Guinea government in a 
large palm oil development in New Britain. As agents for the remaining Sogeri 
estates and from its own properties, BNGD - still under the old name -
exported 4,200 tons of Papuan rubber in 1986 at around 80 (US) cents a 
kilogram. Koitaki Limited remained a Sydney based company into the eighties 
diversifying with cattle at Sogeri and at Mt Hagen in the New Guinea 
Highlands and with coffee near Mt Hagen at Banz. In 1983 it became one of 
those enterprises together with the old BNGD managers' venture, Sogeri 
Rubber Plantations ,  purchased by the partly state-owned corporation ANGCO 
which in 1 988 was also negotiating the acquisition of ltikinumu from Sipef. 
Of other pre- 1 942 plantations controlled or subsequently acquired by 
Steamships Trading Company, Lolorua, Mariboi and Rubberlands were now 
wholly owed by the London based Commonwealth Development Corporation, 
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and Otomata, like many other smaller plantations, had been purchased by or 
on behalf of a neighbouring Papuan community. Yet others, like Ogamobu on 
the Kikori River, were abandoned. 
Across the water from Samarai on Sariba Island and in the old Port 
Moresby cemetery at Badihagwa, behind Hanuabada village, lie many of the 
graves of the white settlers of Papua. At Badihagwa they are found together 
with that of Sir Hubert Murray. The sites are neglected and many of the 
headstones and crosses are broken down with parts and inscriptions missing. 
Many now are quite unmarked. There are the remains of the memorials to two 
of William and Ellen Bruce's children, to Dr Harse's daughter Enid dead at 
twenty-two, to Otto, Arthur, Leo and Adela Gors, to Les Joubert's son, to W. 
J. Little and to L. P. B. Armit, to Richard Edward Weaver murdered on the 
Laloki in 1 906 , to Dr Walter Strong, an officer from 1904 and CMO 1 9 1 5-37, 
and to E. J. Frame of Bums Philp - his epitaph testifying to 'a pioneer of 
Papua' now seldom scanned. Ian London's headstone was one of the last set 
up here before a new cemetery was begun at Bomana. Tom Sefton is buried 
nearby. He died in 1 954 after a stroke had reduced him to a shadow of his old 
loud and masterful self. His headstone has been knocked over. Papuan 
children play there. 
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TABLE 1 PAPUA: Coconut Plantations, 1940 1J 
Owners 1 940 Original Planter Name and location Tons 
( 1 940) 
Central Division 
A. Aoae IA. Aoae) [Lease 843 ) Laloki River 
British New Guinea Devt BNGD [Co Ltd) Aroa, Redscar Bay 320 
British New Guinea Devt R. Hunter /BNGD Obu, Redscar Bay 375 
British New Guinea Devt BNGD Baubauguina, Marshall Lgn 300 
Burns Philp & Co L. Clunn/ G. A. Loudon Ou-Ou Creek, Delena 88 
Catholic Mission Sacred Heart Fathers Kairuku, Yule Island 1 33 
Catholic Mission Sacred Heart Fathers Obu, Redscar Bay 84 
Catholic Mission Teina Materua & Fauolo Tou, Redscar Bay 20 
P. N. Charpentier T. Petero Naruna, Laloki River 8 
Clarke & Whiting Clarke & Whiting Rorona, Galley Reach (900) 
H. S. Exton Angabunga River Pltns Angabunga, Hall Sound l l O 
J. Miller R.E. Chancellor?, J.Miller Upagau River, Aroma 70 
E. J. Noller [Lease 5241 Laloki River 
Papuan Government [R. Hunter ) Daugo (Fisherman's I . )  
Mrs K. Pollard Gors brothers Iki-ikina, Redscar Bay 
W. J. Priest [Lease 102 ) Laloki River 
Dr C. C. Simson C.C.Simson/ AS.Anthony Hisiu, Redscar Bay 600 
Mrs M. Sinclair A. M. Sinclair The Palms, Hisiu, Redscar Bay 
C. Solien J. Solien [Lease 42 of 19201 Galley Reach 15 
S.  & J.  Solien J. Solien Maribol Creek, Galley Reach 1 2  
Mrs V. R .  Ward R.S. Whiting/ E.T. Ward Veimauri, Galley Reach 1 20 
Eastern Division 
Anglo-Papuan Pltns Ltd H.A.Wickham Conflict Islands [freehold) 
G.E.Aumuller,R.F.Bunting C. Cowley/G. A. Loudon Mogubo, Amazon Bay 150 
W. G. Blundell Losau Valley 
British New Guinea Devt BNGD •otomata, Cape Rodney 200 
British New Guinea Devt BNGD Gadaisu, Orangerie Bay 240 
British New Guinea Devt BNGD Waigani, Milne Bay 560 
British New Guinea Devt Laka River Plantations *Paili, Marshall Lagoon 275 
A. H. Bunting Ltd Bunting brothers Miligili I. and Imbert I .  
A. H. Bunting Ltd Bunting brothers Panamau, Dumoulin Is 35 
A. H. Bunting Ltd Bunting brothers Meilai, Dumoulin Is 
A. H. Bunting Ltd Bunting brothers Sanaroa, D'Entrecasteaux 65 
Bunting Trustees R. Bunting Teste/Wari I .  45 
M. Cadigan M. Cadigan Badilla, Milne Bay 40 
Commonwealth Copra Co. F. Kitchen & Sons Giligili, Milne Bay (600) 
T. E. Craig J. Clunn Ramaga, Milne Bay 
T. E. Craig M. R. Ballantyne [Lease 2871 China Strait 
T. E. Craig & J. G. Munt E. S. Tooth Wagatatuna, Milne Bay 
J. & H. Driver J.&H.Leetch/ J .&H.Driver Hihila, Milne Bay 102 
V. C. Eglestaff V. C. Eglestaff Nuatutu, Goodenough I. 12 
G. Eichorn G. Eichorn Boloboli, China Strait [freehold) 
Enesi Plantations Ltd Papuan Government Wagawaga, Milne Bay 
Enesi Plantations Ltd LMS ? Gibara, Milne Bay 
Enesi Plantations Ltd LMS Killerton I. , Milne Bay 
Enesi Plantations Ltd LMS Mutuina, Milne Bay 
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TABLE 1 PAPUA: Coconut Plantations, 1940 contd 
Owners 1 940 Original Planter Name and location Tons 
Enesi Plantations Ltd LMS Salaoni I .  
Engineer Group Engineer Grp Pltg Ass. Bunting brothers 
Engineer Grp Pltg Ass. Duchateau Is. 85 
D'Entrecasteaux Tr.&Pltg G. Harrison 
D'Entrecasteaux Tr.&Pltg J. Olsen 
Kedidia, Fergusson I .  40 
Sebulagomwa, Fergusson I .  
Moununa, East Cape F. Evenett F. Evenett 
F. Evenett F. Evenett Ito I. 
F. Evenett 
F. Evenett 
F. Evenett 
M. M. Fitzgerald 
Dr W. E. Giblln 
D. & W. Gill 
J. Gray 
W. Grieg 
J. Inman 
J. Inman 
C. J. Izod 
I. T. Jenkins 
Mrs C. M. Johns 
F. Kruger 
London Missionary Soc. 
C. E. Mitchell 
NG Angllcan Mission 
P. Osborne 
L. M. Owen-Turner 
Papuan Government 
Papuan Government 
W. L. & D. Tanby 
Robinson River Pltns 
(Burns Philp) 
Robinson River Pltns 
Robinson River Pltns 
Robinson River Pltns 
Sewataitai Plantations 
Steamships Trading Co. 
Steamships Trading Co. 
Steamships Trading Co. 
Dr G. H. Vernon 
Whitten Brothers Ltd 
Whitten Brothers Ltd 
F. Evenett 
F. Evenett 
F. Evenett 
M. M.Fitzgerald 
W. E. Giblln 
Walker brothers; 
Loani Rubber Ltd 
J. Gray 
W. Gray? 
J. Inman 
J. Inman 
N. Izod 
G. Harden/A. C. Pilotti 
R. Johns 
F. Kruger 
LMS 
C. E.  Mitchell 
New Guinea Mission 
C. Owen-Turner 
Papuan Government 
Papuan Government 
W. Tanby 
Robinson River Ltd 
Milne Bay Rubber Co. 
W.H .Gors /W.&E. Whitten 
Domara River Pltns/ 
[ Lease 5 1 0 )  Fergusson I. 
Deirina I. 
[Lease 694]  China Strait 
[Lease 271 of 1 9 1 9 1  Normanby I. 
Nonowai, China Strait 
Loani, China Strait 
Annie Inlet, East Cape 40 
Mariawatte, Mullens Harbour 1 6  
Nuamato I. 
[Lease 3 1 1 of 1 926 ) 
Goodenough I. 
Wakaiuna, Normanby I. 
*Baramata, Cape Rodney 60 
Matadona, China Strait 8 
Gamododo, Milne Bay 
Isu Isu, Lawes Bay 
*Vilirupu, Marshall Lagoon 
Hioge, Goodenough Bay 
Milne Bay 
Eabull, China Strait 
Baibara, Orangerie Bay 
Nari (Mudge) I .  
[Lease 6 1 1 ) , Milne Bay 
*Robinson R. Cloudy Bay 1 ,0 1 6  
Haglta, Milne Bay 87 
*Dedele, Cloudy Bay [freehold) 1 7 1  
T .  & J .  McCrann *Kauru/Baia, Domara River 372 
W. Henderson/ A. Bunting Sewataitai, Normanby I. 240 
Talbot brothers Punipuni, East Cape 1 70 
J. G. Nelsson/W. Sheddon Doini I. nr Samarai,&Tuyam I. 1 20 
Papuan Rubber&Copra Co 
of NZ & Papuan Prod.Ltd Mamai, Port Glasgow 290 
G. H.  Vernon Oni-oni, Port Glasgow 1 8  
W. Whitten Bubuleta, Milne Bay 
R. F. Whitten Kuiaro, China Strait 
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TABLE 1 PAPUA: Coconut Plantations, 1940 contd 
Owners 1 940 
South-Eastern Division 
G. Aumuller, T. Nevitt 
& A. H. Bunting 
C. 0. Anderson 
Original Planter 
J. Anderson 
E. Auerback E. Auerback 
Bank of New South Wales E. & F. Osborne 
G. Brett A. Bernier 
G. Brett J. & E. Mahony 
S. Brudo R. & S. Brudo 
G. Burfttt 
C. Cameron 
C. Coppard 
A. Dawkins 
Mrs E. Delaney 
I. Ede 
R. H. Ede 
H. W. Hughes 
H. W. Hughes 
A. LeBoutillier 
E. Mahony 
E. Mahony 
E. Mahony 
J. G. Munt 
J. G. Munt 
J. G. Nelsson 
D. H. Osborne 
F. Palisbo 
Tagula Plantations Ltd 
Gulf Division 
F. W. Burke 
H. T. Coghill 
A. D. Drummond 
London Missionary Soc. 
Mrs V. Priddle 
Mrs C. J. Smith 
Mrs C. J. Smith 
Steamships Trading Co. 
Steamships Trading Co. 
Delta Dlvlalon 
E. F. Clay 
London Missionary Soc. 
C. Sampson? 
C. Cameron 
C .  Coppard 
A. Dawkins 
J. E. Delaney 
R. H. Ede & Rabbitt 
R. H.  Ede 
Johannessen & Hughes 
P. N. Charpentier 
R. & B. Boyd 
J. & E. Mahony 
J. & E. Mahony 
J. & E. Mahony 
BNG Government 
J. G. Munt 
J. G. Nelsson 
Osborne brothers 
Ah Gow 
T. E. Craig 
F. W. Burke 
H. T. Coghill 
R. Shaw Moody 
F. W. Clark 
Mrs Ashton/V. Priddle 
J.G. Fowler (or 
G.W. Lupson?) 
A. B. Sinclair 
L. Lett/J. F. Puxley 
D. McDonald 
P. Robinson 
LMS 
Name and location 
Panawina, Calvados Chain 
Panamotl, Calvados Chain 
Muwo, Trobriand Is 
Abuletl, Rossel I. 
Kauboga, Misima 
Motorina, Calvados Chain 
Bomapau I. & Kavataria, 
Trobriand Is 
Tons 
45 
1 86 
48 
Panawina, Calvados Chain 1 8  
Kitava, Trobriand Is 85 
Kauboga, Misima 25 
Murua, Woodlark (Ls 353 , 3541 60 
Sinaketa, Trobriand Is 
Guasopa, Woodlark 70 
Laughlin Is 78 
Madau, Woodlark 
Lauani, Woodlark 
Tauhik, Misima 6 
Bonagai, Woodlark 
Moguiva, Griffin Point, Sudest 
Dunvara, Rossel I .  
Nivani I.  Torlesse Group 80 
Panapompom I . ,  Torlesse Group 
Kwaiapan Bay, Woodlark 
Kanadu & Abuleti, Rossel I .  1 42 
Nimoa l. (Sudest) & 
Panapompom I. 
Madaua, Hinai Bay, Sudest 
M uru Ck. , Kerema 
Muru Ck. ,  Kerema 
Keuru, Huiva, le Inlet 
Koaru, Mopu Inlet 
Arimiri, Huiva, le Inlet 
( Lease 964) Vailala River 
Vaivtri, Orokolo Roads 
Maira, Vailala River 
VaiViri, Vailala River 
Varoe (Kanibo?), Kikori 
Aird Hills 
60 
65 
50 
1 86 
40 
80 
1 25 
70 
1 5  
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Owners 1 940 
West em Division 
S. Cowling 
L. Luff & N. M.  Gordon 
W. A. Maidment 
Northern Division 
British New Guinea Devt 
A. H. Bunting 
AH.Bunting, A.Mccallum 
& J. Boland 
Papuan Government 
North Eastern Division 
H. Spiller 
Papuan Government 
Original Planter Name and location 
J. & J. Cowling 
Papuan Industries Ltd 
L. Joubert & E. Oates? 
E. Oates 
Oro Bay Plantations Ltd 
A. Clunas & M. Clark? 
H. Spiller /Davis? 
Papuan Government 
Mibu, Fly River mouth 
Dirimu, Binaturi River 
[ Lease 268] Daru 
Jaropa[ Giropa],  C. Endaiadere 
Tungora, near Buna 
Wiresota, Amboga Ck, 
Oro Bay 
Giriwu River & Giropa 
Point, Buna 
Abuaro, Menapi, Goodenough 
Bay 
Tuft 
Tons 
1 50 
1 00 
70 
1 20 
These plantations midway between Port Moresby and Samarai were at different times within 
the boundaries of the Central Division, an 'East Central' Division (Abau), and the Eastern Division. 
11 Except where Papuans took out leases [in the cases of Augustine Aoae, Teina Materna and the 
Soliens - a Maiay-Papuan family) the list comprises only non-indigenous owned plantations . See note 
29, p. 1 27 above for a discussion about the village plantations set up under the Native Plantations 
scheme. 
Sources: CRS & NAPNG G69 25 / 20 C. 1 1 7 / 1 / 1 825. 'Amended list of Copra growers', 2 1  Nov. 1 940, 
and Territory of Papua, Government Gazette No. 1 1 940, List of Rents Due, 1 Jan. 1 940. Except in the 
case of Rorona and Giligili where the 1 939 production figures are given, the tonnages shown represent 
the copra on hand for shipment in late 1 940. Many smaller plantations had ceased production with 
the outbreak of the war in Europe, their unsold copra being held in store by Burns Philp or 
Steamships Trading Company. 
TABLE 2 PAPUA: Rubber Plantations, 1 940 
Plantation & District 
Central Division 
Barodobo (Rigo) 
Blsiatabu (Sogeri) 
Doa (Galley Reach) 
Eilogo (Sogeri) 
Gobaregere [or 'Kapagere' J 
(Kemp Welch River) 
Itlkinumu (Sogeri) 
Jawarere (Musgrave River) 
Kanosia (Galley Reach) 
Koitaki (Sogeri) 
Koke Bagu11 (Kemp Welch River)• 
Lolorua (Galley Reach) 
New Guinea Rubber Estates 
(Kemp Welch River) 
Veimauri (Galley Reach)* 
Northern Division 
loma 
Kokoda 
Oro Bay• 
Eastern Division 
Hagita (Maiwara River 
Milne Bay) 
Kauru (Domara River, 
including 'Bala')• 
Loani (China Strait)• 
Mamai (Port Glasgow)• 
Sagarai (Mullens Harbour) 
Tomanau (Mullens Harbour) 
Delta Division 
Kikori (Kikori River) 
Ogamobu (Kikori River) 
Western Division 
Madiri (Fly River) 
Owners 
A. C. English [freehold) 
Seventh Day Adventist Church 
British New Guinea Development 
G. A. Loudon 
Papuan Government 
British New Guinea Development 
British New Guinea Development 
Clarke & Whiting 
Koitaki Ltd 
Koke Bagu Ltd 
Anglo-Papuan Plantations 
Steamships Trading Company 
Mrs Vera Ruby Ward 
Durcher & Spellacy 
Papuan Government 
A. H. Bunting 
Robinson River Plantations 
(Burns Philp) 
Robinson River Plantations 
(Burns Philp) 
D. & W. Gill 
Steamships Trading Company 
Mrs Millicent Jewell 
S. & J. Horton 
Papuan Government 
British New Guinea Development 
Unevangelised Fields Mission 
TOTAL 
These estates were also copra producers. 
11 The former Kemp Welch River Rubber Estates property. 
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§ Area Area ln 
planted productn 
(acres} 
( 1 00)? 
809 
600 
2 1 7  
1 ,559 
(288) 
1 , 638 
2, 1 80 
(248) 
2,853 
1 00 
430 
(200) 
1 25 
1 70 
270 
450 
( 80) 
250 
507 
300 
(acres} 
? 
20 
58 1 
1 1 7 
1 79 
1 , 158 
? 
l ,398 
1 ,050 
I l l  
1 , 1 00 
70 
1 1 0 
? 
90 
7 
58 
250 
45 
1 20 
420 
? 
1 90 
4 1 0  
7,784 
§ The areas planted but not in production may represent either trees in decline or new plantings 
since 1 935. The new estates being cleared and just being planted in 1 940 - Sogeri, Ilolo, Mamba, 
Mariboi, Rubberlands, Aroana, Baumata, Cupola and Epo - do not appear on this list. 
Source: CRS A5 18, Item P8 1 2 / l /5 Part 4. Papuan Rubber Plantations as at 15 May 1940; and CRS 
G69, Item 25/ 1 9 ,  24 May 1926. 
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TABLE 3 BRITISH NEW GUINEA and PAPUA: Overseas Trade 1888- 1941 
(Value ofllmports(£) Exports(£) Balance (+ /-) 
1888-89 l l ,  109 5,943 5 , 1 66 -
1889-90 16, 104 6,455 9,649 -
1 890-9 1 1 5 ,530 8, 1 34 7,396 -
1 89 1 -92 23,755 1 1 ,239 1 2 ,5 1 6  -
1 892 -93 25 ,261 14,966 1 0,295 -
1 893-94 28,50 1 14,952 1 3 ,549 -
1 894-95 28,367 1 6, 2 1 5  1 2 , 152 -
1 895-96 34,52 1 1 9 ,40 1 1 5 , 1 20 -
1 896-97 5 1 ,392 44,345 7,047 -
1 897-98 46,97 1 49,858 2,897 + 
1898-99 52, 1 70 68,496 1 6,326 + 
1 899 - 1 900 72, 286 56, 1 67 1 6, 1 1 9  -
1 900-0 1 7 1 , 6 1 8  49,659 2 1 ,959 -
1 90 1 -02 70,8 1 7  68,300 2 ,5 1 7 -
1 902-03 62,367 62,89 1 524 + 
1 903-04 77,63 1 75,506 2 , 1 25 -
1 904-05 67, 1 88 76,435 9,247 + 
1 905-06 79 ,761 80,290 529 + 
1906-07 87, 776 63,756 24,020 -
1 907-08 94,06 1 80, 6 1 6  1 3 ,445 -
1 908-09 94, 680 79,692 1 4,988 -
1 909 - 1 0  1 20 , 1 77 100,599 1 9 ,578 -
1 9 1 0 - 1 1 202 ,9 10 1 1 7, 4 1 0  85,500 -
1 9 1 1 - 1 2  235,369 99,990 135,379 -
1 9 1 2 - 1 3  2 1 8,323 1 28,0 1 6  90,307 -
1 9 1 3 - 1 4  2 1 2 , 1 34 1 23, 1 40 88,994 -
1 9 1 4 - 1 5  202,055 94,354 1 07,70 1 -
1 9 1 5 - 1 6  223 ,040 1 25,428 97,6 1 2  -
1 9 1 6- 1 7  27 1 ,640 1 56,535 1 1 5, 1 05 -
1 9 1 7 - 1 8  283,793 220,599 63, 1 94 -
1 9 1 8 - 1 9  258 , 1 1 2 1 76,247 8 1 ,865 -
1 9 1 9 -20 422 ,74 1 270,48 1 152,260 -
1920-2 1 484,770 1 72 , 672 3 1 2,098 -
1 92 1 -22 305 ,705 2 20,236 85,469 -
1 922 -23 3 1 5 ,423 1 79,452 1 35,97 1 -
1 923-24 354,965 239,408 1 1 5 ,557 -
1 924-25 459 ,080 367, 629 9 1 ,45 1 -
1 925-26 470,774 685,896 2 15, 1 22 + 
1926-27 455,904 454,462 1 ,442 -
1 927-28 403 ,56 1 350,363 53 , 1 98 -
1 928-29 3 6 1 ,27 1 337,365 23,907 -
1 929-30 373 ,9 1 8  324,775 49, 143 -
1930-3 1 240,074 274,354 34,280 + 
1 93 1 -32 22 1 ,843 269 , 254 47,4 1 1 + 
1 932-33 2 1 8,0 1 6  275,866 57,850 + 
1 933-34 220 ,605 249, 1 35 28,530 + 
1 934 -35 269,299 294,743 25,444 + 
1 935-36 3 1 7,8 1 5  355, 157 37,342 + 
1 936-37 452,056 524,00 1 'Z l ,945 + 
1 937-38 63 1 ,497 435,593 1 95,904 -
1938-39 5 1 4,808 490, 1 58 24,650 -
1 939-40 826,4 1 2  5 1 0, 672 3 1 5 , 740 -
1 940-4 1 539 , 1 52 492,775 46,377 -
Source: Territory of Papua, Annual Report 1 9 26-27 (p. 7 1 )  and subsequent Annual Reports. 
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TABLE 4 PAPUA: Agricultural Commodity Exports 1905-1941 
Copra an d  Rubber 
Copra Rubber 
Quantity Value Quantity Value 
(tons) (£) (tons) (£) 
1 905-06 9,3 1 5  1 , 1 45 
1 906-07 7,46 7  1 ,385 
1 907-08 7,5 1 5  483 
1 908-09 1 3 ,376 1 1 3 
1 909- 1 0  29,498 904 
1 9 1 0- 1 1 1 7,837 2,054 
1 9 1 1 - 1 2  1 9 ,368 935 
1 9 12- 1 3  1 6,9 1 2  5 1 7  
1 9 13 - 1 4  29,063 1 ,536 
1 9 1 4- 1 5  1 2,693 1 ,50 1 
1 9 15- 1 6  1 , 156 1 9 ,05 1 43 .5 1 4,8 1 6  
1 9 1 6- 1 7  2 ,096 40,882 85.0 2 6,682 
1 9 1 7- 1 8  3 , 189.7 68,225 1 44. 7 37,020 
1 9 18- 1 9  2,598 53,264 207 33,0 1 0  
1 9 19-20 4,080 1 24,035 242 4 1 ,542 
1 920-2 1 2,984 68,579 220 28,966 
1 9 2 1 -22 5,063 87,377 85 5 , 826 
1 922-23 5 ,870 1 1 2,48 1  5 7  5 , 907 
1 923-24 7,3 1 5  1 36, 659 304 33,334 
1 924-25 7,765 1 72,905 5 1 1 68,507 
1 925-26 8 , 4 1 9  204,097 640 1 94,849 
1 926-27 9,542 1 86,837 76 1 1 56 , 274 
1 927-28 9,825 1 94,0 19 8 1 1 1 02, 1 58 
1 928-29 1 2 ,480 2 1 4,05 1 470 46,8 1 6  
1 929-30 1 1 ,693 1 76,485 763. 75 50,640 
1 930-3 1 9 , 436 93,7 1 0  785 47,036 
1 93 1 -32 10,0 1 1 1 00, 454 806.25 49,262 
1 932-33 9,686 89,5 1 2  953 .25 56,929 
1 933-34 8,082 42 ,990 948.5 6 1 ,324 
1 934-35 8,570 57,597 1 ,069.25 79,03 1 
1 935-36 1 0,549 1 00, 681 1 ,09 6.75 89,467 
1 936-37 1 3,600 1 9 1 ,808 1 , 1 1 2 .5 1 24, 1 74 
1 937-38 1 1 ,249 9 1 , 1 66 1 ,243 1 29,448 
1 938-39 9,357 57,999 1 , 290 1 1 4,949 
1 939-40 6 ,656 45 ,568 1 ,345.75 152,487 
1 940-41 8,93 6  1 , 273 
Source: Territory of Papua, Annual Reports, 1 905-06 - 1 940-4 1 .  
Note: Copra tonnages Include copra exported out o f  trade wi th  Papuan villagers. See note 29, p .  1 50. 
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TABLE 5 PAPUA: Agricultural Commodity Exports 1905-1941 
Sisal Hemp an d  Cotton 
Sisal Hemp Cotton 
Quantity Value Quantity Value 
(tons) £ (tons) £ 
1 905-06 
1 906-07 
1907-08 
1 908-09 
1 909 - 1 0  
1 9 10- 1 1 340 
1 9 1 1 - 1 2  720 
1 9 1 2 - 1 3  3,039 
1 9 13- 1 4  3 , 633 
1 9 14- 1 5  1 ,269 ( 1 38. 1 )  3 , 400 
1 9 15- 1 6  447 1 1 ,999 25.5 1 ,6 1 0  
1 9 1 6 - 1 7  326 1 1 ,463 
1 9 1 7- 1 8  343 . 2  1 7,682 
1 9 18- 1 9  287 1 2 ,532 
1 9 19-20 336 1 2 ,284 
1 920-2 1 1 88 7,723 
1 9 2 1 -22 1 45 4, 630 
1 922-23 
1 923-24 32 1 , 1 25 45 550 
1 9 24-25 396 1 3 , 1 4 1  3 1  3,76 1 
1 925-26 202 7,695 1 03 4,866 
1 926-27 33 5 . 8  824 
1 927-28 59 
1 928-29 3 . 7  4 1 5  
1 929-30 1 . 25 3 2 1 67 
1 930-3 1 6 . 75 2 7 1  . 5  2 8  
193 1 -32 
1 932-33 
1 933-34 
1 934-35 
1935-36 
1 936-37 
1 937-38 
1 938-39 
1 939-40 
1 940-41 
Sources: Territory of Papua, Annual Reports, 1905-06 - 1940-4 1 ;  British New Guinea Development 
Company Annual Report, 1 9 1 5 .  for the tonnage of cotton produced in 1 9 1 4- 1 5 .  
TABLE 6:  PAPUA: Agricultural Commodity Exports 1905-1941 
Coffee an d  Desiccated Coconut 
Coffee Desiccated Coconut 
Quantity Value Quantity 
(tons) £ (tons) 
1 905-06 9 1 5  
1 906-07 700 
1 907-08 470 
1 908-09 325 
1 909- 1 0  654 
1 9 10- 1 1 
1 9 1 1 - 1 2  48 
1 9 1 2 - 1 3  488 
1 9 13 - 1 4  488 
1 9 1 4- 1 5  425 
1 9 1 5 - 1 6  
1 9 1 6- 1 7  
1 9 1 7- 1 8  
1 9 18- 1 9  
1 9 19-20 
1 920-2 1 
1 92 1 -22 
1 922-23 
1923-24 
1 924-25 
1 925-26 
1 926-27 40 
1 927-28 1 08 
1 928-29 4. 15 3 1 3 260.75 
1 929-30 5 . 75 5 1 9 747 
1 930-3 1 2 . 75 242 1 , 46 7  
1 93 1 -32 8.25 537 1 , 228 
1 932-33 3 6 .25 2,404 1 , 1 1 7.75 
1 933-34 60.25 4,993 1 , 274 
1 934-35 79 7,083 1 , 452.75 
1 935-36 54.5 5 , 2 1 7  1 , 4 1 5 .25 
1 936-37 88 7,536 1 , 498.75 
1 937-38 83.25 6 , 606 1 ,54 1 .25 
1 938-39 1 1 1 .75 6 ,9 1 1 1 ,580.5 
1 939-40 77.25 5 , 289 1 , 875.5 
1 940-4 1 
Source: Territory of Papua Annual Reports, 1 905-06 - 1 940-4 1 .  
Value 
£ 
2 , 494 
7,407 
1 6,033 
39,923 
79,264 
. 59,826 
49,5 1 4  
48,000 
37,895 
42,46 7  
47, 1 37 
52,628 
48, 1 40 
58,0 1 5  
3 1 3 
3 1 4  
TABLE 7: PAPUA: Principal Mineral Exports 1905-1941 
Gold an d  Copper 
Gold Copper 
Quantlty Value Quantlty Value 
(Ounces) £ (tons) £ 
1 905-06 24,227 87,869 
1 906-07 1 6 , 103 58,886 137 (ore) 4,098 
1 907-08 1 4,557 5 1 ,024 1 76 2 , 479 
1 908-09 1 4,7 10 5 1 , 1 08 67 1 ,340 
1 909- 1 0  1 6 , 1 5 1  60, 1 8 1  72 l , 439 
1 9 10- 1 1 1 8,497 68,803 403 1 2 ,386 
1 9 1 1 - 1 2  17 ,047 60,628 594 9 ,68 1  
1 9 12-13  1 8,247 64, 1 15 1 ,285 1 8,997 
1 9 13- 1 4  1 4,666 50, 1 10 1 , 150 1 9 ,733 
1 9 1 4- 1 5  15 ,290 5 1 ,22 1 695 5 ,606 
1 9 15- 1 6  1 0,930 43 ,248 1 , 156 1 9 ,05 1 
1 9 16- 1 7  9 ,678 37,988 2,096 40,882 
1 9 17- 1 8  1 2, 1 68 33,5 1 2  l ,  1 1 2 1 1 ,572 
1 9 18- 1 9  1 1 ,769 26 ,64 1 224 1 ,6 1 3  
1 9 19-20 1 1 ,75 1 2 1 ,757 10 1 07 
1 920-2 1 13 ,232 1 8,478 255 1 ,830 
1 9 2 1 -22 52,704 58,6 15  2 ,700 13 ,5 1 4  
1 922-23 1 7,033 22 ,494 1 (smelted) 1 4  
1 923-24 2 , 166  6 ,702 8 1 20 
1 924-25 4,947 1 7,642 2 ,094 4 1 ,674 
1 925-26 7,746 27, 134 1 1 ,466 20 1 , 732 
1 926-27 8,806 29, 1 1 5 582 35,799 
1 927-28 2 , 173 6,364 1 6  208 
1928-29 2 ,287 6 ,767 
1929-30 3 ,624 10,632 8 194  
1 930-3 1 6 ,923 22,440 
1 93 1 -32 8,574 34,338 1 .5 60 
1 932-33 15 ,268 45,383 
1 933-34 1 9,496 45,933 2 . 25 74 
1 934-35 2 1 ,732 68,922 
1 935-36 2 6 , 1 99 8 1 ,034 2 1 0  
1 936-37 33 ,580 87,003 
1 937-38 47,308 108, 1 4 1  
1 938-39 64,622 150, 1 98 
1 939-40 46,239 135,879 
1940-4 1 * 1 4,056 133, 341 
• 1940-4 1 gold weight i n  fine ounces 
Source: Territory of Papua, Annual Reports, 1 905-06 - 1 940-4 1 .  Where figures are amended in later 
Reports, latest figures are given. 
TABLE 8:  PAPUA: Papuans in Employment 1910- 1941 Source: PAR, 1 91 0-41 
Workers Workers 'Aglcultural' 'Aglcultural' 'General 'General Wages Paid Monthly Workers Crown 'Casual' 
engaged paid-off workers workers Labourers' Labourers' average under Servants workers 
[New (Contracts engaged1 paid-off engaged paid-off under contract (estlmated)3 
Contracts I completed I Indenture during year2 
1910-1 1 7,806 5,202 4,5 14 2,513 872 440 £3 1,312 959 1,000 
1 9 1 1 -12 7,963 6,925 4,722 4,044 842 642 1,496 
1912-13 6,975 6,909 3,674 4,381 1,205 765 42,132 1 ,438 2,945 
1913-14 7,681 6,064 3,667 2,939 1,830 1,332 38,636 1,392 3,702 
1914-15 6,769 7,082 3,273 3,234 l,498 1 ,706 44,598 1,530 1,972 
1915-16 6,686 5,880 2, 721 2,824 1,889 1,279 38,835 1 ,606 1,290 
1916-17 7,892 6,663 3,306 2,942 2,539 1 ,930 5 1 ,547 l,724 2,520 
1917-18 7,059 6,840 46,554 
1918-19 8,610 5,913 3,329 2,559 3,229 l,873 41 ,884 1,557 2,845 
1919-20 6,397 6,930 1,949 3.031 2,706 2,295 54,339 1,502 1,652 
1920-21 7,495 7,335 1,878 2,607 3,508 2,786 61 ,483 2, 1 1 5  
1921 -22 4,590 6,251 625 l,964 2,090 57,474 1.230 
1922-23 5,473 4,893 370 731 3,006 2,269 47,993 6,083 1,702 
1923-24 6,206 4.959 645 563 3,656 2,823 42,776 6,814 1,466 
1924-25 6,81 7 4,661 573 441 3,957 2,430 46,019 6,879 1 ,295 
1925-26 6,716 6,3 1 7  628 401 4,041 3,910 63,082 9,672 1, 182 
1926-27 5,566 6,666 301 529 3,286 3,821 61 ,663 8,315 1.277 
1927-28 6,485 6,269 669 592 3,807 3,758 62,246 8,447(8,41 1 1  
1928-29 5,355 8,653(6,725) 
1929-30 5,470 57,641 7,274 1,379 
1930-31 4,21 7  48,327 6,144 2,183 
1931 -32 5,244? 5,244 1,927 
1932-33 5,059(3716) 35,105 5,059 2,242 
1933-34 3,627? 34,918 5,167 2,109 
1934-35 5, 124 32,750 5,964? 9,994 2,564 
1935-36 4,992 4 1 , 1 22 6,952 1 1 ,540 2,928 
1936-37 6,209 4,767 43,897(46,275) 7,965 13,079 2,863 
1937-38 7, 1 1 5  5,692 50,940 9,648 
1938-39 7,249 7,148 61 ,837 9,759 16,984 2.749 
1939-40 7,515 7,040 64,476 9,829 17,351 3,001 
1940-41 6,857 71,426 9,718 17,168 2,897 
1 Resident Ma.gtstrates were required to stipulate the kind of work labourers had agreed to perform on Contracts of Service at the outset. The categories preferred by planters shifted over 
the years from 'Aglcultural and Pastoral' to 'General' labourers. See PAR 1925-26, 88, where general labourers are identified as 'mostly rubber tappers'. Plantation workers comprised 
around half of the Indentured labour force from 19 10. Other large categories of labourers were those engaged In mining and pearling. and as seamen and domestic servants. 
2 The f\gures above for the period 1934-35 to 1 9 40-4 1 are for workers employed under contract agreements at some stage In the year. A better guide to the residual labour force Is 
available for 1938-39 and 1939-40. On 1 July 1938, 9,735 workers were on contracts, on 1 July 1 939, 9,836, and on 1 July 1940, 10,3 1 1 .  These like the Monthly Average under Indenture 
flgures suggest, I believe, an agricultural labour force, with casuals, of at least 6,000. 
3 Casual workers could not be employed continuously for more than three months until 1927. Thereafter the term was unrestricted but the distance from the worker's home could not 
exceed twenty miles. Estimations given In the Annual Reports are unreliable. While some plantations could provtde plenty of work for local men and women, Villagers could juxtapose such 
labour with garden cultivation, festivals and flshlng. See Appendix A below. 
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APP E N DIX A: The I ndentured Labou r System in Papua: Some Recent 
Studies 
Ralph Shlomowitz's articles 'The internal labour trade in Papua ( 1 884- 1 94 1 ) , 
and New Guinea ( 1 920- 1 94 1 ) :  an economic analysis' in the Journal de la Soctete 
des Oceantstes , 82-83 ( 1 986) and 'Mortality and indentured labour in Papua 
( 1 885 - 1 94 1 )  and New Guinea ( 1 920- 1 94 1 )' in the Journal of Pacific History , 23 
( 1 988) appeared as I was completing the present work but did not cause me to 
alter my view. I differ with him on several points. He has in the JPH article 
'shown that between 1 906 and 1 925 contracts in Papua were usually for 1 2  
months' and not the two years 'average' claimed by an official in the 1 920-2 1 
Papuan Annual Report. He interprets the data to suggest that between 1 926 
and 1 94 1  'contracts were usually for 18 months'. I think this view mistaken. 
Contracts of one year (or less) remained normal among the 50% of workers not 
employed in agriculture - those in domestic service or as town labourers, or 
contracted to work in mining or pearling or on coastal shipping for examples -
but many plantation labourers and from time to time possibly a majority of 
them from 1 9 1 2  onwards were employed on thre� year contracts. The reasons 
why planters sought, obtained and preferred three year contracts are discussed 
inter alia in Chapter 9 above. My impression is that as much as ha1f of the 
indentured workforce in agriculture were on the longer contracts and that these 
constituted about a quarter of all contracts. The 'official' in 1 92 1 ,  knowing that 
a considerable proportion of indentures at least in agriculture were for three 
years and reporting on the 'average· term of indenture was, I believe, merely 
taking the mean of two years to give a rough indication - very rough we might 
think - of this 'average' as if the distribution was normal. Papuan planters (and 
other officials) would immediately have known what the writer meant and that 
as description the suggestion that 'two year contracts' might be typical was 
inaccurate. Most labourers did not enter contracts either of this average length 
or of Dr Shlomowitz's revised average of eighteen months. 
In considering the 'typical' periods of engagement for agricultural workers let 
us take 1 924-25 as an example. If the minimum £6 a year was the common 
wage, and I think Shlomowitz and I can agree that it was, then the 4 , 66 1 
labourers discharged under the NLO that year, if they had worked for no more 
than twelve months. might have collectively earned little more than £28,000. 
But the Annual Report gives the total of the wages paid in the year as £46 , 0 1 9  
giving a per capita mean of close t o  £ 1 0 .  I think the discrepancy can be 
explained in this manner: if three quarters of indentured workers - including 
about half of those contracted to work in agriculture - were engaged for twelve 
months, as I have suggested was the case, their wages at the minimum rate 
must have amounted to about £2 1 , 000. Let us allow that it might have been as 
much as £23 ,000, for some workers were certainly paid more than the 
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minimum (as discussed above, pp. 1 45 - 6) .  Left for distribution among the 
remaining 1 , 1 65 is £23 ,000 . If these workers were indeed as I argue workers 
mostly on three year contracts , then the accrued wages paid should have been 
not less than £ 1 8  per capita, the total amounting to a minimum of £20,970 - a 
sum well covered by the balancing £23 ,000. It is not known how 'advances' on 
wages were distributed from year to year in calculating the sum of wages paid, 
but such advances can hardly have altered the outcome on balance. If three 
year contracts were other than relatively common it is difficult to account for 
the government's effort in the 1 927-28 Annual Report (p .64) and elsewhere to 
discourage employers from insisting on them. Dr Shlomowitz's Table 1 1 ,  
'Indentured Labour in Papua and New Guinea: Indirect Measure of the Average 
Length of Contract, 1 920- 1 to 1 940- 1 '  in the first article cited, gives a ratio of 
continuing to newly recruited workers for each year. This, I believe, can be re­
interpreted to support my view. 
We do not possess a complete record of Papuans in employment. (See 
Table 8 above , p. 3 1 5 .) The data in the Annual Reports until 1 923 give only the 
numbers of workers entering and completing contracts of service in each twelve 
month period, and mask the presence in most years of between one and two 
thousand indentured labourers who were in the middle eighteen months of 
three year contracts.  That this was so is suggested by the data provided from 
1 922-23 which give the estimated monthly average number under indenture for 
each year. These generally exceed the engagement figures of the preceding two 
or three years by the missing one or two thousand. The inspection of 1 3 ,669 
'units' of labour in the 1 38 inspections carried out in 1 925 also suggests that 
there must have been difficulty in estimating numbers under indenture when 
there was a large turnover, no day passing, it seems , without contracted service 
being begun or concluded somewhere . The inspections in the year are unlikely 
to have been confined to plantations for we know that not all of these were 
inspected annually, indeed some might not be visited for several years. To 
estimate actual numbers employed on plantations is made even more difficult 
when it is remembered that by the 1 930s perhaps a quarter of the plantations -
especially smaller strings of properties in the two eastern Divisions - were 
relying wholly on local casual labour engaged outside the indentured labour 
system. Estimates given of the number of ·rree' workers in some Annual Reports 
may be indicative but they can hardly be accurate. (See above the note 
regarding casuals that accompanies Table 8.) It is true that the 1 932-33 Annual 
Report [p. 1 OJ goes so far as to estimate that casuals by then made up a third of 
all workers, the proportion having risen from 'a ninth' in 1 926. It is difficult to 
know how these figures were reached. Perhaps it should also be noted here that 
Crown servants , averaging 1 ,500 a year in the period 1 9 1 1 -20, must have 
included several hundred employed on the government's own plantations. 
I agree with Ralph Shlomowitz that £6 a year was the common wage but it 
was not as he has suggested elsewhere 'invariable' in Papua (R. Shlomowitz and 
R. D. Bedford , ·The internal labour trade in New Hebrides and Solomon Islands, 
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1 900- 1 94 1 ' ,  JSO , 86 , ( 1 988) , p. 69). Wages were invariably not less than ten 
shillings a month after 1 907 certainly, but a small minority of experienced 
workers were paid more , a few even much more. Likewise he also concluded 
that the recruiting fee for 'eighteen month or two year contracts' was usually 
between £3 and £4. This may be true as far as it goes but in this form 
contributes to the misrepresentation of the typical terms of engagement 
discussed above . Recruiting fees were almost invariably £3 for each year of 
contracted service. A 'three year boy' in Papua cost the employer £9 in 
recruiting fees before he had commenced work. Since recruiting was a highly 
competitive business the high price of securing labour must be attributed to the 
costs incurred by the recruiter in providing the 'presents' he was expected to 
display and offer as an inducement before villagers would 'consent' to their 
young men leaving home. Clearly in many districts with few alternative means 
of obtaining these goods , the recruiters' visits were significant opportunities . 
The fee charged by a recruiter for the repatriation of a worker was, as Dr 
Shlomowitz found, between five shillings and £ 1 .  
Whether the arguments above regarding the length of contracts , if accepted, 
might influence conclusions about mortality among indentured workers arrived 
at by Shlomowitz I do not know. Certainly planters in Papua were much more 
concerned with treating and containing venereal infections on plantations than 
troubled by the infrequent deaths that occurred. And although I found myself 
in disagreement with some of Dr Shlomowitz's conclusions I was grateful for the 
opportunity to re-consider my own in relation to those of a co-worker 
approaching the data from an entirely different direction. 
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APP E N D IX B:  Plantations in the context of the international economy 
1 900-1 940: a further note 
The Plantation Dream is an account of plantation development in one colonial 
territory in the period 1 884- 1 9 42 and of the experience of its European settlers. 
It was inevitable that such a project would suggest or confirm some general 
conclusions about the whole plantation enterprise and colonial experience in 
the first forty years of the twentieth century. These now seem commonplace. 
They may, of course,  be contested. 
Firstly I agree with Michael Barratt-Brown1 that prolonged periods of over­
production plagued practically every tropical commodity after 1 920 and that the 
benefit undoubtedly flowed to the European consumers. Yet the extent of 
excessive capacity could hardly have been planned or foreseen. And, contrary to 
the opinion of many who were dazzled by empire and the prospect of great 
profits from investment in tropical agriculture , most colonies were irrelevant to 
the power and wealth of the metropolitan industrial societies - with the 
probable exception of the Netherlands - whose trade with each other and the 
regions of European settlement far outweighed trade with their Asian, African 
and Pacific Island dependencies.  No investors in tropical commodities in 1 9 1 4  
foresaw how low prices would go, or might have outlaid the enormous sums 
expended on development if they had known. There was no unreasonable 
margin of profit after 1 920 from which workers on plantations anywhere in the 
world - supposing they could have organised to do so - might have wrung 
improved conditions. The plantation lobbyists themselves were hard-pressed in 
the interwar period to prevent the value of the investments of many 
shareholders falling away to nothing. The pressure to minimise costs was 
remorseless , the plantation workers' expectation of any improvement or change 
hopeless. Restriction of production, as in the rubber industry, was a palliative 
that gave only marginal relief and mainly to the least stressed producers. In 
such circumstances, as Barratt-Brown concluded , the plantation colonies could 
scarcely have become very significant importers of industrial goods with the 
bargaining power that as markets they might have exercised if metropolitan 
exporters had depended on them. 
Second, it is naive to imagine that any alternative system of peasant 
smallholder agriculture producing any of the the major tropical plantation 
commodities in the period under review could have contributed to the capital 
accumulation of which , some think, the supposed excessive profits of the 
capitalist plantation enclave deprived the colonial territories .  The investment 
booms ensured that there would be too many producers on the margins , and 
Michael Barratt-Brown, lifter Imperialism {London 1970), 1 40. 
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the terms of trade and competition ensured that prices would be held low. 
Planters themselves were at best no more than well enough paid agents - at 
worst among the broken casualties - of an international economic order largely, 
indeed necessarily, indifferent to their particular circumstances. The 
beneficiaries of this system were not only the metropolitan manufacturers who 
could manipulate the markets, but all the European, North American and 
Australasian consumers in general who, as I suggest in the text, did no more 
than buy more cheaply and well. It might be acknowledged that generally 
colonial administrations were efficient in providing at least a framework of 
protection and legality under which 'development' could take place and that 
metropolitan governments remained sensitive to public opinion in the industrial 
states that wanted to regard the colonial undertaking in a favourable ethical 
light. 
Third, the advantage in power, wealth, organisation, disposition, flexibility 
and technology possessed by European industrial societies in the late 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries was such as to allow of no alternative 
outcome for most non-Western peoples for a time than their subjugation, 
exploitation , and cultural humiliation - or, as some in the future might again 
judge, their liberation - and in much of the tropical world, their subjection to 
highly disadvantageous terms of trade. The transition of Pacific societies from 
the condition of 'barbaric' independence and cultural integrity, isolated self­
sufficiency or 'subsistence afiluence'2 to that of permanently poor and 
dissatisfied appendages of the industrial world may indeed be for many the 
terminal consequence of the colonial episode.3 The dismantling of the 
plantation system and its replacement with peasant smallholdings as the 
dominant mode of production for tropical commodities is quite unlikely to 
influence this result. The further transition to a modern economy, and the 
abundance this promises , remains almost as far off as ever with now a much 
more acute awareness of the gap to be covered. It may be considered little 
consolation that these societies were spared the greater forms of oppression 
and dispossession experienced by others. 
2 'primitive or subsistence afiluence' - E. K. Fisk's ( 1966) description discussed in 
William C. Clark, 'The dilemma of development', in Harold Brookfield (ed. ), The Pac!f1.c in 
Transltlon (Canberra 1 973), 289 .  
3 See Diana Howlett's 'Terminal development: from tribalism to peasantry' also in 
Brookfield, ibid. , 249-73. 
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Bala lpltnJ, Domara River IEDJ, added to 
Robinson River holdings, 8 1 ,  2 1 1 . 2 49,  
306, 309 
Batbara I Govt pltn), Orangerle Bay, 
showplace estate, 83 ; manager's 
salary, 1 45 ,  good · producer, 206; 
manager loses son in war, 249; 306 
Baillleu, W. L. , one of Papuan Lands 
guarantors, 85 and n 
Baker, Edward, Government Printer, 
founding proprietor of Papuan Tlmes, 
1 23 
B al d wi n ,  C a p t a i n  C h a r l e s  R . ,  
storekeeper, 26; accuses A. C .  Engllsh, 
28; shares in Papuan Ttmes, 1 24; 
attends businessmen's meeting in 
1 9 16 ,  1 46;  marries MacAlpine's sister, 
250 
Ballantine, David, BNG Treasurer, 63; 
plants coffee at Sogerl, 28, 38; retires 
to pltn, dies, 69; property acquired by 
Tavat company and BNGD, 70; 98; 
first coffee planter, 239 
Ballantyne, James, slipway owner and 
planter, China Strait IEDJ,  92 
Ballantyne, Meta, planter on China 
Strait. 92 
Ballot, Harry, 'Russian' murdered at 
Jawarere, 137n, 287 
bananas, grown at Angabunga, 2 4 1  
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Baramata [pltn l, Cape Rodney [EDI, 59 
Barodobo lpltn l, R1go ICDI, 29, 309 
Barton, [Sir) Edmund, [Prime Minister ) ,  
53, 59 
Barton, Captain Francis R1ckman, 
Administrator of BNG, 58; and NLO, 
49; Hunt's high opinion of B. ,  62;  weak 
character and hostility to settlement 
alleged by Murray 63-65; 67, 1 2 1 ;  
Bartonite 'faction' , 68-69, 99 
Bastard, Edwtn, RM, 1 8 1  
Batchelor, E .  L . ,  [Minister for External 
Affairs ) on policy, 107; visits Papua, 
1 1 8 
Baubauguina [pltn), Cloudy Bay [ED ), 
87, 88, 1 27-8; 'Baboguina' , 1 44n; 155,  
234,  235, 273 , 305 
Beach, Hugh 'Percy' , 96 ,  257 
Beasley, J. A. , Minister for Industry, 2 1  7 
Bedford, Randolph, journalist visits 
Papua and denounces administration, 
applies for land, 80, 98 
Bell, Leslie Livingstone, acting CNA 
proceeds against BNGD, 179-80, 1 83-
4; report cited by Murray, 277; reports 
on labour system in Malaya, Chief 
Inspector, Commissioner for Native 
Affairs, 279 and n, 283 
Bellingham, William, manager at Hisiu 
attacked, 286 , and 287n. 
Bensted, John T., Papuan Agent in 
Sydney, 138, 1 63,  1 65, 1 78; stores 
clerk with shares, 98; as former 
Director of Public Works his view of 
Murray, 1 23 
Bentlnck, steamer with BNGD supplies, 
96, 265 
Bernesconi, George, 89; manager at 
Baubauguina accused and convicted of 
illtreatment of Lauboiboio, 1 27-8; 
appeal fails, 130- 1 ;  134, 135, 156, 280 
Bernier, Alphonse and Helene, pltn 
managers at Panasesa, planters on 
Misima, 92, 307 
Bertie, Robert Dugald, Port Moresby 
solicitor, his share in newspaper and 
responsibility for agitation, 1 64; his 
character, review of Murray's Revlew, 
167-9; Condltlons ln Papua, 1 90- 1 ;  
registers Sangara Rubber Plantations, 
265 
Bevan, Theodore, explorer and applicant 
for land, 17-9, 27, 256; inspires 
opposition to BNG Syndicate, 30 
Bisiatabu [pltn ), Sogeri [CD ),  80, 309 
Bloomfield, Arthur Stoughton, promoter 
of companies in Papua, 77-9 ; 
publishes brochure, 79; knew of 
Drummond's shareholdings, 10 1 ;  his 
role as capitalist, 79, 103;  his 
investment, 1 06;  defends Government, 
138 and n; castigated in Papuan 
Courter, 138; sets up Moresby agency, 
1 48, 222;  on good terms with Murray, 
1 5 4 ;  his agency collapses, B .  
withdraws from Papua, 1 94; visits 
Canada, l 94n; offers himself as a 
Senate candidate, l 64n; liquidator of 
Fairfax Harbour companies, 232; 257; 
and first Planters' Assn, 262; and 
Melbourne 'Association of Planters', 
264; shows Wiseman's report to Hunt, 
277 
Boliboll [ or Borebore) [pltn), China Strait 
!ED) ,  92,  305 
Bomana [sisal pltn l. Laloki R1ver [CO ), 
87, 130, 156,  232 
Bomapau I. [pltn) ,  Trobriand Is. [SEO), 
93, 307 
Bonagai [pltn), Woodlark I .  [SED), 90, 
307 
Boxhall, Charles, manager at Sagarat, 8 1  
Bramell, Bertram W. , Commlsioner for 
Native Affairs and Control: a Bartonite 
won over by Murray, 1 1 1 ; on 
desertions 155; 259; his experience 
and role, his visits disruptive, 276; 
Loudon's view of B., 278 
Brandes, Dr E. W. , 237n 
British New Guinea Development 
Company Ltd [BNGDJ, 50n, action 
against BNGD by Papua Trading and 
Planting Co. , 84; prospectus issued, 
8 6 ;  directors,  pltns,  87 ,  1 03 ;  
subsidiaries, 87, 1 48, 20 1 ,  222,  225; 
shareholders, 104; 1 1 6;  directors 
entertain Murray, 1 16 ;  Bernesconi 
trial, 1 27-3 1 ;  and Oelrichs affair, 1 3 1 ,  
1 3 4 ;  Metcalfe's protest, 1 32 - 4 ;  
chairman's comments a t  AGM, 135,  
138; Murray 'doing battle' with BNGD, 
1 36;  threat to government, 1 40- 1 ;  
acquires Doa from Bruce, 1 48;  1 5 1 ;  
Itlkinumu crisis, 1 52-7; destruction of 
Merrle England, 157, 1 63 and n; 
London Secretary visits Papua, 
Loudon's connection with Papuan 
Courter severed, 1 64-5; debenture 
iss u e ,  1 7 2 - 3 ;  L o u d o n  attacks 
government at AGM, 1 77;  Co. 
complains of 'harsh and vindictive 
treatme nt' , Bell  a n d  M urray's 
response, 1 79-8 1 ;  MacAlpine [BNGD 
inspector) meets Poynton, 1 86-7; re­
construction, 1 93;  charters steamer, 
1 96; chairman writes to Murray, 202; 
2 1 1 ; near collapse, second recon­
struction, dividends paid, 2 1 2  and n; 
Tracy [ BNGD agent ) at rubber 
conference, 2 1 9;  Federal Treasurer 
reacts to BNGD report, 220; Ogamobu 
manager visits Malaya, 22 1 ;  costs 
examined, 224; old managers establish 
Sogeri Estate, 225; buy Ogamobu, 
225; and tobacco industry, 229-30; 
sisal, 232;  cotton, 234-5 ; tea, 236; 
sugar, 238; 240, 250, 25 1 ,  262, 265 ,  
297; later history, 302; 305 ; 309 
British New Guinea Syndicate, 30- 1 ,  33 
British New Guinea Trading Company, 
BNGD subsidiary, 87, 1 48, 20 1 ,  222; 
bought by Burns Philp, 201 , 2 1 1 
British Solomon Islands Protectorate, 56 , 
1 4 1  and n, 1 46 
Bruce, William Cunningham, Police 
Commandant, planter and newspaper 
editor: background and character, 69, 
1 64n; loses office, opposed to Murray, 
holds timber concessions, 69; sells 
pltn, 87, 1 48; contractor, 88; 1 20; a 
proprietor and editor of Papuan Times, 
70, 1 24; vendetta against Murray, 1 24; 
attacks 'nominee' system, 1 2 5 ;  
appalled by outcome o f  Bernesconi 
trial, attacks native policy, 1 28-9; 
attacks administration, 137-8; briefly 
conciliatory, 1 46;  in difficulty, sells 
timber business, in debt to BNG 
Trading Co. , 1 48-9 ; death, 1 49n; 
chairs meeting, l 62n; suggested as 
Senate candidate, l 64n; appraises 
BNGD cigars, 229; kept racehorses, 
264; 279 ,  287 
Brudo, Raphael, pearl buyer and planter, 
Trobriand Is, 93-4, 307 
Brudo, Samuel, pearl-buyer and planter, 
Trobriand Is, 93-4, 307 
Bubuleta [pltnJ, Milne Bay [ ED), 36, 273, 
306 
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Buna, [ND ), 87, 94, 238, 239, 308 
Bunting, Arthur, storekeeper and planter 
in ED and SEO, 90, 25 1 ;  pltn at 
Sanaroa [ED ); promoter with Nevitt of 
Sangara sugar venture, 238; death, 296 
Bunting, Fred. , 90 
Bunting, Robert, trader and planter in 
ED, SEO, 90; partner in Elai valley 
leases, 1 02;  assaulted at Giligili, dies, 
286; 296 
Bunting, Robert 'Bob' [ the younger ), 
provides feast for Teste I. workers, 269n 
Burgess, Michael, alleges illtreatment of 
labour, 1 55 ,  1 8 1  and n 
Burke, F. W. , planter, Muru Ck, Kerema 
[ GD ), 307 
Burns, Colonel James, sponsors Hall 
Sound Co.,  3 1 ,  32, 33 
Burns, Philp & Company (Burns Philp), 
1 7, 25, 3 1 ,  32, 33-4, 37, 83; 
beneficiary of Navigation Act, 1 90, 1 95-
6;  buys out BNG Trading Co. Samarai, 
20 1 ;  grip on Papuan overseas trade, 
207; takes over BNG Trading Co. at 
Port Moresby, 2 1 1 ;  acquires Robinson 
River Plantation, 2 1 1 ; 225,  226n, 239, 
303, 306 
Butterworth, Whittens' recruiter, 1 46 
Calligan, Thomas , 230 
Calvados Chain [ED), 90, 92, 1 50n 
Cameron, Cyril 'King', planter at Kitava I .  
[SED J, 93 
Cameron, John, Government Surveyor, 
acquires grant, 27-8; 130n 
Campbell, Alexander Malcolm, RM [ED J, 
1 09; Government Secretary, 70, 1 10; 
criticises exaggerations in publicity, 
7 1 ;  concerned over land purchases, 
1 09- 10; character, 1 1 0- 1 ;  proposes 
scheme to compell Papuans to work, 
1 1 2-3; gives Loudon assurances over 
labour, 13 1 ,  133-4; Commissioner for 
Native Affairs, 1 1 0, 276 
Cardew, H. C., ARM at Kikori, proposes 
joint venture with Percy Robinson, 256 
and n 
Carpenter W. R. [W. R. Carpenter Ltd l, 
208, 2 1 1  
Carruthers, [Sirl Joseph, chairman of 
Angabunga River Plantations, 8 1  
Casement, [Sir) Roger, his Putamayo 
revelations mentioned by Bertie, 169 
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and n; and by Murray, 1 83 
Catholic Mission, 29 , 150n, 305 
Catt, Harry, pltn manager at Baibara, 
83 ; son killed in war, 249 
Cay, Laidley, pltn assistant, assaulted by 
workers at ltikinumu, 286 ,  287n 
Chamberlain, Joseph, Secretary of State 
for the Colonies proposes Australia 
take over British New Guinea, 53 and n 
Champion, Herbert William, Treasury 
Clerk and Treasurer, 99, 100; Govt 
Secretary, 1 1 1 , 1 13 ,  1 23,  1 57, 1 60- 1 ,  
1 97, 26 1 ,  297, 300 
Chancellor, Reginald Ellis, soldier settler 
and trader, Upagau River, Aroma, 95n, 
1 94n, 282 and n, 305 
Charpentier, Prosper, Woodlark planter, 
letter writer, settles on Laloki River, 92 
and n, 93; Batchelor responds to 
letter, 107; on labour problems, 155 
Cheesman , Evelyn, entomologis t ,  
comments o n  planter life, 24 7-8 
Clark, F. W. , trader and planter, Koaru 
IGD I, 96 
Clark, Morton 'Mort', trader and planter 
at Giriwu IND J, 95;  grows cotton, 234 
Clarke, Frank 'Snowy' , pltn manager at 
Domara, 25 l n; of Robinson River, 
reports unrest, 289 
Clarke and Whiting, 77-79, 103, 1 1 4, 
1 15,  1 1 7, 130, 1 43,  194, 201 ,  2 1 2,  
2 19, 222, 225, 232, 235, 305 ,  309 -
see also Sir Rupert Clarke and R. S. 
Whiting 
Clarke, [Sir ) Rupert Havelock Turner, 
(Bt), major investor in Papuan pltns, 
xi, 77-79, 103, 232; attacks Papuan 
administration, 1 27; Loudon seeks his 
assistance, 1 35;  loses investment in 
Fairfax, 232 
Clay, Edmund 'Ted', coastal mariner, 25l n  
Clay, J.  R . ,  agent and coastal shipowner, 
1 98; planter, 24ln; attacked by 
villagers, 287 
Clunas, Alexander 'Alec' ,  contractor, 88; 
trader and planter, Giriwu [ND) ,  95; 
grows cotton, 234 
Clune, Frank, 297 
Clunn, Anna, 296 
Clunn, John, Samara! Publican and 
planter at Ramaga IED J, 37, 95 , 234 
Clunn, Louis, planter at Delena, 95 
cocoa [cacao ) ,  38, 199, 24 1 
Coconut Products Limited ( Papua), 208 
Collins, Edgar, superintendent at 
Rorona, 1 36 
coffee, planted by Ballantine at Sogeri, 
28; growing near Yule I . ,  29; at Sagoro 
Tano, 38; 199;  at Eilogo, 225; survey 
of industry, 239-41 ;  exports, 3 1 3  
Commonwealth Copra Company, 77 
Commonwealth Hemp Company, 226, 
233; directors arrested, 242 
Conflict Group, [ED), 26-7, 42, 84, 200, 
305 
Conflict Islands Planting Association, 27,  
98, 102 
Connolly, W. J. ,  283 
Cooper, [Sir) Pope, member of Queensland 
Papuan Lands Syndicate, 85; at Royal 
Colonial Institute meeting, 104 
copra, 15, 25, 58, 88, 105, 200, 205-13; 
export duty, 170, 196, 197-8; exports, 
3 1 1  
Corke, C .  R. , pltn manager at Dedele, 287 
cotton, 39, 88, 93, 96, 1 78, 233-5; 
exports, 3 1 2  
Cowley, [Sir) Alfred Sandlings, BNGD 
director, 87 
Cowley, Campbell, son of BNGD director, 
planter at Mogubo, 8 1 ;  partner with G. 
A. Loudon, 96; death, 250 
Cowley, Lewis, succeeds Darling as 
BNGD general manager, Murray tells 
C. he might admit 'Manilla men', 1 18;  
resigns 130; Murray compares Loudon 
with C. ,  182; child dies, 25 1 ;  and first 
planters' association, 262 
Cowling, Janet, 'Mrs Evans' , planter at 
Mibu and Madiri [WD J, 82, 96 ; her 
character, 249 
Cowling, John, trader and planter at 
Mibu [WD),  39, 82 , 96, 15 l n; marries, 
249 and n 
Craig, T. E . ,  planter at Madaua, Sudest 
ISED J, 93 , 305, 307 
Craig, T. J., assistant at Baubauguina 
makes allegations against Bernesconi, 
1 27, 130 
Criminal Code [Queensland), adopted in 
Papua, 1 28;  criminal charges, 1 29 ,  
155, 275 ,  280- 1 ,  285-8 
Crisp, E. V1v1an, Steamships general 
manager, 296 
Customs duties (Papuan), 1 73 
Customs Tari.ff (Papua and New Guinea 
Preference) Act. 1 926, 199,  208, 229, 
240 
Currie, W. 'Scotty', trader and planter, 
Oiapu ( GD) ,  96; death, 296, 
D'Albertis, Luigi, his servants remain as 
settlers, 39 
Darling, Charles Alfred, first general 
manager BNGD, 85 , 1 1 6 ,  1 1 8 
Daru, 36, 96, 97, 249 
Daugo (Fisherman's I. Govt pltn) (CD ), 
23, 296 
Davis, Admiral E. H. M. ,  chairman of 
Papua Trading and Planting Syndicate, 
84, 1 04 
Day, Cecil, BNGD pltn manager at 
Otomata, in Sogeri syndicate, 225 
Deakin, Alfred, as Attorney General 
supports transfer of BNG to Australia, 
54; as Prime Minister accepts Smith's 
offer of report, 57; offers Smith 
position of Director of Agriculture etc. , 
5 9 ;  asks M urray's opinion of 
administration, 62-5 ; Barton his 
appointee, 65; Grimshaw corresponds, 
68; appoints Murray, 68, 76; instructs 
Hunt over officers' interests in land, 
101  
de  Courcy Hamilton, H.  M . ,  Mombiri 
director 84; at Royal Colonial Institute 
lecture, 1 04 
Dedele lpltn) IED J, 25,  37, 2 1 1 , 287, 306 
de Moleyns, [ Hon. ) Richard, 40, 1 48n 
Derby, (Lord), disallows annexation, 1 6  
desiccated coconut, 1 99 ,  208-9, 209n, 
286; exports 313 
Dexter, Henry, marine engineer and pltn 
manager: compares Papua and FMS, 
265; handling rebellious labourers, 
273 
Dibbs, [Sir !  George, 32 
Dirimu [pltnl,  Binaturi River [WD J, 82, 
97, 308 
Ditton, Edward, stockman imprisoned 
for assault, deported, 282-3 
Doa lpltn), Galley Reach, 87, 1 48, 25 ln ,  
264, 309 
Doini I. (pltnJ I ED J, 37, 90, 306 
Domara (pltn ), 25 ln - see also Kauru 
Domara River Plantations Ltd, 8 1 , 95 , 
2 1 1 , 287, 293 
Douglas, John, 1 7 
Doyle, Andrew, settler on Laloki, 
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murdered, 286 
Driver, James, planter at Hihila IED J,  88, 
92n 
Drummond, Ralph, Chief Government 
Surveyor, 78, 99- 1 0 1 ,  109 
Dubois, Raymond, manager Papua 
Plantations Ltd, 8 1 ;  complains of 
labour shortage, 1 15-6 , 262; proposes 
govt recruitlng, 1 17 
Dumoulin Is (ED), 305 
Dundee River Rubber Company, 99 and n 
Dunlop Perdrlau Rubber Company, 2 1 9-20 
Dunvara (pltn), Rossel I. (SEDI, 90, 307 
Ede, Isadore, trader and planter, 
Laughlin Is ISEDJ, 93,  1 50n, 306 
Ede, Richard, trader and planter in 
Laughlins (EDJ, 24, 93, 306 
Eglestaff, V. C . ,  planter on Goodenough 
I. IED I, 305 
Eichorn, George, planter on China Strait 
I ED I. 92 
Eilogo lpltn), Sogeri (CD), 225, 240, 30 1 ,  
302, 309 
Encouragement qf Industry Ordinance, 1 13 
Enesi Plantations Limited, 37, 305 
Engineer Group (pltns) IEDJ, 90, 306 
English, Albert Charles, Government 
Agent and planter at Rigo ICDJ, plants 
native rubber, as ARM charged with 
neglect of duties, 28-9; retires to pltn, 
70, 98, 1 03;  grows sisal at Kapakapa, 
23 1 ;  child dies, 25 1 
English, Daisy, marries English, 250, 
25 1 ;  death, 296 
Epo [pltn), Kerema I GD J, 227, 287n 
Esher, Reginald Balliol Brett, Viscount, 
guarantor of BNGD, 85, 86, l 22n 
Ettling, Carl, 250 
Evenett, Frederick 'Brassy', planter at 
Moununa, 9 1 ;  prosecuted over recruiting 
4 7n; son dies, 250; death, 296 
Exton, John, 79 , 23 1 
Fairfax Harbour Plantations Ltd, 79, 
1 0 1 ,  1 94 and n, 232 
Fergusson I .  (Moratau ) IEDI ,  9 1 ,  286 , 
305 
ficus rtgo l makl-makll - see rubber 
Fitch, Captain Algernon Sydney, 
S teamships Trading C ompany 
chairman: arrives Papua, opinion of 
government, chairs public meeting, 
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1 62 and n; telegrams King George V, 
1 66 ;  confronts minister , 1 85-6 ;  
prospects for rubber lands at  Galley 
Reach, 226; invests in rubber at 
Kasiabadina and Kerema, 226-7; re­
conclliatlon with Murray, 296; speaks 
favourably of Murray, 297; retires, 300n 
Fletcher, J . ,  Trade and Customs officer, 
224 
Flynn, Errol, 23 1 
Ford, Henry, 73 
Forrester, L. E. , trader and planter at 
Polotana, East Cape [ED), 9 1  
Fort, G .  Seymour, 1 7  
Fowler, James G. , planter and later ARM: 
contributes verse in Papuan Courter, 
1 2 4- 5 ; cou nted villager- planted 
rubber, 227n; marries MacAlpine's 
s ister , 2 5 0 ;  H u mp hries' verse 
contrasted, 295 
Frame, E. J . ,  Burns Philp manager in 
Port Moresby, registers gold syndicate, 
226; buried at Badihagwa, 303 
Frese, August G. S. , 28 1 ,  283 
Freshwater, James, 95, 15 l n, 248, 249 
2 1 7  
Gadaisu [pltn), Orangerie Bay [ED), 87, 
88, 234, 235 , 269, 305 
Galley Reach [pltn), Galley Reach [CD), 
78, 79, 88, 222; desertions, 1 79-80; 
incorporated into Kanosia, 194;  
Gamododo [pltn l, Milne Bay [ED ), 92,  
306 
Garrioch, Charles Grant, Chief Clerk, in 
partnership with H. L. Greene at 
Sagoro Tano [CD), 38, 80, 98, 239 
Garstang, Harry, 283 
German New Guinea, 8,  1 2 ,  29, 54, 56 ,  
158-9, 159n - see also Mandated 
Territory of New Guinea 
Gibara [pltnl ,  Milne Bay [ED), 305 
Giblin, Dr W. E. ,  planter at Nonowai, 
China Strait, 1 02 
Gillgill [pltnJ, Milne Bay [ED ), 77, 88, 
2 1 1 , 264, 285 , 305 
GUI, L. F. , BSIP planter comments on 
Papua, 175 
Gill, W. P. , 2 4 l n, 309 
Gillingham, Charles 'Peanut Charlie', 
plants peanuts on Gebaro I. [WD), 38, 
241  
Giriwu [pltnl, Giriwu River [ ND ), 95 , 308 
Glass, Ernest, 1 03 
Glynn, Patrick McMahon, Minister for 
Home and Territories, 1 19 
Gobaregere [ Govt pltn), Kemp Welch 
River [CD J, 83 , 25 1 ,  309 
Godson, Fred, 225 
Gofton, Harry 'Hardy', butcher and pltn 
assistant, 250, 25 l n  
Goldie, Andrew, trader, 1 8 ,  2 6  
Goldsmith, Dr F. , 1 1 2 
Goodenough I. [Morata) [ED ), 235 , 305 , 
306 
Gordon, [Sir) Arthur, [Lord Stanmore ), 
20, 43-4 
Gore, Justice Ralph, 26 1 ,  280, 285 
Gors, Arthur, 88, 296, 304 
Gors, Leo, 88, 95, l 94n, 296 , 303, 305 
Gors, Otto, 88, 95 , 102, 303, 305 
Gors, Walter Henry, Burns Philp 
manager and original planter, develops 
Dedele and Warirata, 25-6, 27, 95, 
2 1 1 ; promotes Hall Sound Co., 32-3; 
leaves Papua, 37; returns, 1 93; plants 
sisal 233; cotton, 235 ;  2 4 1 ;  death, 296 
Gray, John, planter at Annie Inlet IEDJ ,  
91  
Greenland, Stanley, labour inspector, 
1 52, 259 , 262, 1 77 
Greenaway, Alfred, planter at Baxter Bay 
[ED J, 96 and n 
Greene, Henry Lesueur, planter at 
Sogoro Tano [CD), 38, 70, 80, 98, 239; 
plants coffee and first hevea rubber, 
38; requests police protection, 64-5 ; 
obtains posltlon in FMS, 88 
Griffin, Henry Lysaght, RM and planter, 
resigns and commences planting, 70, 
98; contractor, 88; obtains posltlon in 
FMS, 88; relative invests in Kemp 
Welch estates, 1 03; grows sisal at 
Tavai, 233 
Grimshaw, Beatrice, publicist, novelist 
and planter, 4n; arrives Papµa, finds 
r ap p o r t  with  M u r r a y ,  b e gins 
correspondence with Deakin, settles in 
Papua, 68-9; writes promotional 
material for Govt. ,  70- 1 ,  72, 73n; view 
of Murray justified, 122 ;  brother tries 
tobacco, 23 1 ;  describes delights of 
planting, 245-6; writes stories, novels 
set in Papua, 255 , 256 
Grimshaw, Ramsay, 23 1 
Guasopa lpltn), Woodlark I. [SEDJ, 93, 307 
Guise, Reginald, trader at Hula [ CD), 25 
Guttridge, George William, Attorney for 
BNGD, appointed MLC, 20 1 
Hacke, Kurt, engineer and manager, 89; 
manages cotton gin, 235 
Hagita [or 'Maiwara' pltnJ, Milne Bay 
IEDJ,  77, 80, 2 1 1 ,  306 
Hall Sound Company, 32-4, 40, 2 1 1 
Harbord, Horace H. ,  former miner, pltn 
manager, Angabunga, 296 
Harris, Edward, Papuan Treasurer, 123;  
provides figures on rubber costs, 2 1 9; 
attends conference regarding rubber, 
returns triumphant, 2 1 9-20 
Harris, G. E..  assistant at Mamai 
banned, 282 
Harrison, Ernest, planter at Sebu­
lagomwa [ED ), 9 1  
Harrison, George, planter at Kedidia 
IED J, 9 1 ,  306 
Harse, Dr Walter, buys Tomanau pltn 
[ED ), 102;  examines labourers, 1 80; 
daughter buried at Badihagwa, 303 
Hartmann, Carl, horticulturist, plants 
government fruit garden, 1 7  
Havilland, Cyril, assistant t o  Govt 
Surveyor with shares, 98 
Hayes, Albert, prospector and speculator 
in land at Patakalana, 84, 85n 
Heagi of Hanuabada, skipper of Varoe, 
1 46, 258-9 
Herbert, Charles, E. , Deputy Chief 
Judicial Officer, 1 2 7, 280 
Hides, Horace, gaoler and leaseholder, 98 
Higginson, Charles B . ,  RM at Samara!, 
reports villagers threatening labourers 
clearing land, 1 1 1 ; good relations with 
planters, 278 
Hihila lpltn), Milne Bay [ED J, 92, 305 
Hinds, Percy, trader, 23 1 
Hioge lpltn), Goodenough Bay [ED),  306 
Hisiu [Anthony's pltn) Hisiu [CD),  38, 
1 03 
Hisiu [Dr Simson's pltn), Hisiu [CD), 
managed by Fred Weekley, 1 02;  
Papuan woman assaulted, Bellingham 
attacked, 286; 305 
Hisiu [ Teina's pltnJ, 98, 305 
Hisiu - see also The Palms, lki-ikina, 
Obu 
Holm, Helge, 89, 28 1 
Holton, Captain Herbert, and Mrs 
Index 337 
Holton, H. A. Wickham's managers in 
Conflicts, 92 
Hombrom Bluff [ Govt pltn), Astrolabe Ra. 
[ CD ), 83 , 236 
Horan, Daniel, contractor, 89 
Horn, Frank, planter, Cape Rodbey [ED), 
dies intestate, 95 
Horn, J. F. , of Robinson River Plantation, 
visits Papua, thinks Murray's style too 
informal, 12 l n; estimates all-in cost of 
labour, 1 45;  visits Giligili, 269 
Horn, Major Kelham K., BNGD director, 
1 85 
Horn, William Austin, director and 
chairman BNGD and Kuala Selangor 
Rubber Co . ,  87, 1 84; 2 1 1 ;  accuses 
Australia of inconsistency, 1 38 
Houlder Bros. timber shippers, 1 48, 207 
Houldsworth, J. H.,  83 
Howard, Hon. Geoffrey, 85 , 136,  1 37n 
Howe, W. F. S. , 238 
Hughes, W. H. , planter, Woodlark [SEO), 
93, 307 
Hughes. W. M., [ Prime Minister), 158, 
1 63, 238 
Huiva [pltnJ, Huiva, le Inlet I GDJ, 235 -
see also Keuru, Arimiri 
Humphries, Walter Richard, 28ln, 295 
and n 
H u nt , Art h u r  A tl e e ,  Permane n t  
Secretary, Dept Home and Territories: 
his character, his BNG Report, 59-6 1 ;  
62;  encourages Smith, 74; propa­
gandist for investment in Papua, his 
connection with A. S. Bloomfield, 76-7; 
buys shares in Kemp Welch River 
Rubber Estates, 1 03;  sympathises with 
Encouragement of Industry Ordinance, 
1 1 2; a 'safe man for the capitalists', 
1 15; confides that Parliament will 
admit no imported labour, 1 18n; 
Murray breaks off correspondence over 
Wilkes judgement, 133; Murray gives 
H. reasons to oppose private oil 
prospecting, 1 4 1 ;  member of Royal 
Commission [ Late German New 
Guinea), 1 59;  164, 277 
Hunter, Captain Archibald A. H. ,  98, 
1 48n 
Hunter, Robert, 23, 39, 87, 234, 296 
Hutchinson, C. F. ,  Ceylon planter visits 
Papua, makes recommendations, 2 14 
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Ik.1-ikina (pltn l, Hisiu ( CD ), 95n, 296, 305 
Ilolo [pltnJ, Sogeri [CD), 225, 302, 309n 
Inman, J . ,  306 
International Rubber Agreement, 222-3, 
224 
International Rubber Regulation 
Committee, 222,  223 
Joma [Govt pltn), 83 , 95 and n; former 
Govt pltn, 309 
Irvine, Don, pltn manager at Giligili: 
provides fireworks display for labour, 
269; death, 296 
ltlkinumu lpltn), Sogeri [CDI, 70, 87, 
105,  1 43; assaults and desertions, 
1 5 1 ,  152-4, 155 ; desertions in ·bean' 
case, 1 79; 277, 286 , 309 
lzod, Norman, Samarai engineer and 
planter on Normanby I .  [ED), designs 
desiccator, 208; and copra drier, 50n; 
306 
Jackson, Charles F. , former Patrol 
Officer, BNGD pltn inspector sent 
·south' to stir up opposition, 1 63-4; 
author of Native Labour Law and 
Practlce, 275, 279 
James, E. A. , customs agent and 
newspaper proprietor, president of 
Pacific Territories Assn, 298 
Jaropa or Giropa [pltnl, Cape Endaiadere 
IND I, 87, 308 
Jawarere (pltnl, Musgrave River [CDJ, 87, 
137, 1 43,  287, 309 
Jefferson, William, pltn manager at 
Ogamobu, 89, 248-9; visits Malaya 
and reports, 221 and n; obtains 
position in FMS, 88, 248n; at 
Otomata, 265 
Jenkins, John Greeley, Sth Aust. Agent 
General in London and member of 
Papuan Lands Syndicate, 85; BNGD 
director, 87; addresses Royal Colonial 
Instltu, te, 104 
Jenkinson, L. A., tobacco expert visits 
Koitaki, 23 1 
Jensen, Richard Thorvald, 89; manager 
at Itikinumu charged under NLO, 152-
3, 155;  appeals to Murray, 156;  
charged with causing grievous bodily 
harm, 28 1 
Jesweit, Dr J . ,  237n 
Jewell, Arthur, planter and general 
manager, Capt.  Barton's private 
secretary, 65n, 260; contractor, 70, 
88; manager of Mombiri and Pacific 
and Papua Produce Co. ,  84; vlce­
presldent of Planters' Assoc. opposes 
copra excise, 170; attends Tariff Board 
meeting, 1 97; appointed MLC,  1 99 ;  
Executive Councillor, 1 99n; proposes 
rubber bounty, travels to Canberra, 
2 1 6-7; argues danger to Papuan 
rubber industry, 2 1 7; further visit 
·south', returns triumphant, 220; 
director Tavai, 70, 232 ;  founding 
member Papua Club, 260; marriage, 
250; 26 1 ;  death, 30 1 
Jewell, Millicent, planter, purchases 
Sagaral 200, 2 1 2, 249; marries Jewell, 
250; continues to manage interests 
after 1 945 , 249, 30 1 ; 309 
Johannessen, Einar, [with W. H. Hughes) 
planter at Madau, Woodlark [SEDI, 89 , 
93, 307 
Johnston, A. Lisle, 30 1 
Jones, Dr R. F.,  98, 1 02 
Joubert, Leslie ·Les' or ·Jumbo·, recruiter 
and planter at Buna, 94; colluded with 
Oelrlchs, 1 3 1 ;  303 
Kairuku [pltn l, Yule I. ( CD) ,  305 
Kanadu [pltnJ ,  Rossel I. [SEDJ, 307 
Kanosia lpltnl, Galley Reach (CDI,  79 , 
8 1 ,  87, 88, 99, 1 05,  130, 1 42-3, 2 12 ,  
273, 302, 309 
Katea [ tobacco pltnl, Lalok.1 River [CD), 
87, 132, 1 47,  229-30, 235 , 24 1 
Kauru [pltn), Domara River IED J, 8 1 ,  
2 1 1 , 249, 287, 293, 306, 309 
Kedldla [pltnl, Fergusson I.  [ED), 9 1 ,  306 
Keelan, Allee Jeanetta, settler and 
author, 25 1 ,  254; her attitude towards 
Papuans, 25 1 ,  253-4; 265, 294 
Keelan, Jack, ARM , 278; manager at 
Gobaregere, 25 1 ;  settles at Sogerl, 
254, 294 
Kelemasina, pltn worker killed, 285 
Kemp Welch River Rubber Estates Ltd, 
78, 1 03-4, 194 
Kemp Welch River Plantation, KW River 
[ CD),  78, 1 04, 1 54,  222 
Kendrick, William, Treasurer, 1 23,  134 
Kennedy, [Sir)  Charles, 30 
Kerema ( Govt pltn), Kerema [ GDI,  83 , 
227 
Kerema Rubber Plantations, 227 
Keuru {pltnl, Hutva I GD J, 96, 307 
Kienzle, Herbert, miner and planter on 
Yodda, 95, 226 and n, 233 
Kikori ( Oovt pltnl, Kikori River IDDJ,  83 , 
96, 309 
Kikori Plantation Company, 82 
Kikori Plantations Ltd, 82 
Killerton I. [Haroari)(pltnJ, Milne Bay 
IEDJ, 3 1 ,  305 
Kingsley, Alfred Thomas, registers 
Mamba Estates, gold syndicate, 226; 
re-opens Tavai, rubber planter, 233 
Klriwtna I . ,  Trobriand Is. [SEDI, 94, 247 
Kitava I . ,  [and pltnl Trobriand Is. [SED J, 
94, 307 
Kitchen, Fred W. , 77, 264 
Kitchen and Sons, 77 
Koaru (pltn), Mopu Inlet ( GD ), 96 , 307 
Koitaki [pltn l. Sogeri I CD J, 80, 105, 1 6 1 .  
1 93, 1 98, 260, 262, 274, 30 1 -2, 309 
Koitaki Ltd, formed, 193 
Kokoda [ Govt pltn), 83, 95 
Kruger, Fred, 83, 296 
Kuala Selangor Rubber Company, 50n, 
87 
Kwaiapan Bay [pltnJ, Woodlark I. [ SEDI, 
90, 307 
Kwato Extension Association, 37 
Labour - labour law and policy, 43-50, 
140-5 1 ;  labour shortage, 1 1 4-5, 1 1 7; 
Smith estimates available supply, 1 1 6 ,  
1 1 9-20; pltn work o f  limited value, 
1 2 1 ;  illegal recruitment, 1 3 1 -2;  Bamu 
workers starvtng at Fairfax Hbr, 1 33 ;  
assaults, desertions, 1 52-3, 154, 1 79-
80, 2 7 1 -5, 284; planters criticise 
implementation of the Native Labour 
Ordlnance, 1 60, 277-8; criticism 
wanes, 20 1 -2; labour believed better 
treated in Papua, 202; 
- boss-boy system, 259, 270- 1 ,  274, 
280; 
- comparative costs, 1 1 4, 1 42-3, 1 44, 
1 45-6, 201 -2, 22 1 ,  233; 
- 'free' or casual labour, 1 44 and n, 3 1 5 ,  
Appendix A; 
- imported labour considered, 45, 58, 
1 1 7-8, 1 18n, 1 42 ,  1 46, 1 62 ,  1 85, 188; 
- labourers and the 1 94 1 -45 war, 298; 
• labourers employed on pltns: 'Aromas', 
270; 'Eroros' , 1 3 1  and n: 'Goaribarts', 
96, 270; 'Oostagos' ,  9 1 ,  96, 270; 'last-
Index 339 
Iasis', 9 1 ,  96, 270; 'Keremas', 96; 
'Kiwais' , 97, 274; 'Kumusis', 1 3 l n; 
'Mambares', 1 3 l n, 1 36 ;  'Orokaivas', 
93, 1 30- 1 ,  130n, 1 34, 270, 'Orokolos', 
96; ·rugos', 270; 
- recruiting, 43-8, 82, 1 46 and n, 257-8, 
266, 276-7, 283; 
- relations on pltns, 245-6, 253-4, 257· 
9,  268-76, 279-86 
Laka River Rubber Company, 79, 87, 88 
Lalaita, labourer beate.n by others at 
Hisiu, 286 
Lambert, Dr S. M . ,  American visitor's 
high opinion of leading planters, 260 
Land • land law and policy: under 
Protectorate, 1 6-8; Land Regulation 
Ordtnance, 1 888, 2 1 -2;  BNG Syndicate 
scheme, 30- 1 ;  Hall Sound Company, 
3 1 - 4 ;  l a n d  a l i e n a tio n d u r in g  
interregnum, 36-9; Land Ordlnance, 
1 906, 4 1 ;  country potentially rich, 66, 
67;  'taking a punt on Papua', 77-83; 
'enterprises of vast possibilities', 83-8; 
'settlement by the small man', 90-7; 
'officials interested in land', 98- 102; 
extent of pltns, 4 1 ,  105; comparisons 
With S.E. Asia, 222, 223 ; Hunt asks if 
payments sufficient, alarm around 
Milne Bay, 1 1  O; some purchases too 
hastily concluded, 22, 1 10- 1 
Lauani lpltn), Woodlark I. (SED I, 93, 307 
Lauboiboto , labourer 'hanged' at 
Baubaugutna, 1 28 
Laughlin Is. [SEDJ, 25, 93 
Leetch, Hanorah, planter, Hihila IEDJ, 
Mrs Mahony's daughter, 92 and n 
Leetch, John, planter, Hihila [EDJ, 92 
LeHunte, {Sir) George . Ruthven, Lieut. 
Governor: succeeds MacGregor, 3 1 ;  
favours Hall Sound Company, 32, 34; 
consolidates labour law, recruiters to 
be Ucenced, 47; 63 
Lett, Lewts, engineer and planter, Maira 
(001, 96; writer and biographer, 96, 
256; sells pltn, 2 1 2;  first wife, son die, 
25 1 ;  comments on change,  266 
Lever Brothers Ltd (later Unilever J,  77, 
209- 10 
Lever, (Strf WW1am (Lord Leverhulme J, 
73, 206 
Little. William 'Bill'. �. 1 1 1 ,  1 13,  229, 
�8 . 
Loatil lplt.l\I, C�lna 8�t, �EDJ. 37. 92.2�. 
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241 and n, 296, 306 ; cocoa, 241 ; 
vanilla, 241 
Lolorua lpltn), Galley Reach ICDI,  84, 87, 
105,  1 46 ,  200, 302, 309 
London Missionary Society, 15 ,  29, 37, 
8 1 ,  1 20, 305 , 307 
Lord, F. A., 260 
Loria, Dr Lamberto, 25n 
Loudon, G. A. [G. A. Loudon & Co. ), 
BNGD agency and retail traders, 1 94, 
20 1 ,  225 ,  235 
Loudon, George Archibald 'Gal', BNGD 
general manager and private planter: 
8 1 ,  83, 95 ; previous experience, 88; 
character, 1 3 1 ,  30 1 ;  shareholder in 
Papuan Courier, 1 5 1 ;  protests over 
Jensen, 1 52-3; investigates Jensen's 
management, his predicament as 
general manager, 153,  156;  the 
'complete businessman', 1 54; defends 
BNGD, lists his circulars to managers, 
157; held responsible for agitation, 
1 64; aims of planter leadership, 1 65-6; 
London speech, his sincerity, his 
remarks in Australia, 177 -8; asks for 
interview with Poynton, 1 8 1 ;  further 
defence of BNGD, 1 82;  Murray's 
opinion of L. and BNGD Board, 1 82-3; 
resigns, 20 1 ;  and G. A. Loudon & Co. ,  
20 1 ,  2 25 ;  financial difficulties , 
establishes Eilogo estate, 225-6;  
comments on cotton failure, 234; 
growing coffee at Eilogo, 240- 1 and n; 
President of Planters' Assn, 264; 
provides 'cinematograph show' for 
'boys' , 269; reconciliation with Murray, 
296-7 and 297n; his view of 
amalgamation with New Guinea, 
death, 30 1 ;  30 l n  
Loudon, Ian, planter at Eilogo, dies in 
accident, 30 1 
Loudon, Winifred 'Peg', opens up Aroana, 
226; experiments with cocoa, 2 4 1 ;  
marries G .  A .  Loudon, 250; Papua a 
'washout', 30 1 
Lowles, J . ,  30 
Lucas, Walter Henry, 1 59 
Luff, Leonard, Daru trader leases 
Dirtmu, 97 
Luff, Captain William, Daru trader, 38-9 
Lyons, Arthur P., RM at Daru suggests 
villagers sell produce to planters, 
15 ln; as Director of Agriculture 
reports on Sangara sugar experiment, 
239; estimation of Mrs Cowling, 249 
and n. 
Lyons, Joseph, [Prime Minister) ,  2 18 
MacAlpine, Alexander, RM , 1 25n, 250, 
286 
MacAlpine, Archibald 'Archie', pltn 
manager, Rorona, 99- 100; succeeds 
Westland, 130, 136 and n, 1 43n; 
character, 1 48; BNGD pltn inspector, 
1 48; investigates ltikinumu desertions, 
1 80; meets minister, 1 86-7; director of 
Tavai, 233 ; brother an RM, sisters 
married to Baldwin and Fowler, 250; 
and first Planters' Assn, 2 6 2 ;  
succeeded by Nevitt, 20 1 ;  death, 20 l n  
Mccomas, J .  M . ,  director, Kikori 
Plantations, 82, 103 
McCrann, Joan Mickle, planter at Bala, 
attends Mrs Lett, death, 249 
McCrann, Thomas,  Port Moresby 
publican and planter, 8 1 ,  2 1 1 , 249 
McDonald, Donald, trader and planter, 
Vaiviri I GDJ, 96, 307 
McDonald, John, gaoler, leaseholder, 98; 
soldier settler, 194n 
McDonald, Percy, building contractor 
and planter at Sogeri, 225; llolo owned 
by Koiari co-operative, 302 
McEacharn, [Sirl Malcolm, Melbourne 
shipowner, director of Hall Sound 
Company, 32, 34 
McGowan, Ernest, trader and planter, 
Moveave [ GD) ,  96 
MacGregor, Dr William, [Sir ), Admin­
istrator and Lieutenant Governor: his 
position and attitude, 20; Land 
Regulation Ordinance 1888, Crown 
Lands Ordinance 1890, 2 1 ;  has 
coconuts planted, 23;  'intervention of 
Europeans' necessary, 23; anxious 
about paucity of settlement, 24, 30; 
publicises opportunities, 27, 30; 
knighted, promoted, 25; encourages 
officers to take up land, 28; with 
failure to attract settlers favours BNG 
Syndicate scheme, 30; accused of 
partiality, 30- 1 ;  comments on land 
legislation ,  42 ; Na tive Labour 
Ordtnance, 44-7; corresponds with von 
M iiller, 23 1 ;  285 
McMahon, Thomas, sisal expert, 232n 
McKenna, Joseph B. 'Joe', manager at 
Kanosia accused of caning workers, 
273 
Madau [pltn), Madau I.  [SEO), 93, 307 
Madaua [pltn), Sudest [SEDJ, 93, 307 
Madiri [pltnJ, Fly River IWDJ ,  82, 96,  
1 5 l n, 248, 249 , 309 
Mahony, Elizabeth, trader and planter on 
Sudest, character, 90; daughter plants 
at Hihila, 92; another d. at Milne Bay, 
98; son, 96;  buying copra, 1 5 l n; 
'Queen of Sudest', 249; leaves in 
frustration, 90, 294 
Mahony, Frank, plants cotton at Keuru, 
96;  soldier settler, 194n 
Mahony, John, trader and planter on 
Sudest, overshadowed by wife, 90- 1 ;  
96, 98 
Maira [pltn), Vailala River [GD ), 96; 
purchased by Steamships, 2 1 2 ;  307 
Maiwara [pltn) - see Hagita 
M a l i n o w s k i ,  B r o n i s l a w ,  P o l i s h  
anthropologist: his estimation of de 
Moleyns, 40; of Mrs Mahony, 90; of 
Greenaway, 96; critical of settler 
outlook, 247; 250; places Papua at 
centre of anthropological attention, 
255 
Mamai [pltn) ,  Port Glasgow [ED),  8 1 ,  
2 1 2 , 277 , 282 , 306 
Mamba Rubber Estates, 95, 226, 227n 
Mandated Territory of New Guinea, 123,  
1 59,  196n, 1 99,  2 10,  2 1 1 ,  22 1 ,  229, 
267, 29 1 ,  30 l n  
Manners, [Sir) George, Mombiri director, 
83 
Manning, Guy, ARM, contractor at Paili, 
70, 88, 1 1 5 
Mariawatte lpltnJ, Orangerie Bay I EDJ,  
306 
Mariboi Rubber Estates, 226, 309n 
Marshall, Gordon, BNGD manager at 
Ogomobu and shareholder in Sogeri 
Plantation, 225 
Marsham, R. H.  P. , assistant at 
B a u b a u g u i n a  c o n vi c t e d  w i t h  
Bernesconi, 1 28 
Massy-Greene, Walter, Minister for Trade 
and Customs, 189 ,  1 90 
Matadona [pltn) ,  China Strait [ED ), 306 
Materua, Teina, 98, 305 
Matley, James ·Jim', BNGD manager at­
tempts arrest of absconding labourer, 
Index 3 4 1  
1 3 2 ;  shareholder in Sogeri, 225 ;  death, 
296 
Mawson, R. E., trader at Orokolo, 96 and n 
Meek, Albert, collector and planter in 
ED, 37 
Menzies, R. G. , [Prime Minister ), 297 
Meredith, 155 
Merrie England [steam yacht), 39, 98;  
seconc;l M.  E.  destroyed in explosion, 
subject of Govt claim against BNGD, 
157 and n, 1 63,  1 77 
Metcalfe, Evelyn, BNGD director visits 
Papua, 1 3 1 ,  185; critical of Govt. 132;  
clashes with Murray, 134 and n; board 
accept his view, 138 
Mibu I.  lpltn J,  Fly River [WDJ ,  38-9 , 82, 
1 5 l n, 249 , 308 
Middleton, W. M . ,  planter, Abuaro and 
Mandated Territory, 9 ln, 250n 
Miligili - see Quessant 
Miller, Tom, pltn manager at Paili and 
shareholder in Sogeri, 225 
Milne Bay Rubber Company, 80 
Mlsima I. ISEDJ, 90, 92, 93, 94, 307 
Mogubo lpltn ], Amazon Bay [ED), 8 1 ,  96, 
225, 305 
Mohi-miri, assaulted at Kanosla, 273 
Mola, H. A. , applicant for lands at Galley 
Reach, 99- 100 
Molloy, Brian, solicitor, prospects with 
Capt. Fitch for rubber land, 226 
Mombiri Rubber Plantations Ltd, 83-4, 
1 04 
Monckton, C. A. W. , RM resigns, 69 
Moresby Trading and Agency Company 
Ltd, 1 04, 185 ;  established, 1 48 ;  in 
liquidation, 1 94; 222 
Morton, Sholto, pltn assistant at Koltaki 
sent to Mareeba to study tobacco 
cultivation, 23 1 
Motorina I. [pltn), Calvados Chain [SEDJ, 
90, 307 
Moununa lpltn) ,  East Cape IEDJ, 9 1 ,  
296, 306 
Mullins Harbour Plantations, 8 1 , 193, 
200 
M unt, George, planter at Nivani, 
Panapompom, and Misima [SED ), 93 , 
9 4, 307 
Murray, Gilbert, 120, 137n 
Murray, 'Judge' John Hubert Plunkett 
[la,ter Sir Hubert), Chief Judicial 
Officer, acting Administrator, Lieu-
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tenant Governor: 7, 49 ; his opinion of 
Barton administration requested by 
Deakin, his character and experience, 
62-3;  evidence before Royal Com­
mission, 64-6 ;  appointed acting 
Administrator, impresses Beatrice 
Grimshaw, 68; attracts enmity of 
Bruce, 69-70; co-operates in publicity 
campaign, 7 1 ;  appointed Lieutenant 
Governor, 76; corresponds with Atlee 
Hunt, 77; his difficulties with BNGD, 
86; drafts Encouragement of Industry 
Ordinance,  1 1 3 ;  in favou r  of 
Westland's proposals, 1 14-5 ; meets 
BNGD directors, 1 16 ;  outlines policy, 
his Papua or British New Guinea pub­
lished, 1 1 9 ;  his opinions change, 1 20-
1 ;  his character further considered, 
1 2 1-3;  opposition mounts, 1 27; High 
Court agrees with M. 130; Metcalfe 
attacks his administration, 132 ;  
breaks off correspondence with Hunt 
over Wilkes, 133; refutes 'slavery' 
allegations, 134; 'doing battle' with 
BNGD, 1 36;  criticised by Citizens' 
Meeting, 137-8; opposes private oil 
drilling, 1 4 1 ;  meets Thompson, 
protests BNGD political activity, 1 64; 
his Review of Australian Administration 
in Papua published, reviewed, 1 67-9 ; 
defends copra tax, 1 7 1 ;  opposes 
delegation proposals, 1 88; receives 
planter support over Navigation Act, 
1 90; supports Bloomfield companies, 
1 95;  knighted, 1 98; defends pltn 
industries, 200; writes to Pearce about 
rubber, 223-4; 1 9 1 ,  236 , 239, 266, 
267n; argues for coffee tariff, 240; 
defends Native Affairs Dept, 277-8; 
considers settlers law-abiding, 285 ;  
288, 294-5; late reconciliations with 
enemies, 296-7; death, 297; buried at 
Badihagwa, 303 
Murray, H. Leonard, Official Secretary, 
1 23, 133, 1 78; succeeds his uncle, 
297-8 
Murua - see Woodlark 
Musgrave, Anthony, BNG Govt Secretary, 
38, 62, 70, 1 00, 1 13 
Musson, Claude, 85 
Muwo I. [pltn),  Trobriand Is [SED I, 94, 
307 
Nari I. [Mudge l . )[ Govt pltnl I ED I, 83 , 306 
Native Labour Ordlnance[sl - see Labour -
labour law and policy 
Native Labour Regulatfons - see Labour -
labour law and policy 
Native Offenders' Exclusion Ordinance, 
285 
Native Plantations, Govt Scheme, 1 49,  
150n, 206 24011, 
Navigation Act [The Commonwealth),  
188-90, 1 95,  196, 206, 263, 264 
Nelson, Sir Hugh, 20, 30 
Nelsson, John Gusth, MLC, trader and 
planter at Kwaiapan Bay [Woodlarkl 
and Doini I. 37, 90, 296, 307 
Nevitt, A. , Cairns accountant in Sangara 
sugar syndicate, 238 
Nevitt, Tom, succeeds MacAlpine as 
BNGD pltn inspector, and general 
manager, his character, appointed 
MLC, 20 1 and n; 202; promotes 
Sangara sugar venture, 238; marriage, 
25 1 ;  member of Papapuan Club, 260; 
Planters' Assn Council, 264 
New Guinea Rubber Estates Ltd, 78, 
1 03, 1 94; - pltn, 2 1 2,  222, 309 
Nicholas, H. S., Sydney journalist and 
lawyer sympathetic to Murray, 165 
and n 
Nimoa I . ,  near Sudest [SED I, 93, 307 
Nivani I .  [pltn l, near Misima, ISEDI, 24, 
93, 306 
Nohoro of Orokolo, convicted of murder 
of Doyle, discharged, 286n 
Nonowai [pltn), China Strait [ED),  1 02,  
306 
Normanby I .  [Duau ) [ED ), 9 1 ,  306 
North Fairfax Harbour Plantations Ltd, 
79, 1 94, 232 
Nuatutu [pltn), Goodenough I . ,  305 
Nunn, Percy, pltn assistant at ltlkinumu, 
accused of beating labourers, 152,  
155,  1 56 ,  282 
Oates, Ernest 'Ernie', recruiter and 
planter at Buna, 94; and 'Oelrichs' 
affair, 1 3 1 ,  308 
Obu [pltn), Hlsiu [CD), 39, 87, 225, 234, 
305 
Oelrichs, A. E., RM charged with 
colluding with Joubert and Oates, 1 3 1 ,  
134 
Ogamobu [pltnl, Klkori River I DD I, 82, 
96, 1 46 ,  22 1 ,  246, 253, 256-9, 262, 
303, 309 
Ogamobu Plantation Ltd, 82 
Okari of Kokoda, alleged instigator of 
desertions, 1 53 
Olsen, John, 9 1  
O'Malley, James Thomas, RM ,  1 1 7; 
suggests workers prefer coastal pltns, 
156;  Commissioner for Native Affairs, 
279, 283-4 
Oni-oni lpltn), Port Glasgow [EDJ,  102, 
306 
Oro Bay Plantations Ltd, 95 
Osborne, Eric, trader associated with 
illegal activities on Rossel I . ,  280- 1 
Osborne, Frank, trader and planter on 
Rossel I. [SEDJ, 38; charged with 
arson, 280- 1 
Osborne, James Robert, 80, 250 
Osborne, P. R. , 1 85 
Otomata lpltn), Cape Rodney [ED), 87, 
234, 265, 273, 302, 305 
Otte, Arie, 230 
Ou-Ou Creek lpltn), Delena [CD), 95, 
225, 305 
Owen-Turner, Charles, 98, 283, 306 
Pacillc and Papua Produce Company Ltd, 
84, 92,  1 43 ,  200 and n 
Paili [Paile ) lpltn ], Marshall Lagoon [ED) ,  
87, 88, 1 44n, 234, 238, 305 
Palms, The, [pltn) ,  Hisiu [CD), 95 , 280, 
305 
Panamotl I. [pltn), Calvados Chain [SEDJ,  
93, 307 
Panapompom I .  [pltn), Torlesse Group 
!SEDJ, 93, 307 
Panasesa I. [pltn), Conflict Group IEDJ ,  
26, 92 
Pana Tinani I., 93 
Panawina I. [pltn ), Calvados Chain 
ISEDJ, 90, 307 
Papua and New Guinea Bounties Act. 
1 926, 1 99, 2 1 6-7, 229; cocoa bounty, 
2 4 1  and n 
Papua Club [ The) ,  260-2 , 264 
Papua Company IThel. 1 48 
Papuan Cotton and Produce Association, 
234 
Papuan Courier, succeeds Papuan Times, 
1 49, 1 60, 1 6 1 ;  calls for public 
meeting, 1 62 ;  paper responds, 1 63 ;  
Loudon and Bertie's controlling 
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interest,  paper 'responsible' for 
agitation, 1 64; 'famous ''bean" case', 
1 79; Loudon loses control, 1 65 ,  1 86 ;  
2 5 6 ,  278 
Papuan Para Rubber Company, aborted, 
80, 98 
Papuan Industries Ltd, 8 1 ,  96, 308 
Papuan Lands Ltd, 85-6,  104 
Papuan Plantations Ltd, 8 1 ,  232 
Papuan Products Ltd, 8 1 ,  1 93 
Papuan Rubber and Trading Company, 
80, 1 02 
Papua Rubber and Copra Company 
Christchurch, New Zealand, 8 1 ,  1 02 ,  
2 1 2  
Papua Rubber Plantations Proprietary, 
Ltd, [ The), 79, 1 0 1  
Papuan Times, commences publication, 
hostile to Govt. 1 23-5; runs appeal for 
Bernesconi, 1 29; 1 33 ,  1 34, 1 37; 
replaced, 1 49;  256 , 264 
Papua Trading and Planting Syndicate 
Ltd, 84 
Patakalana Cotton Estates, 235 
Pearce, [Sir) George, Senator, [Minister 
for Home and Territories), Sir Robert 
Anderson corresponds, 1 97; [Minister 
for External Affairs ), Murray writes 
privately about rubber, 224 
Pemberton, C., 2374n 
Perceval, [Sir) Westby Brook, BNGD 
director, 87 
Philp, [Sir) Robert, 32 
Pilotti, Arturo Carlo, planter at 
Baramata, 95 and n; right to recruit 
suspended, 283 
Pinney, Charles, 99- 100 
Planters' Association of Papua [The ),  
suggests changes to administration of 
NLO, 1 60- 1 ;  publishes Conditions In 
Papua, 1 90; history, 262-5 . [See also 
Association of Planters lobby) 
Pollard, Arthur, manager at Aroa and 
shareholder in Sogeri Plantation, 225 ; 
marries Kathleen Gors, 25 1 
Poynton, Alexander, Minister for Home 
and Territories, vlslts Papua, 18 1-88; 
writes opposing Navigation Act, 1 89-
90; receives sugar proposal, 238; list of 
criminal convictions prepared for his 
visit, 280 
Pratt, Alfred Edward, 1 02 ,  250, 262 
Prlddle, Charles, miner, planter at Mei 
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[GD] ,  250 
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marries C. Priddle, widowed and 
marries Tom Nevitt, 250; of Arimiri 
(Mei), 307 
Pruth, relief vessel wrecked, 1 96 
Punipuni, East Cape [ED], 296, 306 
Puxley, J. F. ,  baker, planter at Maira 
[ GD ], pltn purchased by Steamships, 
2 1 2  
Queenscl!ffe, Steamships Pty Ltd vessel, 
162  
Queensland Papua Land Syndicate, 85 
Quessant I. !Miligili], Bunting's pltn, 90, 
305 
Ramaga [pltn ], Milne Bay [ED], 37, 305 
Ranfurly, [Lord][Sir Uchter John Mark 
Knox], BNGD guarantor, 85; chairman, 
87, 104; alluded to by Murray, 1 83 
rice, grown at Nimoa I . ,  93; in Mekeo, 
1 50n; shortage, 16 1 ,  1 80- 1 ;  1 74, 196 
Rich, Rev. C. F. , 1 15 ,  1 98 
Rigo, !CO i. 28, 29, 70, 75 , 250, 25 1 
Rinzo Gond, Japanese journalist, 
criticises 'British' rule in Papua, 1 62 
Roberts, George, Giligili stockman, 
convicted of manslaughter, 285 
Robinson, Christopher, CJO and acting 
Administrator, proposes leasehold 
system, 40, 268 
Robinson, Irene, 82, 256 ,  257 
Robinson, Percy, planter at Ogamobu:  
forms company, 82, 257;  his letters, 
82, 155, 256, 272 ; partnership with 
Loudon, leaves Papua, 83 , 262; forced 
to increase Heagi's wage, 146 ,  259 ; 
describes 'famine' , writes leader in 
Papuan Courter, 1 62;  on satisfactions 
of planting, 246; his description of 
servants, his treatment of Papuans, 
253 ;  attracted to Papua, 256 ;  
describes pltn routines, 246-7, 257-8; 
on white employees, 258, 272, 287n; 
on officials, 259, 262, 276; on Papua 
Club, on clothing, 26 1 ;  on labour 272; 
knew bitterness, 294 
Robinson River (pltn ], Cloudy Bay (ED), 
87, 1 2 l n, 1 45 ,  2 1 1 , 269, 287, 306 
Robinson River Plantations Ltd, 2 1 1 
Robson, R. W. , 227, 299 
Romilly, Hugh Hastings, 1 8  
Rorona [pltn], Galley Reach (ED ], 79, 99,  
136, 20 1 ;  fires, 130 and n; for sale, 
2 1 2, 235 , 305 
Ross, Douglas, BNGD manager at Obu, 
225 
Ross, J. R. , planter at Kerema, 185 
Rossel I. (Yela),  [SEO],  38, 93, 280, 307 
Royal Commission of Inquiry . . .  Papua, 
64-8, 69, 29 1 
Royal Commission . . .  Late German New 
Guinea, 1 59 
Royal Commission . . .  Navlgatlon Act, 196 
rubber - hevea brasUlensls, 26,  38, 57,  
58, 95, 105, 200, 2 1 1 ,  2 1 2 ,  2 13-227, 
300, 302; exports 3 1 1 ; - ficus rlgo, 28, 
70; -ficus elastlca, 28 
Rubberlands Ltd, 226, 302, 309n 
Russell, H. Y. , Koitaki director: member 
of Melbourne 'Association of Planters', 
264 
Ryan, T. D. ,  Port Moresby publican, buys 
third share in Ogamobu, 83, 225 
Sagarai lpltn), Mullens Harbour [ED ), 8 1 ,  
200, 2 12 , 309 
Sagoro Tano [pltn), Sogeri [CD ], 38, 64, 
70 
Salaoni I. [pltn),  Milne Bay [ED], 306 
Samarai [Dinner l. )[EDJ,  24, 26,  36, 37, 
39,  40, 9 1 ,  92, 94, 109, 1 50n, 1 85 ,  
265, 278, 280, 285, 297, 303 
Samuel, J. K. ,  director of Papua 
Plantations Ltd, asks for admission of 
Javanese, 1 17 
Sanaroa I. [pltn],  D'Entrecasteaux (ED ], 
9 1  
Sangara Rubber Plantations Ltd. ,  226 
Sangara Sugar Estates, 226, 238 
Sariba I .  [ED), 37, 92, 303 
Sawers, W. B. S., 54 
Scratchley, [Sir) Peter, 1 6-7 
Scullin, James, [Prime Minister), 2 1 7, 
2 1 8  
Searle, Clendyn, radio engineer, planter 
at Saga [ND), and at Awala, 227n 
Sebulagomwa [pltn ], Fergusson I.  IED J, 
9 1  
Sefton, Colin, 30 1 
Sefton, Thomas Leslie, pltn manager at 
Koitaki, 80, 1 6 1 ,  26 1 ,  262; income, 
1 45 ;  at meeting of businessmen, 1 46 ;  
tries tobacco, 230; marriage, 250; his 
hostility to the Keelans, 254; founding 
member o f  P a p u a  C l u b ,  his  
background, 260; 262 ;  vice-president 
of Planters' Assn, 264; his manage­
ment style, 274 and n; death, 303 
Seligman, C. G . ,  65 
Sewataitai, [pltn), Normanby I. [ED), 9 1  
Shaw-Moody, Robert, plants cotton at 
Huiva, 235 ; widow remarries, 25 1 
Shedden, William, miner, planter at 
Doini and Woodlark, 37, 90 
shipping, 1 47, 1 49 ,  1 59,  207; post-war 
shortage, 1 6 1 ;  and Navtgatlon Act, 
1 89, 1 95-6,  206, 209, 2 15 
Simpson, William Arthur 'Simmo' , 
assistant at Ogamobu, pltn manager at 
Bubuleta, death, 272-3 
Simson, Dr Colin Coape, takes up lease 
at Hisiu, 95, 102; addresses Citizens' 
Meeting, deputised to publicise 
dissatisfactions, 138 and n 
Sinclair, Allan B . ,  planter at Orokolo , 
296 
Sinclair, Allan MacGregor, planter at 
Hisiu, 95 ; charged with murder, 280; 
trial, 28 1 ;  death, 296 
Sinclair, Margaret, planter at Hisiu, 
murder charge dismissed, 28l n  
sisal hemp, 29,  79 , 88 , 1 05 ,  1 1 7, 130, 
136,  23 1-3; exports, 3 1 2  
Skelly, E .  C . ,  Samarai publican, in 
deputation with Captain Fitch, 1 85 ;  
brother of  Mrs English, 250 
Smith, Charles Adolphe, on man­
slaughter charge, 28 1 
Smith, Gerald, Loudon's Port Moresby 
agent, 298 
Smith, Miles Staniforth Cater, Senator, 
Director of Agriculture, Mines and 
Public Works, Commissioner for 
Lands: speaks on BNG, 55; specialises 
in New Guinea, 56; visits Java and 
FMS and reports, 57-8 ;  appointed 
Director of Agriculture, 50n, 59; 
accepts the need for 'natives' to work, 
58, 6 1 ;  his appointment generates 
confidence, strenuous efforts on behalf 
of planters, his further career, his draft 
of 1 909- 1 9 10 Annual Report rejected, 
74-6; and Govt pltns, 83; credibillty 
damaged by Drummond affair, 1 00- 1 ;  
opposes Encouragement of Industry 
O rd i n a n c e ,  1 1 3 ;  a t t a c k e d  for 
assurances over labour, 1 15 ;  estimates 
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labour availability, 1 1 6 ,  1 19 ;  a 
systematic officer, 1 23;  his Ifandbook 
widely read, 75 and n, 245; proposed 
as replacement for Murray, 1 62 ,  263 ;  
preferred b y  settlers, 1 66;  calculates 
settler contribution to revenue, 1 73 ;  
estimates copra production costs, 1 95 ;  
comments on reconstruction of BNGD 
Company, 1 94; asks for tariff for 
coffee, 240; member of Papua Club, 
26 1 ;  death, 296 
Sogeri [pltnJ, Sogeri [ CDJ,  225, 302, 309 
Sogeri Para Rubber Plantations Ltd, 80, 
264; in liquidation, 1 93 
Soldier Settlement Scheme, 95 , 194 and 
n, 282 
Solomon, Elias, planter, Loani [EDJ, from 
Mauritius, 37, 92;  plants cocoa, 
vanilla, 241 and n; death, 296 
Songoro, Ausa, of Mabadauan, boss-boy 
and recruiter at Koitaki, 27 4 
Speedie, Charles, grows tea, Hombrom 
Bluff, 236 
Spiller, Hobart, planter, trader and 
recruiter, Abuaro, Menapi [NED), 9 1 ;  
recruiter's licence suspended, 283 
Stanley, [Generali Ferdinand Charles, 
BNGD director, 87; as chairman writes 
to Murray, 202 
Steamships Trading Company Ltd , 
established, 1 62 and n; purchases 
Mamai, 8 1 ,  2 1 1 -2;  acquires Maira and 
Vaiviri 2 1 2; develops Rubberlands, 
Mariboi and Epo estates for related 
companies, 226; 'STC Ball', 296; 
developments after 1 945 , 300n, 302; 
306 
Stevenson Committee, 2 1 5  
Streeter, Dr Julius, 102 
Strong, Dr Walter Mersh, 1 02n, 23 1 ,  
2 6 1 , 303 
Sudest I .  [Tagula), [SEDJ, 1 8, 90, 93, 307 
sugar, 226, 228, 237-9, 237n 
Syme, Geoffrey, of Melbourne Age, 
shareholder in Kemp Welch R. estates, 
78, 1 02,  1 03 
Tagula - see Sudest 
Tagula Plantations Ltd, 93, 307 
Talbot, Charles 'Charlie', with his brother 
Dick trader and planter at Punipuni 
[ EDJ, 9 1 ;  death, 296 
Talbot, Richard 'Dick', 9 1  
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Tambar, BNGD coastal steamer, 1 83 
Taupota [pltnJ,  Punipuni [EDJ, 296, 306 
Tavai [sisal pltn), Galre [CDJ, 70, 233 
tea, 26, 228, 236 
Teste I. [Wari I . ) , Bunting's pltn, 90, 269,  
305 
Thompson,  Samuel Leslle , BNGD 
secretary in London, 1 1 6; visits Papua, 
1 64-5; Murray's comments, 1 83 ;  his 
character , 1 85 ;  c o mments on 
'Australian promises' , 203 ; opinion of 
BNGD cigars, 229; BNGD director and 
shareholder in Sogeri, 225; on tea, 
236; suggests sugar venture, 238 
Thoresby, S. F. H., lease on Vanapa R. , 
1 02 
tobacco, 88, 1 49, 1 73,  1 74, 229-3 1 ;  
rations withheld, 270, 271 
Tomanau [pltn), Mullens Hbr [ ED), 102,  
309 
Tooth, Septlmus, 250 
Torlesse Group [ ED),  93 
Tracy, F. C., Sydney agent for BNGD, 
1 78, 2 1 9, 220, 297; shareholder in 
Eilogo, 240 
Trade, overseas: trade deficit borne by 
shareholders in primary industries, 
1 73; table, 3 10; see copra, rubber, 
sisal etc. 
Trobriand Is, 93-4, 247, 255 
Tungora [pltn J, Buna [ NDJ, 308 
Turnbull, Gilbert Munro, novelist, 255-6 
Tweed Baird, R. , 84 
Unevangellsed Fields Mission, acquires 
and leases Madlri and Dirlmu, 96; 
leases out Madiri to Mrs Cowling, 249 ;  
309 
Unilever, 2 1 0  - see Lever Brothers 
Valvlri [pltn), Vailala River [GD) ,  96, 2 1 2 ,  
25 1 , 307 
Vandercook, John, American visitor, 
248-9 
vanilla, 38, 1 99,  24 1 
Varoe, recruiters' launch, 1 46 ,  25 l n, 
258, 259n 
Vaughan, Dr Cecil, obtains grant on 
Musa River, 36, 1 02 
Veimauri fpltnJ, Vanapa River ICDJ, 79, 
2 1 2, 249, 302, 309 
Veiya (pltn), Vanapa River (CD) ,  2 1 2  
Vernon, Dr G .  H . ,  GMO and planter at 
Oni-Oni [ ED ), 1 02 
Vilirupu [pltn), Marshall Lagoon IED J, 
306 
Vine, Sir Somers, 30, 34 
von Holstein Rathlou, Sophie, investor in 
Papua Trading & Planting Co., sues 
directors, 84 
von Muller , ( B aron i  F. , advises 
MacGregor, 23 1 
Voysey, William, pltn manager, testlfles 
against Jensen, 1 52; of Gadalsu, 
shareholder in Sogeri, 225 ; 25 l n  
Wagatatuna lpltn), Milne Bay [ED), 305 
Wagawaga [Govt pltn), Milne Bay [ ED),  
38, 83 , 305 
Waigani [pltn), Milne Bay [ ED), 77, 87, 
1 54, 305 
Wakefield, BNGD coastal steamer, 132, 
1 33 
Walker, Rev. Frederick W. , joint lease­
holder with his brother, 37, 92, 306 ; 
founds Papuan Industries Ltd, 8 1  
Walker, J .  T. , Senator, Burns Philp 
director and member of Hall Sound 
Syndicate, 32,  34 
Walker, Major, Clarke and Whiting 
director, 2 19 
Wallace, A. 0. ,  clears and plants Koitaki, 
80 
Walshe, Richard 'Dickie', accountant at 
Rorona, l 43n; secretary of Planters 
Assn, 264; pltn manager at Domara, 
288; letters to paper, 268 and n, 293 
Ward, Ernest Trevor, pltn manager at 
Vein1auri; buys Velmauri, 2 1 2; marries 
Vera Ashton, 250; leader of fashion, 
26 1 
Ward, Vera Ruby, planter at Veiya and 
Velmauri, 2 1 2 ,  249; marries E. T. 
Ward, 250;  opens up Aroana 226, 241 
Warirata (pltn), Astrolabe Ra. [CD),  26, 
28, 40, 80 
Wataluma Cotton Syndicate land pltn), 
Goodenough I. IEDJ,  235 
Watt, J.  C. ,  junior treasury clerk and 
member of land syndicate, 99- 1 00 
Watt, W. A. , chairman of Dunlop 
Perdrlau, attempts to have rubber duty 
lifted, 2 1 9-20 
Weaver, Richard Edward, settler on 
Lalokl, 39; murdered, 65, 303 
Weekley, Fred, miner and MLC, pltn 
manager at Hisiu, 102,  1 1 1 , 1 13 
Westland, Wallace, Ceylon planter, 
general manager for Clarke and 
Whiting at Kanosia, 88; proposes pltn 
'villages', 1 1 4-5; complains of labour 
shortage, 1 15 
Wharton-Kirk, Bazel, planter compares 
Papua unfavourably with New Guinea, 
1 43 
White, Colonel T. W. , ! Minister for 
Customs], 2 1 9 ,  224 
Whlte Women's Protection Ordlnance, 252 
Whiting, Robert Selmon, major investor 
in Papuan pltns, xi, 77-8, 79, 1 03,  
1 1 4, 1 95 ,  232 ,  2 1 2, 26 1 
Whitten Brothers, 36-7, 90, 273, 306 
Whitten IMrs] Elizabeth, planter, Dedele, 
249, 250, 306 
Whitten, Robert, 296, 306 
Whitten, William, established as trader, 
plants Bubuleta, joined by brother, 
buys Dedele from Gors, 36- 7; supplies 
photographs to Grimshaw, 7 1 ;  306 
Whybrow, George, first manager for 
Mombiri lat Lolorua], in timber milling 
partnership with Bruce, 84 
Wickham, ISir] Henry Alexander, planter 
in Conflict Group, 26-7, 27n; 36, 42 , 
70, 98; returns to England, floats 
Mombiri company, 83-4 and n; 
consulted as expert on Papua, 86; 92 
Wilkes, J .  R. A. , manager at Fairfax 
Harbour convicted of starving workers, 
133, 138 
Index 347 
Wilkins, C .  E. ,  editor, Papuan Courter, 
186 
Wilkinson,  Percy, Commonwealth 
Analyst, Visits Papua, 1 98; 2 1 6 ,  236 
Williams, Arthur, recruiting, 248 and n; 
plants coconuts at Ogamobu, 257; 
treatment of labourers, 258 ,  272 
Williams, Claud, assistant at Ogamobu, 
257 
Williams, Seymour, Bloomfield's agent in 
Port Moresby, 1 85 
Wills, Samuel, BNGD acting general 
manager alleges harsh treatment, 1 79-
8 1  
Winter, ISir] Francis, CJO, 28, 35 
Wiresota lpltn ], Oro Bay INDJ, 95, 308 
Wiseman, George, Malayan planter 
invited to report on rubber pltns, 
suggests insufficient labour, 1 43 ;  
believes white employees incompetent, 
2 1 4; NLO interpreted too literally, 277 
Wolfensburger, 0 . ,  Tariff Board Clerk, 
224 
Woodlark I .  IMuruaJ ISEDJ, 37, 90, 9 1 ,  
92, 93, 1 1� 1 55 , 307 
Wright, W. H. 'Giligili' , pltn manager at 
Giligili, 88; takes over desiccated coco­
nut plant, 208; marriage, 250 
Wythes, Ernest, 88 
Yates, Senator G. E., 196 
Zimmer, J. T. , appointed agricultural 
expert, 1 49 

l 
The Plantation Dream provides the first detailed analysis of land settlement by 
Europeans and the early vicissitudes of plantation agriculture in British New Guinea 
and Papua up until the outbreak of war in the Pacific in 1942. It also becomes a 
history of 'planter Papua', the now vanished world of a few hundred white settlers 
who made their home in 'the first grandchild of Empire' - as the former British New 
Guinea became when it passed to the new Commonwealth as Australia's first 
�seas territory. Having assembled a remarkable range of private papers, 
l reminiscences and archival source material the author examines the colonial 
-.enterprise in Papua in both economic and human terms. 
D. C. Lewis teaches in the Indigenous Health Program at the University 
